This article is about recent unrest and fighting in Xinjiang. For the uprisings and battles in Xinjiang during the 1930s and 1940s, seeXinjiang Wars.
This article needs to beupdated. The reason given is: Updates needed past April 27, 2021. Please help update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information.(March 2024)
TheChinese government has denied charges of genocide and other human rights abuses, characterising the centres as deradicalisation and integration programs and were the subject of dispute at the 44th session of theUnited Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC); 39 countries condemned China's treatment of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang in June 2020.[33] Similarly, in July, a group of 45 nations issued a competing letter to the UNHRC, defending China's treatment of both Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang.[34] Various groups and media organizations worldwide have disputeddenials that human rights violations have occurred.[d]
Xinjiang is a large central-Asian region within the People's Republic of China comprising numerous minority groups: 45% of its population areUyghurs, and 40% areHan.[44] Its heavily industrialised capital, Ürümqi, has a population of more than 2.3 million, about 75% of whom are Han, 12.8% are Uyghur, and 10% are from other ethnic groups.[44]
In general, Uyghurs and the mostly Han government disagree on which group has greater historical claim to the Xinjiang region: Uyghurs believe their ancestors were indigenous to the area, whereas government policy considers Xinjiang to have belonged to China since around 200 BC duringHan Dynasty.[45] According to Chinese policy, Uyghurs are classified as aNational Minority; they are considered to be no more indigenous to Xinjiang than the Han, and have no special rights to the land under the law.[45] During theMao era the People's Republic oversaw themigration into Xinjiang of millions of Han, who have been accused of economically dominating the region,[46][47][48][49] although a 2008 survey on both ethnic groups has contradicted the allegation.[50]
Current Chinese minority policy is based onaffirmative action, and has reinforced a Uyghur ethnic identity that is distinct from the Han population.[51][52] However,Human Rights Watch describes a "multi-tiered system of surveillance, control, and suppression of religious activity" perpetrated by state authorities.[17] It is estimated that over 100,000 Uyghurs are currently held in political "re-education camps",[18] and far-reaching surveillance operations using drones produced byDJI are being undertaken.[53] China justifies such measures as a response to the terrorist threat posed by extremist separatist groups.[19] These policies, in addition to some long-standing prejudices between the Han and Uyghurs,[54][55][56][57][58] have sometimes resulted in tension between the two ethnic groups.[59] As a result of the policies, the Uyghurs' freedoms of religion and of movement have been curtailed,[60][61] and many of them believe the government downplays their history and traditional culture.[45][failed verification]
On the other hand, some Han citizens view Uyghurs as benefiting from special treatment, such as preferential admission to universities and exemption from the (now abandoned)one-child policy,[62] and as "harbouring separatist aspirations".[63] Nonetheless, it was observed in 2013 that at least in the workplace, Uyghur-Han relations seemed relatively friendly,[64] and a survey from 2009 suggested that 70% of Uyghur respondents had Han friends while 82% of Han had Uyghur friends.[65]
Due to exemption from the one-child policy, Uyghur numbers increased from 5.5 million in 1980s to over 12 million in 2017.[66]Ethnic minority couples were paid incentives to keep their family size below the legal limit and accept sterilisation after three children preceding the removal of the preferential policy.[67]
Islamic leaders during the Cultural Revolution were forced to take part in acts against their religion, such as eating pork.[68] China does not enforce the law against children attending mosques on non-Uyghurs outside Xinjiang.[69][70] Since the 1980s Islamic private schools (Sino-Arabic schools (中阿学校)) have been permitted by the Chinese government in Muslim areas, excluding Xinjiang because of its separatist sentiment.[e][72][73][74]
Hui Muslims employed by the state, unlike Uyghurs, are allowed to fast duringRamadan. The number of Hui going onHajj is expanding and Hui women are allowed to wear veils, but Uyghur women are discouraged from wearing them.[75] Muslim ethnic groups in different regions are treated differently by the Chinese government with regard to religious freedom. Religious freedom exists for Hui Muslims, who can practice their religion, build mosques and have their children attend them; more restrictions are placed on Uyghurs in Xinjiang.[76] Hui religious schools are allowed, and an autonomous network of mosques and schools run by a Hui Sufi leader was formed with the approval of the Chinese government.[77][78] According toThe Diplomat, Uyghur religious activities are curtailed but Hui Muslims are granted widespread religious freedom; therefore, Chinese governmental policy is directed atUyghur separatism.[79]
