| Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 | |||||||||
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| Part of theIndo-Pakistani wars and conflicts,Cold War, andBangladesh Liberation War | |||||||||
 First row:Lt-Gen.A.A.K. Niazi, the Cdr. ofPakistani Eastern Comnd., signing thedocumented Instrument of Surrender inDacca in the presence ofLt. Gen.Jagjit Singh Aurora (GOC-in-C of IndianEastern Comnd.). Surojit Sen ofAll India Radio is seen holding a microphone on the right. Second row (left to right):Vice Adm.N. Krishnan (FOC-in-CEastern Naval Comnd.),Air Mshl.H.C. Dewan, (AOC-in-CEastern Air Comnd.), Lt Gen.Sagat Singh (Cdr.IV Corps), Maj Gen.JFR Jacob (COS Eastern Comnd.) andFlt Lt Krishnamurthy (peering over Jacob's shoulder). | |||||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
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 Abdul Motaleb Malik  | ||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||
Indian Armed Forces: 825,000[12] – 860,000[13] Western Front: Eastern Front: | Pakistan Armed Forces: 350,000[18] – 365,000[13] Western Front: | ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
Pakistani claims Indian claims Neutral claims
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Pakistani claims Indian claims Neutral claims | ||||||||
TheIndo-Pakistani war of 1971, also known as thethird India-Pakistan war, was a military confrontation betweenIndia andPakistan that occurred during theBangladesh Liberation War inEast Pakistan from 3 December 1971 until thePakistani capitulation inDhaka on 16 December 1971. The war began with Pakistan'sOperation Chengiz Khan, consisting of preemptive aerial strikes on eightIndian air stations. The strikes led to India declaring war on Pakistan, marking their entry into the war for East Pakistan's independence, on the side ofBengali nationalist forces. India's entry expanded the existing conflict with Indian and Pakistani forces engaging on both the eastern and western fronts.[40] Thirteen days after the war started, India achieved a clear upper hand, and theEastern Command of thePakistan military signed theinstrument of surrender[41] on 16 December 1971 in Dhaka, marking theformation of East Pakistan as the new nation ofBangladesh. Approximately 93,000 Pakistani servicemen weretaken prisoner by theIndian Army, which included 79,676 to 81,000 uniformed personnel of the Pakistan Armed Forces, including some Bengali soldiers who had remained loyal to Pakistan.[42][43] The remaining 10,324 to 12,500prisoners were civilians, either family members of the military personnel or collaborators (Razakars).[44][45][42]
It is estimated that members of the Pakistani military and supporting pro-Pakistani Islamist militiaskilled between 300,000 and 3,000,000 civilians in Bangladesh.[46][47][48][49] As a result of the conflict, a further eight to ten million people fled the country to seek refuge in India.[50]
During the1971 Bangladesh war for independence, members of the Pakistani military and supporting pro-Pakistani Islamist militias called the Razakarsraped between 200,000 and 400,000Bangladeshi women and girls in a systematic campaign ofgenocidal rape.[51][52][53][54]
The Indo-Pakistani conflict was sparked by theBangladesh Liberation War, which was a result of the violation of the rights of East Pakistan by the Pakistan Army.[citation needed] The political tensions in East Pakistan had its origin in thecreation of Pakistan as a result of thepartition of India by the United Kingdom in 1947; the popularlanguage movement in 1950;mass riots in East Bengal in 1964; and the mass protests in 1969. These led to the resignation of PresidentAyub Khan, who invited army chief GeneralYahya Khan to take over thecentral government.[55]: xxx The geographical distance between the eastern and western wings of Pakistan was vast; East Pakistan lay over 1,600 kilometres (1,000 mi) away, which greatly hampered any attempt to integrate theBengali and thePakistani cultures.[56]: 13–14 [57]
To overcome the Bengali domination and prevent formation of the central government inIslamabad, the controversialOne Unit programme established the two wings of East andWest Pakistan. West Pakistanis' opposition to these efforts made it difficult to effectively govern both wings.[55]: xxx In 1969, PresidentYahya Khan announced the firstgeneral elections anddisestablished the status of West Pakistan as a single province in 1970, in order to restore it to its original heterogeneous status comprisingfour provinces, as defined at the time of establishment of Pakistan in 1947.[58] In addition, there were religious and racial tensions between Bengalis and the multi-ethnic West Pakistanis, as Bengalis looked different from the dominant West Pakistanis.[59]
The East Pakistan'sAwami League leaderSheikh Mujibur Rahman stressed his political position by presenting hisSix Points and endorsing the Bengalis' right to govern.[55]: xxx The1970 Pakistani general election, resulted in Awami League gaining 167 out of 169 seats for theEast Pakistan Legislative Assembly, and a near-absolute majority in the 313-seatNational Assembly, while thevote in West Pakistan was mostly won by thesocialistPakistan Peoples Party.[60]: 686–687 The League's election success caused many West Pakistanis to fear that it would allow the Bengalis to draft the constitution based on the six-points and liberalism.[61]: xlv
To resolve the crisis, theAdmiral Ahsan Mission was formed to provide recommendations. Its findings were met with favourable reviews from the political leaders of West Pakistan, with the exception ofZulfikar Ali Bhutto, the chairman of the Pakistan Peoples Party.[62]: 109–110
However, the military top brass vetoed the mission's proposal.[62]: 110 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto endorsed the veto,[62]: 110 and subsequently refused to yield thepremiership of Pakistan toSheikh Mujibur Rahman. The Awami League called for general strikes in the country. President Yahya Khan postponed the inauguration of the National Assembly, causing disillusionment with the Awami League and their supporters throughout East Pakistan.[63] In reaction, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman called for general strikes that eventually shut down the government, and dissidents in the East began targeting the ethnicBihari community, which largely supported West Pakistan.[64]
In early March 1971, approximately 300 Biharis were slaughtered in riots by Bengali mobs inChittagong alone.[64] The Government of Pakistan used the "Bihari massacre" to justify its deployment of the military in East Pakistan on 25 March, when it initiated itsmilitary crackdown.[64] President Yahya Khan called on the military – which was overwhelmingly led by West Pakistanis – to suppress dissent in the East, after accepting the resignation ofLieutenant-GeneralYaqub Ali Khan, the chief of staff of theEast-Pakistani military.[65][66]
Mass arrests of dissidents began and, after several days of strikes andnon-cooperation, the Pakistani military, led by Lieutenant-GeneralTikka Khan, cracked down on Dhaka on the night of 25 March 1971. The government outlawed the Awami League, which forced many of its members and sympathisers into refuge inEastern India. Mujib was arrested on the night of 25/26 March 1971 at about 1:30 am (as per Radio Pakistan's news on 29 March 1971) and taken to West Pakistan.Operation Searchlight, followed byOperation Barisal, attempted to kill the intellectual elite of the east.[67]
On 26 March 1971, MajorZiaur Rahman of the Pakistan Army declared the independence of Bangladesh on behalf of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.[68][69][70]
In April, the exiled Awami League leaders formed agovernment-in-exile inBaidyanathtala ofMeherpur. TheEast Pakistan Rifles and Bengali officers in Pakistan'sarmy,navy, andmarines,defected to the rebellion after taking refuge in different parts of India. The Bangladesh Force, namely theMukti Bahini, consisting of a conventional force and a guerilla force, was formed under the retired colonelMohammad Ataul Gani Osmani.[71]There was also a meeting between Prime Minister Gandhi and President Nixon in November 1971, where she rejected the US advice against intervening in the conflict.[72]
After the resignations of AdmiralS.M. Ahsan and Lieutenant-General Yaqub Ali Khan, themedia correspondents began airing reports of the Pakistani military'swidespread genocide against their Bengali citizens,[73] particularly aimed at the minorityBengali Hindu population,[48][74][40] which led to approximately 10 million people seeking refuge in the neighbouring states of Eastern India.[48][73][75] TheIndian government opened theEast Pakistan–India border to allow theBengali refugees to find safe shelter; the governments ofWest Bengal,Bihar,Assam,Meghalaya andTripura establishedrefugee camps along the border.[76]: 23–24 The resulting flood of impoverished East Pakistani refugees strained India's already overburdened economy.[74]
