Turkish–Islamic nationalism (Turkish:Türk-İslam milliyetçiliği) orTurkish–Islamic synthesis (Turkish:Türk-İslam sentezi) is a type ofTurkish nationalism which has anIslamist leaning instead ofsecular.
Historian Gökhan Çetinsaya explained that there are three opinions on the topic ofTurkish nationalism andIslam. First are the nationalists who reject Islam, second are Islamists who reject nationalism, and third are the ones who mix them both together. There was fusion of Turkish nationalism with Islam during the final years of theOttoman Empire. Hamit Bozarslan claimed that while the Republic of Turkey was officially secular, its policies mirrored the Turkish–Islamic synthesis in practice.[1] Turkish Islamonationalism was popularised and encouraged as part ofOperation Gladio during theCold War by American-backed right-wing intellectuals such asAlparslan Türkeş who were concerned about the increasing Soviet-backed leftist influence in the country. They wanted to make a religion-inspired nationalism.[2] Türkeş did not supportPan-Islamism.[3] A famous quote of his was "Turkishness is our body, Islam is our soul."[4] The Turkish government and military tolerated and even promoted the ideology during the1976-1980 political violence.[5] While nationalists and Islamists were natural rivals in other Muslim nations, in Turkey, most Turkish Islamists professed a degree of ethnonationalism.[6][7] The synthesis was based on theHanafi school, and claimed that it was essential to Turkishness.[8] According to the synthesis, Turkish identity and Islam are both essential to each other. Followers of the ideology claimed that even before adopting Islam, Turks were receptive to Islam. The synthesis emphasised on Islam domestically among Turks, and not on Islam among Muslims worldwide.[9] The synthesis also advocated for Islam in society which would culturally be more Turkish and less Arabic.[10]Ziya Gökalp claimed that one had to be Muslim to be a Turk. He also claimed that any Muslim who speaks Turkish is a Turk, regardless of ethnic origin. He claimed that all Turks were equally Turks, whether or not they were ethnically Turkic.[11]
In the late 1970s, the Turkish political scene was full of ideological conflicts between far-right ultranationalists (Idealists) and far-left groups, along with little-to-no governmental effort to stop it. Under theMotherland Party rule, Turkish Islamonationalism became the de facto official ideology of Turkey (and until today it is accused of being so underAKP rule, although the AKP strongly denies it). In 1982, religion was strengthened in schools and education as a way to strengthen Turkish Islamonationalism, which intended to weaken mainstreamIslamism andsecularnationalism.[12][13] The Turkish–Islamic synthesis was fully developed byAydınlar Ocağı (Turkish:Intellectuals' Hearth) headed bySüleyman Yalçın in the 1980s.[14]
Historically, Islamist movements in Turkey had an ethnic divide. Most Islamist groups solely recruited from either Kurds or Turks, with very few groups recruiting from both. The primary cause for the divide was that most Turkish Islamists held strong nationalist views, refused to fight against their own government, and often held Anti-Kurdish views as well. In turn, the Kurdish Islamists also held nationalist, separatist, and Anti-Turkish views, and often cooperated with secular Kurdish nationalists. Islamist militancy in Turkey was dominated by Kurds. Most Turkish Islamists preferred to travel for Jihad abroad. In theBosnian War,Syrian civil war, as well as theFirst andSecond Chechen War, they mostly professed Turkish nationalist,Neo-Ottomanist, and Pan-Turkist motives in addition to Islamism.[15][16][17]
İbrahim Kafesoğlu claimed that Pre-Islamic Turks had innately been better Muslims than Arabs.[18]Alparslan Türkeş, founder of theMHP andGrey Wolves and one of the top ideologues of the Turkish–Islamic synthesis, was an advocate of theTurkish adhan and advocated for theQuran,Adhan, and evenSalahs to be solely in theTurkish language inTurkey. He co-led the1960 Turkish coup d'état and in an interview after the coup, Türkeş described the usage of Arabic for religion as a "betrayal", and said "In a Turkish mosque, the Quran should be read in Turkish, not Arabic."[19][20][21] After the refugee crisis, anti-Arabism increased, mostly among Grey Wolves. InGaziantep, approximately 2 dozenSyrianArabs had to leave the city after angry Turkish crowds belonging to theGrey Wolves ransacked their homes.[22] Another time a group of about 1,000 Grey Wolves, which organized on social media, blocked various roads inKahramanmaraş and refused to leave even after police warnings. The protestors also removedArabic signs from many Syrian-owned stores, and many store owners closed their shops in fear. They also attacked a Syrian in a car and broke his windows, however they ran away after the Turkish police fired a warning gunshot into the air.[23] Many Turkish Islamonationalist organizations volunteer to fight in Syria in favor ofSyrian Turkmen to strengthen Turkmen interests and weaken Arab rule.[24] TheAlperen Hearths sent 250 fighters in 2015 to "fight against Russia, Iran, and Assad. And to help Turkmen",[25] although they were later accused of having just came into Syria to take photos with fighters, as many of the Alperen Hearths were seen inIstanbul just days after they went to supposedly fight.[26]
