Muromachi government structure

The Muromachibakufu inherited almost unchanged the structure of its Kamakura predecessor (see aboveThe establishment of warrior government), setting up a Mandokoro, Monchūjo, and Samurai-dokoro. But after the appointment of Hosokawa Yoriyuki askanrei, this post became the most important in thebakufu government. The official business of theMandokoro was to control the finances of thebakufu; and later theIse family, who were hereditary retainers of the Ashikaga, came to inherit this office. TheSamurai-dokoro, besides handling legal judgments, wasentrusted with the control of the capital. Leading officials calledshoshi who held the additional post ofshugo of Yamashiro province (now in Kyōto urban prefecture) were next in importance to thekanrei. New offices were established to streamline judicial decisions and handle financial matters, and the Ashikaga maintained their own private guard, thehōkōshū. In local administration, a special administrator was set up in Kamakura to control the 10 provinces of the Kantō area. This office came to be held by heads of the Ashikaga Motouji family. The 11 provinces ofKyushu were placed under control of an office known as the Kyushutandai.

The crucial difference between the twobakufu, however, was the difference in the role of theshugo. Appointed first by Takauji in thechaos of the war between the courts, many rose to positions ofgreat power in one or several provinces under theirpurview. By Yoshimitsu’s time, their number had been reduced and their powers somewhat curtailed. But the structure of thebakufu was essentially a delicate balance between the Ashikaga shogunal house and about a dozen majorshugo houses, almost evenly divided betweencollateral Ashikaga houses and nonrelated warrior families. Yoshimitsu made them all establish primary residence in Kyōto, where they ruled in council with the shogun. This retarded their abilities to develop stronger vassalage ties with local warriors in their provinces, and they often sent out deputies to manage their provincial areas in their absence. Consequently, in later years many powerfulshugo from the early and middle parts of the Muromachi period were overthrown by their own deputies.

The finances of the Muromachibakufu could not be met simply from its receipts from the lands under its direct control, as Kamakura had managed to do. So, according tobakufu needs, theshugo andjitō of each province were ordered to levymonetary taxes on either every unit of land or every household; this, however, also was not fully effective in meeting financial needs. As a result, thebakufu extracted taxes from such dealers as pawnbrokers and sake brewers, who were among the wealthiest merchants of the time. Financial deficiencies also were supplemented bytrading with China. Despite this more diversified tax structure, the Muromachi regime maintained only a shaky hold on the nation. The foundations of thebakufu began to be shaken by the increasing power of theshugo and by the frequent uprisings of localsamurai and farmers.

In theKamakura period the authority of theshugo was essentially limited to security matters—suppressing rebellion,apprehending murderers, and mustering out vassals for service in Kyōto. In the latter half of the Northern and Southern courts period, their executive power over the areas under their control was increased. As the number of disturbances grew, they gained wide powers of military command. Sometimes estates were made depots for military supplies on the pretext of protecting them from the depredations of local warriors, and half their yearly taxes were given to theshugo. This was called theequal tax division, orhanzei. Manyshugo succeeded to their domains by inheritance, and in cases such as that of the Yamana family a singleshugo sometimes held a number of provinces. If the primary agent of the Kamakurabakufu had been thejitō, theshugo was the defining office of the Muromachiregime. From the outset, the controlling power of the Ashikagabakufu was relatively weak, and, especially after the death of Yoshimitsu, the tendency for powerfulshugo to defect became marked. Hence, as time passed the office of shogun became increasingly impotent.

The growth of local autonomy

In the villages around Kyōto, the status of farmers rose markedly as agriculture became more highly developed, and commerce and small-scale manufacturing prospered. Also, confederations of the middle and small landlords, ormyōshu, proceeded apace and often led to uprisings against absentee control. Such confederations appeared where farming by the largermyōshu had dissolved and middle and smallmyōshu had established themselves on a wide scale. These smaller landlords endeavored to defend themselves against the ravages of local warfare, forming unions to manage the forests in common and to maintain irrigation works. In such confederations, a leader called the elder (otona) would be selected to head village government. Assemblies were held regularly among its members at the village shrine or temple, and regulations were drawn up for the maintenance ofcommunity life.

As self-government became strong in thecommunities, the resistance of farmers became fierce. After the unification of the Northern and Southern courts, armed uprisings broke out among the farming villages, the peasants demanding reductions in yearly taxes from the old proprietors and amoratorium on debts owed to the moneylenders. A large-scale uprising of this kind took place in 1428 in the last years of Yoshimitsu’s rule. In 1429 an uprising broke out in Harima province (now part of modernHyōgō prefecture) aimed at the expulsion of the warriors from the province. In 1441 farmers living around Kyōto attacked the pawnbrokers and demanded that thebakufu declare a moratorium on debts. Thereafter, uprisings occurred on a greater or lesser scale almost yearly—testimony to the fading power of both theshōen system and thebakufu.