Inrhetoric andethics, "two wrongs don't make a right" and "two wrongs make a right" are phrases that denotephilosophical norms. "Two wrongs make a right" has been considered as afallacy ofrelevance, in which an allegation of wrongdoing is countered with a similar allegation. Itsantithesis, "two wrongs don't make a right", is aproverb used to rebuke or renounce wrongful conduct as a response to another's transgression. "Two wrongs make a right" is considered "one of the most common fallacies inWestern philosophy".[1]
The phrase "two wrongs infer one right" appears in a poem dated to 1734, published inThe London Magazine.[2]
This is aninformal fallacy that occurs when assuming that, if one wrong is committed, then another wrong will cancel it out.
If Speaker B believes in the maxim "the law should be followed," then theirunstated premise is thatbreaking the law (orthe wrong) is justified, as long as the other party also does so. Yet, if Speaker B believes the maxim "it is acceptable to break the law to wrong those who also break the law", they are committing nological fallacy. From the conversation above, it is impossible to know which Speaker B believes.
This fallacy is often used as ared herring, or an attempt to change or distract from the issue. For example:
Even if President Roberts lied in his Congressional testimony, this does not establish aprecedent that makes it acceptable for President Williams to do so as well (at best, it means Williams isno worse than Roberts). By invoking the fallacy, the contested issue oflying is ignored (cf.whataboutism).
Thetu quoque fallacy is a specific type of "two wrongs make a right". Accusing another ofnot practicing what they preach, while appropriate in some situations,[a] does not in itself invalidate an action or statement that is perceived as contradictory.
Common use of the term, in the realm ofbusiness ethics, has been criticised by scholar Gregory S. Kavka writing in theJournal of Business Ethics. Kavka refers back to philosophical concepts ofretribution byThomas Hobbes. He states that if something supposedly held up as a moral standard or common social rule is violated enough in society, then an individual or group within society can break that standard or rule as well, since this keeps them from being unfairly disadvantaged. As well, in specific circumstances violations of social rules can be defensible if done as direct responses to other violations. For example, Kavka states that it is wrong to deprive someone of their property, but it is right to take property back from a criminal who takes another's property in the first place. He also states that one should be careful not to use this ambiguity as an excuse to recklessly violate ethical rules.[3]
Conservative journalistVictor Lasky wrote in his bookIt Didn't Start With Watergate that, while two wrongs do not make a right, if a set of immoral things are done and left unprosecuted, this creates alegal precedent. Thus, people who do the same wrongs in the future should rationally expect to get away with them as well. Lasky uses as an analogy the situation betweenJohn F. Kennedy's wiretapping ofMartin Luther King Jr. (which led to nothing) andRichard Nixon's actions inWatergate (which Nixon thought would also lead to nothing).[4]
An orient star led, thro' his blind-
Side, to a prize his eye of mind:
The lightning said, its he; in Spight
Of fatetwo wrongs infer one right.
let fly; well shot! thanks to my Spark;
A blind boy, once, has cleft the mark.— The Moral (translated—origin?—inHudibrastic)