TheIndian government repeatedly appealed to theinternational community for assistance, but failed to elicit any response, despite the External Affairs ministerSwaran Singh meeting foreign ministers of other countries.[77] Prime MinisterIndira Gandhi on 27 March 1971 concluded that instead of taking in millions of refugees, it was economical to go to war against Pakistan, and expressed full support of her government for the independence struggle of the people of East Pakistan.[75] On 28 April 1971, theUnion cabinet ordered theChief of the Army Staff GeneralSam Manekshaw to "Go into East Pakistan".[78][79][80] Defected East Pakistan military officers and the elements of IndianResearch and Analysis Wing (RAW) immediately started using the Indian refugee camps for recruitment and training of Mukti Bahiniguerrillas that were to be trained against Pakistan.[81]
By November 1971, the Indian military was providing direct fire against Pakistani troops and even made several incursions into Pakistani territory.[82]
Indian authorities also attempted to carry onpsychological warfare and keep up the morale of comrades in East Pakistan. TheSwadhin Bangla Betar Kendra (Free Bangladesh Radio Centre), which had broadcast Major Rahman's independence declaration, was relocated fromKalurghat in East Pakistan to India after the transmission building wasshelled by PakistaniSabre jets on 30 March 1971. It resumed broadcasts on 3 April from Tripura, aided by the IndianBorder Security Force. The clandestine station was finally shifted toKolkata, where it was joined by a large number of Bangladeshi radio programmers, newscasters, poets, singers and journalists. Its jurisdiction was transferred to the provisional Bangladesh government-in-exile, and made its first broadcast on 25 May, the birth anniversary of poetKazi Nazrul Islam (who would later be named Bangladesh'snational poet). Among the Indian contributors to the radio station's nationalistic programmes wasSalil Chowdhury.Akashvani Kolkata also actively took part in this effort.[83][84]
By the end of April 1971, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had asked the Indian Chief of Army StaffGen Sam Manekshaw if he was ready to go to war with Pakistan.[85][86] According to Manekshaw's own personal account, he refused, citing the onset ofmonsoon season in East Pakistan and also the fact that the army tanks were being refitted.[86] He offered his resignation, which Gandhi declined.[86] He then said he could guarantee victory if she would allow him to prepare for the conflict on his terms, and set a date for it; Gandhi accepted his conditions.[86][87] In reality, Gandhi was well aware of the difficulties of a hasty military action, but she needed to get the military's views to satisfy her hawkish colleagues and the public opinion, which were critical of India's restraint.[80]
By mid July, India had settled on a plan of attack. The ground in the East would be drier by mid November, which would make a rapid offensive easier. By early to mid December, theHimalayan passes would be closed by snow, limiting China's ability to intervene.[88]
The news media's mood in Pakistan had turned increasinglyjingoistic and militaristic against East Pakistan and India when the Pakistani news media reported the complexity of the situation in the East, though the reactions from Pakistan's news media pundits were mixed.[89][90] By the end of September 1971, a propaganda campaign, possibly orchestrated by elements within thegovernment of Pakistan, resulted in stickers endorsing "Crush India" becoming a standard feature on the rear windows of vehicles inRawalpindi,Islamabad andLahore; this soon spread to the rest of West Pakistan.[91] By October, other stickers proclaimedHang the Traitor in an apparent reference to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.[92]
From mid October to 20 November, the Indian army conducted multiple incursions into East Pakistani territory,[93] generally withdrawing to India after completing their mission. From 21 November, however, Indian forces with Mukti Bahini support entered East Pakistan and remained there in preparation for a formal war that India expected to launch on 6 December.[94]
An Indian-Pakistani war seemed inevitable. TheSoviet Union reportedlywarned Pakistan against the war, which they termed as "suicidal course for Pakistan's unity."[95]: part-3 Despite this warning, in November 1971, thousands of people led by conservative Pakistani politicians marched in Lahore and across Pakistan, calling for Pakistan to "crush India".[96][97] On 23 November, President Yahya Khan declared a nationalstate of emergency and told the country to prepare for war.[98] By the first week of December, the conservativeprint media outlets in the country had publishedjihad related materials to boost the recruitment in the military.[91]
On the evening of 3 December, at about 17:35, thePakistan Air Force (PAF) launched surprise pre-emptive strikes on eight Indian airfields,[99] includingAgra, which was 480 kilometres (300 mi) from the border. At the time of the attack, theTaj Mahal had been camouflaged with lots of twigs and leaves and draped with burlap, because its marble glowed prominently in the moonlight.[100] These pre-emptive strikes, known asOperation Chengiz Khan, were inspired by the success of IsraeliOperation Focus in the Arab–IsraeliSix-Day War. Unlike the Israeli attack on Arab airbases in 1967, which involved a large number of Israeli planes, Pakistan flew too few planes to inflict significant damage.[99][101]
In an address to the nation on radio that same evening, Prime Minister Gandhi held that the air strikes were a declaration of war against India[102][103] and theIndian Air Force (IAF) responded with initial air strikes the same night. These expanded to massive retaliatory air strikes the next morning.[citation needed]
This air action marked the start of all-out war; Gandhi ordered the mobilisation of troops and launched a full-scale invasion of East Pakistan. This involved Indian forces incoordinated air, sea and land assaults. The main Indian objective on the eastern front was to capture Dacca, and on the western front to contain Pakistani forces.[104]
The Indian army was better equipped than the Pakistanis and enjoyed significant numerical superiority over them.[72]
Pakistan launched a ground offensive on the western front.[72] Major ground attacks were concentrated on the western border by the Pakistan Army but the Indian Army was successful in penetrating into Pakistani soil. It eventually made some quick and initial gains, including the capture of around 15,010 km2 (5,795 sq mi)[7][8] of Pakistani territory; this land gained by India inAzad Kashmir,Punjab andSindh sectors was later ceded in theSimla Agreement of 1972, as a gesture of goodwill[9]
Casualties inflicted to Pakistan Army'sI Corps,II Corps, and Pakistan Marines'Punjab detachment were very high, and many soldiers and marines perished due to lack of operational planning and lack of coordination within the marine-army formations against Indian Army'sSouthern andWestern Commands.[105]: 82–93 By the time the war came to end, the army soldiers and marines were highly demoralised– both emotionally and psychologically– on thewestern front and had nowill to put up a defensive fight against the approaching Indian Army soldiers.[106]: 1–2
Pakistans head of the army and the military operations during the war,[107][108][109]General Abdul Hamid Khan played a central role in directing Pakistan's Western front campaigns.[110] He oversaw the launch ofOperation Chengiz Khan,[111] a preemptive strike on Indian airbases, aimed at crippling Indian airpower and initiating hostilities. Despite extensive planning, the operation inflicted only limited damage. On the Western front, General Hamid Khan commanded key offensives, including the assault towardsFerozepur and ordered the offensive inChhamb underMajor General Iftikhar Janjua, which resulted in territorial gains. He also directed the attempted advance towardsLongewala, though this effort was ultimately repelled by Indian forces.[112] Hamid Khan oversaw the II Corps offensive into the Indian state of Punjab. The plan involved advancing fromBahawalnagar towards Bhatinda and Ludhiana. Under his directive, major elements of the 1st Armored Division began mobilization on December 15, 1971. Small advancements were made by Pakistani troops. However, due to subsequent orders to halt movements, the offensive was delayed and ultimately did not proceed before the ceasefire on December 17, 1971.[113] His leadership during the conflict, while marked by bold initiatives, has been subject to scrutiny in post-war analyses.[114]
On 3 December, after the air strike carried out by the PAF, the 106 Infantry Brigade of the Pakistani forces under the command of Brig Mohammad Mumtaz Khan advanced towards the village ofHussainiwala with 2000 troops and artillery support. The Indian side had deployed one battalion, 15 Punjab, under the command of Lt Col Shastry comprising 900 soldiers with support from the IAF. The 15 Punjab could not hold the village and had to retreat on 4 December towards the fortress called Kaiser-i-Hind outside Hussainiwala. The Indian forces were eventually pushed from the fortress a well.[115][116][117] The Indian side suffered 125 casualties while the Pakistani forces lost 67 men.
