Theproblem of other minds is aphilosophical problem traditionally stated as the followingepistemological question: "Given that I can only observe thebehavior of others, how can I know that others haveminds?"[1] The problem is thatknowledge of other minds is always indirect. The problem of other minds does not negatively impactsocial interactions due to people having a "theory of mind" – the ability to spontaneously infer the mental states of others – supported by innatemirror neurons,[2] a theory of mind mechanism,[3] or a tacit theory.[4] There has also been an increase in evidence that behavior results fromcognition which in turn requires consciousness and thebrain.
It is a problem of the philosophical idea known assolipsism: the notion that for any person only one's own mind is known to exist. The problem of other minds maintains that no matter how sophisticated someone's behavior is, that does not reasonably guarantee that someone has the presence of thought occurring within them as when oneself engages in behavior.[5]Phenomenology studies the subjective experience of human life resulting from consciousness. The specific subject within phenomenology studying other minds isintersubjectivity.
In 1953,Karl Popper suggested that a test for the other minds problem is whether one would seriously argue with the other person or machine:[6] "This, I think, would solve the problem of 'other minds'....In arguing with other people (a thing which we have learnt from other people), for example about other minds, we cannot but attribute to them intentions, and this means mental states. We do not argue with a thermometer."
Philosophers such asChristian List have argued that there exists a connection between the problem of other minds and Benj Hellie'svertiginous question, i.e. why people exist as themselves and not as someone else. List argues that there exists a "quadrilemma" for metaphysical consciousness theories where at least one of the following must be false: 'first-personrealism', 'non-solipsism', 'non-fragmentation', and 'one world'.[7] List proposes a philosophical model he calls the "many-worlds theory of consciousness" in order to reconcile the subjective nature of consciousness without lapsing into solipsism.[8] Caspar Hare has argued for similar ideas with the concept ofegocentric presentism, in which other persons can be conscious, but their experiences are simply notpresent in the way one's own current experience is.[9][10] A related concept isperspectival realism, in which things within perceptual awareness have a defining intrinsic property that exists absolutely and not relative to anything.[11]
^Hyslop, Alec (14 January 2014). Zalta, Edward N.; Nodelman, Uri (eds.)."Other minds".Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University.ISSN1095-5054. Retrieved26 May 2015.
^'Language and the body-mind problem: a restatement of interactionism', Proceedings of the 11th International Congress of Philosophy, 7, 1953, reprinted in 'Conjectures and refutations', 1963 ISBN 978-0-415-28594-0.
