The report provides a detailed analysis of Tuvalu's general election held in 2006 within the framework of its constitutional democracy. It outlines the electoral system, including voter eligibility, the parliamentary structure, and historical electoral changes through no-confidence motions and by-elections. The paper also presents data on registered voters across various islands, detailing election results and candidates, while reflecting on the socio-political dynamics leading to the election outcomes.

2009

Every five years, voters in New Caledonia go to the polls, to elect representatives to three provincial assemblies (North, South and Loyalty Islands) and the local Congress. Following elections on 10 May 2009, there are 31 members of anti-independence parties in the new Congress and 23 independence supporters. The conservative Rassemblement UMP (RUMP), with 13 seats, is the largest political party in the Congress. But behind these bald figures, all is not well for the supporters of France in the South Pacific. Overall, pro-independence parties increased their representation in the Congress by five seats compared to the last elections in 2004. Anti-independence parties dominate the Southern Province Assembly but are largely irrelevant outside the capital Noumea, winning only two of 22 seats in the Northern Assembly and, for the first time ever, losing all their seats in the Loyalty Islands. This result highlights the ongoing polarisation between Noumea and the bush: in spite of migration from rural areas to the capital, European and immigrant Wallisian voters hold sway in the Southern Province, while the indigenous Kanak population (who largely support independence) dominate in the rural provinces. The elections were marked by significant competition between the anti-independence parties, highlighted by a drop in votes for the RUMP, the decline of the Avenir Ensemble party and success for the new Calédonie Ensemble party led by Philippe Gomes, who won the position of President of the Government of New Caledonia. There is also a sharp