Simultaneously, Pakistani forces began an offensive on Chhamb, similar to the offensive carried out during theIndo-Pakistani war of 1965. The Pakistani 23 Armoured Division underMaj Gen Iftikhar Janjua pushed through the region held by the Indian 10 Division with superior equipment commanded by Maj Gen Jaswant Singh.[118] Till 9 December, the Pakistani commander Maj Gen Janjua perished but the Pakistani forces were able to force the Indian units to retreat by 11 December. Pakistan retained the territory won in this battle after theSimla Agreement.[117][119]
On 4 December, a Pakistani unit from the 18 Infantry Division commanded by Maj Gen B. M. Mustafa headed by Brig. Tariq Mir and Brig Jahanzeb Abab advanced towards the Rajasthan town ofLongewala. The town was held by an outnumbered Infantry Company underMajor K. S. Chandapuri and few border guards but had heavy IAF support.[120] This company held several anti-tank guns, cannons and howitzers. The initial Pakistani armored advance was stalled by the Indian Anti-tank and Anti-Mech defenses from high ground and the Pakistani sappers were also pushed back by Indian small arm and artillery cannon fire.[121] The IAF 122 squadron under the command of Wing Cdr D. M. Conquest equipped withHawker Hunter andHAL HF-24 Marut also bombed the Pakistani units.[122] By 7 December theBattle of Longewala was decisively won by India.
PakistaniI Corps attempted to cut Indian transport lines between Punjab and Jammu by advancing on theShakargarh sector on 6 December. Lt Gen Irshad Ahmed Khan commanded two infantry and one armored division into battle.[123] The region was heavily reinforced by the IndianI Corps commanded byLt Gen Khem Karan Singh holding three infantry divisions, two independent armored brigades and two artillery brigades.[124] The resultant battle raged till the end of the war on 16 December and recorded heavy losses on both sides. Despite being numerically superior than the Indian side, Pakistan failed at capturing the region and the Indian units pushed back and threatened Sialkot. TheBattle of Basantar was deemed an Indian victory.[citation needed]
Between 8 and 14 December, India captured an 800 km2 stretch of the Karakoram range in the Northern region ofLadakh in theBattle of Turtuk under the command ofCol Udai Singh.[125]
When the conflict started, the war immediately took a decisive turn in favour of India and theirBengali rebel allies militarily and diplomatically.[72]
Before the formal beginning of hostilities on 3 December, on 23 November, the Indian Army conventionally penetrated the eastern fronts and crossed East Pakistan's borders to join theirBengali nationalist allies.[126]: 156 Contrary to the1965 war, which had emphasised set-piece battles and slow advances, this time the strategy adopted was a swift, three-pronged assault of nine infantry divisions with attached armoured units and close air support that rapidly converged on Dacca, the capital of East Pakistan.[126]: 156 Lieutenant GeneralJagjit Singh Aurora, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Indian Army'sEastern Command, led the full Indian thrust into East Pakistan. As the Indian Eastern Command attacked thePakistan Eastern Command, IAF rapidly destroyed the small air contingent in East Pakistan and put the Dacca airfield out of commission.[126]: 156 In the meantime, the Indian Navy effectively blockaded East Pakistan.[126]: 156
The Indian campaign's "blitzkrieg" techniques exploited weaknesses in the Pakistani positions and bypassed opposition; this resulted in a swift victory.[127]: 802 Faced with insurmountable losses, the Pakistani military capitulated in less than a fortnight and psychological panic spread in the Eastern Command's military leadership.[127]: 802 Subsequently, the Indian Army encircled Dacca and issued an ultimatum to surrender in "30-minutes" time window on 16 December 1971.[128] Upon hearing the ultimatum, theEast-Pakistan government collapsed when the Lt-Gen.A.A.K. Niazi (Cdr. ofEastern Command) and his deputy, V-Adm.M.S. Khan, surrendered without offering any resistance.[126] On 16 December 1971, Pakistan ultimately called for unilateral ceasefire and surrendered its entire four-tier military to the Indian Army – hence ending the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971.[126]
On the ground, Pakistan suffered the most, with 8,000 killed and 25,000 wounded, while India had 3,000 dead and 12,000 wounded.[22] The loss ofarmoured vehicles was similarly imbalanced and this finally represented a major defeat for Pakistan.[22]
The Indian Army's improved performance following its defeat in theSino-Indian War in 1962 boosted its morale and prestige.[129]
Navy NHQ staffers and commanders of thePakistan Navy knew very well that unlike the1965 war, the Navy was ill-prepared for the naval conflict with India.[130]: 65 The Pakistan Navy was in no condition to fight an offensive war in deep water against theIndian Navy, and neither was it in a condition to mount a serious defence against Indian Navy's seaborne encroachment.[131]: 75–76
In the western theatre of the war, the Indian Navy'sWestern Naval Command, under Vice admiralS.N. Kohli, successfully launched a surprise attack on theport of Karachi on the night of 4/5 December 1971 under the codenameTrident.[citation needed] The naval attack involving the Soviet-builtOsa-class missile boats sank the Pakistan Navy'sdestroyerPNS Khaibar andminesweeperPNS Muhafiz whilePNS Shah Jahan was also badly damaged.[citation needed] Pakistani naval sources reported that about 720 Pakistani sailors were killed or wounded, and Pakistan lost reserve fuel and many commercial ships, thus crippling the Pakistan Navy's further involvement in the conflict.[131]: 85–87 Seeking to retaliate, the Pakistan Navy submarines hunted for the major Indian warships.[132] On 9 December 1971,Hangor sankINS Khukri, inflicting 194 Indian casualties, and this attack was the first submarine kill since World War II.[133]: 229 [134]
Thesinking of INSKhukri was followed by another Indian attack on the port of Karachi on the night of 8/9 December 1971 under the codenamePython.[citation needed] Asquadron of Indian Navy's Osa missile boats approached the Karachi port and launched a series of Soviet-acquiredStyx missiles, that resulted in further destruction of reserve fuel tanks and the sinking of three Pakistani merchant ships, as well as foreign ships docked in Karachi.[135] The PAF did not attack the Indian Navy ships, and confusion remained the next day when the civilian pilots ofPakistan International, acting asreconnaissance war pilots, misidentifiedPNS Zulfiqar and the air forceattacked its own warship, inflicting major damages and killing several officers on board.[136]
In the eastern theatre of the war, the IndianEastern Naval Command, under Vice AdmiralNilakanta Krishnan, completely isolated East Pakistan by anaval blockade in theBay of Bengal, trapping the Eastern Pakistan Navy and eight foreign merchant ships in their ports.[131]: 82–83 From 4 December onwards, the aircraft carrierINS Vikrant was deployed, and itsSea Hawk fighter-bombers attacked many coastal towns in East Pakistan, including Chittagong andCox's Bazar.[137] Pakistan countered the threat by sending the submarinePNS Ghazi, whichsank off the coast ofVisakhapatnam, due to an internal explosion, though whether this was triggered by Indian depth charges, diving to avoid them or some other reason has never been established.[138][139]
Due to a high number of defections, the Navy relied on deploying thePakistan Marines, led byRear AdmiralLeslie Mungavin, where they had to conductriverine operations against the Indian Army, but they too suffered major losses, mainly due to their lack of understanding ofexpeditionary warfare and thewet terrain of East Pakistan.[citation needed]
_launches_an_Alize_aircraft_during_Indo-Pakistani_War_of_1971.jpg)
The damage inflicted on the Pakistan Navy stood at 7gunboats, 1 minesweeper, 1 submarine, 2 destroyers, 3 patrol crafts belonging to thePakistan Coast Guard, 18 cargo, supply and communication vessels; and large-scale damage inflicted on the naval base and docks in the coastal town of Karachi. Three merchant navy ships –Anwarbaksh,Pasni andMadhumathi –[140] and ten smaller vessels were captured.[141] Around 1900 personnel were lost, while 1413 servicemen were captured by Indian forces in Dacca.[142] According to one Pakistani scholar,Tariq Ali, Pakistan lost half its navy in the war.[143]
After the attempted pre-emptive attack, the PAF adopted a defensive stance in response to the Indian retaliation. As the war progressed, the IAF continued to battle the PAF over conflict zones, but the number of sorties flown by the PAF decreased day–by–day.[144][145] The IAF flew 4,000 sorties while the PAF offered little in retaliation, partly because of the paucity of non-Bengali technical personnel.[citation needed]
This lack of retaliation has also been attributed to the deliberate decision of the PAF'sAHQ to cut its losses, as it had already incurred huge losses in the conflict in the liberation war in the East.[146] The PAF avoided making contacts with the Indian Navy after the latter raided the port of Karachi twice, but the PAF did retaliate by bombingOkha harbour, destroying the fuel tanks used by the boats that had attacked.[147]
