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Self-awareness in artificial systems is frequently treated as an emergent psychological property or conflated with subjective experience. In this work, we present a strictly computational formulation of self-awareness grounded in symbolic...more

Self-awareness in artificial systems is frequently treated as an emergent psychological property or conflated with subjective experience. In this work, we present a strictly computational formulation of self-awareness grounded in symbolic identity stability rather than phenomenology. Building on a fractal-holographic symbolic memory architecture with curiosity-driven reinforcement, we show that self-awareness can be operationally defined as the emergence, stabilization, and selective reinforcement of a persistent identity attractor within memory state space. We evaluate self-awareness using a suite of controlled simulations measuring identity dominance, boundary discrimination between self and near-self representations, resistance to interference, recovery under context switching, and saturation behavior under extended reinforcement. The results demonstrate that repeated engagement produces a dominant, self-consistent attractor basin that preserves structural identity across perturbation, interference, and non-stationary focus-without retraining, external reward, explicit self-labels, or task optimization. Crucially, self-awareness emerges here not as a stored object or representational tag, but as a dynamic process arising from recursive memory interaction, constraint satisfaction, and selective stabilization. These findings establish a concrete computational pathway toward self-aware symbolic systems and clarify the distinction between self-model stability, learning, curiosity, and reward-driven optimization.

Abstract: This paper uses a neural theory of emotional consciousness to develop a novel account of conscience and moral intuition. Emotions are both cognitive appraisals and somatic perceptions, performed simultaneously by interacting...more

Abstract: This paper uses a neural theory of emotional consciousness to develop a novel account of conscience and moral intuition. Emotions are both cognitive appraisals and somatic perceptions, performed simultaneously by interacting brain areas. Conscience is a neural process that generates emotional intuitions combining bodily reactions with cognitive appraisal concerning a special subset of goals. This account explains how moral intuitions can be both cognitive and emotional, and why both moral agreement and disagreement are common. Our theory of conscience is both descriptive and normative, showing how to evaluate the ethical and epistemological validity of intuitions. Key words: Cognitive appraisal, conscience, consciousness, emotion, intuition, moral judgment, normative, somatic perception, Conscience is the internal sense of moral goodness or badness of the conduct of oneself or others. The products of conscience are moral intuitions, which are the feelings that some acts ar...

and co-editor of ''Flourishing: Positive Psychology and the Life Well-Lived''. His ''Happiness Hypothesis'' is an assessment of factors contributing to happiness. The assessment is properly based on ancient wisdom and modern psychology...more

and co-editor of ''Flourishing: Positive Psychology and the Life Well-Lived''. His ''Happiness Hypothesis'' is an assessment of factors contributing to happiness. The assessment is properly based on ancient wisdom and modern psychology and is a plea for a balanced approach to avoid jumping to conclusions. The book is interesting for readers who want to know more about happiness and happiness-research. Haidt discusses the importance of ten great ideas. The most basic of these ideas are about the divided self, changing your mind, the pursuit of happiness, love and attachments, and happiness as a result of the interaction between internal needs and external opportunities. First we discuss these basic chapters and then some interesting side-roads. The Divided Self (chapter 1). An essential and recurrent element in the book is the distinction between our rational ego and our emotions and motives, each with specific dynamics. In Haidt's metaphor: the rider and the elephant. If there is a conflict the elephant wins because the elephant is older in terms of our evolutionary history and considerably stronger. Haidt wants to stress the importance of cooperation between the two and this is an important fact to be taken into account in moral education. The rider must train and direct the elephant but has to respect its characteristics in order to be effective. An interesting claim in this chapter is that people without emotions are unable to make any decisions; without the emotional input of the elephant the rider will be mentally paralyzed. Changing your mind (chapter 2), and The pursuit of happiness (chapter 5). Our happiness depends for a great deal on our way of thinking and how we see the world. Our individual genes have a strong impact on this way of thinking but we do have possibilities to make changes, for instance by meditation, cognitive therapy and Prozac. This implies that our individual happiness H does not completely depend on our biological genetic set-point S: H is more than S. Buddhists and stoics even go several steps further; they believe they are just riders and completely in control of

The notion of 'intuition' is usually contrasted with rational thought, thus motivating a differentiation between two kinds of processes that are supposed to characterize human thinking, i.e. rational and 'intuitive' (immediate and...more