1998

Australia and New Zealand, made a conscious attempt to establish trading links with Asian countries. These efforts bore fruit. Almost 11,000 (generally low paying) jobs were created between 1987 and 1992. The tax free zone enterprises, especially in the garment sector, were exporting goods worth around F$200 million. The tourism industry recovered, registering a record 278,000 arrivals by 1990. Unemployment was halved from per cent to 5.7 per cent, and the country enjoyed an average growth rate of 4 per cent. While the links with Fiji's traditional trading partners could not be brokengeography and common sense ensured that-Asian companies moved into Fiji in ways that could not have been foreseen before the coups. Malaysia's MBf company bought one of Fiji's largest companies, Carpenters, and ventured into other areas. A South Korean company began citrus farming in Vanua Levu. Taiwan made inquiries and China explored new trade links. A start had been made, but by the mid-1990s, hopes of continued Asian investment in the Fiji economy had dwindled. With the advent of the currency crisis in 1997, it has vanished altogether. Even in the beginning, however, the Southeast Asian companies, including those from Malaysia, Fiji's new-found friend, were more interested in using the country for 'vulpine extraction rather than solid investment' (Scarr 1997:49). The Falvey Committee The other major task was to restore Fiji to constitutional rule. The Governor General's early attempts to return Fiji to a semblance of constitutionality had foundered. A month later, on 11 June, the interim regime appointed a Constitution Review Committee, chaired by the former Alliance Attorney General, Sir John Falvey (Parliamentary Paper 21 1987). The Coalition refused to cooperate, complaining of under-representation on the 16 member Committee, with only four representatives; the rest (four each) being nominees of the Governor General, the Great Council of Chiefs and the Alliance Party. It was after all, the majority party in parliament. Nor did the Coalition accept the Committee's Terms of Reference which required it to propose 'amendments which will guarantee indigenous Fijian political interests and in so doing bear in mind the best interests of other people in Fiji'. To do so would have compromised its already vulnerable position and undermined its credibility among its supporters. The intimidating environment in which the enquiry was to be carried out was also a problem. Mobility was restricted by decree, soldiers were on the streets, and expression of even mildly critical opinion of the regime invited swift retribution. The Coalition would participate only if the Terms of Reference were revised. The government relented, asking the Falvey Committee to 'review the Constitution of Fiji with the view to proposing to the Governor General any amendments which will guarantee indigenous Fijian political 4 another way interests with full regard to the interests of other people in Fiji.' The change was significant. Despite the constraints and threats, the censorship of the press and the atmosphere of fear and insecurity, the Committee received several hundred submissions from individual citizens, community, cultural and religious organisations, and political parties, at all major centres. The submissions ranged widely, expressing fears and anxieties, outrage at, or enthusiastic support for, what had happened, rather than addressing the purpose of the enquiry which was 'concerned with the central governmental institutions of the State in which Fiji's political interests find their primary representation and protection'. To no one's surprise, the Falvey Committee produced a divided report. The majority recommendations, supported by the nominees of the Great Council of Chiefs, the Alliance Party and two of the Governor General's own representatives, recommended significant changes. Fiji should retain its Dominion status, with the Queen as the Head of State, but the Great Council of Chiefs, and not the Prime Minister (as in the Westminster convention), should nominate the candidate for Governor General, for a term of five years. The Senate should be abolished and its eight Great Council of Chiefs nominees transferred to the House of Representatives where they would continue to exercise their veto over all entrenched legislation affecting Fijian interests. The Lower House should be increased from 52 to 71 seats, comprising, besides the eight Great Council of Chiefs' nominees, 28 Fijian, 22 Indian and eight General Electors members, all elected from communal constituencies, one Rotuman member elected by all Rotumans (living on the island or in Fiji), and a maximum of four members appointed by the Prime Minister acting on his own or on his party's advice. These proposals departed strikingly from the 1970 constitution under which Fiji had gained independence. Then, Fijians and Indo-Fijians had enjoyed parity of representation, each with 22 seats in the Lower House, 12 of which were elected communally and 10 through cross-voting. That principle was rejected on the grounds that 'recognition has been given in a number of international instruments to the appropriateness of positive discrimination for the protection of indigenous rights and in the present circumstances such discrimination is desirable in the interests of the indigenous Fijian people'. Second, all cross-voting was removed. This was a device introduced in sowing the seeds 5 than one elected nationally. The present system has given rise to racial tensions, especially during elections.' This assessment was true because cross-voting was a strange, confusing hybrid. Indians elected on predominantly Fijian votes were seen as traitors by their own community and cheap opportunists by others, like the 'washerman's donkey', belonging neither here nor there. Very few politicians in cross-voting seats commanded broad, multiracial respectonly James Shankar Singh and Semesa Sikivou come to mind. Yet, the Indians elected on Fijian votes, but marginal figures in their own community, were paraded as representatives of the Indian community. The abolition of cross-voting, therefore, was not lamented, but the Committee's prescription of complete communal compartmentalisation of the electorate was worse, based on untenable assumptions of unity and uniformity of interests within each community. Electoral constituencies for the Fijians were replaced by provincial boundaries on the grounds that 'Fijian participation in the electoral system will have more meaning for the Fijian if it reflects the traditional hierarchy and relationships in Fijian society, especially the link between a Fijian and his land area. A system based on the traditional provincial structure will, therefore, be more acceptable to the Fijians'. The definition of 'Fijian' was tightened to include only those registered in the Vola Ni Kaiva Bula, the Register of Native Births. Irrespective of where they lived, Fijians could only vote in the province where their proprietary land unit was situated (that is, the province in which they were registered in the Vola Ni Kawa Bula). The 28 Fijian communal seats would be elected from the 14 Fijian provinces, each returning two members, except Ba which would elect four, and Serua and Namosi one each. This weighting was a not too subtle attempt to shore up the rural constituencies to the disadvantage of Fijians in urban and peri-urban areas where about a third of the Fijian people were living by the late 1980s. The use of provincial boundaries would encourage the emergence of provincial and regional rivalries that many Fijians would come to regret. Another curious feature of the majority recommendation was the 8 another way his own control, while a Council of Advisors would help him run the country. The Alliance and the Coalition would each nominate 11 members to the Council, to be drawn from the elected members of the deposed parliament, with provision for each side to nominate one Senator. Both parties would have equal number of the important portfolios, while six Councillors of State without portfolio would become members of a Constitutional Inquiry Committee. The primary responsibility of this Council would be to oversee the process of constitutional review, its first task being to establish a Constitution Inquiry Committee headed by an independent overseas chairman. In a major breakthrough, unimaginable just a few weeks back, the leaders agreed on broadly acceptable Terms of Reference which would require the Committee to recommend arrangements for the early return to full parliamentary democracy; take full account of the aspirations of the Kaukimoce, Jonetani, allegations against, 39 Kepa, Sailosi, 10 Kermode, Sir Ronald, report on Stephens affair, 41