In the east,No. 14 Squadron "Tail Choppers" was destroyed and its CO,Squadron LeaderPQ Mehdi, was takenPOW, putting Pakistan's air command in Dhaka out of commission. India thereby achieved totalair superiority on the eastern front.[citation needed]
At the end of the war, PAF pilots made successful escapes from East Pakistan to neighbouringBurma; many PAF personnel had already left the East for Burma on their own before Dacca was overrun by the Indian military in December 1971.[148]
As the Indian Army tightened its grip in East Pakistan, the IAF continued with its attacks against Pakistan as the campaign developed into a series of daylight anti-airfield, anti-radar, and close-support attacks by fighter jets, with night attacks against airfields and strategic targets byCanberras andAn-12s, while Pakistan responded with similar night attacks with itsB-57s andC-130s.[149]: 107–108
The PAF deployed itsF-6s mainly on defensivecombat air patrol missions over their own bases, leaving the PAF unable to conduct effective offensive operations.[149]: 107 The IAF's raids damaged oneUSAF and one UN aircraft in Dacca, while aRCAFDHC-4 Caribou was destroyed in Islamabad, along with the USAF'sBeech U-8 owned by theUS military's liaison chiefBrigadier-GeneralChuck Yeager.[149]: 107 [150] Sporadic raids by the IAF continued against PAF forward air bases in Pakistan until the end of the war, and interdiction and close-support operations were maintained.[149]: 107–108
One of the most successful air raids by India into West Pakistan happened on 8 December 1971, when Indian Hunter aircraft from thePathankot-based 20 Squadron, attacked the Pakistani base inMurid and destroyed 5F-86 aircraft on the ground. This was confirmed by Pakistan's military historian, Air CommodoreM Kaiser Tufail, in his bookIn The Ring and on Its Feet: Pakistan Air Force in the 1971 Indo-Pak War.[151]
The PAF played a more limited role in the operations. They were reinforced byMirages from an unidentified Middle Eastern ally (whose identity remains unknown).[149]: 107 According to author Martin Bowman, "LibyanF-5s were reportedly deployed toSargodha AFB, perhaps as a potential training unit to prepare Pakistani pilots for an influx of more F-5s from Saudi Arabia."[149]: 112 The IAF was able to conduct a wide range of missions – troop support; air combat; deep penetration strikes; para-dropping behind enemy lines; feints to draw enemy fighters away from the actual target; bombing and reconnaissance.[149]: 107 The PAF, which was solely focused on air combat, was blown out of the subcontinent's skies within the first week of the war.[149]: 107 Those PAF aircraft that survived took refuge atIranian air bases or in concrete bunkers, refusing to offer a fight.[152]
India flew 1,978 sorties in the East and about 4,000 in Pakistan, while the PAF flew about 30 and 2,840 at the respective fronts.[149]: 107 By the end of the war, India had lost 45–65 aircraft while Pakistan lost 75.[19][153][154]
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Officially, theInstrument of Surrender of Pakistan Eastern Command stationed in East Pakistan, was signed between the Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, the GOC-in-C of Indian Eastern Command and Lieutenant-General A.A.K. Niazi, the Commander of the Pakistan Eastern Command, at theRamna Race Course in Dacca at 16:31HrsIST on 16 December 1971.[citation needed] There was a problem over who would represent the Bangladesh government, as the three Bangladeshibattalion commanders -Lt ColsShafiullah,Khaled Musharraf and Ziaur Rahman - were located too far away to be airlifted on time. The responsibility fell on the only armed forces officer available, Gp CaptAK Khondkar, chief of the newly formedBAF.[155] As thesurrender was accepted silently by Lieutenant-General Aurora, the surrounding crowds on the race course started shoutinganti-Pakistan slogans, and there were reports of abuses aimed at the surrendering commanders of Pakistani military.[156] Indian officers and an Indian diplomat,MEAjoint secretary for Pakistan AK Ray, had to form ahuman chain around Lt Gen Niazi to protect him from beinglynched.[155]
Hostilities officially ended at 14:30GMT on 17 December, after the surrender on 16 December, and India claimed large gains of territory in Pakistan (although pre-war boundaries were recognised after the war). The war confirmed the independence ofBangladesh.[149]: 107
Following the surrender, the Indian Army took approximately 90,000 Pakistani servicemen and their Bengali supporters asPOWs, making it the largest surrender sinceWorld War II.[157] Initial counts recorded that approximately 79,676 war prisoners were uniformed personnel, and the overwhelming majority of the war prisoners were officers – most of them from the army and navy, while relatively small numbers were from the air force and marines; others in larger number were serving in paramilitary units.[158]
The remaining prisoners were civilians who were either family members of the military personnel or volunteers (razakars). TheHamoodur Rahman Commission and thePOW Investigation Commission reports instituted by Pakistan lists the Pakistani POWs as given in the table below. Apart from soldiers, it was estimated that 15,000 Bengali civilians were also made prisoners of war.[159]
| Inter-service branch | Number of captured Pakistani POWs | Officer commanding |
|---|---|---|
 Pakistan Army | 54,154 | Lieutenant-GeneralAmir Abdullah Khan Niazi |
 Pakistan Navy/Pakistan Marines | 1,381 | Rear-AdmiralMohammad Shariff |
 Pakistan Air Force | 833 | Air CommodoreInamul Haq |
| Paramilitary (East Pakistan Rifles/Police) | 22,000 | Major-GeneralRao Farman Ali |
| Civil government personnel | 12,000 | GovernorAbdul Motaleb Malik |
| Total: | 90,368 | ~ |
TheSoviet Union sympathised with theEast Pakistanis, and supported the Indian Army andMukti Bahini's incursion against Pakistan during the war, in a broader view of recognising that thesecession of East Pakistan asIndependent Bangladesh would weaken the position of its rivals— the United States and China. The Soviet Union gave assurances to India that if a confrontation with the United States or China developed, it would take counter-measures. This assurance was enshrined in theIndo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in August 1971.[citation needed]
The Soviet Union accepted the Indian position that any resolution to the crisis in East Pakistan would have to be on terms acceptable to India and the Awami League, but the Indo-Soviet treaty did not mean a total commitment to the Indian stance, according to authorRobert Jackson. The Soviet Union continued economic aid to Pakistan and made sympathetic gestures to Pakistan until mid-October 1971.[160] By November 1971, theSoviet ambassador to PakistanAlexei Rodionov directed a secretive message (Rodionov message) that ultimately warned Pakistan that "it will be embarking on a suicidal course if it escalates tensions in the subcontinent".[95]: part-3
The United States stood with Pakistan by supporting it morally, politically, economically and materially when U.S. PresidentRichard Nixon and his Secretary of StateHenry Kissinger refused to use rhetoric in a hopeless attempt to intervene in a large civil war. The U.S. establishment had the impression that the Soviets were in an informal alliance with India, and the US therefore needed Pakistan to help to limit Sovietinfluence in South Asia.[161]: 281 During theCold War, Pakistan was a closeformal ally of the United States and also hadclose relations with the People's Republic of China, with whom Nixon had been negotiating arapprochement and where heintended to visit in February 1972.[162] Nixon feared that an Indian invasion of Pakistan would mean total Soviet domination of the region, and that it would seriously undermine theglobal position of the United States and the regional position of America's new tactical ally, China.[161]: 281–282 Nixon encouragedIran to send military supplies to Pakistan.[163] The Nixon administration also ignored reports it received of the "genocidal" activities of the Pakistani military in East Pakistan, most notably theBlood telegram, and this prompted widespread criticism and condemnation – both by theUnited States Congress and in the international press.[73][164][165]
ThenU.S. Ambassador to the United Nations,George H. W. Bush, introduced a resolution in theUN Security Council calling for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of armed forces by India and Pakistan.[166] However, it wasvetoed by the Soviet Union, and the following days witnessed the use of great pressure on the Soviets from the Nixon-Kissinger duo to get India to withdraw, but to no avail.[167]
When Pakistan's defeat in the eastern sector seemed certain, Nixon deployedTask Force 74, led by theaircraft carrierUSS Enterprise, into theBay of Bengal.Enterprise and its escort ships arrived on station on 11 December 1971.[168][page needed] According to a Russian documentary, the United Kingdom also deployed a carrier battle group led by the aircraft carrierHMS Eagle to the Bay,[169][better source needed] on her final deployment.
