ThePeace of Utrecht was a series ofpeace treaties signed by the belligerents in theWar of the Spanish Succession, in the Dutch city ofUtrecht between April 1713 and February 1715. The war involved three contenders for the vacant throne of Spain, and involved much of Europe for over a decade. Essentially, the treaties allowedPhilip V (grandson of KingLouis XIV of France) to keep the Spanish throne in return for permanently renouncing his claim to the French throne, along with other necessary guarantees that would ensure that France and Spain should not merge, thus preserving the balance of power in Europe.[1]
France andGreat Britain had come to terms in October 1711, when the preliminaries of peace had been signed inLondon. The preliminaries were based on a tacit acceptance of the partition of Spain's European possessions. Following this, theCongress of Utrecht opened on 29 January 1712, with the British representatives beingJohn Robinson,Bishop of Bristol, andThomas Wentworth, Lord Strafford.[4] Reluctantly theUnited Provinces accepted the preliminaries and sent representatives, butEmperor Charles VI refused to do so until he was assured that the preliminaries were not binding. This assurance was given, and so in February the Imperial representatives made their appearance. AsPhilip was not yet recognized as its king, Spain did not at first send plenipotentiaries, but theDuke of Savoy sent one, and theKingdom of Portugal was represented byLuís da Cunha. One of the first questions discussed was the nature of the guarantees to be given by France and Spain that their crowns would be kept separate, and little progress was made until 10 July 1712, when Philip signed a renunciation.[5]
With Great Britain, France and Spain having agreed to a "suspension of arms" (armistice) covering Spain on 19 August in Paris, the pace of negotiation quickened. The first treaty signed at Utrecht was the truce between France and Portugal on 7 November, followed by the truce between France and Savoy on 14 March 1713. That same day, Spain, Great Britain, France and the Empire agreed to the evacuation ofCatalonia and anarmistice inItaly. The main treaties of peace followed on 11 April 1713. These were five separate treaties between France and Great Britain, theDutch Republic,Savoy,Prussia andPortugal. Spain under Philip V signed separate peace treaties with Savoy and Great Britain at Utrecht on 13 July. Negotiations at Utrecht dragged on into the next year, for the peace treaty between Spain and the Netherlands was only signed on 26 June 1714 and that between Spain and Portugal on 6 February 1715.[6]
Several other treaties came out of the congress of Utrecht. France signed treaties of commerce and navigation with Great Britain and the Dutch Republic (11 April 1713). Great Britain signed a like treaty with Spain (9 December 1713).[6]
Signature of the Treaty of Utrecht between Portugal and Spain, in the Maliebaan, on 6 February 1715. TheDom Tower is visible in the background. From left to right: TheDuke of Osuna, in red coat,Luís da Cunha, in black coat, The Secretaries, in blue and yellow coats and the Count of Tarouca, crouched, in brown coat.
Peace and friendship treaties of Utrecht and elsewhere
Western Europe in 1714, after the Treaties of Utrecht andTreaty of Rastatt
The Peace confirmed the Bourbon candidate asPhilip V of Spain to remain as king. In return, Philip renounced the French throne, both for himself and his descendants, with reciprocal renunciations by French Bourbons to the Spanish throne, including Louis XIV's nephewPhilippe of Orléans. These became increasingly important after a series of deaths between 1712 and 1714 left the five year oldLouis XV as his great-grandfather's heir.[9]
Great Britain was the main beneficiary; Utrecht marked the point at which it became the primary European commercial power.[10] In Article X, Spain ceded the strategic ports ofGibraltar andMenorca.[11]
In a major coup for the British delegation, theBritish government emerged from the treaty with theAsiento de Negros, which referred to the monopoly contract granted by theSpanish government to other European nations to supply slaves toSpain's colonies in the Americas. TheAsiento de Negros had come about due to the fact that theSpanish Empire rarely engaged in thetransatlantic slave trade itself, preferring to outsource this to foreign merchants.Bourbon France had previously held theAsiento de Negros, allowing French slave traders to supply 5,000 slaves to the Spanish Empire each year; France had gained control over this contract after Philip V had become King of Spain. After the British government gained access to theAsiento de Negros, the economic prominence held by DutchSephardic Jewish slaveowners began to fade, while theSouth Sea Company was established in hopes of gaining exclusive access to the contract. The British government sought to reduce its debt by increasing the volume of trade it had with Spain, which required gaining access to theAsiento de Negros; as historianG.M. Trevelyan noted: "The finances of the country were based in May 1711 on the assumption that the Asiento, or monopoly of the slave trade with Spanish America, would be wrested from France as an integral part of the terms of peace". Following the passage of the treaty, the British government gained a thirty-year access to theAsiento de Negros.[12][13][14][15][16][17]
The importance placed by British negotiators on commercial interests was demonstrated by their demand for France to "level the fortifications ofDunkirk, block up the port and demolish the sluices that scour the harbour, [which] shall never be reconstructed".[18] This was because Dunkirk was the primary base for Frenchprivateers, as it was possible to reach the North Sea in a single tide and escape British patrols in the English Channel.[19]
In South America, Spain returnedColónia do Sacramento in modern Uruguay to Portugal and recognised Portuguese sovereignty over the lands between the Amazon andOyapock rivers, now inBrazil.[21] The British agreed to prevent their citizens from visiting Spanish colonies in America without prior approval from colonial officials.