In the last two decades of the 20th century, Uyghurs in Turpan were treated favourably by China with regard to religion; while Kashgar andHotan were subject to more stringent government control.[80][81][82] Uyghur and Han Communist officials in Turpan turned a blind eye to the law, allowing Islamic education of Uyghur children.[83][84] Religious celebrations and theHajj were encouraged by the Chinese government for UyghurCommunist Party members, and 350 mosques were built in Turpan between 1979 and 1989.[85] As a result, Han, Hui and the Chinese government were then viewed more positively by Uyghurs in Turpan.[86] In 1989, there were 20,000 mosques in Xinjiang.[87] Until separatist disturbances began in 1996, China allowed people to ignore the rule prohibiting religious observance by government officials.[88] Large mosques were built with Chinese government assistance in Ürümqi.[89] While rules proscribing religious activities were enforced in southern Xinjiang, conditions were comparatively lax in Ürümqi.[90]
Armed police and metal detector at the Kargilik bazaar
According toThe Economist, in 2016 Uyghurs faced difficulties travelling within Xinjiang and live in fenced-off neighbourhoods with checkpoint entrances. In southern Ürümqi, each apartment door has aQR code so police can easily see photos of the dwelling's authorized residents.[91]
In 2017, overseas Uyghur activists claimed that new restrictions were being imposed, including people being fined heavily or subjected to programmes of "re-education" for refusing to eat during fasting in Ramadan, the detention of hundreds of Uyghurs as they returned fromMecca pilgrimages, and many standard Muslim names, such as Muhammad, being banned for newborn children.[92][93] It was claimed that Han officials had been assigned to reside in the homes of those with interned Uyghur family members as part of the government's "Pair Up and Become Family" program.[94][95] There were also reportedly separate queues for Uyghurs and outsiders, where the former needed to get their identity cards checked at numerous points.[96]
In 2021Amnesty International released a 160-page report on the human rights violations occurring in Xinjiang. It intensively describes China's collection of thebiometric data and surveillance of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.[97] Additionally in 2021PBS' Frontline discusses the extensive surveillance and facial recognition software being utilized in Xinjiang. From QR codes to facial recognition cameras and "home stays," by government officials. They estimate nearly two million Uyghurs are being detained across over 12,000 camps.[98]
The history of the region has become highly politicised, with both Chinese and nationalist Uyghur historians frequently overstating the extent of their groups' respective ties to the region.[99][100] In reality, it has been home to many groups throughout history, with the Uyghurs arriving fromCentral Asia in the 10th century.[101] Although variousChinese dynasties have at times exerted control over parts of what is now Xinjiang,[102] the region as it exists today came under Chinese rule as a result of thewestward expansion of theManchu-ledQing dynasty, which also saw the annexation ofMongolia andTibet.[103]
EarlyQing rule was marked by a "culturally pluralist" approach, with a prohibition on Chinese settlement in the region, and indirect rule through supervised local officials.[103][104] An increased tax burden placed on the local population due to rebellions elsewhere in China later led to a number ofHui-led Muslim rebellions.[100][105] The region was subsequentlyrecaptured, and was established as an official province in 1884.[citation needed]
Near the end of their rule the Qing tried to colonize Xinjiang along with other parts of the imperial frontier. To accomplish this goal they began a policy ofsettler colonialism by whichHan Chinese were resettled on the frontier.[106]
After the 1928 assassination ofYang Zengxin, governor of the semi-autonomousKumul Khanate in east Xinjiang under theRepublic of China, he was succeeded byJin Shuren. On the death of the Kamul KhanMaqsud Shah in 1930, Jin abolished the Khanate entirely and took control of the region aswarlord.[107] Corruption, appropriation of land, and the commandeering of grain and livestock by Chinese military forces were all factors which led to the eventualKumul Rebellion that established theFirst East Turkestan Republic in 1933.[108][109][110] In 1934, it was conquered by warlordSheng Shicai with theaid of the Soviet Union. Sheng's leadership was marked by heavy Soviet influence, with him openly offering Xinjiang's valuable natural resources in exchange for Soviet help in crushing revolts, such as in1937.[111] Although already in use,[f] it was in this period that the term "Uyghur" was first used officially over the generic "Turkic", as part of an effort to "undermine potential broader bases of identity" such as Turkic or Muslim. In 1942, Sheng sought reconciliation with the Republic of China, abandoning the Soviets.[citation needed]
In 1944, theIli Rebellion led to theSecond East Turkestan Republic. Though direct evidence of Soviet involvement remains circumstantial, and rebel forces were primarily made up of Turkic Muslims with the support of the local population, the new state was dependent on the Soviet Union for trade, arms, and "tacit consent" for its continued existence.[113] When the Communists defeated the Republic of China in theChinese Civil War, the Soviets helped the CommunistPeople's Liberation Army (PLA) recapture it, and it wasannexed by the People's Republic in 1949.