On 6 and 13 December, theSoviet Navy dispatched two groups ofcruisers anddestroyers fromVladivostok;[citation needed] they trailed US Task Force 74 into the Indian Ocean from 18 December 1971 until 7 January 1972. The Soviets also had anuclear submarine to help ward off the threat posed by the USSEnterprise task force in the Indian Ocean.[170][171]
As the war progressed, it became apparent to the United States that India was going to invade and disintegrate Pakistan in a matter of weeks, therefore President Nixon spoke with theUSSR General SecretaryLeonid Brezhnev on ahotline on 10 December, where Nixon reportedly urged Brezhnev to restrain India as he quoted: "in the strongest possible terms to restrain India with which ... you [Brezhnev] have great influence and for whose actions you must share responsibility."[172]
After the war, the United States accepted the newbalance of power and recognised India as a dominant player in South Asia; the US immediately engaged in strengtheningbilateral relations between the two countries in the successive years.[173] In June 1972, Soviet Ambassador Rodionov said, "the Soviet Union had always stood and would stand for the unity and territorial integrity of Pakistan". The USSR aided Pakistan economically on several technical and industrial projects.[174][better source needed]
A 2019 study argues "that Nixon and Kissinger routinely demonstrated psychological biases that led them to overestimate the likelihood of West Pakistani victory" in the war, and that they overestimated "the importance of the crisis to broader U.S. policy. The evidence fails to support Nixon and Kissinger's own framing of the 1971 crisis as a contest between cool-headedrealpolitik and idealistic humanitarianism, and instead shows that Kissinger and Nixon's policy decisions harmed their stated goals because of repeated decision-making errors."[175]
During the course of the war, China harshly criticised India for its involvement in the East Pakistan crises, and accused India of havingimperialistic designs in South Asia.[176]: 19 Before the war started, Chinese leaders and officials had long been philosophically advising the Pakistan government to make peaceful political settlements with the East Pakistani leaders, as China feared that India was secretly supporting, infiltrating, and arming the Bengali rebels against theEast Pakistani government.[177][178] China was also critical of the Government of East Pakistan, led by itsgovernor Lieutenant-GeneralTikka Khan, which used ruthless measures to deal with the Bengali opposition, and did not endorse the Pakistani position on that issue.[178]
When the war started, China reproached India for its direct involvement and infiltration in East Pakistan.[178] It disagreed with Pakistani President Yahya Khan's consideration of military options, and criticisedEast Pakistan Awami League politicians' ties with India.[178] China reacted with great alarm when the prospects of Indian invasion of Pakistan and integration ofPakistan-administered Kashmir into theirside of Kashmir, became imminent.[102] US President Nixon encouraged China to mobilise itsarmed forces along its border with India to discourage the Indian assault, but the Chinese did not respond to this encouragement since the Indian Army'sNorthern Command was well prepared to guard theLine of Actual Control, and was already engaging and making advances against the Pakistan Army'sX Corps in theLine of Control.[citation needed]
China did not welcome the break-up of Pakistan's unity by the East Pakistani politicians, and effectively vetoed the membership ofBangladesh when it applied to the United Nations in 1972.[179] China objected to admitting Bangladesh on the grounds that two UN resolutions concerning Bangladesh, requiring therepatriation of PakistaniPOWs and civilians, had not yet been implemented.[180] Furthermore, China was also among the last countries torecognise the independence ofBangladesh, refusing to do so until 31 August 1975.[181][179][182] To this date, its relations with Bangladesh are determined by the Pakistan factor.[183]
Ceylon (modern-day Sri Lanka) saw the partition of Pakistan as an example for themselves and feared India might use its enhanced power against them in the future.[184] The left-wing government ofSirimavo Bandaranaike following a neutral non-aligned foreign policy.[185][186] As Pakistani aircraft could not fly over Indian territory, they would have to take a longer route around India and so they stopped atBandaranaike Airport in Sri Lanka where they were refuelled before flying toEast Pakistan.[187] This decision did not strain relations between Ceylon and India.[188]
As manyArab countries were allied with both the United States andPakistan, it was easy forKissinger to encourage them to participate. He sent letters to both, theKing of Jordan and theKing of Saudi Arabia. PresidentNixon gave permission for Jordan to send tenF-104s and promised to provide replacements.[189]F-86s fromSaudi Arabia helped camouflage the extent of PAF losses, and some LibyanF-5s were reportedly deployed toSargodha AFB, perhaps as a potential training unit to prepare Pakistani pilots for an influx of more F-5s from Saudi Arabia.[149]: 112 In addition to these three countries, an unidentified Middle Eastern ally also suppliedPakistan withMirage IIIs.[citation needed]
Despite not having diplomatic relations at the time, Israel supplied India with armaments, ammunition, intelligence and training ahead of its intervention inEast Pakistan, which has been described as a "surprising minor success" of India's efforts to garner international support. In July 1971Golda Meir, Israel's prime minister, got Israeli arms manufacturerShlomo Zabludowicz to provide India and theMukti Bahini with mortars, ammunition and instructors.[190] Meir reportedly sought diplomatic ties with India in exchange, which were finally established in 1992 underP. V. Narasimha Rao.[191]
In the western front (present-dayIndia-Pakistan border), both countries sparred indecisively.[192] By the end of the war, India had captured a larger quantity of territory than Pakistan. After the ceasefire on 17 December, both sides attempted to take back lost territory. On 17 December, India's 51 Para brigade launched a successful but costly attack on a sand dune occupied by an intruding Pakistaniplatoon, which cost the Indian unit 21 killed and 60 wounded.[193] In May 1972, as the snow melted, Pakistan attacked the Lipa Valley, where the heavily outnumbered Indian forces fell back, with both sides suffering heavy casualties as well as Pakistani forces losing their senior commander.[194] Pakistan would launch similar attacks to attempt to regain lost territory at Minimarg Lake and Turtuk.[194]
Subsequently, in 1972, India and Pakistan signed theSimla Agreement, after which both sides would retain territory they captured in Kashmir and demarcate theLine of Control, while the international border would return to its pre-war limits.
