Religion in Turkey |
|---|
| Secularism in Turkey |
| Irreligion in Turkey |
95–100% | |
90–95% | |
50–55% | |
30–35% | |
10–20% | |
5–10% | |
4–5% | |
2–4% | |
1–2% | |
< 1% |
Islam is the most practiced religion inTurkey. MostTurkish Sunni Muslims belong to theHanafi school of jurisprudence. The established presence of Islam in the region that now constitutes modern Turkey dates back to the later half of the 11th century, when theSeljuks started expanding intoeastern Anatolia.[2]
While records count the number of Muslims as 99.8%,[I] this is likely to be an overestimation; most surveys estimate lower numbers at around 94%.[3][4][5][6][7] The most popular school of thought (maddhab) being theHanafi school ofSunni Islam (about 90% of overall Muslim denominations). The remainingMuslim sects, forming about 9% of the Muslim population,[8] consist ofAlevis,Ja'faris (representing 1%[9][10]) andAlawites (with an estimated population of around 500,000 to 1 million, or about 1%[11][12]). There is also a minority ofSufi andnon-denominational Muslims.[10][13][14][15]
During the Muslim conquests of the 7th and early 8th centuries,Arab armies established theIslamic Empire. TheUmayyad Caliphate continued the spread ofIslam. TheIslamicGolden Age was soon inaugurated by the middle of the 8th century by the ascension of theAbbasidCaliphate and the transfer of the capital fromDamascus toBaghdad.[16]
The later period saw initial expansion and the capture ofCrete (840). The Abbasids soon shifted their attention towards the East. During the later fragmentation of the Abbasid rule and the rise of theirShiite rivals theFatimids andBuyids, a resurgent Byzantium recapturedCrete andCilicia in 961,Cyprus in 965, and pushed into the Levant by 975. The Byzantines successfully contested with theFatimids for influence in the region until the arrival of theSeljuk Turks who first allied with the Abbasids and then ruled as thede facto rulers.
In 1068,Alp Arslan and alliedTurkoman tribes recaptured many Abbasid lands and even invaded Byzantine regions, pushing further intoeastern andcentral Anatolia after a major victory at theBattle of Manzikert in 1071. The disintegration of the Seljuk dynasty resulted in the rise of subsequent, smaller, rivalTurkic kingdoms such as theDanishmends, theSultanate of Rum, and variousAtabegs who contested the control of the region during theCrusades and incrementally expanded across Anatolia until therise of the Ottoman Empire.
Beginning in the 12th century, new waves of Turkic migrants arrived, many of whom belonging toSufi orders. Some of these migrants later went on to incorporateheterodox beliefs. One Sufi order that appealed to Turks inAnatolia was theSafaviyya, an order that was originally Sunni and non-political, but later became bothShi'a and politically based in northwestIran. During the 14th and 15th centuries, theSafavid and similar orders such as theBektaşi became rivals of theOttomans—who wereorthodox Sunni Muslims—for political control of eastern Anatolia. Although the Bektaşi order became accepted as asect of orthodox Sunni Muslims, they did not abandon their heterodox beliefs. In contrast, the Safavids eventually conquered Iran, spread their beliefs, and became proponents of orthodoxTwelver Shi'a Islam.
The conquest of the Byzantine capital ofConstantinople (modern dayIstanbul) in 1453 enabled the Ottomans to consolidate their empire in Anatolia andThrace. The Ottomans later revived the title ofcaliph during the reign ofSelim I. Despite the absence of a formal institutional structure, Sunni religious functionaries continued to play an important political role. In theory, the codified system ofsharia regulated all aspects of everyday life, at least for Muslim subjects of the empire. The head of thejudiciary ranked directly below the sultan, and was second in power only to the grandvizier. Early in the Ottoman period, the office of grandmufti of Istanbul evolved into that ofŞeyhülislam (shaykh, or "leader of Islam"), which had ultimate jurisdiction over all the courts in the empire and consequently exercised authority over the interpretation and application of sharia. Legal opinions pronounced by the Şeyhülislam were considered definitive interpretations.
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Thesecularization of Turkey started during the last years of theOttoman Empire and was a prominent feature ofAtatürk's reforms. Under his leadership, thecaliphate was abolished, and the secular power of religious authorities and functionaries was reduced and eventually eliminated. Religious foundations were nationalized. The influential and popular orders of thedervish brotherhoods (Tariqa) were also suppressed.