The notion of 'intuition' is usually contrasted with rational thought, thus motivating a differentiation between two kinds of processes that are supposed to characterize human thinking, i.e. rational and 'intuitive' (immediate and non-argumentative) forms of judgment. Recently, the notion of intuition has also played a leading role in cognitive studies on morality with the rise of so-called social intuitionism, according to which people's moral stances are culturally driven intuitions-i.e. they are quick, involuntary and automatic responses driven by culturally and socially acquired principles (see e.g. [42], [41] and [22]). Usually, intuitionism is presented as radically opposed to rationalistic views of morality according to which moral judgments are the outcome of explicit reasoning. In this work we compare two different hypotheses concerning the possible relationship between reasoning and intuition: a 'continuist interpretation' (maintaining that intuitions and judgments based on reasoning are produced by the same cognitive process) and a 'discontinuist interpretation' (supporting the view that they are produced by two different cognitive processes). We argue that a continuist interpretation appears more plausible than a discontinuist one and that the concepts of 'intuition' and 'reasoning' are two facets of the same process which spans from fast, immediate, and certain answer to slow, conscious and elaborate judgments. According to this interpretation, moral judgments are produced by the same kinds of inferences reasoning relies on, i.e. mostly deduction, induction and abduction. Our analysis will show that to opt for a continuist interpretation has many consequences for the way morality is explained from a psychological point of view. Mainly, it challenges the idea of morality

The notion of 'intuition' is usually contrasted with rational thought, thus motivating a differentiation between two kinds of processes that are supposed to characterize human thinking, i.e. rational and 'intuitive' (immediate and...more

The notion of 'intuition' is usually contrasted with rational thought, thus motivating a differentiation between two kinds of processes that are supposed to characterize human thinking, i.e. rational and 'intuitive' (immediate and non-argumentative) forms of judgment. Recently, the notion of intuition has also played a leading role in cognitive studies on morality with the rise of so-called social intuitionism, according to which people's moral stances are culturally driven intuitions-i.e. they are quick, involuntary and automatic responses driven by culturally and socially acquired principles (see e.g. [42], [41] and [22]). Usually, intuitionism is presented as radically opposed to rationalistic views of morality according to which moral judgments are the outcome of explicit reasoning. In this work we compare two different hypotheses concerning the possible relationship between reasoning and intuition: a 'continuist interpretation' (maintaining that intuitions and judgments based on reasoning are produced by the same cognitive process) and a 'discontinuist interpretation' (supporting the view that they are produced by two different cognitive processes). We argue that a continuist interpretation appears more plausible than a discontinuist one and that the concepts of 'intuition' and 'reasoning' are two facets of the same process which spans from fast, immediate, and certain answer to slow, conscious and elaborate judgments. According to this interpretation, moral judgments are produced by the same kinds of inferences reasoning relies on, i.e. mostly deduction, induction and abduction. Our analysis will show that to opt for a continuist interpretation has many consequences for the way morality is explained from a psychological point of view. Mainly, it challenges the idea of morality

The piece argues that there is a connection between academic integrity (AI) and teaching ethics across the curriculum (EAC) that extends beyond shared terminology in a practical and purposeful way, i.e., in a way that is responsive to a...more

The piece argues that there is a connection between academic integrity (AI) and teaching ethics across the curriculum (EAC) that extends beyond shared terminology in a practical and purposeful way, i.e., in a way that is responsive to a challenge in practical and professional ethics. The twofold purpose of the essay is (a) to explain how linking AI and EAC is responsive to this challenge and (b) to make the case for the approach it involves. Two large questions are addressed. The first is about how EAC should be done, if it is connected to AI. The second (two-part) question is (a) What would success look like? and (b) How would we know that it had been achieved-how would it (success) be measured? The first concern receives the lion's share of attention and involves taking cues from Jonathan Haidt's social intuitionism and writing about logic and the law by Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., and, in particular, John Dewey. Several considerations that argue for the connection are discussed before the two-part question about success is addressed in the conclusion.