Since the end of the war, India continues to retain control over the regions such asChalunka,Thang,Turtuk,Takshi and Pachtang.[11][195]
The war and subsequent independence of Bangladesh stripped Pakistan of more than half of its population, and with nearly one-third of its army in captivity, clearly established India's military and political dominance of the subcontinent.[40] India successfully led a diplomatic campaign to isolate Pakistan.[72] On state visits to the United Kingdom and France, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi convinced them to break with their ally the United States and block any pro-Pakistan resolution in the United Nations.[72]
The victory also defined India's much broader role in foreign politics, as many countries in the world had come to realise – including the United States – that the balance of power had shifted to India as a major player in the region.[196]: 80 [197]: 57 In the wake of changing geopolitical realities, India sought to establish closer relations with regional countries such as Iran, which was a traditional ally of Pakistan.[197]: 57 The United States itself accepted a new balance of power, and when India conducted asurprise nuclear test in 1974, the US notified India that it had no "interest in actions designed to achieve new balance of power."[173]
In spite of the magnitude of the victory, India was surprisingly restrained in its reaction.[40] Mostly, Indian leaders seemed pleased by the relative ease with which they had accomplished their goals—the establishment of Bangladesh and the prospect of an early return to their homeland of the 10 million Bengali refugees who were the cause of the war.[40] In announcing the Pakistani surrender, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared in the Indian Parliament:
Dacca is now the free capital of a free country. We hail the people of Bangladesh in their hour of triumph. All nations who value the human spirit will recognise it as a significant milestone in man's quest for liberty.[40]
Colonel John Gill ofNational Defense University, US, remarks that, while India achieved a military victory, it was not able to reap the political fruits it might have hoped for in Bangladesh. After a brief 'honeymoon' phase between India and Bangladesh,their relationship began to sour.[198][199] The perceived Indian overstay revived Bangladeshi anxieties of Hindu control.[200] Many were concerned that Mujib was permitting Indian interference in the country's internal matters[201] and many in the Bangladeshi army resented his attachment with India.[202] Whilst India enjoyed excellent relations with Bangladesh during theAwami League tenures, relations deteriorated when theBangladesh Nationalist Party assumed power. A 2014Pew Research Center opinion poll found that 27% of Bangladeshis were wary of India. However, 70% of Bangladeshis held a positive view of India: while 50% of Bangladeshis held a positive view of Pakistan.[203]
For Pakistan, the war was a complete and humiliating defeat,[40] a psychological setback that came from a defeat at the hands of rival India.[45] Pakistan lost half its population and a significant portion of its economy, and suffered setbacks to its geopolitical role in South Asia.[40][45] In the post-war era, Pakistan struggled to absorb the lessons learned from the military interventions in the democratic system and the impact of the Pakistani military's failure was grave and long-lasting.[204][205]
From thegeopoliticalpoint of view, the war ended in thebreaking-up of the unity of Pakistan from being the largestMuslim country in the world to itspolitico-economic and military collapse that resulted from a directforeign intervention by India in 1971.[206]: 50 [207]: 1 [208][209] Pakistani policy-makers further feared that thetwo-nation theory had been disproved by the war, thatMuslim nationalism had proved insufficient to keep Bengalis a part of Pakistan.[210]
The Pakistani people were not mentally prepared to accept the magnitude of this kind of defeat, as the state media had been projecting imaginary victories.[210] When the ceasefire that came from the surrender of East Pakistan was finally announced, the people could not come to terms with the magnitude of defeat; spontaneous demonstrations and massive protests erupted on the streets of major metropolitan cities in Pakistan. According to Pakistani historians, the trauma was extremely severe, and the cost of the war for Pakistan in monetary terms and in human resources was very high.[211][212]: xxx Demoralized and finding itself unable to control the situation, the Yahya administration fell whenPresident Yahya Khan turned over his presidency toZulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was sworn in on 20 December 1971 as Presidentwith the control of the military.[63]The loss of East Pakistan shattered the prestige of the Pakistani military.[45] Pakistan lost half its navy, a quarter of its air force, and a third of its army.[143] The war also exposed the shortcomings of Pakistan's declared strategic doctrine that the "defence of East Pakistan lay in West Pakistan".[213]Hussain Haqqani, in his bookPakistan: Between Mosque and Military notes,
Moreover, the army had failed to fulfill its promises of fighting until the last man. The eastern command had laid down arms after losing only thirteen hundred men in battle. In West Pakistan, too, twelve hundred military deaths had accompanied lackluster military performance.[45]
In his bookThe 1971 Indo-Pak War: A Soldier's Narrative, Pakistan Army's Major General Hakeem Arshad Qureshi, a veteran of this conflict, noted:
We must accept the fact that, as a people, we had also contributed to the bifurcation of our own country. It was not a Niazi, or a Yahya, even a Mujib, or a Bhutto, or their key assistants, who alone were the cause of our break-up, but a corrupted system and a flawed social order that our own apathy had allowed to remain in place for years. At the most critical moment in our history we failed to check the limitless ambitions of individuals with dubious antecedents and to thwart their selfish and irresponsible behaviour. It was our collective 'conduct' that had provided the enemy an opportunity to dismember us.