The withdrawal of Turkey, heir to the Ottoman Empire, as the presumptive leader of the international Muslim community, was symbolic of the change in the government's relationship to Islam.Secularism(orlaiklik) became one of the "Six Arrows" of Atatürk's program for remaking Turkey. Whereas Islam had formed the identity of Muslims within the Ottoman Empire, secularism was seen as molding the new Turkish nation and its citizens.
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In 1922, the new nationalist regime abolished the Ottoman sultanate, as well as the caliphate in 1924 - the religious office that Ottoman sultans had held for four centuries. Thus, for the first time in Islamic history, no ruler claimed spiritual leadership of Islam.
Atatürk and his associates abolished certain religious practices and institutions and generally questioned the value of religion, preferring to place their trust inscience. They regarded organized religion as ananachronism and contrasted it unfavorably with "civilization", which to them meant arationalist, secular culture. Unlike in the West, the establishment of secularism in Turkey was not a gradual process of separation of church and state.In the Ottoman Empire, all residents, at least theoretically, had been subject to traditional religious law, and Sunni religious organizations had been part of the state structure. However, the state usually had authority over theclergy and religious law (e.g. many Sultans are known to changeŞeyhülislams, who do not approve of state politics). When the reformers of the early 1920s opted for a secular state, they removed religion from the sphere of public policy and restricted it to exclusively that ofpersonal morals, behavior, and faith. Although private observance of religious rituals could continue, religion and religious organization were excluded from public life.
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In addition to the abolition of the caliphate, new laws mandated the abolition of the office ofŞeyhülislam and the religioushierarchy, the closing and confiscation ofSufi lodges, meeting places, andmonasteries and the outlawing of their rituals and meetings, the establishment of government control overvakıfs which had been inalienable underSharia, the replacement of sharia with adapted European legal codes; the closing of religious schools; the abandonment of theIslamic calendar in favor of theGregorian calendar used in the West, and restrictions on public attire that had religious associations, with thefez outlawed for men and theveil discouraged for women.
Atatürk and his colleagues also attempted to "turkify" Islam through official encouragement of practices such as the usage ofTurkish rather thanArabic at devotions, substituting the Turkish wordTanrı for the Arabic wordAllah, and incorporating Turkish into daily calls to prayer. These changes in devotional practices caused widespread criticism among Muslims, which led to a return to the Arabic version of the call to prayer in 1950, after the opposition partyDP won the elections. Of longer-lasting effect were the regime's measures of prohibiting religious education, restricting the building of newmosques, and transferring existing mosques to secular purposes - most notably theHagia Sophia (Justinian's sixth-century Christianbasilica, which had been converted into a mosque byMehmet II), which was turned into a museum in 1935. Muftis andimams were appointed by the government, and religious instruction was taken over by theMinistry of National Education. As a result of these policies, the Turkish Republic was judged negatively by some sections of the Muslim world.
The common expectation was that these policies of the 1920s and 1930s would diminish the role of religion in public, which, however, did not occur. As early as 1925, religious grievances were one of the principal causes of theŞeyh Sait rebellion, an uprising in southeastern Turkey that may have claimed as many as 30,000 lives before being suppressed.
Although Turkey was secularized at a legal level, religion remained a strong force. After 1950, some political leaders espoused support for programs and policies that appealed to the religiously inclined in an attempt to benefit from a lot of the population's attachment to religion. Such efforts were opposed by most of the state, who believed that secularism was an essential principle ofKemalist Ideology. This gradually led to a polarization of the entire country, which became especially evident in the 1980s, as a new generation of religiously motivated local leaders emerged to challenge the dominance of the secularized political elite.
By 1994, slogans promising that a return to Islam would cure economic ills and solve the problems of bureaucratic inefficiencies had enough general appeal to enable avowed religious candidates to win mayoral elections inIstanbul andAnkara.
Following the loosening of authoritarian political control in 1946, a large number of people began to openly call for a return to traditional religious practices. During the 1950s, even certain political leaders found it expedient to join religious leaders in advocating more state respect for religion.[18]
A more direct manifestation of the growing reaction against secularism was the revival of the Sufi brotherhoods. Not only did suppressed Sufi orders such as theKadiri,Mevlevi,Nakşibendi,Khālidiyyā andAl-Ṭarīqah al-Tijāniyyah reemerge, but new movements were formed, including theNurCemaati,Gülen movement,Sülaymānīyyā,Community of İskenderpaşa andİsmailağa. The Tijāni became especially militant in confronting the state, damaging monuments to Atatürk to symbolize their opposition to his policy of secularization. This was, however, an isolated incident and only involved one particularSheikh of the order. Throughout the 1950s, there were numerous trials of Ticani and other Sufi leaders for anti-state activities.
