| Agadir Crisis | |||||||||
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| Part of theCauses of World War I | |||||||||
 SMS Panther in the Bay ofAgadir | |||||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||||
 Germany | |||||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
| Alfred von Kiderlen-Waechter | |||||||||
| Events leading toWorld War I |
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TheAgadir Crisis,Agadir Incident, orSecond Moroccan Crisis was a brief crisis sparked by the deployment of a substantial force ofFrench troops in the interior ofMorocco in July 1911 and the deployment of the GermangunboatSMS Panther toAgadir, a MoroccanAtlantic port.[1]Germany did not object to France's expansion but demanded “territorial compensation” for itself.Berlin threatened warfare, sent a gunboat and stirred upGerman nationalists. Negotiations between Berlin and Paris resolved the crisis on 4 November 1911: France took over Morocco as aprotectorate in exchange for territorial concessions toGerman Cameroon from theFrench Congo.[2]
InBritain,David Lloyd George, thenChancellor of the Exchequer, made a dramatic "Mansion House" speech on 21 July 1911 – with the consent of prime ministerH. H. Asquith andForeign SecretarySir Edward Grey, bypassing the non-interventionist majority in theCabinet – that denounced the German move as an intolerable humiliation.[2] There was talk of war and Germany backed down; relations between Berlin and London worsened and the British moved closer to France. Berlin felt humiliated and began to dimly realize that it was operating with few allies and antagonizing multiple potential adversaries.[3]
France's pre-eminence in Morocco had been upheld by the 1906Algeciras Conference, following theFirst Moroccan Crisis of 1905–06. France and Germany agreed on 9 February 1909 that while France would have exclusive political control, the two nations would uphold each other's economic interests in Morocco.[4] In 1911 they forced the sultan to sign a new treaty wherein he promised not to sign any other treaties without French approval,[5] arguably violating the earlier made agreements.
Germany's move was aimed at testing the relationship between Britain andFrance, and possibly intimidating Britain into an alliance with Germany.[6] Germany was also enforcing compensation claims for acceptance of effective French control of Morocco.
In 1911, a rebellion broke out inMorocco against SultanAbd al-Hafid. The French – after forcing the Sultan to request their assistance – prepared to send troops to help put down the rebellion under the pretext of protecting European lives and property inFèz.[7] Actual danger to European communities was remote: the rebellion broke out deep in the interior.[7] They dispatched aflying column at the end of April. On 5 June, the Spanish deployed troopsto occupy Larache andKsar el-Kebir, fearing a French annexation of the country.[8]
Joseph Caillaux, then French minister for Finance, assured German diplomats in May 1911 that 'France would be prepared, if the Germans recognized its vital interest in Morocco, to make concessions elsewhere'. On 20 June, France agreed to start negotiations. After ten days, they still had not responded.[9] It was then thatKiderlen-Waechter, the German Foreign Minister, askedKaiser Wilhelm II for permission to send a gunboat,[10] having rejected the need to send two ships out of belief that the French would be quickly willing to negotiate.[11]
On 1 July, the German gunboatSMS Panther arrived at the port ofAgadir, under the pretext of protecting German trade interests. The largerBremen-classcruiserSMS Berlin came days later, replacing the gunboat.[12] A German civilian,Hermann Wilberg, 110 kilometres (70 mi) to the north, was sent south to Agadir to provide a pretext for the arrival of thePanther, but he only reached Agadir three days after the ship had arrived.[13] There was an immediate reaction from the French and the British.
In the midst of this crisis, Germany was hit by financial turmoil. The stock market plunged by 30 percent in a single day,[14] the public started cashing in currency notes for gold, and there was a run on the banks. TheReichsbank lost a fifth of its gold reserves in one month. It was rumoured that the French finance minister had orchestrated this crisis.[14] Faced with the possibility of being driven off thegold standard, the Kaiser backed down and let the French take over most of Morocco.[15]
On 7 July, the German ambassador inParis informed the French government that Germany had no territorial aspirations in Morocco, and would negotiate for a Frenchprotectorate on the basis of "compensation" for Germany in theFrench Congo region and the safeguarding of her economic interests in Morocco. The German terms, as presented on 15 July, while containing an offer to cede the northern part ofKamerun andTogoland, demanded from France the whole of the French Congo from theSangha River to the sea, to which was later added the transfer of France's right to the preemption of theBelgian Congo.
