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Network-centric warfare, also callednetwork-centric operations[1] ornet-centric warfare, is amilitary doctrine or theory of war that aims to translate an information advantage, enabled partly byinformation technology, into acompetitive advantage through thecomputer networking of dispersed forces. It was pioneered by theUnited States Department of Defense in the 1990s.
In 1996,Admiral William Owens introduced the concept of a 'system of systems' in a paper published by the Institute for National Security Studies in the United States.[2] He described a system of intelligence sensors, command and control systems, and precision weapons that providedsituational awareness, rapid target assessment, and distributed weapon assignment.
Also in 1996, the United States'Joint Chiefs of Staff releasedJoint Vision 2010, which introduced the military concept offull-spectrum dominance.[3] Full Spectrum Dominance described the ability of theUS military to dominate thebattlespace from peace operations through to the outright application ofmilitary power that stemmed from the advantages ofinformation superiority.
The term "network-centric warfare" and associated concepts first appeared in the United States Department of Navy's publication, "Copernicus:C4ISR for the 21st Century." The ideas of networking sensors, commanders, and shooters to flatten the hierarchy, reduce the operational pause, enhance precision, and increase speed of command were captured in this document. As a distinct concept, however, network-centric warfare first appeared publicly in a 1998US Naval Institute Proceedings article byVice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski andJohn Garstka. However, the first complete articulation of the idea was contained in the bookNetwork Centric Warfare : Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority byDavid S. Alberts, John Garstka and Frederick Stein, published by theCommand and Control Research Program (CCRP).[4] This book derived a new theory of warfare from a series of case studies on how business was using information and communication technologies to improve situation analysis, accurately control inventory and production, as well as monitor customer relations.
Theinformation revolution has permeated the military world as well, with network-centric warfare replacing traditional combat methods. Technology is now at the forefront of battlefields, creating a new era of warfare - network-centric.
It's a new level of communication and coordination through what is known as tactical interoperability. From human soldiers to smart weapon systems, command & control systems, automatic sentry systems, and platforms on land, air, and space - all these elements are seamlessly connected in a single communication fabric, with encompass battle management systems for all services, catering to individuals from General HQs to soldiers on the field.
Network-centric warfare was followed in 2001 byUnderstanding Information Age Warfare (UIAW), jointly authored by Alberts, Garstka, Richard Hayes of Evidence Based Research and David A. Signori of RAND.[5]UIAW pushed the implications of the shifts identified by network-centric warfare in order to derive an operational theory of warfare.
Starting with a series of premises on how the environment is sensed,UIAW describes three domains. The first is aphysical domain, where events take place and are perceived by sensors and people. Data emerging from the physical domain is transmitted through aninformation domain. It is processed in acognitive domain before being acted upon.
The process is similar to a"observe, orient, decide, act" loop described byCol. John Boyd of theUSAF.
The last publication dealing with the developing theory of network centric warfare appeared in 2003 withPower to the Edge, also published by the CCRP.[6]Power to the Edge is a speculative work suggesting that modern military environments are far too complex to be understood by any one individual, organisation, or even military service.
Modern information technology permits the rapid and effective sharing of information to such a degree that "edge entities" or those that are essentially conducting military missions themselves, should be able to "pull" information from ubiquitous repositories, rather than having centralised agencies attempt to anticipate their information needs and "push" it to them. This would imply a major flattening of traditional military hierarchies, however.
Power To The Edge's radical ideas had been under investigation bythe Pentagon since at least 2001. InUIAW, the concept ofpeer-to-peer activity combined with more traditionalhierarchical flow of data in the network had been introduced.
Shortly thereafter, the Pentagon began investing in peer-to-peer research, telling software engineers at a November 2001 peer-to-peer conference that there were advantages to be gained in the redundancy and robustness of a peer-to-peernetwork topology on the battlefield.
Network-centric warfare/operations is a cornerstone of the ongoing transformation effort at the Department of Defense initiated by formerSecretary of DefenseDonald Rumsfeld. It is also one of the five goals of theOffice of Force Transformation,Office of the Secretary of Defense.
SeeRevolution in Military Affairs for further information on what is now known as "defense transformation" or "transformation".
The US DOD has mandated that theGlobal Information Grid (GIG) will be the primary technical framework to support US network-centric warfare/network-centric operations. Under this directive, all advancedweapons platforms,sensor systems, andcommand and control centers are eventually to be linked via the GIG. The termsystem of systems is often used to describe the results of these types of massive integration efforts.
The topicNet-Centric Enterprise Services addresses the applications context of the GIG.
A number of significant U.S. military programs are taking technical steps towards supporting network-centric warfare. These include theCooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) of theUnited States Navy and theBCT Network of theUnited States Army.