The Journal of Pacific History, 1998

2013

In 2010, as part of the process of political reform, constitutional amendments were instituted to the 1875 Constitution of Tonga 1 to an extent and depth that have never been done before in Tonga's constitutional history. 2 It was a reform of the constitutional system 3 involving a fundamental shift from a monarchical government system to a system in which the executive is responsible to a representative parliament-where legislative and executive powers are exercised by elected representatives who are ultimately responsible to the electorate. This was a process that was not only political, but also impacted culture and tradition in the sense that the traditional and cultural powers of the Monarch were enshrined and preserved in the Constitution since its promulgation in 1875. Guy Powles attributes the stability record of Tonga to the 'unique amalgam of Tongan chiefly authority and British forms of government and law' which was adopted and accepted by the people of Tonga since 1875. 4 The main purpose of this paper is to provide a short overview of how the 2010 reforms adopted by consensus approach diluted the power of the Monarch by amending the Constitution to effect the devolution of some of his Constitutional executive power to the Legislative Assembly. It should be noted that this approach ensured a relatively peaceful transition and reform in Tonga. 5 However, in looking at the new changes instigated in 2010, there are two aspects of this system that invite close scrutiny, namely:

Victoria University , 2016

The paper analyses the Kiribati traditional and the western democratic political system and discusses how the current modern political system is adopted and accepted as a way of governing the people. It also analyses issues faced in adopting the new system of governing and suggests ways forward in making the two systems work in harmony, as well as, in trying to involve the people in the new western democratic system.

Pacific and Asian Studies, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University. SSGM's key objectives are to encourage scholarship on governance and state-society relations; generate dialogue throughout Melanesia and the Pacific Islands on these issues; and assist in bridging policy and research. The Program's research and outreach focuses on: * Island Melanesia -Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia and Fiji; * the culturally-related region to the west including Papua/Irian Jaya and Timor; and * the countries of the Pacific Islands region to the north and east.

Victoria University of Wellington Law Review

This article is a case note of Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly v The Speaker of National Parliament and the Minister for Provincial Government unreported, High Court, Solomon Islands, cc 309/96, 26 February 1997. The decision is a constitutional law case from the Solomon Islands filed by the applicant in response to the passing of the Provincial Government Act 1996. The author first introduces the political framework of the Solomon Islands, and then discusses the decision itself. The author then comments on the decision: first on the interpretation of the Constitution of the Solomon Islands, secondly on the role of Chiefs and Elders, and finally on the changes in the bench.

Electoral Studies, 2006

Kathmandu School of Law Review

Fiji a country of 300 islands, having multi-ethnic communities, has gone through a number of constitutional changes from Colonial to post independence time. This paper vividly explores the constitutional history of the Fiji along with a critical review on emerging issue of the ‘Draft constitution’ listing the key human rights violation that occurred during the three Coup de Tats and comparing ‘consociational’ to ‘hegemonic’ constitutions.

2018

Three months after the 2nd September 2008 election, Vanuatu was still without a stable government. In the wake of the September polls, there was intense manoeuvring by the major parties involving accusations of 'member stealing' and allegations of the exchange of large sums of money to secure support. A government led by Edward Natapei was formed on September 22 based upon a coalition between the Vanua'aku Pati (VP) and the National United Party (NUP). With a slim 27 to 25 majority in the country's 52 seat Parliament, the new government immediately faced a succession of 'no confidence' challenges, each moved by frustrated opposition MPs who had missed out on positions in cabinet.

AI

HOW CAN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY FUNCTION MORE EFFECTIVELY IN SMALL PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES SUCH AS TUVALU AND NAURU? , 2012

This paper first outlines the underlying causes of instability in Nauru and Tuvalu. The problems that executive instability causes in both countries will also be explained. The third section of this paper considers various legislative and constitutional provisions from other Pacific island countries that could be used to control the problem. The first provision that will be discussed was selected from the Constitution of Kiribati, specifically s 32, concerning the way which a president is elected. This provision was selected not only because of Kiribati’s political stability but also because there have been multiple occasions where this provision has been recommended for adoption in Nauru and Tuvalu. The second provision that has been selected is from the 1963 Electoral Act of Samoa. The newly introduced s 15 F was chosen given that it controls party-hopping in Samoa. In Nauru and Tuvalu’s context such provision would address the issue of floor-crossing which is another cause of instability. The last legal control in this research paper is the 2003 Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidacy Act of Papua New Guinea, which deals with restricting the ability to vote on motions of no confidence. In conclusion, a summary of which control(s) are more suitable for Nauru and Tuvalu will be explained.

