The paper explores the interplay between the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the Russian Foreign Ministry (RFM), particularly in the context of the concept of 'spiritual security.' It elucidates how the ROC enhances the Russian state’s influence globally, aims to reclaim lost church properties from the Communist era, and strengthens its role within the Russian diaspora. The study also critiques the implications of these relationships for Orthodox unity, particularly regarding tensions with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, and discusses how spiritual security is framed as essential for preserving national and cultural identity.

A contemporary discussion of canonical territory and proselytism is complicated by the contemporary Russian political and ideological sphere – both domestic and foreign. Kirill’s election accelerates the likelihood of further complicating the picture as he will doubtless move to consolidate his previously held and expressed positions, largely predicated on the basis of national, cultural, and spiritual security.. This posture simultaneously constrains Orthodox Christian mission and increases the obstacles to non-Orthodox Christian mission by defensively deploying a discourse of canonical territory and proselytism. The contemporary application of canonical discourse appears to have a relatively recent career and must be allowed to provide a point of dialogue between Evangelical Baptist and Orthodox missiologists.

The Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC), the largest religious community in Russia, plays an essential role in the process of the cultural and national self-identification of the Russian people. Being a socio-political institution with a centuries-long history, it possesses great symbolic capital and enjoys public respect, which has been used for political purposes. Since Vladimir Putin regained the presidency in 2012, in order to strengthen the political regime in Russia the Kremlin has begun to extensively draw upon conservative ideology and promote the traditional moral and social values which the Church is viewed as the guardian of. This has resulted in establishing closer relations between the secular government and the ROC, as well as in a greater engagement of ROC hierarchs and organisations in domestic and foreign policy issues. This situation exposes the ROC to criticism for being excessively involved in politics, and in the longer term, to the risks linked to potential destabilisation of the governmental system in Russia.

Religions, 2022

Russian officials and the Moscow Patriarchate have worked together in recent years to pro- mote a socially conservative policy agenda, both domestically and beyond the Russian Federation’s borders. Examining official documents and the statements of key leaders, this article evaluates the development and nature of contemporary church–state relations as they pertain to international rela- tions. The picture that emerges is one of pragmatic partnering, with the state increasingly inclining towards normative positions long espoused by the Church in an effort to shift its foreign policy in a direction that stresses civilizational differentiation and positions Russia as the protector of Christians and “traditional values” around the globe. Underlying this shift in orientation on the part of the Kremlin is a neorealist perspective (though one increasingly expressed through ideational rhetoric) that envisions Russia as not just having a privileged regional sphere of influence but becoming a major player in a polycentric world. As a means of legitimating these objectives, the Church has proven an ideal partner; however, it would be a mistake to simply regard the latter institution as an arm of the state, given that it has its own objectives and motivations relative to the wider world, and these at times conflict with those of the Kremlin.

Greek Orthodox Theological Review 1-4 (2007) [c] 2010

In 1920 the Russian refugee bishops established the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR), also known as the Russian Church Abroad. In 1927 this church renounced subordination to the Church in Russia (also known as the Moscow Patriarchate). On May 17, 2007, representatives of both churches concelebrated Divine Liturgy in the Moscow Christ Savior Cathedral. The process of reconciliation between the Moscow Patriarchate and the ROCOR became a rare example of true ecumenical dialogue, helping the two estranged branches identify common ontological grounds. The author sketches the historical antecedents of the ROCOR's relations with the Moscow Patriarchate and analyzes the ROCOR's conciliar pronouncements and other representative documents from the period of estrangement. This paper demonstrates that the ROCOR ecclesiology of the studied period had been struggling to avoid the perils of isolationism. The history of the Orthodox Church teaches us that ecclesiastical divisions tend to be most persistent when one of the estranged factions believes that the separation is predicated on doctrine. Despite the ROCOR's occasional reference to doctrinal reasons underlying the estrangement, this division was in fact a result of political considerations and therefore was easier to overcome than, for instance, in the case of the Old Believers.

