Oliver Hart (born October 9, 1948,London, England) is a British-born American economist who, withBengt Holmström, was awarded the 2016 Nobel Prize for Economics for his contributions tocontract theory. His groundbreaking research on what came to be known as “incomplete contracts,” in which the rights and responsibilities of the contracting parties are not fully stated for all eventualities (because not all eventualities can be foreseen), influenced the design of alternative “rudimentary” contracts covering, for example, the allocation ofproperty rights between firms and the relation between managers and investors in privately owned firms. His work also helped to rationalize decisions about whether particular public services should be privately contracted or government-run.

Hart studied mathematics atKing’s College, London, and theUniversity of Cambridge (B.A., 1969) andeconomics at Warwick University (M.A., 1972) andPrinceton University (Ph.D., 1974). He served as lecturer in economics at the University of Essex and other institutions before joining the faculty of theLondon School of Economics (LSE) as professor of economics in 1981. He was later professor and visiting professor of economics at theMassachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and LSE. He joined the department of economics atHarvard University in 1993, becoming Andrew E. Furer Professor of Economics in 1997.

Hart’s groundbreaking work explored the notion that unforeseen eventualities should be addressed by optimally allocating control, decision-making, or ownership rights between contracting parties in different circumstances. His study of noncontractual investment decisions by private contractors providing public services found that the incentive to cut costs at the expense of quality was often too strong, resulting in inefficiency, poor performance, or failure to achieve the goals of public policy. Research by Hart and his colleagues in 1997 generally supported the view thatprisons should be run by the government, whereas services such as garbage collection and weapons production should be privately contracted.

Hart’s publications includeFirms, Contracts, and Financial Structure (1995) and numerous scholarly papers.