The treaty's territorial provisions did not go as far as theWhigs in Britain would have liked, considering that the French had made overtures for peace in 1706 and again in 1709. The Whigs considered themselves the heirs of the staunch anti-French policies ofWilliam III of England and theJohn Churchill, 1st Duke of Marlborough. The Whigs were now a minority in the house, but still pushing their anti-peace agenda. The whigs opposed peace every step of the way. The Whigs even called the treaty a sellout for letting the duke of Anjou stay on the Spanish throne.[25]
However, in theParliament of 1710 theTories had gained control of theHouse of Commons, and they wished for an end to Great Britain's participation in a European war.Queen Anne and her advisors had also come to agree.[26]
The party in the administration ofRobert Harley (created Earl of Oxford and Mortimer on 23 May 1711) and theViscount Bolingbroke proved more flexible at the bargaining table and were characterized by the Whigs as "pro-French"; Oxford and Bolingbroke persuaded the Queen to create twelve new "Tory peers"[27] to ensure ratification of the treaty in theHouse of Lords. The opponents of the treaty tried to rally support under the slogan ofNo Peace Without Spain.
Although the fate of theSpanish Netherlands in particular was of interest to the United Provinces, Dutch influence on the outcome of the negotiations was fairly insignificant, even though the talks were held on their territory. The French negotiatorMelchior de Polignac taunted the Dutch with the scathing remarkde vous, chez vous, sans vous,[28] meaning that negotiations would be held "about you, around you, without you". The fact that Bolingbroke had secretly ordered the British commander,the Duke of Ormonde, to withdraw from the Allied forces before theBattle of Denain (informing the French but not the Allies), and the fact that they secretly arrived at separate peace with France was afait accompli, made the objections of the Allies pointless.[29] In any case, the Dutch achieved theircondominium in theAustrian Netherlands with the Austro-DutchBarrier Treaty of 1715.[30]
The Treaty stipulated that "because of the great danger which threatened the liberty and safety of all Europe, from the too close conjunction of the kingdoms of Spain and France, ... one and the same person should never become King of both kingdoms".[31] Some historians argue this makes it a significant milestone in the evolution of the modern nation state and concept of abalance of power.[32]
First mentioned in 1701 byCharles Davenant in hisEssays on the Balance of Power, it was widely publicised in Britain by author and Tory satiristDaniel Defoe in his 1709 articleA Review of the Affairs of France. The idea was reflected in the wording of the treaties and resurfaced after the defeat ofNapoleon in the 1815Concert of Europe that dominated Europe in the 19th century.[citation needed]
For the individual signatories, Britain established naval superiority over its competitors, commercial access to Spain and America, and control of Menorca and Gibraltar; it retains the latter territory to this day. France accepted the Protestant succession on the British throne, ensuring a smooth transition when Anne died in August 1714, and ended its support for the Stuarts under the1716 Anglo-French Treaty.[33] While the war left all participants with unprecedented levels of government debt, only Great Britain successfully financed it.[34]
Spain retained the majority of its Empire and recovered remarkably quickly; the recapture of Naples and Sicily in 1718 was only prevented by British naval power and a second attempt was successful in 1734. The 1707, 1715 and 1716Nueva Planta decrees abolished regional political structures in the kingdoms ofAragon,Valencia,Majorca and thePrincipality of Catalonia, although Catalonia and Aragon retained some of these rights until 1767.[35]
Despite failure in Spain, Austria secured its position in Italy and Hungary, allowing it to continue expansion into areas of South-East Europe previously held by theOttoman Empire. Even after paying expenses associated with theDutch Barrier, increased tax revenues from theAustrian Netherlands funded a significant upgrade of the Austrian military.[36] However, these gains were diminished by various factors, chiefly the disruption of thePragmatic Sanction of 1713 caused by Charles disinheriting his nieces in favour of his daughterMaria Theresa.[37]
Attempts to ensure its succession involved Austria in wars of little strategic value; much of the fighting in the 1733–1735War of the Polish Succession taking place in its maritime provinces in Italy. Austria had traditionally relied on naval support from the Dutch, whose own capability had been severely degraded; Britain prevented the loss of Sicily and Naples in 1718 but refused to do so again in 1734.[38] The dispute continued to loosen Habsburg control over the Empire; Bavaria, Hanover, Prussia and Saxony increasingly acted as independent powers and in 1742,Charles of Bavaria became the first non-Habsburg Emperor in over 300 years.[39]
The Dutch Republic ended the war effectively bankrupt, while the damage suffered by the Dutch merchant navy permanently affected their commercial and political strength and it was superseded by Britain as the pre-eminent European mercantile power.[40] The acquisition of theBarrier Fortresses however became an important asset of Dutch foreign policy and enlarged their sphere of influence. Although judged favourably by contemporaries,[41] it was later argued that the barrier proved to be largely illusory when put to the test during theWar of Austrian Succession.[42][43] The Dutch had in any case successfully defended their positions in the Southern Netherlands and their troops were central in the alliance which halted French territorial expansion in Europe until a new cycle began in1792.[44]
While the final settlement at Utrecht was far more favourable to France than the Allied offer of 1709 had been, it gained little that had not already been achieved through diplomacy by February 1701.[45] Though France remained a great power, concern at its relative decline in military and economic terms compared to Britain was an underlying cause of theWar of the Austrian Succession in 1740.[46]
That Treaty, which ushered in the stable and characteristic period of Eighteenth-Century civilization, marked the end of danger to Europe from the old French monarchy, and it marked a change of no less significance to the world at large, – the maritime, commercial and financial supremacy of Great Britain.[47]
Britain had shaped Europe in her interests at the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. It soon became clear, however, that she had designed a system to deal with past threats, principally from France, rather than those of the future. The new challenges came first from Spain, which was unreconciled to the loss of its Mediterranean lands.[48]
^Drescher: JANCAST (p. 451): "Jewish mercantile influence in the politics of the Atlantic slave trade probably reached its peak in the opening years of the eighteenth century ... the political and the economic prospects of Dutch Sephardic [Jewish] capitalists rapidly faded, however, when the British emerged with the asiento [permission to sell slaves in Spanish possessions] at the Peace of Utrecht in 1713".