2008

The Pacific Island microstate of Tuvalu has acquired a reputation for having a ‘high degree of political stability’ (Somoza 2001, p. 832), and has a top Freedom House ranking for civil rights and political liberties (Freedom House 2007). Yet, despite regular elections and the absence of severe social crises, there has been since 1993 an increasing frequency of ‘no confidence’ challenges in parliament and resulting defeats of governments. Following an early postindependence phase of relative executive stability, Prime Ministers proved much less able to sustain majorities in parliament. Seven different governments took office between 1998 and 2006, and none lasted more than two years. One analysis of the 2004 parliament found that all but two of the then incumbent MPs had defected from one group to another at some point during their tenures (Taafaki 2004, p. 17). ‘Political stability’ was a principle concern encountered during the deliberations of the 2000 Constitutional Review Commit...

2019

This report examines the unique arrangements for the appointment and removal of the President of the Pacific state of Kiribati, in the context of political, historical and social factors. It outlines the potential for similar mechanisms to be introduced in the Isle of Man, while remaining aware of the significance of the constitutional, geographical and cultural differences between the two jurisdictions. The report concludes that the dual effect of a vote of no confidence in Kiribati's model, which triggers not only a new Presidential election but also a fresh general election for the legislature, provides a measure of balance between competing democratic mandates. However it is not the only option, and refinements could be made. Requiring a special majority for a vote of no confidence in the President without triggering a general election may also be considered. Attention should also be paid to identifying the desirable number of presidential candidates, and to how they are to be nominated. Kiribati, officially the Republic of Kiribati, is a sovereign state in the Pacific, constituting 33 islands spread over 3 million km in the central Pacific Ocean, with more than one third of the 72,000 population living on one island.1 It is categorized as part of Micronesia, which includes other island archipelagos, such as Nauru and the Federated States of Micronesia. The permanent population is just over 110,000, more than half of whom live on Tarawa Atoll. The official languages are Taetae ni Kiribati, also known as 'Gilbertese', and English. In 1892, the Gilbert Islands were proclaimed a British Protectorate by Captain Davis of HMS Royalist on behalf of Queen Victoria. It was brought under the jurisdiction of the Western Pacific High Commissioner in 1883,2 and administered by a resident Commissioner. The islands were annexed by Britain in 1916 as part of the colony of Gilbert and Ellice Islands. The basic system of government for the colony was provided by the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Order in Council 1915 (UK), which came into force on 1 January, 1916. This was replaced in 1974 by the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Order in Council 1974 (UK). Whilst recognising traditional island leaders, the colonial institutions of law and government reflected traditional British colonial models. The system of governance became increasingly anglicised during the colonial period and this has had a profound influence on the present political system.