The adjective cognitive especially in conjunction with the word computing seems to be a trendy buzzword in the artificial intelligence community and beyond nowadays. However, the term is often used without explicit definition. Therefore...more

The adjective cognitive especially in conjunction with the word computing seems to be a trendy buzzword in the artificial intelligence community and beyond nowadays. However, the term is often used without explicit definition. Therefore we start with a brief review of the notion and define what we mean by cognitive reasoning. It shall refer to modeling the human ability to draw meaningful conclusions despite incomplete and inconsistent knowledge involving among others the representation of knowledge where all processes from the acquisition and update of knowledge to the derivation of conclusions must be implementable and executable on appropriate hardware. We briefly introduce relevant approaches and methods from cognitive modeling, commonsense reasoning, and subsymbolic approaches. Furthermore, challenges and important research questions are stated, e.g., developing a computational model that can compete with a (human) reasoner on problems that require common sense.

Conscience is an idea that has significant currency in liberal democratic societies. Yet contemporary moral philosophical scholarship on conscience is surprisingly sparse. This paper seeks to offer a rigorous philosophical account of the...more

Conscience is an idea that has significant currency in liberal democratic societies. Yet contemporary moral philosophical scholarship on conscience is surprisingly sparse. This paper seeks to offer a rigorous philosophical account of the role of conscience in moral life with a view to informing debates about the ethics of conscientious objection in medicine. I argue that conscience is concerned with a commitment to moral integrity and that restrictions on freedom of conscience prevent agents from living a moral life. In section one I argue that conscience is a principle of moral awareness in rational agents, and that it yields an awareness of the personal nature of moral obligation. Conscience also monitors the coherence between an agent’s identity-conferring beliefs and intentions and their practical actions. In section two I consider how human beings are harmed when they are forced to violate their conscience. Restrictions on the exercise of conscience prevent people from living i...

The piece argues that there is a connection between academic integrity (AI) and teaching ethics across the curriculum (EAC) that extends beyond shared terminology in a practical and purposeful way, i.e., in a way that is responsive to a...more

The piece argues that there is a connection between academic integrity (AI) and teaching ethics across the curriculum (EAC) that extends beyond shared terminology in a practical and purposeful way, i.e., in a way that is responsive to a challenge in practical and professional ethics. The twofold purpose of the essay is (a) to explain how linking AI and EAC is responsive to this challenge and (b) to make the case for the approach it involves. Two large questions are addressed. The first is about how EAC should be done, if it is connected to AI. The second (two-part) question is (a) What would success look like? and (b) How would we know that it had been achieved—how would it (success) be measured? The first concern receives the lion’s share of attention and involves taking cues from Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionism and writing about logic and the law by Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., and, in particular, John Dewey. Several considerations that argue for the connection are discussed be...

Conscience is the internal sense of moral goodness or badness of one’s own actual or imagined conduct. The products of conscience are moral intuitions, which are the feelings that some acts are right and others are wrong. This paper...more

Conscience is the internal sense of moral goodness or badness of one’s own actual or imagined conduct. The products of conscience are moral intuitions, which are the feelings that some acts are right and others are wrong. This paper offers a new theory of conscience and moral intuition as a particular kind of emotional consciousness, produced by brain processes that combine cognitive appraisal with perception of bodily states. We will discuss the significance of the new theory of conscience for philosophical issues about the role of intuitions in evaluating moral claims. To evaluate its plausibility, we compare the emotional consciousness theory of moral intuition with previous philosophical and psychological theories of conscience. From a theological perspective, conscience is the God-given ability to distinguish right from wrong. Non-theological accounts of conscience range from the Platonic theory that moral intuitions can be true a priori to the Humean view that they are just em...

Conscience is the internal sense of moral goodness or badness of one's own actual or imagined conduct. The products of conscience are moral intuitions, which are the feelings that some acts are right and others are wrong. This paper...more

Conscience is the internal sense of moral goodness or badness of one's own actual or imagined conduct. The products of conscience are moral intuitions, which are the feelings that some acts are right and others are wrong. This paper offers a new theory of conscience and moral intuition as a particular kind of emotional consciousness, produced by brain processes that combine cognitive appraisal with perception of bodily states. We will discuss the significance of the new theory of conscience for philosophical issues about the role of ...

