TheNATO Double-Track Decision was the decision byNATO from December 12, 1979, to offer the Soviet Union andWarsaw Pact a mutual limitation ofmedium-range ballistic missiles andintermediate-range ballistic missiles amidst theSoviet invasion of Afghanistan.[1] In case of refusal, NATO planned to deploy more medium-rangenuclear weapons inWestern Europe after the Euromissile Crisis.[2]
Thedétente between theUnited States and theSoviet Union culminated in the signing ofSALT I andAnti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972) and the negotiations towardSALT II (1979). Through these agreements, the two countries agreed to freeze the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers at existing levels, reduce the number ofanti-ballistic missiles and not build more ground-based launchers.
Along with the 1973Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War thesearms control measures caused European NATO members, especiallyWest Germany to feel overlooked.[3] On 28 October 1977, ChancellorHelmut Schmidt gave a speech at theInternational Institute for Strategic Studies in London in which he condemned the threat posed to Western Europe by theSS-20 missiles being deployed by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe earlier that year and publicly expressed a European concern that the strategic nuclear parity reduced the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee and exacerbated the military imbalance within Europe.[4][5][6][7] The road-mobile SS-20 missile was capable of carrying up to threeMIRV warheads and was more accurate than the previously deployedSS-4 andSS-5 missiles.[8]
The strategic nuclear parity between the United States and Soviet Union achieved through the SALT I, ABM and SALT II arms control agreements and development of newintermediate-range nuclear by the Soviet Union led to fears of "decoupling" among non-nuclear European NATO members.[4] According to Noel D. Cary, "unless America was unswervingly prepared to risk the sacrifice of one of its cities to save a German one, West Germany might be vulnerable to Soviet political blackmail."[9]
The decision was prompted by the continuing military buildup ofWarsaw Pact countries, particularly their growing capability in nuclear systems threateningWestern Europe. EuropeanNATO members were especially concerned about the growth of long-range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNF) such as theSS-20 andTupolev Tu-22M 'Backfire' bomber.[10][11]
On 12 December 1979, at a special meeting of NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers inBrussels, the so-called NATO Double-Track Decision was adopted. The ministers resolved to modernise NATO's LRTNF by deploying 108Pershing II launchers to replace the existing AmericanPershing 1a missiles and an additional 464BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) ("track two")[10][11][12] if negotiations for reciprocal limits ("track one") failed by the fall of 1983.[13] NATO offered immediate negotiations with the goal of banning nuclear armed middle-range missiles from Europe completely, with the provision that the missiles could be installed four years later if the negotiations failed.
TheSoviet Union was critical of the fact that neitherFrench norBritish nuclear weapons had been considered in the arms control negotiations.[14]
Soon after the NATO Double Track Decision opposition started to mount. In November 1980,German Green Party politicianGert Bastian and peace activist Josef Weber [de] drafted theKrefeld appeal [de] calling for the federal government ofWest Germany to retract its support for the deployment ofPershing II missiles in the country and GLCMs across Europe. TheKrefeld appeal also called upon West Germany to oppose anuclear arms race, emphasizing that the nuclear armament of the twoCold War superpowers is endangering Europeans in particular. By 1983 theKrefeld appeal had gained five million signatures and opposition to the NATO Double Track Decision became a minimal consensus for thepeace movement.[15]
The Soviet Union and United States agreed to open negotiations and preliminary discussions, named the Preliminary Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Talks,[16] which began inGeneva, Switzerland, in October 1980. The relations were strained at the time due to the December 1979Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which led America to impose sanctions against the USSR.[17] Formal talks began on 30 November 1981, with the U.S. negotiators led by PresidentRonald Reagan and those of the Soviet Union byGeneral Secretary,Leonid Brezhnev. The core of the U.S. negotiating position reflected the principles put forth during thePresidency of Jimmy Carter: any limits placed on U.S. intermediate-range capabilities, both in terms of "ceilings" and "rights", must be reciprocated with limits on Soviet systems. Additionally, the United States insisted that a sufficient verification regime be put in place due to their low trust in the Russians.[18]
Between 1981 and 1983, American and Soviet negotiators gathered for six rounds of talks, each two months in length—a system based on the earlier SALT talks.[19][20] The US delegation was composed ofPaul Nitze,Major General William F. Burns of theJoint Chiefs of Staff,Thomas Graham of theArms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and officials from theUS Department of State,Office of the Secretary of Defense, andUS National Security Council.[21][22] In the fall of 1983, just ahead of the scheduled deployment of US Pershing IIs and GLCMs, the United States lowered its proposed limit on global INF deployments to 420 missiles, while the Soviet Union proposed "equal reductions": if the US cancelled the planned deployment of Pershing II and GLCM systems, the Soviet Union would reduce its own INF deployment by 572 warheads.[23][24][25] In November 1983, after the first Pershing IIs arrived in West Germany, the Soviet Union ended negotiations.[26][27][28]
On 8 December 1987 theUnited States and theSoviet Union signed theIntermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Thistreaty reverted the double-track policy.[29] This treaty also provided for the destruction of all middle-range weapons and ended this episode of theCold War.
The Pershing II launchers began to be deployed in West Germany in late November 1983 and the deployment of 108 launchers was completed in late 1985.[30] Initial Operational Status (IOS) was achieved on 15 December 1983 when A Battery,1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery Regiment rotated onto operational status at the Missile Storage Area (MSA) inMutlangen. The West German government announced on 13 December 1985 that the US Army56th Field Artillery Brigade was equipped with 108 Pershing II launchers across three missile battalions stationed atNeu-Ulm, Mutlangen andNeckarsulm.[31][32]
464 BGM-109G missiles would be based at six locations throughout Europe: 160 atRAF Greenham Common andRAF Molesworth in the United Kingdom, 112 atComiso Air Station in Italy,[33][34][35] 96 atWueschheim Air Station in West Germany,[36] 48 at theWoensdrecht Air Base in the Netherlands,[37][38] and 48 at theFlorennes Air Base in Belgium.[38][39][40][41]
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