The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region was established in 1955.[114]
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, between 60,000 and 200,000 Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other minorities fled China to the USSR, largely as a result of theGreat Leap Forward.[115][116] As theSino-Soviet split deepened, the Soviets initiated an extensive propaganda campaign criticising China, encouraging minority groups to migrate – and later revolt – and attempting to undermine Chinese sovereignty by appealing to separatist tendencies. In 1962, China stopped issuing exit permits for Soviet citizens, as the Soviet consulate had been distributing passports to enable the exodus.[117] A resulting demonstration inYining was met with open fire by the PLA, sparking further protests and mass defections. China responded to these developments by relocating non-Han populations away from the border, creating a "buffer zone" which would later be filled with Han farmers andBingtuan militia.[115][116][117] Tensions continued to escalate throughout the decade, with ethnic guerrilla groups based inKazakhstan frequently raiding Chinese border posts,[118][119] and Chinese and Soviet forcesclashing on the border in 1969.[118][120][121]
From the 1950s to the 1970s, a state-orchestrated mass migration into Xinjiang has raised the number of Han from 7% to 40% of the population, exacerbating ethnic tensions.[122] On the other hand, a declining infant-mortality rate, improved medical care and non-applicability of China's one-child policy on minorities have helped the Uyghur population in Xinjiang grow from four million in the 1960s to eight million in 2001.[123]
In 1968, theEast Turkestan People's Party was the largest militant Uyghur separatist organization, and may have received support from the Soviet Union.[124][125][126] During the 1970s, the Soviets likely supported theUnited Revolutionary Front of East Turkestan (URFET),[5] which issued a series of press releases responsible for creating the impression of an active, organized resistance movement, despite involving only a handful of individuals.[127][128][129] Its founder, Yusupbek Mukhlis came to be resented by other Uyghur groups for "exaggerating Uyghur involvement in militant activities", including falsely claiming credit for terrorist attacks.[130]
Xinjiang's importance to China increased after the 1979Soviet assistance to Afghanistan, which led to China's perception of being encircled by the Soviets.[131] China supported the Afghanmujahideen during the Soviet assistance to theDemocratic Republic of Afghanistan and broadcast reports of Soviet atrocities committed on Afghan Muslims to Uyghurs to counter Soviet broadcasts to Xinjiang that Soviet Muslim minorities had a better life.[132] Anti-Soviet Chinese radio broadcasts targeted Central Asian ethnic minorities, such as the Kazakhs.[133] The Soviets feared disloyalty by the non-Russian Kazakh, Uzbek, and Kyrgyz in the event of a Chinese invasion of Soviet Central Asia, and Russians were taunted by Central Asians: "Just wait till the Chinese get here, they'll show you what's what!"[134] Chinese authorities viewed Han migrants in Xinjiang as vital to defence against the Soviet Union.[135] China established camps to train the Afghan mujahideen near Kashgar and Hotan, investing hundreds of millions of dollars in small arms, rockets, mines, and anti-tank weapons.[136] During the 1980s, student demonstrations and riots against police action assumed an ethnic aspect, and the April 1990Baren Township riot has been acknowledged as a turning point.[137]
The Soviet Union supported Uyghur nationalist propaganda and Uyghur separatist movements against China. Soviet historians claimed that the Uyghur native land was Xinjiang; and Uyghur nationalism was promoted by Soviet versions of history on turcology.[138] This included support of Uyghur historians such asTursun Rakhimov, who wrote more historical works supporting Uyghur independence, claiming that Xinjiang was an entity created by China made out of the different parts of East Turkestan and Zungharia.[139] Bellér-Hann describes these Soviet Uyghur historians were waging an "ideological war" against China, emphasizing the "national liberation movement" of Uyghurs throughout history.[140] TheCPSU supported the publication of works which glorified the Second East Turkestan Republic and theIli Rebellion against China in its anti-China propaganda war.[141]
China's "Strike Hard" campaign[g] against crime, beginning in 1996, saw thousands of arrests, as well as executions, and "constant human rights violations", and also marked reduction in religious freedom.[142] These policies, and a feeling of political marginalization, contributed to the fomentation of groups who carried out numerous guerrilla operations, including sabotage and attacks on police barracks, and occasionally even acts of terrorism including bomb attacks and assassinations of government officials.