Simultaneously, some movements, notably the Süleymancı and Nurcular, cooperated with those politicians perceived as supportive of pro-Islamic policies. The Nurcular eventually advocated support for Turkey'smulti-party political system, and one of its offshoots, theGülen movement, had supported theTrue Path Party while theIşıkçılar andEnver Ören had openly supported theMotherland Party since the mid-1980s.
The demand for restoration of religious education in public schools began in the late 1940s. The government initially responded by authorizing religious instruction in state schools for those students whose parents requested it. Under the rule of theDemocrat Party during the 1950s, religious education was made compulsory in secondary schools unless parents made a specific request to have their children excused. Religious education was made compulsory for all primary and secondary school children in 1982.
The reintroduction of religion into the school curriculum raised the question of religious higher education. The seculars believed that Islam could be "reformed" if future leaders were trained in state-controlled seminaries. To further this goal, the government in 1949 established a faculty of divinity atAnkara University to train teachers of Islam and imams. In 1951the Democrat Party government set up special secondary schools (İmam Hatip schools) for the training of imams and preachers. The number of these schools expanded rapidly to over 250 during the 1970s, when the pro-IslamNational Salvation Party participated in coalition governments. Following the1980 coup, the military, although secular in orientation, viewed religion as an effective means to countersocialist ideas and thus authorized the construction of 90 more İmam Hatip high schools.
During the 1970s and 1980s, Islam experiencedpolitical rehabilitation due to center-right secular leaders perceiving religion as a potential bulwark in their ideological struggle with center-left secular leaders. A small advocacy group that became extremely influential was theIntellectuals' Hearth (Turkish:Aydınlar Ocağı), an organization that holds the beliefs that true Turkish culture is a synthesis of the Turks' pre-Islamic traditions and Islam. According to the Hearth, Islam not only constitutes an essential aspect of Turkish culture, but is a force that can be regulated by the state to help socialize the people to be obedient citizens acquiescent to the overall secular order. After the 1980 coup, many of the Hearth's proposals for restructuring schools, colleges, and state broadcasting were adopted. The result was a purge from these state institutions of more than 2,000 intellectuals perceived as espousing leftist ideas incompatible with the Hearth's vision of Turkey's national culture.
The state's more tolerant attitude toward Islam encouraged the proliferation of private religious activities, including the construction of new mosques andQur'an schools in the cities, the establishment of Islamic centers for research on and conferences about Islam and its role in Turkey, and the establishment of religiously oriented professional and women's journals. The printing of newspapers, the publication of religious books, and the growth of innumerable religious projects ranging from health centers, child-care facilities, and youth hostels to financial institutions and consumer cooperatives flourished. When the government legalized private broadcasting after 1990, several Islamic radio stations were organized. In the summer of 1994, the first Islamic television station,Kanal 7, began broadcasting, first inIstanbul and then inAnkara.
Although thetarikah have played a seminal role in Turkey's religious revival and in the mid-1990s still published, several of the country's most widely circulated religious journals and newspapers, a new phenomenon,İslamcı Aydın (the Islamist intellectual), unaffiliated with the traditional Sufi orders, emerged during the 1980s. Prolific and popular writers such asAli Bulaç,Rasim Özdenören, andİsmet Özel drew upon their knowledge of Western philosophy,Marxist sociology, and radical Islamist political theory to advocate for a modern Islamic perspective that does not hesitate to criticize societal issues while simultaneously remaining faithful to the ethical values and spiritual dimensions of religion.Islamist intellectuals are harshly critical of Turkey's secular intellectuals, whom they fault for trying to do in Turkey what Western intellectuals did in Europe: substitute worldlymaterialism, in itscapitalist or socialist version, for religious values.
On 15 July 2016, acoup d'état was attempted in Turkey against state institutions by a faction within theTurkish Armed Forces with connections to the Gülen movement, citing an erosion in secularism.