On 21 July,David Lloyd George delivered a speech at theMansion House, London in which he declared that national honour was more precious than peace: "If Britain is treated badly where her interests are vitally affected, as if she is of no account in the cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure."[16] The speech was interpreted by Germany as a warning that she could not impose an unreasonable settlement on France.[17]
On 4 November, secret Franco-German negotiations betweenCaillaux and the Germans led to a convention referred to as theFranco-German Accord,[18] under which Germany accepted France's position in Morocco in return for territory in theFrench Equatorial African colony ofMiddle Congo (now theRepublic of the Congo), as outlined in theMorocco-Congo Treaty. This 275,000 km2 (106,000 sq mi) territory, known asNeukamerun, became part of theGerman colony ofKamerun. The area is partly marshland (wheresleeping sickness was widespread) but gave Germany an outlet on theCongo River. Germany ceded to theFrench colony ofTchad a small area of territory to the southeast ofFort Lamy (now part ofChad).
French premier Caillaux's negotiations with the Germans were leaked, causing him to fall from office on 21 January 1912, after a term of only seven months.[19] In Germany, the Franco-German accord was also criticised – especially by the nationalist press – for giving Germany too little.[19]
The initial reaction inLondon was cautious: the Liberal government in Cabinet felt thatFrance was largely responsible for triggering the crisis and ought therefore be urged to give ground.[20] The British government attempted to restrain France from adopting hasty measures and to dissuade her from sending troops. In April, theForeign SecretarySir Edward Grey wrote: "what the French contemplate doing is not wise, but we cannot under our agreement interfere".[21] When Cabinet authorised Grey to inform the French that Britain might accept aGerman presence inMorocco on 19 July, the French government replied angrily that any such acceptance would breach the1904 Anglo-French Agreement.[20]
The prospect of a German naval port on the Atlantic, however, allowed Grey to secure Cabinet's approval on 21 July to inform the German ambassador that Britain would respond forcefully to defend its interests. Britain sent battleships to Morocco, in case war broke out. As in theFirst Moroccan Crisis, British support of France showed the strength of theEntente Cordiale.[20]
Divisions, however, became clear between the supporters of the entente (Grey,Lloyd George, andAsquith especially) and the non-interventionists (who made up a majority of the Cabinet). Lloyd George delivered the Mansion House speech on 21 July 1911, bypassing the Liberal non-interventionists in Cabinet.Viscount Morley,secretary of state forIndia, denounced the speech as an 'unwarranted and unfortunate provocation to Germany';Lord Loreburn, the Lord Chancellor, entreated Grey to take a non-interventionist stance and disavow the speech. Later in the year, there was a backbench revolt against Grey,[22] which was unsuccessful.
One consequence of the crisis was that theFrench viewedGerman policy as motivated by bluff:Raymond Poincaré, the premier succeedingCaillaux in early 1912, observed that 'whenever we have adopted a conciliatory approach to Germany... she has abused it; on the other hand, on each occasion when we have shown firmness, she has yielded', drawing the conclusion that Berlin would only understand a forceful response.[23] Kissinger labels the risk-taking in this crisis used to appease the nationalism-inclined journalists and agitated public while disregarding the true interests at stake elsewhere as "strategic frivolity".[24]
American historianRaymond James Sontag argued in 1933 that it was a comedy of errors that became a tragic prelude to theFirst World War:
WithAbd al-Hafid's capitulation and signing of theTreaty of Fes (30 March 1912), France established a fullprotectorate overMorocco, ending what remained of that country's formal independence.British backing of France during the crisis reinforced the Entente between the two countries (and withRussia as well), increasing Anglo-German estrangement, deepening the divisions which would culminate in theFirst World War.[26]
This incident led Britain'sHome SecretaryWinston Churchill to conclude theRoyal Navy must convert its power source fromcoal tooil, to preserve its supremacy. Until then, thelocally abundant coal was favoured over imported oil (mostly fromPersia), but the speed and efficiency offered by oil convinced him that "Mastery itself was the prize of the venture." Subsequently, Churchill was asked by Prime MinisterH. H. Asquith to becomeFirst Lord of the Admiralty, which he accepted.[27]
The crisis led Britain and France to conclude a secret naval agreement by which the Royal Navy promised to protect the northern coast of France fromGerman Navy attack, while France concentrated her fleet in the western Mediterranean and agreed to defend British interests there. France was thus able to guard her communications with herNorth African colonies, and Britain to concentrate more force in home waters to oppose the German High Seas Fleet.[28] Britain also formed aRailway Executive Committee in order to rapidly mobilize in the event of a continental war.[29]
German world historianOswald Spengler was inspired by the episode to write hisThe Decline of the West. "The Agadir crisis of 1911, which suddenly raised the spectre of a general European war and strikingly revealed the danger of Germany's encirclement by the Entente, crystallized Spengler's nascent vision of the future international political transformation of the West."[30]
During theFirst World War, in 1916,Neukamerun returned to France. The territory today forms part ofChad,Central African Republic, theRepublic of the Congo, andGabon.[31] Established in 1912, theFrench protectorate in Morocco lasted until 1956.[32]
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