— Qureshi, p. 288[214]
After the war, the Pakistan Army's generals in the East held each other responsible for the atrocities committed, but most of the burden was laid on Lieutenant-GeneralTikka Khan, who earned notoriety from his actions as governor of the East; he was called the "Butcher of Bengal" because of the widespread atrocities committed within the areas of his responsibility.[215] Tikka was a "soldier known for his eager use of force".[216]
Lieutenant-GeneralA. A. K. Niazi commented on Tikka's actions: "On the night between 25/26 March 1971, General Tikka struck. Peaceful night was turned into a time of wailing, crying and burning. General Tikka let loose everything at his disposal as if raiding an enemy, not dealing with his own misguided and misled people. The military action was a display of stark cruelty more merciless than the massacres atBukhara andBaghdad byChengiz Khan andHalaku Khan ... General Tikka ... resorted to the killing of civilians and ascorched earth policy. His orders to his troops were: 'I want the land and not the people'".[217] Major-GeneralRao Farman wrote in his table diary: "Green land of East Pakistan will be painted red," which has been interpreted to mean that he planned to massacre Bengalis.[218] Farman said the entry was not expressing a thirst for blood, but concern that East Pakistan's future could be the red flag of Communism.[219]
Major reforms were carried out by successive governments in Pakistan after the war. To address the economic disparity, theNational Finance Commission system was established to equally distribute the taxation revenue among thefour provinces, the large-scalenationalisation of industries and nationwidecensus were carried out in 1972.[220] TheConstitution was promulgated in 1973 that reflected this equal balance and a compromise betweenIslamism andHumanism, and provided guaranteed equal human rights to all.[221] Themilitary was heavily reconstructed and heavily reorganised, with President Bhutto appointing chiefs of staff in each inter-service, contrary toC-in-Cs, and making instruction on human rights compulsory in the military syllabus in each branch of inter-services.[222]: 62–100 Major investments were directed towards modernising the navy.[131]: 100 The military'schain of command was centralized inJoint Staff Headquarters (JS HQ) led by an appointedChairman Joint Chiefs Committee to coordinate military efforts to safeguard the nation's defence and unity.[222]: 62–63 In addition, Pakistan sought to have a diversified foreign policy, as Pakistani geostrategists had been shocked that both China and the United States provided limited support to Pakistan during the course of the war, with the US displaying an inability to supply weapons that Pakistan needed the most.[223]: xxxiii
In January 1972, Pakistan under Bhutto launched theclandestine development of nuclear weapons[224] with a view to "never to allow[ing] another foreign invasion of Pakistan."[This quote needs a citation]
As a result of the war, East Pakistan became an independent country,Bangladesh, as the world's fourth most populous Muslim state on 16 December 1971.[citation needed] West Pakistan, now just Pakistan, secured the release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from theHeadquarter Prison and allowed him to return to Dacca. On 19 January 1972, Mujib was inaugurated as the firstPresident of Bangladesh, later becoming thePrime Minister of Bangladesh in 1974.[citation needed]
On the brink of defeat in around 14 December 1971, the media reports indicated that the Pakistan Army soldiers, the localEast Pakistan Police they controlled,razakars and theShanti Committee carried outsystematic killings of professionals such as physicians, teachers, and other intellectuals,[225][226] as part of apogrom against theBengali Hindu minorities who constituted the majority of urban educated intellectuals.[227][228] This massacre of Hindus was confirmed by the Pakistani military brass in a postwar judicial inquiry.[229][better source needed]
Young men, especially students, who were seen as possible rebels and recruiters were also targeted by the stationed military, but the extent of casualties in East Pakistan is not known, and the issue is itself controversial and contradictory among the authors who wrote books on the pogrom;[230][231] the Pakistani government denied the charges of involvement in 2015.[232]R.J. Rummel cites estimates ranging from one to three million people killed.[233] Other estimates place the death toll lower, at 300,000. Bangladesh government figures state that Pakistani forces aided by collaborators killed three million people, raped 200,000 women and displaced millions of others.[234][235]
According to authors Kenton Worcester, Sally Bermanzohn and Mark Ungar, Bengalis themselves killed about 150,000 non-Bengalis living in the East.[236] There had been reports of Bengali insurgents indiscriminately killing non-Bengalis throughout the East; however, neither side provided substantial proofs for their claims and both Bangladeshi and Pakistani figures contradict each other over this issue.[237][238] Bihari representatives in June 1971 claimed a higher figure of 500,000 killed by Bengalis.[239]
In 2010, theAwami League's government decided to set up atribunal to prosecute the people involved in allegedwar crimes and those who collaborated with Pakistan.[240] According to the government, the defendants would be charged withcrimes against humanity,genocide, murder, rape and arson.[241]
According to John H. Gill, there was widespread polarisation between pro-Pakistan Bengalis and pro-liberation Bengalis during the war, and those internal battles are still playing out in the domestic politics of modern-day Bangladesh.[242] To this day, the issue of committed atrocities and pogroms is an influential factor in theBangladesh–Pakistan relations.[243]
In the aftermath of the war, the Pakistani Government constituted theWar Enquiry Commission, to be headed byChief JusticeHamoodur Rahman, who was an ethnicBengali,[244] and composed of thesenior justices of theSupreme Court of Pakistan.[244] The War Enquiry Commission was mandated with carrying out thorough investigations into the intelligence, strategic, political and military failures that causes the defeat in the war.[citation needed]
The War Commission also looked into Pakistan's political and military involvement in thehistory of East Pakistan that encompasses 1947–71.[citation needed] TheFirst War Report was submitted in July 1972, but it was very critically opined and penned on political misconducts of politicians and the military interference innational politics.[245]: 22–197 Written in moral and philosophical perspective, the First Report was lengthy and provided accounts that were unpalatable to be released to the public. Initially, there were 12 copies that were all destroyed, except for the one that was kept and marked as "Top Secret" to prevent thebacklash effects on the demoralised military.[246] In 1976, theSupplementary Report was submitted, which was the comprehensive report compiled together with the First Report; this report was also marked asclassified.[247]
In 2000, the excerpts of the Supplementary Report were leaked to a political correspondent of Pakistan'sDawn, which theDawn published together withIndia Today.[248][249] The First Report is still marked as classified, while the Supplementary Report's excerpts were suppressed by the news correspondents.[250] The War Report's supplementary section was published by the Pakistan Government, but it did not officially hand over the report to Bangladesh despite its requests.[249]
The War Report exposed many military failures, from the strategic to the tactical–intelligence levels, while it confirmed the looting, rapes and the unnecessary killings by the Pakistan military and their local agents.[251] It laid the blame squarely on Pakistan Army generals, accusing them of debauchery, smuggling, war crimes and neglect of duty.[252] The War Commission had recommendedpublic trial of Pakistan Army generals on the charges that they had been responsible for the situation in the first place and that they had succumbed without a fight,[253] but no actions were ever taken against those responsible, except the dismissal of chiefs ofthe Pakistan Army,Pakistan Air Force,Pakistan Navy, and decommissioning of the Pakistan Marines.[248][253]
The War Commission, however, rejected the charge that 200,000 Bengali girls were raped by the Pakistan Army, remarking, "It is clear that the figures mentioned by the Dacca authorities are altogether fantastic and fanciful," and cited the evidence of a British abortion team that had carried out the termination of "only a hundred or more pregnancies".[244][254][255] The commission also claimed that "approximately 26,000 persons (were) killed during the action by the Pakistan military"[254][256]Bina D'Costa states that the War Commission was aware of the military's brutality in East Pakistan, but "chose to downplay the scale of the atrocities committed."[257]
The second commission was known asIndo-Pakistani War of 1971 Prisoners of War Investigation, conducted solely by the Pakistani government, that was to determine the numbers of Pakistani military personnel who surrendered, including the number of civilian POWs.[258] The official number of the surrendered military personnel was soon released by the Government of Pakistan after the war was over.[258]
On 2 July 1972, theIndo-Pakistani summit was held inSimla, Himachal Pradesh, India where theSimla Agreement was reached and signed between PresidentZulfikar Ali Bhutto and Prime MinisterIndira Gandhi.[259] The treaty provided insurance to Bangladesh that Pakistan recognised Bangladesh's sovereignty, in exchange for the return of the Pakistani POWs.[100] Over the next five months, India released more than 90,000 war prisoners, with Lieutenant-General A.A.K. Niazi being the last war prisoner to be handed over to Pakistan.[100]
The treaty also gave back more than 13,000 km2 of land that the Indian Army had seized in Pakistan during the war, though India retained a few strategic areas, includingTurtuk,Dhothang,Tyakshi (earlier called Tiaqsi) andChalunka ofChorbat Valley,[260][261] which was more than 883 km2.[262][263][264] The Indian hardliners, however, felt that the treaty had been too lenient to President Bhutto, who had pleaded for leniency, arguing that the fragile stability in Pakistan would crumble if the accord was perceived as being overly harsh by Pakistanis and that he would be accused of losing Kashmir in addition to the loss of East Pakistan.[265] As a result, Prime Minister Gandhi was criticised by a section in India for believing Bhutto's "sweet talk and false vows", while the other section claimed the agreement to be successful, for not letting it to fall into "Versailles Syndrome" trap.[266]
In 1973, India and Pakistan reached another compromise when both countries signed a trilateral agreement with Bangladesh that actually brought the war prisoners, non-Bengali and Pakistan-loyal Bengali bureaucrats and civilian servants to Pakistan.[267] TheDelhi Agreement witnessed the largest masspopulation transfer since thePartition of India in 1947.[268]
In 2009, the issue of establishing theInternational Crimes Tribunal began to take public support. The tribunal was formally established in 2010 to investigate and prosecute suspects for the genocide committed in 1971 by the Pakistan Army and their local collaborators,Razakars,Al-Badr andAl-Shams during the Bangladesh Liberation War.[269]: 169
After the war, 41battle honours and 4theatre honours were awarded to units of the Indian Army; notable among them are:[273]
For bravery, a number of soldiers and officers on both sides were awarded the highest gallantry award of their respective countries. Following is a list of the recipients of the Indian awardParam Vir Chakra, Bangladeshi awardBir Sreshtho and the Pakistani awardNishan-E-Haider:
Recipients of the Param Vir Chakra:[274][275]
| Rank | Name | Unit | References |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lance Naik | Albert Ekka (Posthumously) | 14 Guards | [276] |
| Flying Officer | Nirmal Jit Singh Sekhon (Posthumously) | No. 18 Squadron IAF | [277] |
| Major | Hoshiar Singh | 3 Grenadiers | [278] |
| Second Lieutenant | Arun Khetarpal (Posthumously) | 17th Horse (Poona Horse) | [279] |
Recipients of the Bir Sreshtho:[280][281]
Recipients of the Nishan-E-Haider:[282][283]
| Rank | Name | Unit | References |
|---|---|---|---|
| Major | Muhammad Akram (Posthumously) | 4 Frontier Force Regiment | [284] |
| Pilot Officer | Rashid Minhas (Posthumously) | No. 2 Squadron PAF | [285] |
| Major | Shabbir Sharif (Posthumously) | 6 Frontier Force Regiment | [286] |
| Sowar | Muhammad Hussain (Posthumously) | 20th Lancers | [287] |
| Lance Naik | Muhammad Mahfuz (Posthumously) | 15 Punjab | [288] |
On 25 July 2011, Bangladesh Swadhinata Sammanona, the Bangladesh Freedom Honour, was posthumously conferred on former Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.[289]
R. M. Muzumdar -IOFS officer. Second Indian Director General of the Indian Ordnance Factories. He was awarded the Padma Bhushan by the Government of India, in 1973, in the Civil service category, for his contributions during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971.
