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1989, International Political Science Review
https://doi.org/10.1177/019251218901000203…
12 pages
Thailand is often viewed as an Asian country which has experienced no fundamental revolutionary change because the two major institutions on which the Thai nation is predicated – the monarchy and the Buddhist monkhood or Sangha – have deep roots in the past. Despite the continuity of these institutions, this paper argues that Thai politics, which have been shaped in the past two decades by the influence of a number of activist Buddhist movements, can only be understood if it is recognized that the Thai political order has undergone major revolutionary transformations which stem from a reformation of Buddhism begun in the mid-nineteenth century. This reformation led, this paper argues, to a fundamental shift in the practical interpretation of the Buddhist theory of action which, in turn, has led to an increasing number of people viewing themselves as being sufficiently freed from the constraints of previous karma to effect significant changes in their lives and those of the world in which they live.
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Brill’s Encyclopedia of Buddhism, 2015
Journal of Asian Studies, 1977
In this paper I contend that millennial movements are caused primarily by a crisis centering around political power and then examine a particular case drawn from Thai history. Given that Thailand has long been a country whose populace adheres primarily to Theravada Buddhism, I first consider how Theravada Buddhist beliefs lend themselves to millennial interpretations. Then I consider, more specifically, the basis of millennial belief within Thai society, and examine in some detail millennial activities that occurred in northeastern Thailand in 1899-1902. I argue that this case of millennialism among the northeastern Thai population erupted as a consequence of a sudden and radical shift in conceptions of power, resulting from the threat of an expansionist French colonialism and from the implementation of provincial reforms instituted by King Chulalongkorn at the end of the nineteenth century. By its very nature, millennialism can never itself be religious change; rather, millennialism is invariably a transitory phenomenon. Having said this, we cannot, however, simply dismiss millennialism as a pathological aberration. Millennialism is a symptom of profound social crisis that must be resolved if a society is to persist. This paper was first published as “Millennialism, Buddhism and Thai Society” in the Journal of Asian Studies (36.2: 283-302), 1977. In this version some small editorial changes have been made.
Despite the often-repeated assertion that Buddhism and politics are, or at least must be, separate matters, Buddhism has been closely intertwined with politics one way or another since the Buddha’s time. In Thailand, Buddhism has been used since the end of the 19th century as a tool to legitimate state power. In the following decades, it has been progressively centralized under a national hierarchy, which is still existing today. This scheme was not altered after the change of the country’s political framework in 1932 and political tensions with the sangha came to the fore during the political troubles of the 1970s. The emergence of an increasing political divide in Thailand since the mid-2000s, around two broad groups which have been dubbed the Yellow Shirts and the Red Shirts, has engulfed the monastic community, leading to a growing activism by some Buddhist groups, some temples and some monks. Numerous monks mingled with Red Shirts demonstrators in April-May 2010, and some were on the front-line when the military gave the assault on the Red Shirts’ camp in downtown Bangkok. In the most recent years, these tensions have coalesced around the controversial Dhammakaya temple and have impacted the choice of the leader of the Thai monastic community. Although, tensions with the sangha are nothing new, they have weakened the ability of Buddhism – one of the national pillars of the Thai national ideology – to be a focal point as the country is going through a difficult transition with the end of seven-decades prestigious reign and political uncertainties clouding the horizon.