^England Under Queen Anne Vol III, by G. M. Trevelyan, p. 123
^Africa, Its Geography, People, and Products, by W. E. B. Du Bois[page needed]
^A History of Colonial America by Oliver Perry Chitwood, p. 345
^Moore, John Robert (1950). "Defoe, Steele, and the Demolition of Dunkirk".Huntington Library Quarterly.13 (3):279–302.doi:10.2307/3816138.JSTOR3816138.
^Bromley, J. S. (1987).Corsairs and Navies 1600–1760. Continnuum-3PL. p. 233.ISBN9780907628774.
^Albareda Salvadó, Joaquim (2010).La Guerra de Sucesión en España (1700–1714). Ed. Crítica. p. 344.ISBN978-84-9892-060-4.
^Szabo, I. (1857).The State Policy of Modern Europe from the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century to the Present Time. Vol. I, Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans and Roberts, p. 166
^Churchill, W. (2002).Marlborough: His Life and Times, University of Chicago Press, ISBN 0226106365, pp. 954–955
^Israel, J. I. (1995),The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477–1806, Oxford University Press, ISBN 0198730721 hardback, ISBN 0198207344 paperback, p. 978
^Article II, Peace and Friendship Treaty of Utrecht.
^Vives Vi, Jaime (1969).An Economic History of Spain. Princeton University Press. p. 591.ISBN9780691051659.
^Falkner, James (2015).The War of the Spanish Succession (Kindle ed.). 4173–4181: Pen and Sword Military.ASINB0189PTWZG.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
^Anderson, M. S. (1995).The War of Austrian Succession 1740–1748. Routledge. pp. 10–11.ISBN978-0-582-05950-4.
^Lindsay, J. O. (1957).The New Cambridge Modern History. Vol. 7: The Old Regime,1713–1763. Cambridge University Press. p. 420.ISBN9780521045452.{{cite book}}:ISBN / Date incompatibility (help)
^Elliott, John (2014). Dadson, Trevor (ed.).The Road to Utrecht in Britain, Spain and the Treaty of Utrecht 1713–2013. Routledge. p. 8.ISBN978-1-909662-22-3.
^Kubben, Raymond (2011).Regeneration and Hegemony: Franco-Batavian Relations in the Revolutionary Era 1795–1803. Martinus Nijhoff. p. 148.ISBN978-90-04-18558-6.
^Ward, Adolphus William (1922).The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, Volume 2 (2011 ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 57.ISBN9781108040136.{{cite book}}:ISBN / Date incompatibility (help)
Gregory, Desmond:Minorca, the Illusory Prize: A History of the British Occupations of Minorca Between 1708 and 1802 (Associated University Press, 1990)
Stanhope, Philip:History of England, Comprising the Reign of Queen Anne until the Peace of Utrecht (London: 1870)
Trevelyan, G. M (1930–34).England Under Queen Anne. 3 volumes. Longmans, Green and co.
Van Nimwegen, Olaf (2020).De Veertigjarige Oorlog 1672–1712: de strijd van de Nederlanders tegen de Zonnekoning [The 40 Years' War 1672–1712: the Dutch struggle against the Sun King] (in Dutch). Prometheus.ISBN978-90-446-3871-4.
Van Nimwegen, Olaf (2002).De Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden als grote mogendheid: Buitenlandse politiek en oorlogvoering in de eerste helft van de achttiende eeuw en in het bijzonder tijdens de Oostenrijkse Successieoorlog (1740–1748) (in Dutch). De Bataafsche Leeuw.ISBN978-90-6707-540-4.
"The Treaties of Utrecht (1713)" Brief discussion and extracts of the various treaties on François Velde'sHeraldica website, with particular focus on the renunciations and their later reconfirmations.
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