A February 1992 Ürümqi bus bombing, attributed to the Shock Brigade of the Islamic Reformist Party, resulted in three deaths.[142]
On 28 October 2013, five Uyghursdrove a jeep into Beijing's Tiananmen Square, set the gas tank on fire, killed two civilians and injured more than forty bystanders.[143] These Uyghurs had jihadist flags and there was evidence of their ties to ETIM.[143]
A police roundup and execution of 30 suspected separatists duringRamadan resulted in large demonstrations in February 1997, characterised as riots by Chinesestate media outletChina Daily[144] and peaceful by Western media.[145] The demonstrations culminated in the 5 FebruaryGhulja incident, in which a People's Liberation Army (PLA) crackdown led to at least nine deaths.[146] 25 FebruaryÜrümqi bus bombings killed nine people and injured 68. Responsibility for the attacks was acknowledged by Uyghur exile groups.[147][148]
In Beijing's Xidan district, a bus bomb killed two people on 7 March 1997; Uyghur separatists claimed responsibility for the attack.[149] Uyghur participation in the bombing was dismissed by the Chinese government, and the Turkish-based Organisation for East Turkistan Freedom admitted responsibility for the attack.[142][148] The bus bombings triggered a change in policy, with China acknowledging separatist violence.[150] The situation in Xinjiang quieted until mid-2006, although ethnic tensions remained.[151]
In 2005, Uygur authorNurmemet Yasin was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for inciting separatism following his publication of an allegorical short story, "The Blue Pigeon".[152]
The number of violent incidents and uprisings increased from the 1990s, peaking in 2014, although their extent is difficult to confirm independently due to restrictions on the access of independent observers and international journalists.[153] Nonetheless, the majority of events during this period were characterised as spontaneous clashes or riots by "disorganized, disgruntled, fairly impulsive young men".[153][154]
According to Vaughan Winterbottom, although theTurkistan Islamic Party distributes propaganda videos and itsArabicIslamic Turkistan magazine (documented by Jihadology.net and theJamestown Foundation) the Chinese government apparently denied the party's existence; China claimed that there was no terrorist connection to its 2008 bus bombings as the TIP claimed responsibility for the attacks.[155] In 2007, policeraided a suspected TIPterrorist training camp.[156] The following year, an attempted suicide bombing on aChina Southern Airlines flight was thwarted[157] and theKashgar attack resulted in the death of sixteen police officers four days before the beginning of theBeijing Olympics.[158]
On 28 February 2012, anattack in Yecheng left 20 people dead, including seven attackers.[165] On 24 April 2013,clashes in Bachu occurred between a group of armed men and social workers and police nearKashgar. The violence left at least 21 people dead, including 15 police and officials.[166][167][168] According to a local government official, the clashes broke out after three other officials reported that suspicious men armed with knives were hiding in a house outside Kashgar.[169] Two months later, on 26 June,riots in Shanshan left 35 dead, including 22 civilians, 11 rioters and 2 police officers.[170]
On 28 October 2013, an SUV ploughed through a group of pedestrians near Tiananmen Square in central Beijing, crashed into a stone bridge and caught fire, causing dozens of casualties. Chinese authorities quickly identified the driver as Uyghur.[171][155]
In 2014, the conflict intensified. In January, eleven Uighur militants were killed by Kyrgyz security forces.[172][173] They were identified as Uyghurs by their appearance, and their personal effects indicated that they were separatists.[174]
On 1 March, a group of knife-wielding terroristsattacked theKunming Railway Station, killing 31 and injuring 141.[175] China blamed Xinjiang militants for the attack,[176] and over 380 people were arrested in the following crackdown. Following reports of the attack, Uyghur-Chinese actressMedina Memet urged her fans on Weibo not to equate Uyghurs with terrorism.[177][178] A captured attacker and three others were charged on 30 June.[179] Three of the suspects were accused of "leading and organising a terror group and intentional homicide", although they did not directly take part since they had been arrested two days earlier.[180] On 12 September, a Chinese court sentenced three people to death and one to life in prison for the attack.[181] The attack was praised by ETIM.[182]
On 18 April, a group of 16 Chinese citizens identified as ethnic Uyghursengaged in a shootout with Vietnamese border guards after seizing their guns when they were being detained to be returned to China. Five Uyghurs and two Vietnamese guards died in the incident. Ten of the Uyghurs were men, and the rest were women and children.[183][184][185][186]
According to theXinhua News Agency, on 28 July,37 civilians were killed by a gang armed with knives and axes in the towns of Elixku and Huangdi inShache County and 59 attackers were killed by security forces. Two hundred fifteen attackers were arrested after they stormed a police station and government offices. The agency also reported that 30 police cars were damaged or destroyed and dozens of Uyghur and Han Chinese civilians were killed or injured. TheUyghur American Association claimed that local Uyghurs had been protesting at the time of the attack. Two days later, the moderate imam of China's largest mosquewas assassinated in Kashgar after morning prayers.[193]