“Problems of Post-Communism”, 2019

This paper presents a reconstruction of the Russian Orthodox Church’s narrative on mission, including the evolution and most characteristic features of its content and context. The notion of mission employed in this article combines components of both messianism and missionism. In short, mission is understood as the conviction that a certain community (state/nation) is exceptional and that this exceptionality manifests itself in its special destiny (Russian: osoboe prednaznachenie). As such, it represents a specific component of the identity of a state. In contemporary Russia, mission is seen as a crucial attribute of civilizational distinctiveness and of a major power.

Acta Politologica, 2019

By stepping up linkages with post-Soviet states and by creating a various and sophisticated scope of soft power instruments, the Russian federation has striven to maintain its strong influence and simultaneously sought to block Western impact in the Post-soviet region. The principal goal of this study is to explore how the Russian political establishment and the influential Russian Orthodox Church are working together to generate Orthodox Christian linkages in the post-Soviet state of the Republic of Moldova and how they are using Orthodox aspects related to “Orthodox identity” and “Orthodox brotherhood” with a view of obtaining support and admiration of the population of this country. The Russian Orthodox Church as an institution is increasingly becoming an effective tool of the Russian concept of soft power, which is taking on growing dimensions and dangerous forms in the hands of the current Russian political leaders. A success or failure of this kind of Russian soft power is subsequently evaluated in the conclusion.

The aim we have set ourselves, through an examination of all the constitutive factors, is to elaborate an analysis study in relation to the problem of the relationship between the Church and the state of the Republic of Moldova related to the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in the geopolitical processes. In the desire to approach objectively and equidistantly the researched subject, we have appealed to the interdisciplinary research, seeking to confront several sources and to present different opinions expressed by experts and religious leaders. An additional value to this study is the use of sociological survey data as an argument in support of conclusions. Relevant for this study is also the information collected from national and international media on the subject.

For many analysts the term Russky mir, or Russian World, epitomizes an expansionist and messianic Russian foreign policy, the perverse intersection of the interests of the Russian state and the Russian Orthodox Church. Little noted is that the term actually means something quite different for each party. For the state it is a tool for expanding Russia's cultural and political influence, while for the Russian Orthodox Church it is a spiritual concept, a reminder that through the baptism of Rus, God consecrated these people to the task of building a Holy Rus. The close symphonic relationship between the Orthodox Church and state in Russia thus provides Russian foreign policy with a definable moral framework, one that, given its popularity, is likely to continue to shape the country's policies well into the future.

AI

The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) seeks to support the foreign as well as the interior interests of the Russian people, as defined by the authorities. The Moscow patriarchate is religiously elevating, symbolically representing and historically substantiating the political course of Putin and his inner-circle. But in this respect the ROC effectively does not differ from other religions in the region, such as Lutheranism in the Baltic States. It appeals to large parts of the Russian population to see the ROC in the function of the defender of its ‘canonical territory,’ as well as of the cultural traditions of this religiously united ‘Orthodox world.’ On the other hand, only a small minority actually takes an active role in the religious life of its church. As far as schools are concerned, the vast majority of Russians prefers the teaching of secular values and norms to religious instruction. Essentially, the ROC possesses no power that is anchored in the people, as is the case for an institution like the Roman Catholic Church in Poland; instead it holds only a derived power, dependent on the good will of political leaders. Ultimately, it remains dependent on a ‘de-secularisation from above,’ supported only by the national-conservative elite, who are willing to promote the influence of orthodoxy because it serves their national-political purposes. The difference from other state–church relationships lies in the fact that the humble ROC effectively supports almost all the Moscow Regime’s interior and foreign policy projects, while the self-confident and independent churches in the Western hemisphere frequently assume the role of a public conscience and ethically-motivated opposition with regard to their parliaments’ and political leaders’ decisions. According to these different traditions, the ROC works as mere supporter and ethical reinforcer of Moscow’s politics, not as a moral marker and persistent advocate of universal human rights, as is the case in the Western hemisphere.

