Early history through the Soviet era

TheScythians had established a presence in the lands of the Donbas by the 7th centurybce, and many nomadic peoples of theWestern Steppe passed through the area over subsequent centuries. By the 16th century the settled population began to grow, and control of the area was divided between the ZaporozhianCossacks in the north and thekhanate of Crimea in the south. At this time the kings ofPoland and theprinces of Muscovy attempted to exert their influence in the region, and both enlisted the Cossacks to check the advances of theTatars fromCrimea. TheCrimean War (1853–56), which cut off Russia’s access to imported coal from England, provided someimpetus to the industrial development of the Donbas, but large-scale commercial exploitation of the region began only after the coming of the railways in the 1870s.

After several largely unsuccessful efforts to establish a metallurgical industry in the Donbas, an ironworks was set up in 1872 by Welsh engineerJohn Hughes at the site of present-dayDonetsk. The industrial economy of the Donbas began to expand dramatically after the completion in 1886 of a railway to the iron ore mines of Kryvyy Rih, and, by the beginning ofWorld War I, the Donets Basin had developed into the principal iron- and steel-producing region of the Russian Empire. Soviet leaderJoseph Stalin’sFive-Year Plans greatly accelerated industrial development in the Donbas during the interwar years,albeit at an enormous human cost to the Ukrainian peasantry. Tens of thousands of Ukrainian peasants were deported to Siberia, and millions perished as a result of Stalin’s man-made famine (Holodomor). Meanwhile, many of the workers attracted to the growing industrial cities in the Donbas came from Russia. As a result, the urban centres of the Donbas became highly Russified islands in what had been a Ukrainian rural sea.World War II caused heavy damage to mines, plants, and towns. Many industrial assets were destroyed by the Soviets ahead of the German advance as part of their scorched-earth retreat, and the local population suffered brutaltreatment under Nazi occupation. The great devastation of World War II accelerated the reequipment of factories and mines with modern machinery, while concentration into larger units during reconstruction madeeconomies of scale possible. Throughout the postwar Soviet period, the Donbas remained a key centre of heavy industry and coal production.

The Donbas in independent Ukraine and the Russian invasion of the Donbas

With thecollapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Donbas became a major industrial engine of the economy of independent Ukraine. The region also served as the political base ofViktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian politician who would play a significant role in early 21st-century Ukrainian history. In 2004 Ukrainian Pres.Leonid Kuchma presented Yanukovych as his successor, but Yanukovych faced a strong challenge from opposition leaderViktor Yushchenko. During the presidential campaign, Yushchenko was prevented from speaking in the Donbas by local authorities, and he became seriously ill fromdioxin poisoning in an apparent assassination attempt (allegedly by the Ukrainian state security service). When Yanukovych and Yushchenko faced each other in the second round of the 2004 presidential election, exit polls gave Yushchenko the clear lead. Yanokovych was declared victorious, however—a result that was quickly recognized by Russian Pres.Vladimir Putin. Yushchenko’s supporters maintained that the results were fabricated, and a mass protest movement that came to be called the Orange Revolution began in western Ukraine, where Yushchenko was generally regarded as the winner. Meanwhile, inSyeverodonetsk, in the Donbas, a meeting of Moscow-supported politicians recognized Yanukovych as president and considered a referendum on whether the Ukrainianoblasti (provinces) of Donetsk and Luhansk should becomeautonomous and ultimately secede from Ukraine and join Russia. In December 2004 the presidential election results were annulled by the Supreme Court, and a second runoff was held, in which Yushchenko was declared the winner. Instability would plague Yushchenko’s administration, however, and he was soon forced into a power-sharing agreement with Yanukovych as hisprime minister.

