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Jim Crow law
What were Jim Crow laws?
Jim Crow laws were any of the laws that enforcedracial segregation in the American South between the end ofReconstruction in 1877 and the beginning of thecivil rights movement in the 1950s. In itsPlessy v.Ferguson decision (1896), theU.S. Supreme Court ruled that “separate but equal” facilities for African Americans did not violate theFourteenth Amendment, ignoring evidence that the facilities for Black people were inferior to those intended for whites.
How did Jim Crow laws get their name?
“Jump Jim Crow” was the name of aminstrel routine originated about 1830 byThomas Dartmouth (“Daddy”) Rice. He portrayed the Jim Crow character principally as a dim-witted buffoon, building on and heightening contemporary negative stereotypes of African Americans. “Jim Crow” came to be a derogatory term for Black people, and in the late 19th century it became the identifier for the laws that reinstatedwhite supremacy in the American South afterReconstruction. The demeaning character symbolically rationalizedsegregation and the denial of equal opportunity.
How were Jim Crow laws used?
From the late 1870s Southern U.S. state legislatures passed laws requiring the separation of whites from “persons of color” in public transportation and schools.Segregation was extended to parks, cemeteries, theatres, and restaurants in an attempt to prevent any contact between Blacks and whites as equals. Although theU.S. Constitution forbade outrightracial discrimination, every state of the former Confederacy moved to disfranchise African Americans by imposing biased reading requirements, stringent property qualifications, or complexpoll taxes.
When did Jim Crow laws come into being?
When federal troops were removed from the U.S. South at the end ofReconstruction in the late 1870s and the state legislatures of the formerConfederacy were no longer controlled bycarpetbaggers and African American freedmen, those legislatures began passing Jim Crow laws that reestablishedwhite supremacy and codified thesegregation of whites and Blacks.
When did Jim Crow laws begin to disappear?
In the U.S. South, Jim Crow laws and legalracial segregation in public facilities existed from the late 19th century into the 1950s. Thecivil rights movement was initiated by Black Southerners in the 1950s and ’60s to break the prevailing pattern of segregation. In 1954, in itsBrown v.Board of Education of Topeka decision, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed thePlessy v.Ferguson (1896) decision’s justification of “separate but equal” facilities. It declared segregation in public schools unconstitutional. In the years following, subsequent decisions struck down similar kinds of Jim Crow legislation.
Jim Crow law, in U.S. history, any of the laws that enforcedracial segregation in the South between the end ofReconstruction in 1877 and the beginning of thecivil rights movement in the 1950s.Jim Crow was the name of a minstrel routine (actuallyJump Jim Crow) performed beginning in 1828 by its author,Thomas Dartmouth (“Daddy”) Rice, and by many imitators, including actorJoseph Jefferson. The term came to be aderogatory epithet forAfrican Americans and adesignation for their segregated life.
From the late 1870s, Southern state legislatures, no longer controlled by so-calledcarpetbaggers andfreedmen, passed laws requiring the separation of whites from “persons of colour” inpublic transportation and schools. Generally, anyone of ascertainable or strongly suspected Black ancestry in any degree was for that purpose a “person of colour”; the pre-Civil War distinction favouring those whose ancestry was known to be mixed—particularly the half-French “free persons of colour” in Louisiana—was abandoned. The segregation principle was extended to parks, cemeteries, theatres, and restaurants in an effort to prevent any contact between Blacks and whites as equals. It wascodified on local and state levels and most famously with the “separate but equal” decision of theU.S. Supreme Court inPlessy v.Ferguson (1896).
In 1954 the Supreme Court reversedPlessy inBrown v.Board of Education of Topeka. It declared segregation in public schools unconstitutional, and, by extension, that ruling was applied to other public facilities. In the years following, subsequent decisions struck down similar kinds of Jim Crow legislation.See alsoBlack code;racial segregation.
Origins
Prior to the Civil War the inferior status ofslaves had made it unnecessary to pass laws segregating them from white people. Bothraces could work side by side so long as the slave recognized his subordinate place. In the cities, where most free African Americans lived,rudimentary forms of segregation existed prior to 1860, but no uniform pattern emerged. In the North free Blacks also laboured under harsh restrictions and often found an even more-rigid segregation than in the South.
One might have expected the Southern states to have created a segregation system immediately after the war, but that did not happen. In some states the legislatures imposed rigid separation, but only in certain areas;Texas, for example, required that every train have one car in which all people of colour had to sit. The South had had no real system of public education prior to the Civil War, and as the postwar Reconstruction governments created public schools, those were as often as not segregated by race. Nonetheless,New Orleans had fullyintegrated schools until 1877, and inNorth Carolina former slaves routinely sat on juries alongside whites.

In 1877 theSupreme Court ruled inHall v.DeCuir that states could not prohibit segregation on common carriers such asrailroads, streetcars, or riverboats. In theCivil Rights Cases of 1883, the court overturned key elements of theCivil Rights Act of 1875, thereby sanctioning the notion of “separate but equal” facilities and transportation for the races (though it did not use the termseparate but equal). Seven years later the court approved aMississippi statute requiring segregation on intrastate carriers inLouisville, New Orleans & Texas Railway v.Mississippi (1890). As those cases demonstrated, the court essentiallyacquiesced in the South’s “solution” to the problems of race relations.