University of Otago, 2020

Ko e foaki ʻo e Konisitutone ʻo Tongá ʻi he 1875, ne hoko ia ko e maka maile ki he hisitōlia ʻo e tukuʻau mai e laó mo e fakalakalaka ʻa Tongá ʻi he ngāue ʻaufuatō ʻa e Tuʻí ko Tupou I. Naʻe hanga ʻe he Konisitutoné ʻo vahevahe e kakai ʻo e fonuá ki he ngaahi faʻunga e tolu-ko e laine faka-Tuʻí; ko e houʻeiki nōpelé pe maʻu tofiʻa e 30; pea mo e kakaí. Naʻe lava peʻe he Konisitutoné, ʻa ia ne tongi pea mei he nofo ʻa kaingá, ke ne pukepuke ʻa Tonga he ngaahi taʻu lahi-ka ʻi heʻene aʻu mai ki he ʻahó ni, kuo liliu. ʻI Nōvema ʻo e 2010, ne hoko ai ha fakalelei faka-konisitutone mo fakapolitikale peá ne hoko ai ke fakaʻatā 'e he Tuʻí ha ʻepoki foʻou mo ha hala fononga foʻou ke fou atu ai ʻa Tonga. Naʻe mokoi ʻa e Tama Tuʻí ke momoi ʻa e konga lahi ʻo hono mafai pulé ki he kau Minisitá ʻo e Kapinetí, ʻa ia ne fili ʻe he Palēmiá pea mei Fale Alea, ka ʻoku maʻu ai e tokolahi ʻe he kau fakafofonga ʻo e kakaí. Ko e taha eni ha vāʻihala foʻou ki he temokalatí, ʻoku ʻikai anga maheni ki ai e ngaahi puleʻanga faka-Tuʻi fakamamani lahí he neongo ʻoku kei kūkūkaunaka e maka tuliki fakaefonuá, ka kuo pau pe ke fai e fefaʻuhi pea mo e ngaahi fakaʻamu foʻoú pea ʻe toe lahi ange ʻa e fakalakalaká ʻo kau ai ʻa e fiemaʻu ko ia ke fai e liliu faka-politikale. Ko e pepá ni ʻoku hoko ia ko e fuofua ngāue ʻo tānaki ʻilo ai pe ki he ʻēlia ko ení, ʻaki hono ʻanalaiso ʻo e fakalelei faka-konisitutone mo e faka-politikale ʻo e 2010 ʻo ngāueʻaki e founga fakalao ka ʻi he taimi tatau ʻoku ngāueʻaki ai pe mo e ngaahi fakakaukau tuʻufonua ʻa Tongá. ʻOku makatuʻunga eni ke fakaʻatalahi ʻetau vakai ki he talanoa ko ia ʻoku pehē ne ohi ʻe Tonga e ngaahi faʻunga fakatemokalati ʻi he 2010. ʻI hono toe fakamahino angé, ko e talanoa ʻo e liliu fakapolitikalé, ko e talanoa ia ki he Tuʻí pea mo e Konisitutoné pea mo e ngaahi founga ʻena fengāueʻaki ke paotoloaki e pule mo e mafai e Tuʻí ʻi Tonga. Koeʻuhí ko e mahuʻinga ko ia ke tau aʻusia e faʻunga faka-konisitutone faka-Tongá, ngaahi meʻa ne hoko ʻi he liliu faka-politikale ʻo e 2010 ʻi Tongá, pea pehē ki he ola ʻo e ngāue ko iá-ʻoku ngāueʻaki leva ʻe he pepá ni ʻa e ngaahi tefitoʻi fakakaukau ʻo e C h a p t e r 1 2 It is interesting that the Monarch is now using the Opening Address of the Legislative Assembly as a medium to overtly communicate his views of Cabinet's performance and activities. In contrast, before 2010, the Opening Address was used by the Monarch to declare Government's (previously comprised Privy Council and Cabinet) policies, development programmes and priorities. 3 Kanivatonga News, "King may be misinformed about gov't matters after refusing PM's meeting request since dissolution, source claims" 04 June 2019 <kanivatonga.nz/2019/06/king-maybe misinformed about -govt-mattersafter-refusing-pms-meeting-requests-since-dissolution-…>. 4 Rodney C Hills, "Tonga's Constitution and the Changing State" in Regime Change and Regime Maintenance in Asia and the Pacific, Discussion Paper No. 4

The Round Table, 2010

The President of Fiji abrogated the 1997 Constitution in April 2009 and the country was suspended from the Pacific Islands Forum and the Commonwealth, despite Fiji disclosing a potential time line for general elections by 2014 under a new open-list proportional voting system. The European Union subsidy for Fiji's sugar industry was also frozen following accusations that Fiji had breached the 2007 revised Cotonou Agreement, where it promised to hold elections by 2009. This article charts the tensions between the post-2006 coup Fiji government and the 1997 Constitution caused by the legal action from the deposed government, and differences with the Fiji Military Forces Commander Commodore Frank Bainimarama over a quick return to democracy push from the Pacific Islands Forum, the Commonwealth and the European Union. Continued diplomatic pressure from Forum members, Australia and New Zealand increased tensions as Fiji deported the High Commissioners of these two countries in November 2009 and imposed Public Emergency Regulations that curbed freedom of expression of local critics. In what could be seen as a deepening of military rule, Bainimarama clarified in early 2010 that the military would continue to monitor the elected government after the proposed 2014 election and barred mainstream political parties from participating in any future political forum or general elections.

Electoral reform took place in New Zealand and Thailand during 1990s. Prior the reform, both countries used the plurality system then changed to mixed-member electoral system. However, New Zealand changed to Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP), while Thailand changed to Mixed-Member Majoritarianism (MMM). This paper aims to study why the electoral reform took place in both countries, and why New Zealand still keep supporting the MMP while Thailand changed the components of the Parallel Voting twice. The result found that electoral reform in New Zealand is the 'elite-mass' interaction reform, while electoral reform in Thailand is the 'elite imposition' reform

