Platform | Cars | Start Year | Type | Engine | European Market |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
C6 | Simca 1307/8 and Chrysler Alpine | 1976 | FWD 4-door hatch | 1.5 | 2.5 million cars/year |
C2 | Horizon | 1978 | FWD 4-door hatch | 1.3 | 3 million cars/year |
C9 | Tagora | 1980 | RWD 4-door sedan | 2.0 | 1.5 million cars/year |
Lee was right about the technology, but the powertrain, chassis, and body were... the technological
innovations on that car - like automatic transmission, and on-board
computer, automatic speed control, electronic ignition, and electronic
trip computer. ... They were all developed by
Chrysler engineers in this country and then made available to our
French company for use on the Simca Horizon.
The Tagora was an entirely SIMCA (Chrysler Europe) creation in terms of engineering, save for a last-minute substitution of Peugeot parts. The SIMCA four-cylinder engine was mechanically completely unrelated to the Peugeot fours.The C9 programme approval by Chrysler Corporation management was for more than $60 million for special tools. This did not include product development costs which were expensed - rather than capitalized. Product development costs were covered in our annual budget and so were not part of the C9 programme submission. In my presentation to top management I forecast that with the C9 our annual sales in the European luxury car market would increase from 30,000 Chrysler 2-Litre cars to 60,000 C9s. This was only 5% penetration of that market segment but on this basis the C9 program was profitable and was approved. (Chrysler - Europe's overall passenger car penetration was 7%, so 5% of this segment seemed like a reasonable forecast.)
The entry-level C9 continued with an enlarged version of the SIMCA engine, which ended up with the same displaacement as the 2.2-litre version of the aluminium "Douvrin" engine in the later Renault 25 and Citroen CX Phase 2, but was otherwise unrelated. The Peugeot turbodiesel found in the 604 and 505 went straight into the C9.Peugeot delayed the production date of the C9 to make changes to install their V6 engine and to increase the feature and appointment level - and the price. I think they moved the front wheels forward about 2 inches to accommodate the engine. I think the addition of the V6 and the wheel movement actually helped the C9. I think it failed in the marketplace because PSA did not need the car. They already had two cars (Peugeot 604 and Citroen CX) in this 1,200,000 to 1,500,000 market segment. It seemed to me that the C9 - which we named Tagora - should have been a new model of the 604.
Year | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 |
Produced | 145 | 15,368 | 2,566 | 1,310 |
Burton Bouwkamp added:I believe that the major cause in the failure of the Tagora was
the catastrophic re-branding of the Simca range (already perturbed
by the intervening addition of Chrysler ): Simca = Simca-Chrysler = Talbot!
The majority of the range having remained unchanged, the buyers were
left somewhat bemused.
You may remember a similar hiatus when Datsun switched (abeit more
logically ) to Nissan.
Additionally, the dealerships were suffering from a severe crisis of
confidence following the arrival of Peugeot. The Paris based Sales
division had never quite come to terms with Chrysler "European" products and the prospect of a new regime did little to instill
much confidence in their personal futures!
I agree that the Tagora itself had lost something between the
studio and the production line, including some twelve months for re-engineering. The narrowing of the rear track to accommodate the
Peugeot components pretty well ruined the stance of the vehicle - a
size 8 body on a size 6 chassis.
Finally, though very roomy, the interior of the car was by then
quite out of step with the growing demand for "richness:" the plain,
angular style, constrained by demanding cost targets, made for a
lined "refrigerator" look rather than a comfortable "lounge." I might
add that the 604, at launch, had had the same problem - a blown up
504 but not a top of the line car. The Frankfurt show-car interior (leaving aside the gadgets) was
much nearer the mark. Ah well!
It reminds me of a styling meeting in which Jean Boillot accused me
of trying to sink the company by proposing to trim the B post on the 305 GL instead of leaving it painted!
The Talbot Tagora PresidenceI still think the car
would have been a marketing success if it had been merchandised as the new
Peugeot 604 instead of a luxury offering from a weak - and disappearing - dealer body. [Still,] Marc makes some interesting points:1. European customers were confused by the brand name transition over 5 years from Simca to Chrysler to Talbot. This weakened the nameplate image.
2. Chrysler Europe (renamed Talbot) had a weak marketing/merchandizing capability.
3. Revising the C9 design to use Peugeot components helped the product with the availability of a V6 engine but hurt the product by delaying the car 12 months and the narrow rear track appearance hurt the product.
