American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 78:3 (2004): 425-443.
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20 pages
I outline features of the emerging consensus that philosophy has now liberated itself from the horizon of onto-theology with respect to the history of metaphysics. I draw on Jean-Marc Narbonne, Hénologie, Ontologie et Ereignis (Plotin-Proclus-Heidegger), conferences presented at La métaphysique: son histoire, sa critique, ses enjeux held at Laval University in 1998, and other recent work, showing why Heidegger’s horizon does not encompass ancient or medieval Platonic or Aristotelian philosophy. Noting that both French Neoplatonic studies after Bréhier and Heidegger in Identität und Differenz were opposing Hegelian accounts of the history of philosophy, I suggest that: (1) both were reacting to the same problem, (2) French Neoplatonism was motivated by Heidegger’s questions, (3) Heidegger’s account of Being beyond the difference of Being and beings resembles the Neoplatonic account of the One.
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This text looks into the question of God, and Heidegger's critique of the onto-theo-logical constitution of metaphysics. The specific goal is to see the setting of contra-distinction that exposes the differentiation between Hegel and Heidegger.
https://www.zetabooks.com/studia-phaenomenologica-2020-volume-20-phenomenology-and-the-history-of-platonism.html The onto-agathological fold of metaphysics: Aristotle, Plato and Heidegger-DRAFT Abstract-This paper tries to identify from Heidegger a figure of the history of metaphysics in Plato, which I call onto-agathological, parallel to the famous onto-theological figure. From a text from the 1935 course of "Einführung in die Metaphysik", I show that the history of metaphysics is not only the Aristotelian history of onto-theology, but also for Heidegger the Platonic history of the supremacy of good over being, an onto-agathological history where the concept of "fold" plays a decisive role: fold within the being itself that the good transcends but in which it participates, which responds to the onto-theological fold also within being. I thus develop the hypothesis of another history of metaphysics, in which I show the strong phenomenological content, against the Neokantians Windelband and Rickert. This article thus aims to show the Platonic content of phenomenology from the famous text of Republic 509C on the Agathon.
2024
The article analyzes Heidegger's critique of Aristotle's bipartite approach to being and entities in the genesis of Western metaphysics. Heidegger challenges Aristotle's analysis, arguing that the integration of entities as a whole and particular entities inphysis led to a disregard for ontological difference. The German philosopher proposed that the bifurcation of being resulted in the metaphysical tradition becoming an "ontotheology." In contrast, Heidegger, through phenomenological hermeneutics, reintroduced the question of being, emphasizing the understanding of beings through the pre-logical way Daseinexists in the world, without relying on an eternal and immutable foundation
This paper examines Heidegger’s concept of “facticity” in his writings from the 1920s. Heidegger’s focus on this concept, the author suggests, is keyed to Heidegger’s own rethinking of existence in terms of Luther’s and Paul’s interpretations of early Christianity. In this context, then, we gain new insight into Heidegger’s notions of temporality, of Jeweiligkeit, and also his critical appropriation of Aristotle.
This article aims to treat the uniqueness of religious thought as a subject of reflection by reference to Martin Heidegger’s philosophy since his views incorporate such a deeply rooted analysis. In pursuing the subject the article inquiries into the possibility of a non-metaphysical religious mode of thought in considering Heidegger’s critique of traditional Western metaphysics, his assessments on the onto-theological and humanistic character of metaphysics, and his evaluations on the meaning of true thinking pursuant to the mode of thought he calls ontological. With regard to our assessments of religious thought, we take Heidegger’s onto-theological criticisms as a point of departure. However, considering his philosophy and manner of thinking, we try to reveal what kind of possibilities the Heideggerian view can provide us in terms of religious thinking. Therefore, it is important that our assessments of religious thought not be interpreted as identical to Heidegger’s philosophy but rather as ideas that he might have potentially incorporated into his own philosophy.