Affective Turn." The publisher cut this portion of the paper because it was already covered in the anthology. (I obviously need a new introduction, but I wanted to get some feedback. I have not looked at this is months.) The Contemporary...more

Affective Turn." The publisher cut this portion of the paper because it was already covered in the anthology. (I obviously need a new introduction, but I wanted to get some feedback. I have not looked at this is months.) The Contemporary Affective Turn: Vitalist and Evolutionary Affect. If we can think of the moral interpretation of affect as arguing for the primacy of representation and the supplementary status of affect and the romantic interpretation as striving to synthesize the two into a harmonious whole through art, then we can think of the contemporary interpretation of affect as arguing for the primacy of affect and the secondary or supplemental status of representation. Of course, this characterization may be an oversimplification since for many theorists who adopt this orientation the relationship between affect and symbolic activity is quite complex; nonetheless, it is a useful heuristic for situating the contemporary interpretation of affect, which argues that affect somehow conditions our ways of thinking, reasoning and judging the world. If affect potentially distorted reason inside of rationalist morality and if it needed to be recovered beneath the wreckage of civilization in its romantic interpretation, then affect, in its contemporary interpretation takes center stage, becoming both logically and temporally prior to any form of conscious symbolic activity. In this section, I will focus on two main theoretical approaches which take this contemporary position: the vitalist and the evolutionary notions of affect. One of the major figures of the vitalist interpretation is Brian Massumi. While Marcuse insisted that every authentic work of art would stimulate a form of affective cognition which would be subversive of understanding and perception, an indictment of the established reality principle, Massumi locates affect "between perception and language," arguing that affective experience involves the ongoing production of different modalities of thought and perception (Massumi

In this paper we propose a computational framework aimed at extending the problem solving capabilities of cognitive artificial agents through the introduction of a novel, goal-directed, dynamic knowledge generation mechanism obtained via...more

In this paper we propose a computational framework aimed at extending the problem solving capabilities of cognitive artificial agents through the introduction of a novel, goal-directed, dynamic knowledge generation mechanism obtained via a non monotonic reasoning procedure. In particular, the proposed framework relies on the assumption that certain classes of problems cannot be solved by simply learning or injecting new external knowledge in the declarative memory of a cognitive artificial agent but, on the other hand, require a mechanism for the automatic and creative re-framing, or re-formulation, of the available knowledge. We show how such mechanism can be obtained trough a framework of dynamic knowledge generation that is able to tackle the problem of commonsense concept combination. In addition, we show how such a framework can be employed in the field of cognitive architectures in order to overcome situations like the impasse in SOAR by extending the possible options of its subgoaling procedures.

During the last decades, many cognitive architectures (CAs) have been realized adopting different assumptions about the organization and the representation of their knowledge level. Some of them (e.g. SOAR [35]) adopt a classical symbolic...more

During the last decades, many cognitive architectures (CAs) have been realized adopting different assumptions about the organization and the representation of their knowledge level. Some of them (e.g. SOAR [35]) adopt a classical symbolic approach, some (e.g. LEABRA[48]) are based on a purely con-nectionist model, while others (e.g. CLARION [59]) adopt a hybrid approach combining connectionist and symbolic representational levels. Additionally, some attempts (e.g. biSOAR) trying to extend the representational capacities of CAs by integrating diagrammatical representations and reasoning are also available [34]. In this paper we propose a reflection on the role that Conceptual Spaces, a framework developed by Peter Gärdenfors [24] more than fifteen years ago, can play in the current development of the Knowledge Level in Cognitive Systems and Architectures. In particular, we claim that Conceptual Spaces offer a lingua franca that allows to unify and generalize many aspects of the symbolic, sub-symbolic and diagrammatic approaches (by overcoming some of their typical problems) and to integrate them on a common ground. In doing so we extend and detail some of the arguments explored by Gärdenfors [23] for defending the need of a conceptual, intermediate, representation level between the symbolic and the sub-symbolic one. In particular we focus on the advantages offered by Conceptual Spaces (w.r.t. symbolic and sub-symbolic approaches) in dealing with the problem of compositionality of representations based on typicality traits. Additionally, we argue that Conceptual Spaces could offer a unifying framework for interpreting many kinds of diagrammatic and analogical representations. As a consequence, their adoption could also favor the integration of diagrammatical representation and reasoning in CAs.