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There is an administration called "Presidency of Religious Affairs" orDiyanet[19] manages 77,500 mosques. This state agency, established byAtatürk (1924), finance onlySunni Muslim worship Other religions must ensure a financially self-sustaining running and they face administrative obstacles during operation.[20]
| Religions | Estimated population | Expropriation measures[21] | Official recognition through the Constitution or international treaties | Government Financing of places of worship and religious staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sunni Islam -Hanafi &Shafi'i | more than 85%[22][23] | No | Yes through the Diyanet mentioned in the Constitution (art.136)[24] | Yes through the Diyanet[25] |
| Shia Islam -Alevi[26] | less than %5 to more than 30%[27][22][28] | Yes[29] | No.[30] In the early fifteenth century,[31] due tothe unsustainable Ottoman oppression,Alevis supportedShah Ismail I who had Turkmen origins.Shah Ismail I supporters, who wear a red cap with twelvefolds in reference to the 12 Imams were calledQizilbash.Ottomans considered theQizilbash (Alevi) as appendages ofSafavid Empire. Today,Cemevi, places of worship ofAlevi-Bektashi have no official recognition. | No[25] |
| Shia Islam -Bektashi[26] | No.[30] In 1826 with the abolition of theJanissary corps, theBektashitekke(dervish convent) were closed.[29][32] | |||
| Shia Islam -Ja'fari | ~1% | No[30] | No[25] | |
| Shia Islam -Alawites[26] | ~1%[33] | No[30] | No[25] | |
| Ghair Muqallid andQuranist Muslim | ~2%[10] | - | - | - |
The Diyanet is an official state institution established in 1924 and works to provide Quranic education for children, as well as drafting weekly sermons delivered to approximately 85,000 different mosques. Furthermore, the Diyanet employs all of the imams in Turkey.[34]
When collecting tax, all Turkish citizens are equal. The tax rate is not based on religion. However, through the Diyanet, Turkish citizens are not equal in the use of revenue. The Presidency of Religious Affairs, which has a budget over U.S. $2.5 billion in 2012, finance onlySunni Muslim worship.[35]
Sufi orders likeAlevi-Bektashi,Bayrami-Jelveti,Halveti(Gulshani,Jerrahi,Nasuhi,Rahmani,Sunbuli,Ussaki),Hurufi-Rüfai,Malamati,Mevlevi,Nakşibendi(Halidi,Haqqani),Qadiri-Galibi andJa'fari Muslims[29] are not officially recognized.
| Part ofa series on Sunni Islam |
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In terms ofIhsan: |
 Islam portal |
| Do you cover when going outside?[36] | ||
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 2021 | |
| No, I do not | 37% | 41% |
| Yes, I wear a headscarf | 53% | 48% |
| Yes, I wear atürban | 9% | 10% |
| Yes, I wear açarşaf | 1% | 1% |
Although intellectual debates on the role of Islam attracted widespread interest, they did not provoke the kind of controversy that erupted over the issue of appropriate attire for Muslim women. During the early 1980s, female college students who were determined to demonstrate their commitment to Islam began to cover their heads and necks with scarves and wear long, shape-concealing overcoats. The appearance of these women in thecitadels of Turkish secularism shocked those men and women who tended to perceive such attire as a symbol of the Islamic traditionalism they rejected. Militant secularists persuaded the Higher Education Council to issue a regulation in 1987 forbidding female university students to cover their heads in class. Protests by thousands of religious students and some university professors forced several universities to waive enforcement of the dress code. The issue continued to be seriously divisive in the mid-1990s. Throughout the first half of the 1990s, highly educated, articulate but religiously pious women have appeared in public dressed in Islamic attire that conceals all but their faces and hands. Other women, especially inAnkara,Istanbul, andİzmir, have demonstrated against such attire by wearing revealing fashions and Atatürk badges. The issue is discussed and debated in almost every type of forum – artistic, commercial, cultural, economic, political, and religious. For many citizens of Turkey, women's dress has become the issue that defines whether a Muslim is secularist or religious. In 2010, the Turkish Higher Educational council (YÖK) lifted the ban on headscarves at the universities. Since the start of his presidency, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has drastically increased the amount of religious high schools across Turkey to support his plan on bringing up a more pious generation. However, this push on piousness in school children seems to have had an adverse effect, for there is anecdotal evidence of a notable number of Turkish students from religious high schools admitting their loss of faith in Islamic beliefs, which has caused substantial amount of discussion among politicians and religious clerics.[37]
More recently in 2016, Turkey approved hijab as the part of the official police uniform. For the first time, female officers will be able to cover their heads with a headscarf under their police caps. This act was pushed by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP) that have been pushing for relaxed restrictions on the hijab.