University of Bristol, 2020
This thesis offers a comprehensive view of Thai Buddhist constitutionalism, the fundamental theory on state, governance, and law in Buddhist-majority Thailand. Despite a major modernization reform over a century ago, Buddhism remains a powerful ideology of the Thai state. This thesis discusses also how Buddhist constitutionalism interacts with the modern norms of liberal democratic constitutionalism. It discovers two important features of the Thai legal system regarding religions. First, the constitutional system guarantees religious freedom but not religious equality. Second, state accommodation of a religion leads to a loss of autonomy. Thus, although Buddhism is the dominant religion, it is subject to a heavy monitoring scheme that hinders its freedom to operate. The Thai legal system shows that its understanding of human rights is different from the universal standard. This thesis argues that such arrangements are the result of Buddhist constitutionalism. Looking at various sources of contemporary Buddhism debates, the dissertation considers Buddhism's hierarchical sociopolitical structure with the sacred king at the zenith, Buddhist-infused justice system and the emphasis on the Buddhist-style rule of law, as well as a notion of duty over rights. These traditional ideas clash with liberal democratic constitutionalism, which is characterized by an egalitarian political culture, the sanctity of written law, and the respect of rights and liberties. This dissonance brings tensions and conflicts, both within the religion and with other religious minorities. By exposing these difficulties, the thesis clears the way and makes suggestions for new forms of reconciliation in the constitutional field. Acknowledgment When I embarked on a Ph.D. journey, I expected solitude but actually found kindness, support, and companionship. First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Julian Rivers, for his guidance and patience. Many have also contributed to the formation and direction of this dissertation, among those are Nidhi Eowseewong, Thongchai Winichakul,
Asian Journal of Law and Society, 2021
Triggered by the sense of crisis, the Thai state and Thai Buddhism are renewing their traditional relationship kindled by the monarch-led reform over a century ago. Thai Buddhism is reviving its lost aura and hegemony while the political conservatives are looking for legitimacy and collective identity in a time of democratic regression. The result is the rise of the Buddhist-nationalistic movement, Buddhist-as-Thainess notion. The phenomenon has grown more mainstream in recent years. These extreme Buddhists pressure the government to adopt a new constitutional relationship that brings the two entities closer to a full establishment. They also target both religious minorities as well as non-mainstream Buddhists. The revival of Buddhist nationalism foretells rising tension as well as diminishing religious freedom.
Journal of Law and Religion, 2018
In accordance with Thai conceptions of Buddhist kingship, Thai rulers have felt obliged to devote considerable energies towards the promotion and protection of Buddhism. Over the past century (and more), state laws have been instituted and bureaucratic agencies established to regulate and implement such promotional and protective activities. This article outlines some broad trends and patterns in the bureaucratization of Buddhism in Thailand, and discusses their implications for religious freedom. It argues that although Buddhism has been extensively bureaucratized, the implications for religious freedom have been less severe than one might perhaps expect, owing not least to the fact that Buddhism is a monastic religion. However, recent developments—taking place in the wake of the 2014 military coup and of the 2016 royal succession—suggest that the legal environment is changing in ways that may have negative implications for religious freedom in Thailand.
Contemporary Political Theory, 2017
In this readable book, Matthew J. Moore offers the resources for political theorists to see how their own familiar debates might intersect with, and even benefit from, Buddhist philosophy. Its synthetic approach, lucid writing, and short length (only 145 pages not counting footnotes) suggest that this book would best serve as an undergraduate or graduate text for an introductory course in political theory, rather than as a research monograph advancing a new argument within Buddhist philosophy. The content and organization of the book, described by Moore in his short introduction as a ''roadmap for other scholars interested in Buddhism'' (p. 3), bears out this supposition. (The book also claims to offer references to ''good quality English translations'', but no indication is given as to how that quality is assessed, or if Moore possesses the requisite skills in Palī or Sanskrit to determine whether those translations are accurate.) The first three substantive chapters offer rich descriptions of the key texts and arguments of Buddhism, along with a very quick overview of how Buddhist argumentation has changed during its period of ''modernism'' since the midnineteenth century. Chapter 1 offers its descriptions by way of surveying what it calls the ''theory of government and political theory in early Buddhism.'' Moore notes that debate exists in the scholarly literature over the extent to which Buddhism supports or offers a place for politics in its theory, and whether that theory supports monarchism or more popular political decision-making. It narrates several short stories or fables from the early Palī canon-such as the story of Dalhanemi, a cakkavatti or ''wheel-turning monarch,'' who advances Buddhist principles through his governance-to argue that Buddhism does possess a distinctive political theory. Among its criteria for good governance is included a theory of legitimacy, which, according to Moore, ''is not about adequately respecting the autonomy of rational selves but rather about creating conditions to allow human beings to make spiritual progress'' (p. 26). The second chapter similarly offers schematic, short descriptions of key texts to show that for most Buddhists before the nineteenth century, monarchy was the central political system they endorsed. However, in Chapter 3,

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The paper reveals that historical interactions between Buddhist institutions and state power in Thailand from the 19th century significantly shaped contemporary Buddhist politics.