İbrahim Kafesoğlu claimed that Kurds were not a nation, but a tribe ofTurkic-Turanid origin which migrated to the Middle East earlier than other Turks, and was assimilated by the neighboring populations, especially Iranian.[27][28] In a 2013 interview, Altan Tan claimed that the Islamist movement in Turkey was "full of nationalists" who despised Kurds, therefore prompting Kurds to vote secular.[29] Turkish–Islamic nationalists often attempted to hide the Kurdishness of various Islamic figures.[30]
A Turkish politician once stated that "for a thousand years, Kurds and Turks formed an ummah that fought against the invading kuffar armies. However, even in this unification, Kurds stayed as Kurds, Turks stayed as Turks. This is how religion should be employed; it should not be employed for assimilation purposes, as the Turkish state is so intent on doing."[31] Another Turkish religious activist claimed that "because they were repressed for years underKemalist regimes, several Muslim Turkish associations andNGOs developed the ritual of having their own Friday prayers in small groups in their own apartments and offices, free from state monitor and control. These were not mass events though. Since Muslim Turks feared the state's rage the prayers were held without any public announcement. Only those who were in the know attended. However, when it comes to Kurds, all of a sudden, Muslim Turks find this ritual disturbing. They labelCivil Friday prayers as 'so-called Friday prayers' and they say that these prayers are harmful to Muslim unity. So, what has changed? Why is it that alternative, state-free Friday prayers, which were completely acceptable when Turks had them, are deemed dangerous when Kurds organize them? I think Muslim Turks are angry at Muslim Kurds for having achieved something they have not been able to achieve themselves: challenge the state in a public and visible way." She also claimed that "the state has co-opted Muslim Turks with the implementation of Turkish-Islamic policies. For example, as a Muslim Turk, you are free to campaign for the sufferings of Muslims in other countries, such as Bosnia, Palestine, China, Syria, etc. However, you are not allowed to draw attention to the sufferings of Muslim Kurds."[32] She also stated "I have been actively involved in Kurdish rights activism since the 80s. For years, Muslim Turks, including close friends of mine, have labeled me as a Kurdist/Kurdophile. When I worked with Muslim Turkish NGOs inIstanbul, or in other Western cities, after becoming good friends they would tell me that they have been warned about my Kurdist tendencies. Yet, no one calls you Chechenist,Arabist, Bosniakist when you show an interest in the sufferings of Muslims inChechnya,Palestine, or Bosnia. The irony is that, most of these people who accuse me of being a Kurdist are actually Turkists, but they do not even acknowledge it."[33]
Turkish Islamonationalists were accused of downplayingShafi'ism "at every opportunity" and attempting to spread Hanafism to Kurds in hopes that it would also lead them to adopt a Turkish identity.[34] Islamist and conservative groups in Turkey, such as theRefah Party, and theAKP, were accused of carrying nationalist views as well. Despite using an "Islamic formula" to meet Kurdish demands, the Turkish Islamists ultimately failed, as they did not want to offend Turkish nationalism.[35] The AKP appeals to Kurds had failed for many reasons, mainly because Kurdish identity was important for Kurdish Muslims, the Islamic identity that the AKP presented to replace Kemalism still included "the heavy dose of nationalism", and instead of genuinely attempting to resolve the conflict, the AKP occasionally loosened the restrictions on Kurds to counter domestic and foreign pressure.[36] The AKP and its Turkish nationalism was the source of the division of Islamists in Turkey on an ethnic basis.[37]
The1980 coup implemented Turkish–Islamic synthesis as thede facto state ideology, and also implemented the most restrictive policies against Kurdish identity in the history of Turkey. Amid increased Turkish Islamonationalist hatred towards Kurds, thePKK took up arms in 1984. Turkish Islamonationalist portrayed Kurds as the provocateurs in the conflict. Many Turkish Islamonationalists frequently made the excuse that they only oppose the PKK or separatists and not ordinary Kurds. However, in practice, they opposed Kurds in general, and they continued their Anti-Kurdish policies whilst simultaneously denying them.[38][39]