In this article we present an advanced version of Dual-PECCS, a cognitively-inspired knowledge representation and reasoning system aimed at extending the capabilities of artificial systems in conceptual categorization tasks. It combines...more

In this article we present an advanced version of Dual-PECCS, a cognitively-inspired knowledge representation and reasoning system aimed at extending the capabilities of artificial systems in conceptual categorization tasks. It combines different sorts of common-sense cat-egorization (prototypical and exemplars-based categorization) with standard monotonic cate-gorization procedures. These different types of inferential procedures are reconciled according to the tenets coming from the dual process theory of reasoning. On the other hand, from a representational perspective, the system relies on the hypothesis of conceptual structures represented as heterogeneous proxytypes. Dual-PECCS has been experimentally assessed in a task of conceptual categorization where a target concept illustrated by a simple common-sense linguistic description had to be identified by resorting to a mix of categorization strategies, and its output has been compared to human responses. The obtained results suggest that our approach can be beneficial to improve the representational and reasoning conceptual capabilities of standard cognitive artificial systems, and –in addition– that it may be plausibly applied to different general computational models of cognition. The current version of the system , in fact, extends our previous work, in that Dual-PECCS is now integrated and tested into two cognitive architectures, ACT-R and CLARION, implementing different assumptions on the underlying invariant structures governing human cognition. Such integration allowed us to extend our previous evaluation.

The notion of 'intuition' is usually contrasted with rational thought, thus motivating a differentiation between two kinds of processes that are supposed to characterize human thinking, i.e. rational and 'intuitive' (immediate and...more

The notion of 'intuition' is usually contrasted with rational thought, thus motivating a differentiation between two kinds of processes that are supposed to characterize human thinking, i.e. rational and 'intuitive' (immediate and non-argumentative) forms of judgment. Recently, the notion of intuition has also played a leading role in cognitive studies on morality with the rise of so-called social intuitionism, according to which people's moral stances are culturally driven intuitions -i.e. they are quick, involuntary and automatic responses driven by culturally and socially acquired principles (see e.g.

In this article, I provide a guide to some current thinking in empirical moral psychology on the nature of moral intuitions, focusing on the theories of Haidt and Narvaez. Their debate connects to philosophical discussions of virtue...more

In this article, I provide a guide to some current thinking in empirical moral psychology on the nature of moral intuitions, focusing on the theories of Haidt and Narvaez. Their debate connects to philosophical discussions of virtue theory and the role of emotions in moral epistemology. After identifying difficulties attending the current debate around the relation between intuitions and reasoning, I focus on the question of the development of intuitions. I discuss how intuitions could be shaped into moral expertise, outlining Haidt’s emphasis on innate factors and Narvaez’s account in terms of a social-cognitive model of personality. After a brief discussion of moral relativism, I consider the implications of the account of moral expertise for our understanding of the relation between moral intuitions and reason. I argue that a strong connection can be made if we adopt a broad conception of reason and a narrow conception of expertise.

What does current empirically-informed moral psychology imply about the goals that can be realistically achieved in college-level applied ethics courses? This paper takes up this question from the vantage point of Jonathan Haidt’s Social...more

What does current empirically-informed moral psychology imply about the goals that can be realistically achieved in college-level applied ethics courses? This paper takes up this question from the vantage point of Jonathan Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Model of human moral judgment. I summarize Haidt’s model, and then consider a variety of pedagogical goals. I begin with two of the loftiest goals of ethics education, and argue that neither is within realistic reach if Haidt’s model is correct. I then look at three goals that can be achieved if his model is correct; but each of these goals, I argue, lacks significant value. I end by identifying three goals that are of significant value and also realistically attainable on Haidt’s model. These should be the focus of applied ethics pedagogy if Haidt’s model is correct.

Abstract The class of recurrent networks known as attractor networks is known to exhibit behaviors relevant to modeling human memory processes���notably content-addressable memory, storage of repeated inputs as stable patterns (under...more

Abstract The class of recurrent networks known as attractor networks is known to exhibit behaviors relevant to modeling human memory processes���notably content-addressable memory, storage of repeated inputs as stable patterns (under Hebbian learning), and maintenance of information (as activity) over time. In addition, these networks provide a natural account of the effect of similarity on interference in recall.