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Yanukovych was elected president in 2010, and he immediately pivoted away from the pro-European course that Yushchenko had set in favour of a strongly pro-Russian foreign and domestic policy. In 2012 Yanukovych signed a law that granted local authorities the power to confer official status upon minority languages; in cities throughout the Donbas, this meant the recognition of Russian as an official language alongside Ukrainian. In spite of Yanukovych’s obviousaffinity for Russia, in late 2013 he signaled his willingness to conclude an association agreement with theEuropean Union. After a visit with Putin in Moscow, Yanukovych opted not to sign the agreement, and, within hours of the about-face, protesters took to the streets. For months thousands of people converged on centralKyiv to participate in a protest camp in the city’s Maidan Nezalezhnosti (“Independence Square”). In February 2014 Yanukovych attempted to quash the demonstration with a bloody crackdown that killed dozens of protesters and destroyed his political base.Impeached by anoverwhelming parliamentary majority that included members of his own party, Yanukovych fled to Russia. Within days Putin, deprived of his lever in Kyiv, invaded the Ukrainian autonomous republic ofCrimea. Putin spent the next month consolidating his grip on Crimea, and in April 2014 Russian-backed militants and Russian troops in uniforms that lacked insignia seized control of a broad swath of the Donbas. Pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk proclaimed their independence, and fierce fighting continued throughout the region.

During the summer of 2014, the Ukrainian military pushed back Russian and separatist forces throughout the Donbas, recapturing the cities ofMariupol,Slov’yansk, andKramatorsk and waging a pitched battle for control of theDonetsk airport. Tens of thousands of people were internally displaced by the fighting, and damage toinfrastructure within the conflict zone disrupted access to water and electrical power. Several attempts were made to negotiate a cease-fire, and in February 2015 talks inMinsk, Belarus, led to an agreement that saw most heavy weapons being withdrawn from the line of contact that ran through the Donbas.

This did not mean an end to the fighting, however, and by 2022 the war in the Donbas had claimed more than 14,000 lives. From the beginning of hostilities, Putin had denied—implausibly—the involvement of Russian personnel in the Donbas war, but in late 2021 it appeared that Russia was preparing for overtmilitary action against Ukraine. Moscow stated that the massing of troops and matériel along the Ukrainian border was nothing more than an exercise, but Western analysts characterized the buildup as clear evidence of a planned invasion. On February 21, 2022, Putin’s intentions were made clear when he recognized the independence of the self-proclaimed people’s republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. Three days later Russian troops poured into Ukraine from Crimea, Belarus, and southwestern Russia, but their advance was soon checked by atenacious Ukrainian defense. As the Russian drive on Kyiv faltered, the focus shifted to the Donbas, where many of Ukraine’s most seasoned units were holding the line. With his broader ambitions in Ukraine frustrated by a poor performance by the Russian military and overwhelming Western support for Ukraine’s government, Putin sought to salvage his “special military operation” by “liberating” the Donbas. As hiscasus belli, Putin had claimed, falsely, that Ukrainian forces were carrying out agenocide against Russian speakers in the Donbas. Ironically, the Russian invasion caused significantly more death and hardship than the previous eight years of conflict, and cities like Mariupol—traditionally strongly pro-Russian in their sympathies—were essentially razed byindiscriminate Russian artillery strikes.

In September 2022 Ukraine launched a counteroffensive that liberated some 4,500 square miles (almost 12,000 sq km) of Russian-occupied territory inKharkiv, Donetsk, and Luhanskoblasti. Putin responded by initiating a massive conscription drive to replace Russia’s staggering personnel losses, and the Russian occupation governments in the Donbas and southern Ukraine hastily declared that they would hold “referenda” on joining Russia. Outside of Russia, the so-called “referenda” were dismissed as a sham, and video evidence emerged of Russian gunmen going door-to-door to collect “votes.” Although the Russian military controlled less than half of Donetskoblast, Russian authorities reported that 99 percent of residents had voted to join Russia. This unbelievable total recalled a similar “referendum” held in Russian-occupied Crimea in 2014. On September 30 Putin delivered an address that announced the illegal annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhyaoblasti by Russia. The move, which was roundlycondemned by the West, was an attempt to legitimize Russia’s invasion and occupation at a time when Ukrainian forces were reclaiming territory throughout the region.