The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) enjoys high visibility in contemporary Russia and is among the most trusted institutions in the country. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ROC emerged as a prominent political actor voicing opinions on domestic, international and global issues. Since 2012, when Vladimir Putin began his third presidential term, the Moscow Patriarchate and the Kremlin have been cooperating ever more closely. Against this background, the study examines what kind of political order the Russian Church advances, how this is done, and why. Relying on poststructuralist, post-secular and postcolonial theory and employing discourse analysis as the primary method, the study offers a characterisation of the ROC’s political attitude and discerns what made this attitude possible. The analysis shows that from the early 1990s, the current ecclesiastical leadership gradually developed a great-power nationalist outlook. The post-Soviet ROC re-constructed the image of Russia as a Great Orthodox Power, borrowing creatively from the ideological legacies of the past, suspending some of its former narratives and adopting new ones. Thus, driven by a fantasmatic ideal of complete and harmonious unity of Church, State, people, and ‘civilisational space’, the official ROC has been actively involved in the emergence and consolidation of the dominant order in Russia. The latter foregrounds the centrality of the State as an agent of Russia’s historical continuity, civilisational unity and special mission in the world. The ROC plays a simultaneously hegemonic and subaltern role in this order. Insofar as the Church performs the function of a ‘unifying force’ bearing the memory and values of ‘historical Russia’, its position is hegemonic; as the Patriarchate cannot speak about politics in any other language except the state-centric one, its identity is subaltern. Finally, the only role that the ROC’s official discourse assigns to ‘the people’ is to serve, protect and be loyal to the reified ‘Fatherland’.

Routledge Handbook of Russian Foreign Policy, (London: Routledge, 2018) pp. 217-232., 2018

The recent “conservative turn” in Russian politics has raised to new levels the role of spiritual and moral values in political discourse. The new partnership formed between the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the state, a modernized version of the traditional Byzantine symphonia, has also affected Russian foreign policy. One notable example is the emergence of the “Russian World” as a key concept in Russia's relations with Ukraine and the rest of the CIS. Although the Church plays a subordinate role in this relationship, it is far from being merely the Kremlin’s puppet. By decentering the nation, this investigation seeks to shed light on the Church’s distinct approach to politics, and show where it draws the line on cooperation with civil authorities. Only by viewing the ROC as an autonomous political and eschatological actor, will we be able to appreciate how it influences Russian foreign policy.

Fr. Dr Daniel Payne’s contribution examines the way in which the Russian Orthodox Church under the leadership of Patriarch Kirill has drawn upon its understanding of canonical territory, spiritual security, and the Russkiy Mir to promote an ideology uniting the Russian world and those of traditional religious belief. Vladimir Putin has capitalized upon the Russian Orthodox Church's religious understandings of Russkiy Mir and has utilized these understandings to promote his foreign policy in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia. While it is not the sole rationale for Putin's actions towards these nations, the critical influence of the Russian Orthodox Church on his foreign policy should not be underestimated.

Przegląd Zachodni, Journal of the Institute of Western Affairs in Poznań, Special Issue, 2019

The aim of the article is to analyse the place and importance of the Orthodox Church in the society and political culture of Ukraine after 2013. The new political realities following the Revolu-tion of Dignity, the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas created new challenges for the Or-thodox Church in Ukraine. Particularly important is the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church’s authority over the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.At the turn of 2018 and 2019, by a decision of Patriarch Bartholomew I and with the support of the Ukrainian political authorities, a new reality became fact in Ukrainian Orthodoxy. However, the creation of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (as a metropolis) does not mean that the split has been overcome. There will be two hostile, equal and comparably strong structures in Ukraine, politically backed by Ukraine and Russia, and this will draw those countries into conflicts over their religious structures and the wealth that their communities possess. At this stage, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine will rely primarily on the potential of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate, and this fact in turn will hinder the transfer of bishops and priests associated with the Moscow Patriarchate. The rift will be difficult to repair.

Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, 2014

This article investigates the role that the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) plays in the politics of history in contemporary Russia.

Church History, 2009

The relationship between the Russian national Identity and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is the subject matter of thorough analysis. One the one hand the notion of Russian National Identity is itself important, the role of ROC in its formation is another dimension to be scrutinized, on the other hand. The debate is centred on the question of whether or not the ROC has extravagant influence over the Russian political class which define major policies regarding notion of identity. This article examines the notion of Russian National Identity, emergence of identity debate in Russia and role of ROC in this debate during various periods of Russian history.