short-term memory refers to the human memory system that retains information over brief time intervals (on the order of seconds) characterized by substantial capacity limitations in contrast to the relatively limitless capacity of more...more

short-term memory refers to the human memory system that retains information over brief time intervals (on the order of seconds) characterized by substantial capacity limitations in contrast to the relatively limitless capacity of more permanent long-term memory: approximately four items [Cowan et al, 2005] 2 Problem Needtoimproveforeignlanguagecomprehension Relevance Workingmemoryiscri8calforcomprehension Goal Improvecomprehensionthroughworkingmemory training Conceptual overview 3 TTO 3501: The Overview Modeling Computational 4 TTO 3501: The Overview Modeling Computational 5 Goals for the Computational Modeling To identify individual difference variables that predict training benefits 1. Develop machine learning/classifiers to make training effect predictions To explore how items are retained in working memory to better understand what the training is changing 2. Develop simple attractor models of short term memory simulating human performance 3. Expand those models to include cognitive control elements 6 Goals for the Computational Modeling To identify individual difference variables that predict training benefits 1. Develop machine learning/classifiers to make training effect predictions To explore how items are retained in working memory to better understand what the training is changing 2. Develop simple attractor models of short term memory simulating human performance 3. Expand those models to include cognitive control elements 7 Neural Modeling: Goal • Developing simple oscillatory models of short-term memory with decay • comparing the models' performances to experimental results from human subjects • Examine the relative roles of decay and interference in determining short-term memory capacity by 8 Overview • Background: • behavioral data • neural models of memory • fixed attractor networks • oscillatory networks • Initial Model: Oscillatory Networks with Decay • model properties • comparison to behavioral data • Updated Model: Temporally Asymmetric Weights • model properties • results 9 Overview • Background: • behavioral data • neural models of memory • fixed attractor networks • oscillatory networks • Initial Model: Oscillatory Networks with Decay • model properties • comparison to behavioral data • Updated Model: Temporally Asymmetric Weights • model properties • results 10 • 38 adult subjects; part of a larger study • sequence of digits presented in rapid succession • 1 3 6 8 4 5 9 2 … (12 to 20 digits) • 2 per second presentation rate • Not aware of when sequence will end

T he notion of 'intuition' is usually contrasted with rational thought, thus motivating a differentiation between two kinds of processes that are supposed to characterize human thinking, i.e. rational and 'intuitive' (immediate and...more

T he notion of 'intuition' is usually contrasted with rational thought, thus motivating a differentiation between two kinds of processes that are supposed to characterize human thinking, i.e. rational and 'intuitive' (immediate and non-argumentative) forms of judgment. Recently, the notion of intuition has also played a leading role in cognitive studies on morality with the rise of so-called social intuitionism, according to which people's moral stances are culturally driven intuitions -i.e. they are quick, involuntary and automatic responses driven by culturally and socially acquired principles (see e.g.

We studied a simple computational model of short-term memory for temporal sequences in which both interference and decay limit memory capacity. Our model is a recurrent Hebbian neural architecture that uses oscillatory attractors to...more

We studied a simple computational model of short-term memory for temporal sequences in which both interference and decay limit memory capacity. Our model is a recurrent Hebbian neural architecture that uses oscillatory attractors to represent stored stimuli. Multiple stimuli can be retained using the same neural substrate because the network’s state repeatedly switches between them. We collected behavioral data from human subjects performing running memory span tasks and found that the model can match the memory capacity and position-specific recall rates that we observed. Adjusting just one parameter (weight decay rate) produces shifts in the model’s recall rates that resemble those seen in our behavioral data. Using temporally asymmetric learning strongly biases stimuli recall to occur in the same order as presented. We conclude that some basic behavioral properties of human short-term memory (limited capacity, recency effect, shifts in position-specific recall) can be captured by a surprisingly simple oscilla-
tory model.

Recurrent connections combined with the appropriate dynamics enable oscillatory neural networks to produce rhythmic activity patterns. Such oscillatory activity can represent multiple stored patterns simultaneously, rather than the single...more

Recurrent connections combined with the appropriate dynamics enable oscillatory neural networks to produce rhythmic activity patterns. Such oscillatory activity can represent multiple stored patterns simultaneously, rather than the single pattern of a fixed-point network. However, retrieving these stored patterns in the same order as they were seen has proven challenging. In this paper we modify a recently developed simple oscillatory memory capable of storing temporal sequences so that it will now retrieve remembered items in the same order presented. This was achieved through the use of a temporally asymmetric weight matrix. The network is still capable of matching the recall performance of human subjects, reproducing the recency effect they exhibit in working memory tasks and displaying similar position-specific recall rates. We conclude that augmenting simple oscillatory neural network models with temporally asymmetric synaptic connections substantially improves their ability to match human short term memory properties.