Confronting Fiji Futures, 2016

MA Thesis, 2017

Divided societies have pursued different paths in their attempts to design constitutions that settle ethnic tensions while at the same time promoting and consolidating democracy. Some of these projects have been successful while others have not. Constitutional and democratic design in a divided society has been a difficult process. The negotiation and accommodation of group interests have often been characteristics of the development of divided societies such as South Africa, Lebanon, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina amongst others. The accommodation of contending demands to political and socio-economic rights by diverse ethnic groups – and the strain they present for constitutionality and democracy – has been one the immense challenges confronted by societies that are described by long lasting ethnic division and conflict. Since gaining independence from the United Kingdom in 1970, Fiji politics have been marked by a pattern of coups and constitutional reform. Fiji has negotiated various constitutional arrangements with a view to meeting group claims to difference and equality. While the 1970 and 1997 Constitutions sought a form of multicultural compromise with the realities of Fiji’s demographic make-up, demands for continued ethno-political paramountcy by sections of the indigenous Fijian (iTaukei) population led to the overthrow of the democratically elected governments in 1987 and 2000. The 1990 Constitution institutionalized the privileged ethno-political status of indigenous Fijians while the coup of 2006 ushered in a period of political and constitutional reform that has sought to promote a more civic and ‘ethnically blind’ set of constitutional arrangements. The main research question is: does Fiji’s new ‘ethnically-blind’ constitution increase the likelihood of democratic stability? In order to answer this question, this thesis analyses the failures of Fiji’s earlier constitutional frameworks and examines influential continuities and discontinuities in Fiji’s politics and governance.

The evolution of government in Pacific islands Parliamentary practice in the Pacific Islands has not received much scholarly attention. A number of capacity-building projects are underway to improve administrative practice. This paper reviews current development assistant projects as well as the interplay between executive and legislative power that remains a feature of most parliaments in the region. It includes a review the Pacific islands context, consideration of recent parliamentary dynamics, and a review of parliamentary development activities.

Electoral Studies, 1987

The former British colony of Fiji, situated in the southwest Pacific ocean, held its fifth postindependence general election from 4 to 11 April 1987. When the final votes were counted, on 12 April, one of the longest reigning governments in the Commonwealth, that of Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara's Alliance Party finally conceded defeat to a coalition of parties led by a 52-year-old medical dcctor, Dr Timoci Bavadra. The coalition, made up of the Indian-backed National Federation Party (NFP) and the multi-racial Fiji Labour Party (FLP) won 28 of the 52 seats in the House of Representatives. The right-wing Alliance Party which had ruled Fiji since independence from Britain in 1970, and mainly backed by indigenous Fijians, won 24 seats. The outcome of the election seemed to promise a new era of multi-racial politics in Fiji. But for many rural Fijians the results signified the beginning of 'Indian rule' and for many Indians a dream finally come true, a share in the political kingdom. The election had brought an Indian-dominated government to power, ending 17 years' rule by the indigenous Melanesian Fijians, mostly chiefs whose forefathers had ceded Fiji to Queen Victoria in 1874. Several factors contributed to the coalition's victory. The Alliance defeat was largely due to the complex one man, four-vote electoral system; the Fijian urban middle-class challenge to the legitimacy of chiefly rule coupled with the anti-Indian campaign launched by the Fijian Nationalist Party (FNP); the presence of a small but influential Western United Front (WUF)-an anti-Alliance splinter regional Fijian party led by a high Fijian chief, Ratu Osea Gavidi; and most important of all, the fact that for the first time a Melanesian Fijian, Bavadra, was leading a major opposition party in a general election. Moreover the Indians retained a remarkable degree of internal cohesion. Yet the overall election results highlighted one aspect of politics in Fiji-the importance, and crucial factor, of race-a subject whose origins can be traced to the period as a British colony. The history of 96 years of British rule in Fiji is, broadly speaking, one of benevolent apartheid. It has kept apart the settler Europeans, the indigenous Fijians and the Indians, who were originally brought from British India in 1879 to work on the sugar plantations as 'coolie labourers'. Later, on independence, the Constitution of Fiji codified these vestiges of racialism. Today politics is race and race is politics in Fiji's multi-racial setting of 7 14,000 population where the Indians (48.6%) slightly outnumber the native Fijians (46.2%) and minority European, part-European, Chinese and other groups (normally referred to as general electors). The ethnic groups have preserved many of the social customs, language, religion, and etiquette of their forebears. But these groups have for the most part, adopted English language and aspects of English manners. Ethnic affiliation, however, remains the main basis of social, economic, and political identity. The Fijian society is traditionally hier

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