On 21 September, Xinhua reported that aseries of bomb blasts killed 50 people in Luntai County, southwest of the regional capital Ürümqi. The dead consisted of six civilians, four police officers and 44 rioters.[194]
On 12 October, four Uyghurs armed with knives and explosives attacked a farmers' market in Xinjiang. According to police, 22 people died (including police officers and the attackers).[195]
On 29 November, 15 people were killed and 14 injured in a Shache County attack. Eleven of the killed were Uyghur militants.[196]
On 18 September 2015, in Aksu, an unidentified group of knife-wielding terroristsattacked sleeping workers at a coal mine and killed as many as 50 people, before fleeing into the mountains.[9] The Turkistan Islamic Party has claimed responsibility for the attack.[197] On 18 November, a 56-day manhunt for the attackers concluded with security forces killing 28 assailants. One member of the gang surrendered to authorities.[9][198]
TheBangkok bombing is suspected to have been carried out by the Turkishultranationalist organisation known as theGrey Wolves in response to Thailand's deportation of 100 Uyghur asylum-seekers back to China. A Turkish man was arrested by Thai police in connection with the bombing and bomb-making materials were found in his apartment.[199][200][201] Due to the terrorist risk and counterfeiting of passports, Uyghur foreigners in Thailand were placed under surveillance by Defence MinisterPrawit Wongsuwon[202][203][204][205] and Thai police were placed on alert after the arrival of two Turkish Uyghurs.[206]
On 30 August 2016, Kyrgyzstan's Chinese embassy was struck by a suicide bombing by a Uyghur, according to Kyrgyz news.[207] The suicide bomber was the only fatality from the attack. The casualties included wounds suffered by Kyrgyz staff members and did not include Chinese.[173][208] A Kyrgyzstan government agency pointed the finger atNusra allied Syrian based Uyghurs.[209]
Police killed 4 militants who carried out a bombing on 28 December 2016 in Karakax.[210]
On 14 February 2017, three knife wielding attackers killed five people before being killed by police.[211][212]
In the period 2013–2017 there were 330,918 arrests in the province accounting for 7.3% of total arrests in China. This compares to 81,443 arrests in the previous five years.[11] In March 2019, Chinese officials said that they have arrested more than 13,000 militants in Xinjiang since 2014.[213]
Critics of the programme have highlighted the concentration of Uyghurs instate-sponsored internment camps,[233][234] suppression of Uyghurreligious practices,[235][236] politicalindoctrination,[218][237] severe ill-treatment,[218] and testimonials of alleged human rights abuses includingforced sterilization andcontraception.[238][233][239] TheAssociated Press reported that from 2015 to 2018,birth rates in the mostly Uyghur regions of Hotan and Kashgar plunged by more than 60%.[240] In the same period, the birth rate of the whole country decreased by 9.69%, from 12.07 to 10.9 per 1,000 people.[241] According to a fax received byCNN, Chinese officials acknowledged that birth rates dropped by almost a third in Xinjiang in 2018, but they denied reports of forced sterilization and genocide.[242] Birth rates have continued to plummet in Xinjiang, falling nearly 24% in 2019 alone when compared to just 4.2% nationwide.[240] According toThe Economist, China paid ethnic minority women who were exempt from the standard family planning size limits a lump sum then annual allowance to agree to undergo tubal ligation or IUD implantation after three children in an attempt to keep birthrates to the nationwide standard without imposing strict limits on ethnic minority family sizes. In 2017 the standard rural limit was applied to Uyghurs which lowered their allowed births to the standard for Han Chinese (which had increased from two to three children in 2016).[67]
In 2021,Shirzat Bawudun, the former head of the Xinjiang department of justice, and Sattar Sawut, the former head of the Xinjiang education department, were sentenced todeath with a two-year reprieve on separatism and bribery charges.[243] Such a sentence is usually commuted to life imprisonment.[244] Three other educators were sentenced to life in prison.[245][246]
The Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) is anIslamic extremistterrorist organisation seeking the expulsion of China from"East Turkestan".[247] Since its emergence in 2007 it has claimed responsibility for a number of terrorist attacks,[171][155] and the Chinese government accuses it of over 200, resulting in 162 deaths and over 440 injuries.[248] Hundreds of Uyghurs are thought to reside in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to have fought alongside extremist groups in conflicts such as theSyrian Civil War.[249] However, the exact size of the Turkistan Islamic Party remains unknown and some experts dispute its ability to orchestrate attacks in China, or that it still exists as a cohesive group.[171][250][251]
The TIP is often assumed to be the same as the earlier East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which changed its name to the Turkistan Islamic Party after their leader at the time,Hasan Mahsum, was killed by Pakistani forces in 2003.[252][155][253]