Open Theology, 2021
The Origin," one of Martin Heidegger's most important notions after 1934, is tightly related to being-historical thinking, and to the peculiar kind of divinity that being-historical thinking indicates. However, the notion of the Origin appears already in Heidegger's early Freiburg lectures (given between 1919 and 1923), thus placing it among the fundamentals of his early thought. This article argues that Heidegger's project of fundamental ontology emerges from that early notion of the Origin, preparing the way for its flourishing in his later thinking. Attending to Heidegger's early notion of the Origin, I suggest, reveals a unique feature of Heidegger's thinking; namely, an element of genuine religiosity ungraspable in terms of both philosophy and theology. Thus, rather than interpreting fundamental ontology as a transcendental project encompassing a de-theologized version of early Christianity, it should be taken as an attempt to think the truth of the Origin, thus preparing the way for the genuine religiosity of Heidegger's later thought. In this light, a unique sense of divinity underlies Heidegger's lectures between 1919 and 1925; a sense which can only be comprehended through Heidegger's triple sense schema (enactment-relation-content).
Global Journal of HUMAN-SOCIAL SCIENCE: A Arts & Humanities - Psychology Volume 21 Issue 1, 2021
In this article I attempt to present Heidegger's conception of the ontotheology in his late thought. I based mainly on his famous book "Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)." In ontotheology Heidegger needs the figure of "the last god" to show the very path to being itself. It is not the God of religion, but the proper god of metaphysics, the god of other beginning, which using a sign (Wink) points Dasein the right direction. It seems to be a key to the meaning of ontotheology itself. The problem of ontotheology is presented against the backdrop of several of the most important contexts of Heidegger's thought manifested in "Contributions...": the problem of being itself and the path to it or the problem of the last god and his sign.
2001
Martin Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics, first published in 1953, is known for its incisive analysis of the Western understanding of Being, its original interpretations of Greek philosophy and poetry, and its vehement political statements. This companion to the Introduction to Metaphysics presents an overview of Heidegger’s text and a variety of perspectives on its interpretation from more than a dozen highly respected contributors. In the editors’ introduction to the book, Richard Polt and Gregory Fried alert readers to the important themes and problems of Introduction to Metaphysics. The contributors then offer original essays on three broad topics: the question of Being, Heidegger and the Greeks, and politics and ethics. Included here: Table of Contents, Introduction, Index.
Stasis , 2024
The essay proposes a new reconstruction of Heidegger’s metaphilosophy. Providing a common explanation to a variety of Heidegger’s pronouncements on the nature of his discipline in seminars and public addresses, the essay stresses their ties to the phenomenological doctrine of Being and Time. My presentation spans four major theses: (1) Philosophy is actual in the practice of philosophizing, understood as an activity of intrinsic worth; (2) The essential procedure of philosophizing is clarification of experience; (3) The medium of philosophizing is conceptual knowledge; (4) The goal of philosophizing is non-conceptual: a “fundamental attunement.” Focusing on the apparent tension between (3) and (4), I argue that the structural relations between the conceptual and the non-conceptual elements in Heidegger’s metaphilosophy are best accounted for in terms of the duality of understanding (Verstehen) and being-attuned (Befindlichkeit) in the existential analytic. In conclusion, I suggest that the metaphilosophical vision this analysis yields is faithful to the existential promise of philosophy and provides the conceptual resources to defend its essential status as a mode of human realization.
It would be simplistic to view metaphysics merely as a philosophical discipline with its own specific topic, such as the explication of the being of entities, the explica tion of human experience in its entirety, etc. However, metaphysics does have an immanent tendency to be the "whole" of philosophy "at once", for its analysis sets the frame of the meaningfulness of any experience and of any theoretical or practical attitu de. The task that defines metaphysics is the effort to explain, and thus to ground, the experiential world as a meaningful life-environment. Already from the Aristotelian beginning, this defining task is pursued within metaphysics by following two differen t viewpoints: first, the viewpoint of the relational framework, which by its perspective aims at meaningfully justifying the structural features of the environment as a whole; and second, the viewpoint of the ground, aiming at that which provides support f or all meaningfulness.

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The paper reveals Heidegger's misinterpretation of Neoplatonism, suggesting he forced it into a framework that neglects its specific character, as seen in the works of Pierre Hadot and Jean-Marc Narbonne.
The author notes that philosophy is overcoming Heidegger's restrictive historical narrative, particularly through reevaluations by scholars at Université Laval, which began in 1998 and highlights Aquinas’s connections to Neoplatonism.
It suggests that Aquinas’s thought has been increasingly reinterpreted through Neoplatonic lenses, particularly contributing to debates around 'onto-theology' and its connection to contemporary metaphysical discussions.