From 1887 to 1892 nine states, including Louisiana, passed laws requiring separation on publicconveyances, such as streetcars and railroads. Though they differed in detail, most of those statutes required equal accommodations for Black passengers and imposed fines and even jail terms on railroad employees who did not enforce them. Five of the states also provided criminal fines or imprisonment for passengers who tried to sit in cars from which their race excluded them. TheLouisiana Separate Car Act passed in July 1890. In order to “promote the comfort of passengers,” railroads had to provide “equal but separate accommodations for the white and colored races” on lines running in the state.

Challenging the Separate Car Act
The Louisiana Separate Car Act marked a dramatic and humiliating reversal of fortune for the Black and mixed-race citizens ofLouisiana. Although a slave state, Louisiana in general and New Orleans in particular had always had, because of their French origins, a more-tolerant attitude toward people of colour than did other Deep South states. In addition to the usual demarcation between Black and white, since the 1700s New Orleans had acknowledged a third class, free people of colour (in French,gens de couleur libres), sometimes calledCreoles, the freed descendants of European fathers and African mothers who had enjoyed a great deal ofautonomy. Although Louisiana, like most Southern states, had laws against marriage between slaves, it did allow free people of colour, whites, and thegens de couleur to marry, testify in court against whites, and in some cases inherit property from their fathers. Some became slaveowners themselves, and apparently many of them accumulated significant property. Their social standing, especially in New Orleans, had insulated them from some of the white reaction following the war. But when whites regained power after the end of Reconstruction, they saw only two races, and the privileged position of thegens de couleur evaporated; from then on they were Black as far as the law was concerned.
Gens de couleur helped form the American Citizens Equal Rights Association when the Separate Car bill was introduced, and they pledged to fight it. Among the members of the committee wasLouis A. Martinet, a Creole attorney and doctor who had also founded theDaily Crusader, and he and his newspaper became the leading opponents of the law. After its passage his paper called for both a legal challenge and aboycott of those railroads that had segregated cars. Martinet received the help ofAlbion W. Tourgée, a white lawyer, who had fought for the North, and served as a lawyer and judge in North Carolina.
A citizens’ committee (theCitizens’ Committee to Test the Constitutionality of the Separate Car Law), drawn primarily from the Creolecommunity, raised $3,000 to fund a lawsuit, and Tourgée agreed to be leadcounsel in the case. But they also needed a local lawyer, since the challenge to the law would have to go through state courts before it could be appealed to the federal system. A white lawyer,James Walker, finally agreed to take the case in December 1891.Martinet did not consider any of the Black lawyers in New Orleans competent to raise aconstitutional question, since, as he explained, they practiced almost entirely in the police courts.
Tourgée and Martinet considered several possibilities. They could have a Black passenger buy a ticket outside Louisiana and then travel into the state, thus raising a challenge to the law under thecommerce clause. They might have a fair-skinned person of mixed race attempt to enter the ladies’ car, but there they ran into the problem, as Martinet noted, that she might not be refused admission. In New Orleans, he wrote to Tourgée, “people of tolerably fair complexion, even if unmistakably colored, enjoy here a large degree of immunity from the accursed prejudice.”
But Tourgée wanted someone who was an octoroon, a person who was “of not more than one eighth colored blood,” because he believed the winning strategy would be to expose theambiguities in the definition of race. How did the law, or a train conductor, determine the race of a passenger? “It is a question,” Tourgée told his colleague, that theSupreme Court“may as well take up, if for nothing else, to let the court sharpen its wits on.” Martinet agreed, and in New Orleans he began talking to sympathetic railroad officials who wanted the law overturned for their own financial reasons. It would not do if their test passenger was merelyexcluded from boarding or even thrown off the train; he would have to be arrested so that a real case existed and he could claim injury in federal court. One railway informed him that it did not enforce the law, while another said that though it opposed the statute as too costly, it did not want to go against it publicly. Then the Louisville & Nashville line agreed to a test case. As it happened, for reasons neither Martinet nor Tourgée expected, their test case fizzled.
On February 24, 1892, 21-year-oldDaniel Desdunes purchased a first-class ticket on the Louisville & Nashville from New Orleans toMobile,Alabama, and took a seat in the whites-only car. He was arrested according to the plan and charged with a criminal violation of the Separate Car Act.Tourgée,Martinet, and the local attorney,James Walker, filed a “plea of jurisdiction,” arguing that since Desdunes was a passenger in interstate commerce, he had the right and privilege to travel free from any governmental regulation save that of theCongress. Tourgée also introduced his claim that the determination of race was a complex question of both science and law and so could not bedelegated to a train official. The lawyers assumed that their plea would be denied, Desdunes would be convicted, and then they would appeal. Then, on April 19, 1892, the presiding judge, Robert Marr, suddenly disappeared, and no one knew what had happened to him.
- Date:
- c. 1877 -c. 1950
While Desdunes’s attorney tried to figure out what to do next, on May 25 the Louisiana Supreme Court handed down its decision inLouisiana ex rel. Abbott v.Hicks. A train conductor on the Texas and Pacific Railway had been prosecuted for seating a Black passenger in a white car, and the railway argued that since the passenger was traveling between two states, either the Louisiana law did not apply to interstate travel or, if it did, then it was unconstitutional under thecommerce clause. Much to everyone’s surprise, the Louisiana high court agreed that regulations of the Separate Car Act could not apply to interstate passengers. Given that development, the new judge in Desdunes’s case,John Ferguson, dismissed the case.
