The TIP are believed to have links toal-Qaeda and affiliated groups such as theIslamic Movement of Uzbekistan,[254] and thePakistani Taliban.[255] Philip B. K. Potter writes that despite the fact that "throughout the 1990s, Chinese authorities went to great lengths to publicly link organizations active in Xinjiang—particularly the ETIM—to al-Qaeda [...] the best information indicates that prior to 2001, the relationship included some training and funding but relatively little operational cooperation."[256][257] Meanwhile, specific incidents were downplayed by Chinese authorities as isolated criminal acts.[1][17] However, in 1998 the group's headquarters were moved toKabul, inTaliban-controlledAfghanistan, while "China's ongoing security crackdown in Xinjiang has forced the most militant Uyghur separatists into volatile neighboring countries, such as Pakistan," Potter writes, "where they are forging strategic alliances with, and even leading, jihadist factions affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban." The East Turkestan Islamic Movement dropped "East" from its name as it increased its domain.[1] The U.S. State Department have listed them as a terrorist organisation since 2002,[258] and as having received "training and financial assistance" from al-Qaeda.[257] In October 2020, this designation was lifted.[259]
A number of members of al-Qaeda have expressed support for the TIP, Xinjiang independence, and/or jihad against China. They includeMustafa Setmariam Nasar,[260]Abu Yahya al-Libi,[261][262] and late al-Qaeda leaderAyman al-Zawahiri who has on multiple occasions issued statements naming Xinjiang (calling it "East Turkestan") as one of the "battlegrounds" of "jihad to liberate every span of land of the Muslims that has been usurped and violated."[263][264][265][266][267] Additionally, the al-Qaeda aligned al-Fajr Media Center distributes TIP promotional material.[268]
Andrew McGregor, writing for the Jamestown Foundation, opines that "though there is no question a small group of Uyghur militants fought alongside their Taliban hosts against theNorthern Alliance [...] the scores of terrorists Beijing claimed that Bin Laden was sending to China in 2002 never materialized" and that "the TIP's 'strategy' of making loud and alarming threats (attacks on the Olympics, use of biological and chemical weapons, etc.) without any operational follow-up has been enormously effective in promoting China's efforts to characterise Uyghur separatists as terrorists."[269]
Protesters inPrague, Czech Republic carrying Tibetan and East Turkestan flags, 29 March 2016
In October 2018 and December 2019, Chinese state media aired two documentaries on the conflict and the purported necessity of the internment camps, which reportedly drew mixed reactions on Chinese social media.[270][271]
In July 2019, 22 countries issued a joint letter to the 41st session of theUnited Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), condemning China's mass detention of Uyghurs and other minorities, calling upon China to "refrain from the arbitrary detention and restrictions on freedom of movement of Uyghurs, and other Muslim and minority communities in Xinjiang".[289][290][291]
In the same UNHRC session, 50 countries issued a joint letter supporting China's Xinjiang policies,[289][292][293] criticising the practice of "politicizing human rights issues". The letter stated, "China has invited a number of diplomats, international organizations officials and journalist to Xinjiang" and that "what they saw and heard in Xinjiang completely contradicted what was reported in the media."[292]
In October 2019, 23 countries issued a joint statement at the UN urging China to "uphold its national and international obligations and commitments to respect human rights".[294]
In response, 54 countries issued a joint statement supporting China's Xinjiang policies. The statement "spoke positively of the results of counter-terrorism and de-radicalization measures in Xinjiang and noted that these measures have effectively safeguarded the basic human rights of people of all ethnic groups."[294][295]
UN rights chiefMichelle Bachelet met with Xinjiang officials in May 2022 to raise "concerns about the application of counter-terrorism and de-radicalisation measures and their broad application".[296] TheWorld Uyghur Congress and the Washington D.C.-basedCampaign for Uyghurs accused Bachelet of parroting Chinese talking points, urging her to resign,[297] and Bachelet announced in June 2022 that she would step down from her role as UN human rights chief.[298] In August 2022, Bachelet released areport concluding that the extent ofarbitrary and discriminatory detention of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang since 2017—in context of restrictions and deprivation more generally of fundamental rights enjoyed individually and collectively—may constitute international crimes, in particularcrimes against humanity.[299][300][301]
The rulingDemocratic Progressive Party released a short video on social media urging support for Uyghurs in China and criticising the Chinese government.[302]
Hundreds of Uyghurs fleeing China throughSoutheast Asia have been deported back by the governments of Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, and others, drawing condemnation from the U.S., theUNHCR, and human rights groups.[310][311] The U.S. State Department said deported Uyghurs "could face harsh treatment and a lack of due process" while the UNHCR andHuman Rights Watch have called the deportations a violation of international law.[312][313] Alternatively, countries such as Germany have altered immigration policies to prevent the extradition of Uyghurs back to China, along with Malaysia, as of 2020, following suit.