O. P. Bahl, anIOFS officer. Former Additional Director General Ordnance Factories and Member of theOrdnance Factory Board. ReceivedPadma Shri, in 1972 in the civil-service category for his efforts during the war.[290][291][292]
On 28 March 2012,President of BangladeshZillur Rahman and the Prime MinisterSheikh Hasina conferred Bangladesh Liberation War Honour and Friends of Liberation War Honour to 75 people, six organisations,Mitra Bahini and the people of India at a special ceremony at theBangabandhu International Conference Centre, Dhaka. This included eight heads of states: former Nepalese PresidentRam Baran Yadav, the thirdKing of BhutanJigme Dorji Wangchuck, former Soviet General SecretaryLeonid IIyich Brezhnev, former Soviet head of stateNikolai Viktorovich Podgorny, former Soviet Prime MinisterAlexei Nikolaevich Kosygin, former Yugoslav PresidentMarshal Josip Broz Tito, former UK Prime MinisterSir Edward Richard George Heath and former Nepalese Prime MinisterBishweshwar Prasad Koirala. The organisations include theBBC,Akashbani (All India Radio),International Committee of the Red Cross,United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,Oxfam andKolkata University Shahayak Samiti.
The list of foreign friends of Bangladesh has since been extended to 568 people. It includes 257 Indians, 88 Americans, 41 Pakistanis, 39 Britons, 9 Russians, 18 Nepalese, 16 French and 18 Japanese.[293][294]
India's decisive victory over Pakistan in the 1971 war and emergence of independent Bangladesh dramatically transformed the power balance of South Asia
However, India's decisive victory over Pakistan in 1971 led the Shah to pursue closer relations with India
India's decisive victory in 1971 led to the signing of the Simla Agreement in 1972
The Pakistan Government, however, claimed [in June 1971] that the combined fighting strength of the 'secessionists' amounted to about 180,000 armed personnel.
while the size of the Indian armed forces remained static at one million men and Pakistan's at around 350,000.
About 3,843 Indian soldiers died in this war that resulted in the unilateral surrender of the Pakistan Army and led to the creation of Bangladesh. Among the soldiers who returned home triumphant were also 9,851 injured; many of them disabled.
Pakistan retaliated by causing extensive damage through a single B-57 attack on Indian naval base Okha. The bombs scored direct hits on fuel dumps, ammunition dump and the missile boats jetty.
Muslims in West Pakistan had developed a culture which bordered on ethnocentrism, since the ideas entertained in West Pakistan were that they, the ethnic "Sindhi," "Punjabi," "Beluchi," "Afghani," and others were "real" Muslims whereas "Bengali" Muslims from East Pakistan were "distant" Muslims.
By November, the Indian Army and paramilitary troops were regularly providing artillery support to the Mukti Bahini and, toward the end of the month, the army had even made small incursions into East Pakistan in several locations.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in thepublic domain.In a two-week war, Pakistan lost half its navy, a quarter of its air force and a third of its army.
The Nixon Administration's South Asia policy... is beyond redemption
WHT 016-048 12/08/1971 11:06 – 11:14 am P, GHWB[1]Archived 9 April 2022 at theWayback Machine
In the west, the two armies sparred indecisively, each side's small advances being balanced by the other side's gains. The only exception was the dramatic drive by India's 11th Division into the sandy wastes of Pakistan's Sindh Province which netted India approximately 4,500 square kilometers of Pakistani territory, albeit barren desert.18
There was no significant action south of Fazilka, although Indian 4 Para of 51 Para Brigade conducted a costly assault to evict an intruding Pakistani platoon from a nameless sand dune near the village of Nagi several days after the cease-fire (26/27 December). This action cost 4 Para 21 killed and 60 wounded
As the snows melted, Pakistan tried constantly to reclaim its lost territories in Jammu and Kashmir and improve its defensive posture along the ceasefire line in the process. In May 1972, Pakistan made a surprise brigade attack on the Indian forward posts in the Kayan area of the Lipa valley. The Indian posts fell back, suffering heavy casualties. Similarly, the Minimarg Lake area in Gurais was becoming active and large tracts of snow earlier claimed to be in Indian hands were gradually shrinking. The same was the case in the Tartok area of the Partapur sector of Ladakh. These ceasefire violations were prompted by Indian tactical and administrative difficulties in the newly acquired territory.
There were high levels of corruption and cronyism within the administration and widespread concerns that he [Mujib] was allowing India to interfere in Bangladesh's domestic affairs existed.
Another, far more dangerous group felt deeply affronted: the army ... Their resentment originated in the final days of the war of 1971. According to them, the Indian army had robbed the Bangladeshi fighters of the glory of liberating Bangladesh, walking in when the freedom fighters had already finished the job, and had taken away to India all sophisticated weaponry and vehicles captured from the Pakistanis ... they also felt bitter about Mujib's closeness to India, which, they thought, undermined the sovereignty of Bangladesh. By 1973, many in the army were both anti-Indian and anti-Mujib; in the elections that year the garrisons voted solidly for opposition candidates.
At least 125 persons, believed to be physicians, professors, writers and teachers, were found murdered today in a field outside Dacca. All the victims' hands were tied behind their backs and they had been bayoneted, garroted or shot. These victims were among an estimated 300 Bengali intellectuals who had been seized by West Pakistani soldiers and locally recruited supporters.
Through a gazette notification of the government issued on 15 December 1973, the insignia of Bir Srestha was conferred upon seven martyr freedom fighters (posthumously)
Inside, there are separate plaques for Bir Shrestha Captain Mohiuddin Jahangir, Bir Shrestha Flight Lt Motiur Rahman, Bir Shrestha Sepoy Mostofa Kamal, Bir Shrestha Sepoy Hamidur Rahman, Bir Shrestha Lance Naik Munshi Abdur Rouf, Bir Shrestha Ruhul Amin, and Bir Shrestha Lance Naik Nur Mohammad Sheikh.
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