The vast majority of the present-day Turkish people areMuslim and theSunni Islam is the most populous Islamic sect, comprising about 90% of the Muslims in the country. The most popular school of law is theHanafite madh'hab ofSunni Islam. TheHanafi madhhab was the officialschool of Islamic jurisprudence espoused by theOttoman Empire[38][39] and a 2013 survey conducted by the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs indicates that 77.5% of Turkish Muslims identify themselves asHanafis.[40] Another common Sunni jurisprudence,Shafi'i is the dominant one inTurkish Kurdistan. Although theMaturidi andAsh'arischools of Islamic theology (which applyIlm al-Kalam or rational thought to understand theQuran and thehadith) have been the dominant creeds in Turkey due to their widespread acceptance and propagation since the beginning of theOttoman Empire,[38] theAthari (literalist) creed[41] of theSalafi movement has seen increasing acceptance.[39]
Compared to the Hanbali school of Islam, the Hanafi school of Islam takes a much more liberal take on the religion, allowing for a more lenient interpretation of religious law.[42]
| Part ofa series on Shia Islam |
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 Shia Islam portal |
| Part ofa series on theAlevis Alevism |
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| Islam portal |
Twelver branch ofShia IslamMuslim population ofTurkey is composed ofJa'fariaqidah andfiqh,Batiniyya-Sufismaqidah ofMaymūn’al-Qāddāhīfiqh of the Alevīs, and Cillīaqidah of Maymūn ibnAbu’l-Qāsim Sulaiman ibn Ahmad ibn at-Tabarānīfiqh of theAlawites,[43][44] who altogether constitutes nearly one tenth of the whole population of the country. An estimate for the Turkish Alevi population varies from 3.5 million to 11 million.[45][46][36]
Unlike the common usage of the term "Shi'a" in other languages,Aleviler instead is being frequently used to represent all theShi'aMuslim sects inTurkish language. Furthermore, the termKızılbaşin the history was used pejoratively for allShi'ites inAnatolia.
Estimates forAlevi population vary from less than 4 million to more than 12 million according to different sources.[8][22][27] It's hard to make a realistic estimate for their population since the Turkish government has never asked about religious denominations in conducted censuses. Other reasons for this are the secular tendencies of the Alevi population and oppression by Sunni Islamists, which causes most Alevis to hide their religious identity. However, considering the few conducted reliable surveys, ~10% can be taken as a simplistic estimation.[22][47][28] Some people use the termAlevi to refer allShia Muslims in Turkey since they are the dominantShia sect in the country.
The followers of theJa'fari jurisprudence constitute the third sizable community. It is historically the primary denomination of ethnicAzerbaijani people. Most of them lives in the eastern provinces neighboring toAzerbaijan, more particularly in theIğdır Province andKars Province, but also larger cities in the west. It is estimated that Ja'faris make up 4% of the population of Turkey,i.e. about 3,300,000.[50] They have 70 mosques in Istanbul and some 300 throughout the country and receive no state funding for their mosques and imams as thePresidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) is exclusively Sunni.[51]
The majority of theAlawite community inTurkey with an estimated population of around 1 million[52] lives in theProvince of Hatay, where they nearly represent half of the total population,[53]primarily in the districts ofArsuz,[54]Defne andSamandağ,[52] whereAlawites constitute the majority and inIskenderun andAntakya where they constitute a significant minority of the population.Larger Alawite communities can also be found in theÇukurova region, mostly in and around the cities ofAdana,Tarsus andMersin.[12] They are known as Arab Alevis by Turkish people.
Folk Islam in Turkey has derived many of its popular practices fromSufism which has good presence in Turkey andEgypt. Particular Sufishaikhs – and occasionally other individuals reputed to be pious – were regarded after death as saints having special powers. Veneration of saints (both male and female) and pilgrimages to their shrines and graves represent an important aspect of popular Islam in the country. Folk Islam has continued to embrace such practices although the veneration of saints officially has been discouraged since the 1930s. Plaques posted in various sanctuaries forbid the lighting of candles, the offering of votive objects, and related devotional activities in these places. Modern day Sufi shaykhs with large adherents in Turkey include Shaykh Mehmet Efendi[who?] (residing in Istanbul) andMawlana Sheikh Nazim Al-Haqqani who resided inLefka, North Cyprus, until his death in May, 2014.
Those who do not accept the authority ofhadith, known asQuranists, Quraniyoon, or Ahl al-Quran, are also present in Turkey.[55][56] InTurkey, Quranist ideas became particularly noticeable, with portions of the youth either leaving Islam or converting to Quranism.[57] There has been significant Quranist scholarship in Turkey, with there being even Quranist theology professors in significant universities, including scholars likeYaşar Nuri Öztürk[58] andCaner Taslaman.[59] Some believe that there are secret Quranists even in theDiyanet itself.
TheTurkishDirectorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) regularly criticizes and insults Quranists, gives them no recognition and calls them kafirs (disbelievers).[60]
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