The research highlights that key monastic leaders, especially in the 20th century, acted as influential political mediators, supporting nationalist movements and influencing policy decisions.
The study shows that revolutionary movements were often framed through Buddhist concepts of morality and justice, which resonated with the Thai populace's cultural values.
The paper employs a mixed-method approach, integrating qualitative interviews with quantitative electoral data analysis from 2000 to 2020.
The research identifies the late 1930s and the 2006 coup as pivotal moments for shifting Buddhist engagement in Thailand’s political sphere.
In this paper I will argue that the relationship between religion and political order in Thailand changed fundamentally after the trauma of the political crisis of the mid-1970s. It is my thesis that in the aftermath of that crisis 'religion' (satsana), which had been controlled by the state since the time when Siam was begun to be transformed into the modern nation-state of Thailand, fragmented into a diverse number of forms reflective of and contributing to the pluralism of Thai society. This fragmentation of satsana has generated tensions and some open conflicts not only between the governing elites and followers of particular religions but also between different followings. While the fragmentation of religion in the post-1976 period has irrevocably, I believe, undermined the position of the established Buddhist church as the sole embodiment of satsana as a 'pillar' (lak) of the Thai nation, I also maintain that a new 'civil religion' – a 'civil Buddhism' – has emerged that still provides for most Thai the basis for moral reflections about and moral critiques of political action. Although this new civil religion provides space for followers of non-Buddhist religions, I will focus in this paper only on Buddhism because the overwhelming majority of Thai still identify as Buddhist. 1
This paper concerns the role of Kittiwuthō Bhikkhu, a senior Thai monk who in the turbulent 1970s gained wide attention for equating communists (and supposed communists) of being the modern manifestation of Māra, the Buddhist counterpart to the devil. Kittiwuthō maintained in a highly influential sermon that only by destroying communists could Thai Buddhism survive. In this sermon he maintained that communists were not truly human and thus killing them was not a sin. He provided, thus, Buddhist legitimation of a holy war or for what I have termed ‘militant Buddhism’. In my paper I argue that the rise of militant Buddhism in Thailand was a direct consequence of a political crisis in which the moral basis for political authority became deeply problematic. In turn, once militant Buddhism had emerged as a significant ideology, that is, an ideology with wide support, it became a critical element in the efforts to order events to achieve a resolution to this crisis. Implicit in this argument is a theoretical assumption that neither political action nor political ideology can be seen as mere reflections of the other, but that they are related dialectically.
Throughout history, religion has played a significant role in shaping Thai political institutions and practices. Since the formation of the Tai states in central Southeast Asia from the sixth to the ninth centuries, the formation and development of Dvaravati civilization had been shaped by the dominant religious beliefs, among them Buddhism of various sects, which had been transmitted to the kingdoms in various waves and shades. Religion as an organized idea and worldview brought with it new ideas that gave rise to social and political institutions in the Thai kingdoms. The most important ideas and beliefs informing Thai political ideas for about seven centuries are those teaching and beliefs which are originated and have been developed within the framework and structures of Theravada Buddhism. It stresses the relations between men especially along the vertical structure such as relations between the ruler and the ruled, kings and subjects, male and female.
This paper probes beneath the surface of the revitalized religiosity and thriving “civic Buddhism” that is identifiable in parts of Thailand’s rural periphery today as a result of grassroots processes of change. It exemplifies Phra Phaisan Visalo’s assertion that Thai Buddhism is “returning to diversity” and “returning again to the hands of the people.” Using in-depth case studies of three influential local monks in the northeastern province of Yasothon, it develops three cross-cutting themes that are of significance not only as evidence of a process we term “relocalization” but also as issues that lie at the heart of contemporary Thai Theravāda Buddhism. The paper explores how the teachings and specific hermeneutics of influential Buddhist thinkers like Buddhadāsa Bhikkhu, Phra Payutto and Samana Phothirak have been communicated, interpreted, adjusted and implemented by local monks in order to suit specific local realities and needs. Added to this localization of ideas is the localization of practice, wherein the three case studies reveal the quite different approaches and stances adopted by a “folk monk” (Phra Khruu Suphajarawat), a “forest monk” (Phra Mahathongsuk) and what might loosely be termed a “fundamentalist monk” (Phra Phromma Suphattho) at the interface of monastery and village, or the spiritual (supramundane) and social (mundane) worlds. This articulation of Buddhism and localism in turn feeds the debate concerning the appropriateness or otherwise of social engagement and activism in connection with a monk’s individual spiritual development and the normative function of the monk in modern Thai society.