The role of commercial entities has become increasingly scrutinized, due to the presence of Western enterprises such as Coca-Cola, Volkswagen and Siemens in the region. The major concern here is the fact that the presence of these entities could finance human rights violations and enable the supervision of ethnic minorities by technological cooperation. Moreover, reports have claimed that forced labor prevails in Xinjiang's textile industry.[314]
Based on these allegations, international organizations such as the World Bank have begun to reconsider their involvement in Xinjiang, while textile manufacturers including Adidas or Badger Sportswear have withdrawn from Xinjiang. Divestment also concerns collaboration in the realm of AI and digital technologies, and some enterprises have decided to discontinue the handover of technologies and knowledge to Chinese entities involved in the human rights violations in Xinjiang.[315]
The Chinese government's primary response to allegations of human rights violations has been to deny the allegations. In the context of the Xinjiang conflict, China is doing just that, while maintaining that they are placing Uyghurs into internment camps to prevent the spread of separatist ideology and terrorist rhetoric in the country.[316] China has used its membership on the Economic and Social Council's (ECOSOC) NGO Committee to block NGOs advocating on behalf of Uyghurs from being granted UN accreditation.[317]
Due to the increasing tensions between Uyghurs and China, the conflict has also stemmed beyond the Chinese border.[318]
During theSyrian civil war, a Chinese hostage was murdered by theIslamic State, which claimed its desire to fight against China over Xinjiang.[319] These militants are also very active in Syria, mostlyIdlib, where it formed to be one of the most radical fighting groups in the conflict, which prompted China to take cautious reactions.[320][321]
In recent decades, China has become an economic behemoth and is far outpacing the US in trade with countries on the continents of Africa and Asia. Due to this newly found 'economic clout', China's neighbors, many of whom hold China as their number one trading partner, do not want to pick a fight, especially if they believe being critical of China will yield negative economic effects for their country. With countries hesitant to critique Chinese actions, the door is left open for arguments supporting China in their assertions.[325]
'Eradicating Ideological Viruses': China's Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang's Muslims (Report).Human Rights Watch. 9 September 2018. Retrieved3 January 2019. "Zenz estimated the detainee number by extrapolating from a leaked Xinjiang police report, released by a Turkish TV station run by Uyghur exiles, as well as from reports by Radio Free Asia. CHRD and ERI made the estimate by extrapolating the percentages of people detained in villages as reported by dozens of Uyghur villagers in Kashgar Prefecture during interviews with CHRD."
^The People's Republic, founded in 1949, banned private confessional teaching from the early 1950s to the 1980s, until a more liberal stance allowed religious mosque education to resume and private Muslim schools to open. Moreover, except in Xinjiang for fear of secessionist feelings, the government allowed and sometimes encouraged the founding of private Muslim schools in order to provide education for people who could not attend increasingly expensive state schools or who left them early, for lack of money or lack of satisfactory achievements.[71]
^TheFirst East Turkestan Republic had considered the name "Uyghuristan", with some early coins bearing that name, but settled on the "East Turkestan Republic" on the basis that there were other Turkic peoples in Xinjiang and the new government.[112]
^The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party, Organization for Freeing Eastern Turkistan and the Islamic Party of Turkistan were outlawed by Kyrgyzstan's Lenin District Court and its Supreme Court in November 2003.[278][279]
^Collins, Gabe (23 January 2015)."Beijing's Xinjiang Policy: Striking Too Hard?".The Diplomat.Archived from the original on 5 February 2016. Retrieved1 January 2016.China's long-running Uighur insurgency has flared up dramatically of late, with more than 900 recorded deaths in the past seven years.
^abcMartina, Michael; Blanchard, Ben (20 November 2015)."China says 28 foreign-led 'terrorists' killed after attack on mine".Reuters.Archived from the original on 24 April 2017. Retrieved3 July 2017.China's government says it faces a serious threat from Islamist militants and separatists in energy-rich Xinjiang, on the border of central Asia, where hundreds have died in violence in recent years.
^Burchfield, Robert W., ed. (1998) [First edition published 1926 and edited byH. W. Fowler]."Majority".The New Fowler's Modern English Usage (Revised 3rd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 477.ISBN0-19-860263-4. Retrieved27 October 2022.
^Ismail, Mohammed Sa'id; Ismail, Mohammed Aziz (1960) [Hejira 1380],Muslims in the Soviet Union and China (privately printed pamphlet), vol. 1, translated by U.S. Government, Joint Publications Service, Tehran, Iran, p. 52{{citation}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) translation printed in Washington: JPRS 3936, 19 September 1960.
^ab国家统计局人口和社会科技统计司 [Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics of the National Bureau of Statistics]; 国家民族事务委员会经济发展司 [Department of Economic Development of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission] (September 2003).2000年人口普查中国民族人口资料 [2000 Census Chinese National Population Information] (in Chinese (China)). Beijing: 民族出版社 [Nationalities Publishing House].ISBN978-7-105-05425-1.