4. The interior was not luxurious enough for that market segment.
Platform | Cars | Start Year | Type | Engine | European Market |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
C6 | Simca 1307/8 and Chrysler Alpine | 1976 | FWD 4-door hatch | 1.5 | 2.5 million cars/year |
C2 | Horizon | 1978 | FWD 4-door hatch | 1.3 | 3 million cars/year |
C9 | Tagora | 1980 | RWD 4-door sedan | 2.0 | 1.5 million cars/year |
Lee was right about the technology, but the powertrain, chassis, and body were... the technological
innovations on that car - like automatic transmission, and on-board
computer, automatic speed control, electronic ignition, and electronic
trip computer. ... They were all developed by
Chrysler engineers in this country and then made available to our
French company for use on the Simca Horizon.
The Tagora was an entirely SIMCA (Chrysler Europe) creation in terms of engineering, save for a last-minute substitution of Peugeot parts. The SIMCA four-cylinder engine was mechanically completely unrelated to the Peugeot fours.The C9 programme approval by Chrysler Corporation management was for more than $60 million for special tools. This did not include product development costs which were expensed - rather than capitalized. Product development costs were covered in our annual budget and so were not part of the C9 programme submission. In my presentation to top management I forecast that with the C9 our annual sales in the European luxury car market would increase from 30,000 Chrysler 2-Litre cars to 60,000 C9s. This was only 5% penetration of that market segment but on this basis the C9 program was profitable and was approved. (Chrysler - Europe's overall passenger car penetration was 7%, so 5% of this segment seemed like a reasonable forecast.)
The entry-level C9 continued with an enlarged version of the SIMCA engine, which ended up with the same displaacement as the 2.2-litre version of the aluminium "Douvrin" engine in the later Renault 25 and Citroen CX Phase 2, but was otherwise unrelated. The Peugeot turbodiesel found in the 604 and 505 went straight into the C9.Peugeot delayed the production date of the C9 to make changes to install their V6 engine and to increase the feature and appointment level - and the price. I think they moved the front wheels forward about 2 inches to accommodate the engine. I think the addition of the V6 and the wheel movement actually helped the C9. I think it failed in the marketplace because PSA did not need the car. They already had two cars (Peugeot 604 and Citroen CX) in this 1,200,000 to 1,500,000 market segment. It seemed to me that the C9 - which we named Tagora - should have been a new model of the 604.
Year | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 |
Produced | 145 | 15,368 | 2,566 | 1,310 |
Burton Bouwkamp added:I believe that the major cause in the failure of the Tagora was
the catastrophic re-branding of the Simca range (already perturbed
by the intervening addition of Chrysler ): Simca = Simca-Chrysler = Talbot!
The majority of the range having remained unchanged, the buyers were
left somewhat bemused.
You may remember a similar hiatus when Datsun switched (abeit more
logically ) to Nissan.
Additionally, the dealerships were suffering from a severe crisis of
confidence following the arrival of Peugeot. The Paris based Sales
division had never quite come to terms with Chrysler "European" products and the prospect of a new regime did little to instill
much confidence in their personal futures!
I agree that the Tagora itself had lost something between the
studio and the production line, including some twelve months for re-engineering. The narrowing of the rear track to accommodate the
Peugeot components pretty well ruined the stance of the vehicle - a
size 8 body on a size 6 chassis.
Finally, though very roomy, the interior of the car was by then
quite out of step with the growing demand for "richness:" the plain,
angular style, constrained by demanding cost targets, made for a
lined "refrigerator" look rather than a comfortable "lounge." I might
add that the 604, at launch, had had the same problem - a blown up
504 but not a top of the line car. The Frankfurt show-car interior (leaving aside the gadgets) was
much nearer the mark. Ah well!
It reminds me of a styling meeting in which Jean Boillot accused me
of trying to sink the company by proposing to trim the B post on the 305 GL instead of leaving it painted!
The Talbot Tagora PresidenceI still think the car
would have been a marketing success if it had been merchandised as the new
Peugeot 604 instead of a luxury offering from a weak - and disappearing - dealer body. [Still,] Marc makes some interesting points:1. European customers were confused by the brand name transition over 5 years from Simca to Chrysler to Talbot. This weakened the nameplate image.
2. Chrysler Europe (renamed Talbot) had a weak marketing/merchandizing capability.
3. Revising the C9 design to use Peugeot components helped the product with the availability of a V6 engine but hurt the product by delaying the car 12 months and the narrow rear track appearance hurt the product.
4. The interior was not luxurious enough for that market segment.