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Maskin monotonicity

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Maskin monotonicity is a desired property ofvoting systems suggested byEric Maskin.[1]

Each voter reports his entirepreference relation over the set of alternatives. The set of reports is called apreference profile. Asocial choice rule maps the preference profile to the selected alternative.

For a preference profileP1{\displaystyle P_{1}} with a chosen alternativeA1{\displaystyle A_{1}}, there is another preference profileP2{\displaystyle P_{2}} such that the position ofA1{\displaystyle A_{1}} relative to each of the other alternatives either improves or stays the same as inP1{\displaystyle P_{1}}. With Maskin monotonicity,A1{\displaystyle A_{1}} should still be chosen atP2{\displaystyle P_{2}}.[2]

Maskin monotonicity is a necessary condition for implementability inNash equilibrium. Moreover, any social choice rule that satisfies Maskin monotonicity and another property called "no veto power" can be implemented in Nash equilibrium form if there are three or more voters.[1]

See also

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References

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  1. ^abMaskin, Eric (1999). "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality".Review of Economic Studies.66:23–38.CiteSeerX 10.1.1.122.2734.doi:10.1111/1467-937X.00076.S2CID 16282419.
  2. ^Doğan, Battal; Koray, Semih (2014)."Maskin-monotonic scoring rules"(PDF).Social Choice and Welfare.44 (2): 423.doi:10.1007/s00355-014-0835-6.hdl:11693/12509.S2CID 253844286.
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