^Jiang, Wenran (6 July 2009)."New Frontier, same problems".The Globe and Mail.Archived from the original on 10 July 2009. Retrieved18 January 2010.But just as in Tibet, the local population has viewed the increasing unequal distribution of wealth and income between China's coastal and inland regions, and between urban and rural areas, with an additional ethnic dimension. Most are not separatists, but they perceive that most of the economic opportunities in their homeland are taken by the Han Chinese, who are often better educated, better connected, and more resourceful. The Uyghurs also resent discrimination against their people by the Han, both in Xinjiang and elsewhere.
^"China's Minorities and Government Implementation of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law". Congressional-Executive Commission on China. 1 October 2005. Archived fromthe original on 7 April 2010. Retrieved6 May 2010.[Uyghurs] live in cohesive communities largely separated from Han Chinese, practice major world religions, have their own written scripts, and have supporters outside of China. Relations between these minorities and Han Chinese have been strained for centuries.
^Pei, Minxin (9 July 2009)."Uighur riots show need for rethink by Beijing".Financial Times. Retrieved18 January 2010.Han Chinese view the Uighurs as harbouring separatist aspirations and being disloyal and ungrateful, in spite of preferential policies for ethnic minority groups.
^Su, Jinbao (8 November 2015)."- YouTube"临夏中阿学校第二十二届毕业典礼 金镖阿訇讲话2007 [Chinese-Arabic School Muslim Students Graduation Ceremony].Archived from the original on 29 April 2017. Retrieved27 May 2016 – via YouTube.
^Su, Jinbao (8 November 2015)."- YouTube"老华寺女校举行演讲仪式 上集 [Chinese Muslim Makes a Speech in Islamic Girls' School].Archived from the original on 11 February 2017. Retrieved27 May 2016 – via YouTube.
^“‘Like We Were Enemies in a War.’”China's Mass Internment, Torture and Persecution of Muslims in Xinjiang, Amnesty International, 2021, xinjiang.amnesty.org/.
^Barnwell, Robin, and Gesbeen Mohammad. “China Undercover.”PBS, Public Broadcasting Service, 23 Aug. 2022, www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/documentary/china-undercover/.
^abTschantret, Joshua (16 June 2016). "Repression, opportunity, and innovation: The evolution of terrorism in Xinjiang, China".Terrorism and Political Violence.30 (4):569–588.doi:10.1080/09546553.2016.1182911.S2CID147865241.
^abcSun, Yi (2024). "Necessitated by Geopolitics: China's Economic and Cultural Initiatives in Central Asia". In Fang, Qiang; Li, Xiaobing (eds.).China under Xi Jinping: A New Assessment.Leiden University Press. p. 154.ISBN9789087284411.JSTORjj.15136086.
^Hierman, Brent (May 2007). "The Pacification of Xinjiang: Uighur Protest and the Chinese State, 1988–2002".Problems of Post-Communism.54 (3):48–62.doi:10.2753/PPC1075-8216540304.S2CID154942905.
^abTristan James Mabry (6 February 2015).Nationalism, Language, and Muslim Exceptionalism.University of Pennsylvania Press. p. 113.ISBN978-0-8122-9101-8.Periodic uprisings against Chinese rule have erupted more frequently in recent decades, though most events are spontaneous clashes or riots in the form of "social and civil unrest by disorganized, disgruntled, fairly impulsive young men, not a widespread movement" (Smith 2001). [...] The extent of these uprisings is difficult to confirm independently as the access of independent observers (especially international journalists) is severely restricted, though it is apparent that their frequency accelerated starting in the 1990s, and has continued unabated (see, for example, Jacobs 2014).
^Kevin Tang (3 March 2014)."China's Netizens React To Kunming Station Attacks With Anger, Grief".BuzzFeed News. Retrieved12 December 2019.Muslim-Chinese celebrity Medina Memet urged her fans on Weibo not to equate Uighur with terror. "I have never been ashamed to say I'm from Xinjiang, or that I'm a Muslim, though my brethrens and religion keeps getting misunderstood and misused by others. I am afraid that after this attack, we will be looked at with cold eyes again. I hope the government will find out what happened, to let our people understand, to give justice to the victims, and to clear the good name of Xinjiang's peaceful citizens."
^Abu Mansour Al-Gharib (2016) [رجب – 1437 هـ].عملية أظهرت عجز سلطات الصين [Operation showed the inability of the Chinese authorities](PDF).تركستان الإسلامية [Islamic Turkistan] (in Arabic). No. 19. p. 25. Archived fromthe original(PDF) on 25 September 2016.
Lovelace, Doug (29 July 2008).Terrorism Documents of International and Local Control: Volumes 90 and 91. Oxford University Press.ISBN978-0-19-538101-6.
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