AlthoughRecep Tayyip Erdoğan initially achieved the most progress in solving the conflict, he took a sharp nationalist turn in the 2010s and began restricting Kurdish cultural expressions, and most Turkish Islamonationalists supported Erdoğan and became the bulk of the opposition to increased Kurdish cultural rights in Turkey.[40][41]Mucahit Bilici stated that "there is a clear pattern in Erdoğan's language and indeed in the approach of all Islamist interlocutors with the Kurds. The primary aim is to minimize and make invisible the Kurds' Kurdishness by highlighting their Muslimness. The word 'Kurd' itself is avoided and used only very strategically. It occurs most often as part of a laundry list of ethnicities—Laz,Circassian,Georgian,Arab,Bosnian,Albanian—all specificity swamped by false diversity. The Kurds can gain legitimacy and prominence only as servants and defenders of Islam. Kurdish cities are re-presented as deeply religious domiciles. For example, the city ofUrfa is always called 'city of the prophets' andDiyarbakır 'city of the companions'. The purpose is to avoid treating anything Kurdish as purely Kurdish."[42]
On February 23, 1979, while the 20-year-old KurdishRaider activist,Metin Yüksel, was leavingIstanbul'sFatih Mosque, he was shot dead byGrey Wolves loyal to theMHP.[43][44][45][46]
Turkish Islamonationalists are known to hateGreeks due to their conflicts in history as well as Greeks being Christian.[47] The Grey Wolves were once accused of storming anIstanbul pogrom memorial exhibition and throwing eggs and taking down pictures, although the Grey Wolves denied any involvement.[48][49] In 2005 many Turkish Islamonationalists organized a rally and marched to the gate of theEcumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and chanted "Patriarch Leave" and "Patriarchate to Greece".[50]MHP leader also once held a map showing Turkey claiming all of the islands controlled by Greece.[51]
Similar to Greeks, Turkish Islamonationalists are also known to hateArmenians due to their conflicting history and due to Armenians practicing Christianity.[citation needed]Sevag Balıkçı, an Armenian in theTurkish Army, was murdered by Kıvanç Ağaoglu, who was a supporter ofAbdullah Çatlı, the former Grey Wolves leader.[52] OnArmenian Genocide Remembrance Day in 2012, various nationalist and Turkish Islamonationalist groups protested against the remembrance of the Armenian genocide inTaksim Square.[53] When Armenian pianistTigran Hamasyan visited the city ofAni in Kars Province, the local Grey Wolves leader suggested that his anyone who supports him should "go on an Armenian hunt."[54][55]
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Turkish Islamonationalism is often criticized by Islamists who view nationalism as a sin, by secular Turkish nationalists who view religion as unimportant, and by various minority rights organizations and activists in Turkey.[56] The Turkish nationalists in early Turkey were known for their secularism, Atatürk had applauded a 1926 document written by Hasan Ruşeni Barkın, titled "there is no religion, just nationality. My Turkishness is my religion."[57]
Ahmet Altan, a Turkish Islamist commentator, stated "would Turkish Muslims who believe in the Turkish-Islamic synthesis and see it in accordance with the religion also accept theKurdish-Islamic synthesis? Since they accept the Turkish-Islamic synthesis and find it appropriate to add a national name to Islam, they cannot object to the Kurdish-Islamic synthesis."[58] A Kurdish cleric had also called for violence against Turkish–Islamic synthesists, claiming that they are the exact same asKemalists andTuranists when it comes toAnti-Kurdism.[59]
TheRaiders Organization claimed that this ideology is a "fascistic product of imperialism", and that nationalism is a Western ideology, which has no place in Islamic nations.[60]
Nihal Atsız viewed it as an artificial ideology which forcefully fuses two contradictory ideologies together, and he also saw Islamism as being incompatible with Turkism.[61]
The ideology was also criticised by Pan-Turkists who said "the person who does not defend secularism cannot be a Turanist. TheGagauz are Christian,Karaites and Khazar are Jewish,Altais are Tengrist,Yakuts areshamanist,Azerbaijanis are Shia,Anatolian Turkmens are Alevi. The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and its Sunnism, was not able to reach large utopias, but a small part of Anatolia. Instead of caring for the Turkmen Alevi, it considers it ideal to beat the son of a Turkmen in the name of idealism-sunnism because he is a leftist. In addition, secularism prevents the damage of sectarianism and gives the nation rationality. If he is an idealist, he cannot remain against secularism. The idealist who does not defend secularism does not have ideals nor kızılelma." Kızılelma means "red apple" and symbolizes the goal of conquest in Turkish tradition.[62]
Yoğun şekilde milliyetçi temalarla karşılaştık. Mesela Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu'nun videoları ve Abdullah Çatlı'nın resimleri geniş yer tutuyordu.
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