Buddhism in Thailand has been both subjected to integrative policies advanced by the Thai government and manipulated as an instrument for promoting national integration. As a result of reforms instituted at the end of the nineteenth century, several different traditions of Theravada Buddhism were united into a national religious system. In the 1960s, the Thai government has attempted to involve the Buddhist sangha in efforts to promote economic development among the Thai peasantry and assimilation of tribal peoples into Thai society. The first was undertaken under the name of Thammathūt (‘Dhammic ambassador’) and the second as Thammacārik (‘wandering Dhamma’). While the policies designed to integrate Buddhism within Thailand were successful, the efforts to use Thai Buddhism as instrument of national policy are more problematic. Insofar as Buddhism becomes an instrument of national policy, freedom of action by members of the sangha could become severely limited even in the realm of religious affairs.
According to Chaiwat Satha-Anand, since earliest times, human societies have always had conflict; since human beings lived in different socialcultural environments. Phramaha Hansa Dhammahaso also gives his opinions that in our present world, with its diversity of cultures, languages, philosophy and religions, it is possible for conflict to arise between two people or two groups. There are many reasons why human beings and societies are driven to conflict. In fact, conflict that arises in this context could even be a natural and necessary thing in human life. (Phramaha Hansa Dhammahaso, 2009) There are many kinds of conflict. But the conflict which has more power to destroy the people is the political conflict. The political conflict in the world from the past to the present has killed people in a very large number. (*) Ph.D., College of Religious Studies, Mahidol University, Thailand 22 382 BUDDHIST CONTRIBUTION TO GLOBAL PEACE-BUILDING Political conflict, nowadays, is found in many...
ABSTRACT This paper presents the preliminary observations on the situation of Buddhism in Northeast Thailand in the midst of changes and transformations in the various aspects of the contemporary world. Under the influence of diverse factors the structure in the form of Buddhism from the past have immensely adjusted and transformed itself into the present predicaments and circumstances. The paper begins with the history of Buddhism in the Northeast, then presents three prevalent orientations, namely, popular Buddhism, meditational Buddhism and rationalist-humanist Buddhism and finally discusses the deviated practices in vogue at the present moment both among the monastics as well as the lay community. The paper reflects upon the factors behind all changes to the structure of the traditional religious pattern and ends with suggestion as to how Buddhism can make an adaptation in appropriate ways to the current situation that is changing rapidly.
Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia, 2018
Asian Journal of Comparative Law, 2007
The purpose of this article is to address the relationship between Buddhism, constitutional reform and human rights in Thailand. It poses the questions: To what extent is the Thai state Buddhist in character? How are we to describe the relationship between Buddhism and the state? Can and should human rights be supported or presented as being supported by Buddhism, or interpreted according to Buddhist ideas? The historical relationship between the state and the sangha is examined, in which the state used religion to bolster the state's legitimacy. The place of Buddhism, human rights and the Human Rights Commission under the 1997 constitutional reforms is then addressed, in the context in particular of the problem of insurgency in the Southern provinces. It is concluded that the constitution-makers rightly refused to make Buddhism the state religion but that attempts to disseminate human rights understanding in Buddhist terms are justified, provided inter-faith dialogue is part of this process.
Journal of Religion and Violence, 2014
Received in the Western global imaginary as a peaceful non -violent form.of spirituality and alternate non- religion, how does Buddhism function when deployed by an ultra nationalist and racist State? What does it permit? What forces does it unleash? I claim.Thai Buddhism has nihilist consequences exemplified in its murderous indifference aka equinimity