The Moscow Patriarchate is a transnational subject of political relations which acts both inside and outside the Russian Federation. It has specific goals: to maintain the integrity of its canonical territory and to gain dominance within the Universal Orthodox Church. It is in competition with the Patriarchate of Constantinople, it makes alliances with Slavic Orthodox churches and it pursues diplomacy. The activity of the Moscow Patriarchate is of interest to the Russian government. This article examines relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and other Orthodox churches and their significance for Russian foreign policy.

Religion, State and Society

This contribution introduces the concept of 'religious political technology' (RPT), using as a case study the strategies of Damir Mukhetdinov, deputy mufti of the Moscow-based muftiate DUMRF. RPT encompasses the construction and professional dissemination of an ideological platform that presents religionin this case Islamas an asset to the state and the nation. Mukhetdinov's RPT is historically enrooted in Russia's Islamic discourse (through references to Tatar intellectuals and theologians of the late imperial period), and presented as loyal, tolerant, peaceful and modernand at the same time as 'traditionalist'. His RPT is meant to appeal to mainstream trends in Russian society (including Neo-Eurasianism and Slavophile thought), to the Orthodox Church, and to the Kremlin; it also presents itself as an instrument of Russia's foreign policy. At the same time, Mukhetdinov's provocative statements meet strong opposition.

Religions

Russian officials and the Moscow Patriarchate have worked together in recent years to promote a socially conservative policy agenda, both domestically and beyond the Russian Federation’s borders. Examining official documents and the statements of key leaders, this article evaluates the development and nature of contemporary church–state relations as they pertain to international relations. The picture that emerges is one of pragmatic partnering, with the state increasingly inclining towards normative positions long espoused by the Church in an effort to shift its foreign policy in a direction that stresses civilizational differentiation and positions Russia as the protector of Christians and “traditional values” around the globe. Underlying this shift in orientation on the part of the Kremlin is a neorealist perspective (though one increasingly expressed through ideational rhetoric) that envisions Russia as not just having a privileged regional sphere of influence but becoming a maj...

Religion, State and Society, 2013

The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/termsand-conditions 1996, p. 242). Hence it can be argued that mutual recognition of church and state (which in East Germany had taken place already in 1979 (White et al., 2000, p. 682) and was

Religion, State and Society, 2017

This paper draws upon a number of official, semi-official and other public texts related to the current views of the Russian Church on social and political issues. Overall, in spite of a variety of opinions and nuances, a certain mainstream becomes apparent, as expressed through this body of texts. The most discussed topics include moral values related to the human body (such as abortion, euthanasia, reproductive technologies and sexuality) and issues such as blasphemy, juvenile courts and new technologies of personal registration for Russian citizens. 'Traditional morality' has become the signature discourse of the Russian Orthodox Church which is attempting to construct 'tradition' by drawing upon a partly imagined ethos of imperial Russia and the late Soviet Union. Traditional family values are central to the church's rhetoric. The authors of these texts see a presumed decay of traditional values as the main danger that must be opposed. They usually trace the source of this danger directly to the contemporary West. By contrast, they see Russia as a protective shield against these global influences. Either consciously or involuntarily, they translate their religious language of traditional morality into a political rhetoric of solidarity and patriotism. Such ideological rhetoric has direct political implications and analogies in the agenda of Putin's regime. This Russian appeal to 'traditional values', both religious and political, has recently acquired an extraordinary international relevance.

Journal of East Asian Studies

Who attempts to influence policymaking through authoritarian assemblies and why are some delegates considerably more active in doing so than others? Drawing on original data from provincial People's Political Consultative Conferences (PPCCs) in China, this study adopts a delegate-centered perspective and develops a theory of delegates’ activity in authoritarian assemblies. It argues that delegates’ activity can be explained by a combination of both cooptation theory and an understanding of delegates’ position within the authoritarian regime and hierarchy. The results highlight that core elites with more direct means of influencing policymaking will forego assemblies. Yet, peripheral elites lack other institutional channels of access to decision-makers and have to voice their demands in authoritarian legislatures. This study highlights the need for disaggregating groups of actors in authoritarian politics and offers an alternative view of cooptation particularly relevant for clos...

Religions, 2023

This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY

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