Net-Centric Enterprise Solutions for Interoperability (NESI) provides, for all phases of the acquisition of net-centric solutions, actionable guidance that meets network-centric warfare goals of the United States Department of Defense. The guidance in NESI is derived from the higher level, more abstract concepts provided in various directives, policies and mandates such as theNet-Centric Operations and Warfare Reference Model (NCOW RM) and theASD(NII) Net-Centric Checklist.
The doctrine of network-centric warfare for the United States armed forces draws its highest level of guidance from the concept of "team warfare", meaning the integration and synchronization of all appropriate capabilities across the various services, ranging fromArmy toAir Force toCoast Guard. This is part of the principle ofjoint warfare.
The tenets of network-centric warfare are:[7]
Net-Centric operations are compatible withMission Command doctrine, which theoretically allows considerable freedom of action for combat troops,[8][9] and with more decentralized approaches toCommand and Control (C2).[10]
There is significant need to harmonize the technical and operational aspects of net-centric warfare and net-centric operations among multiple nations, in order to support coalition activities, joint operations, etc.The NATO Command Structure and many NATO and non-NATO nations have joined theFederated Mission Networking (FMN) initiative and work together under the FMN Framework Process to coordinate the design, development and delivery of operational and technical capabilities required to conduct net-centric operations. Within the Alliance theNATO Interoperability Standards and Profiles (NISP) provides the necessary guidance and technical components to support project implementations andFederated Mission Networking. IndividualStandardization Agreements are the coordinating vehicle for establishing shared technical standards amongNATO nations.
See alsoPartnership for Peace for information on extending coordination efforts to non-NATO nations that are keen to supportmilitary operations other than war activities, such as international peacekeeping, disaster response, humanitarian aid, etc.
"With less than half of theground forces and two-thirds of the military aircraft used 12 years ago inDesert Storm, we have achieved a far more difficult objective. ... In Desert Storm, it usually took up to two days for target planners to get a photo of a target, confirm its coordinates, plan the mission, and deliver it to the bomber crew. Now we have near real-time imaging of targets with photos and coordinates transmitted by e-mail to aircraft already in flight. In Desert Storm,battalion,brigade, anddivision commanders had to rely on maps, grease pencils, and radio reports to track the movements of our forces. Today, ourcommanders have a real-time display of our armed forces on their computer screen."
—former Vice PresidentRichard Cheney.
"Net-centric warfare's effectiveness has greatly improved in 12 years. Desert Storm forces, involving more than 500,000 troops, were supported with 100Mbit/s of bandwidth. Today,OIF forces, with about 350,000 warfighters, had more than 3,000 Mbit/s of satellitebandwidth, which is 30 times more bandwidth for a force 45 percent smaller. U.S. troops essentially used the same weapon platforms used in Operation Desert Storm with significantly increased effectiveness."[11]
—Lieutenant general Harry D. Raduege Jr, director,Defense Information Systems Agency.
"Our incipient NCW plans may suffer defeat by [adversaries] using primitive but cagey techniques, inspired by an ideology we can neither match nor understand; or by an enemy who can knock out our vulnerableGlobal Positioning System or useelectromagnetic pulse weapons on a limited scale, removing intelligence as we have construed it and have come to depend upon. Fighting forces accustomed to relying upon downlinks for information and commands would have little to fall back upon."
— Charles Perrow,Information Assurance,National Defense University, May 2003
The aspiration of theAustralian Defence Force (ADF) to embrace network-centric warfare is outlined in the documentADF Force 2020. This vision has been criticized by Aldo Borgu, director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). By developing interoperability with U.S. systems, in his view, the three arms of the Australian Defence Force could end up operating better with their sister United States services than with each other.[12]
Network centric warfare is criticized by proponents ofFourth Generation Warfare (4GW) doctrine.[citation needed]
Also, since Network-centric warfare focuses so much on distributing information, one has to be wary of the effect of false, misleading, or misinterpreted information entering the system, be it through enemy deception or simple error. Just as the usefulness of correct information can be amplified, so too can the repercussions of incorrect data entering the system achieve much greater non-positive outcomes.[citation needed]
One way that this can happen is through errors in initial conditions in an uncorrected, closed system that subsequently skew result-sets; the result-sets are then reused, amplifying the initial error by orders of magnitude in subsequent generations of result-sets; seechaos theory.[clarification needed]
Other possiblefailure modes or problem areas in network-centric warfare include the occurrence of theByzantine generals' problem inpeer-to-peer systems; problems caused by an inadequate or a shallow understanding of (or general disregard for) self-regulation, self-organization,systems theory,emergent behavior andcybernetics; in addition to this, there are potential issues arising from the very nature of any complex, rapidly developed artificial system arising fromcomplexity theory, which implies the possibility of failure modes such ascongestion collapse orcascading failure.[citation needed]
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