There is a emerging challenge to the onto-theological framework that Heidegger established, allowing for more diverse philosophical and theological perspectives, especially concerning the transcendence of the divine.
The paper asserts that modern metaphysics, as characterized by Heidegger, is rooted in a mischaracterization influenced by thinkers like Wolff, Kant, and Hegel, thus requiring a reevaluation of its historical foundations.
International journal of philosophical studies, 2001
Modern Theology, 2018
Without denying legitimate criticisms of metaphysics that have been made since the time of the Reformation, the purpose of this essay is to challenge prevailing assumptions in continental philosophy and theology since Heidegger that the age of metaphysics is now over and should be replaced as "first philosophy" either by some version of phenomenology, such as that offered by Jean-Luc Marion, or by a pragmatic linguistic approach in the spirit of Wittgenstein, such as that offered by Kevin Hector. Notwithstanding the genuine merits of their proposals and concerns, it is argued here that metaphysics is not so easily dismissed, and that there is, in fact, a way to do metaphysics otherwise-a way that was taken by Erich Przywara, whose analogical metaphysics is characterized not only by an analogy between God and creation, the analogia entis, but also by an analogy between philosophical and theological metaphysics. In this, form, it is argued, not only is metaphysics impervious to the standard criticisms of "onto-theology," it also turns out to be, at its core, nothing other than a Christological metaphysics. We need not fear that the work of metaphysics has to be begun again, but it is equally true that it has to be reviewed and renewed in every age in relation of the difficulties and problems of the age.
Proceedings of the ... annual meeting of the Heidegger Circle, 1980
Aoristo - International Journal of Phenomenology, Hermeneutics and Metaphysics, 2020
In Heidegger the ontological difference is one between any intra-worldly entities and the very horizon of their appearing, the world itself. Both E. Fink and J.-P. Sartre elaborated on this, and so further did Deleuze; even his and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus draws ultimately on the utterly Heideggerian idea of an ontological difference as one between world and worldly entities. Now the very architecture of traditional (Wolffian) special metaphysics – although programmatically entity-oriented – gets thereby affected, namely in its first part, rational psychology. From Heidegger through Fink and Sartre until Deleuze, the move of opening the metaphysical dimension of thought to the transcendental one in order to do justice to the ontological difference goes along with that of blowing psychology up (and indeed psyche itself) within the very domain of metaphysics.
2017
both advanced a philosophical hermeneutics. These two thinkers, as teacher and student, share much in common, yet their hermeneutics are also divergent. I argue that their commonalities and differences are both markedly present in their contrasted interpretations of Plato. Heidegger argued that Plato was the founder of onto-theological metaphysics because Socrates' program of education in the Republic required a reorientation of the soul to the Idea of the Good.
Heidegger’s later philosophy is marked by two conflicting claims about phenomenology. On the one hand, phenomenology and philosophy generally is tasked with “responding to the claim of what is to be thought” in a novel and unprecedented manner. On the other hand, Heidegger recognizes that there have been earlier attempts at thus doing justice to phenomena; in the ontological commitments of earlier thinkers, Heidegger finds accounts of the “things themselves,” each of which has different implications for what phenomenology should concern itself with. Phenomenology, as Heidegger conceives it, should thus both incorporate the history of philosophy and exceed it, yet it is unclear how these ideas can be reconciled. This chapter calls this problem the “dilemma of the historicity of phenomenology” and identifies different versions of it in Heidegger’s works after 1935/6.
The Experience of Truth - The Truth of Experience: Between Phenomenology and Hermeneutics
The spirit of this book is explorative. It meets the contemporary challenge posed by experience and truth with a critical openness that allows for the full complexity of these concepts to be investigated. The distinction between experience and truth has become subject to finitude; how then can these words and concepts be defined? What might be understood by experience and truth, when the distinction between them is not transformed once and for all (eternally), but once and again (historically)? The contributors to the book investigate a wide range of questions revolving around this challenge to the contemporary understanding of experience and truth. They do so through the perspectives of phenomenology and hermeneutics, while also shedding new light on phenomenological and hermeneutic thought as such – on the distinction between phenomenology and hermeneutics, as well as on the interrelation between such philosophical thought and other fields of thought and culture.