InAncient Greece (ca. 8th BC – AD 6th c.), hegemony denoted the politico-military dominance of thehegemoncity-state over other city-states.[4] In the 19th century,hegemony denoted the "social or cultural predominance or ascendancy; predominance by one group within a society or milieu" and "a group or regime which exerts undue influence within a society".[5]
In theories ofimperialism, the hegemonic order dictates the internal politics and the societal character of the subordinate states that constitute the hegemonicsphere of influence, either by an internal,sponsored government or by an external,installed government. The termhegemonism denoted the geopolitical and the cultural predominance of one country over other countries, e.g. the hegemony of theGreat Powers established withEuropean colonialism in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.[6] InInternational Relations theories, hegemony is distinguished from empire as ruling only external but not internal affairs of other states.[7]
From the post-classicalLatin wordhēgemonia (1513 or earlier) from theGreek wordἡγεμονία,hēgemonía, 'authority, rule, political supremacy', related to the wordἡγεμών,hēgemṓn,'leader'.[8]
In Ancient East Asia, Chinese hegemony existed during theSpring and Autumn period (c. 770–480 BC), when the weakened rule of theEastern Zhou dynasty led to the relative autonomy of theFive Hegemons (Ba in Chinese [霸]). The term is translated aslord protector, orlord of the covenants, orchief of the feudal lords and is described as intermediate between king of independent state andEmperor of All under Heaven.[12] The hegemons were appointed byfeudal lord conferences and were nominally obliged to support the King of Zhou,[13] whose status parallel to that of the Roman Pope in the medieval Europe.
In 364 BC,Qin emerged victorious from war and itsDuke Xian (424–362 BC) was named hegemon by the King of Zhou.[14] Qin rulers did not preserve the official title of hegemon but in fact kept the hegemony over their world: "For more than one hundred years [before 221 BC] Qin commanded eight lands and brought the lord of equal rank to its court."[15] One of the six other great powers,Wei, was annexed as early as 324 BC. From the reign of Duke Xian on, "Qin gradually swallowed up the six [other] states until, after hundred years or so, theFirst Emperor was able to bring all kings under his power."[16]
The century preceding theQin's wars of unification in 221 BC was dominated by confrontation between the hegemonichorizontal alliance led by Qin and the anti-hegemonic alliance calledperpendicular orvertical.[17] "The political world appears as a chaos of ever-changing coalitions, but in which each new combination could ultimately be defined by its relation to Qin."[18]
The first anti-hegemonic orperpendicular alliance was formed in 322 BC. Qin was supported by one state,Wei, which it had annexed two years previously. The remaining five great warring states of China joined in the anti-hegemonic coalition and attacked Qin in 318 BC.[19] "Qin, supported by one annexed state, overwhelmed the world coalition."[20] The same scenario repeated itself several times.[21][22]) until Qin decisively moved from hegemony toconquests and annexations in 221 BC.
Rome established its hegemony over the entire Mediterranean after its victory over theSeleucid Empire in 189 BC. Officially, Rome's client states were outside the whole Roman imperium, and preserved their entire sovereignty and international rights and privileges.[23]
With few exceptions, the Roman treaties with client states (foedera) were formulized on equal terms without any expression of clientship and the Romans almost never used the word "client." The term "client king" is an invention of the post-Renaissance scholarship.[24] Those who are conventionally called by modern historians of Rome "client kings" were referred to as "allies and friends" of the Roman people. "Alliance" and "friendship," not any kind of subordination, bound them to Rome.[25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32]
No regular or formal tribute was extracted from client states. The land of a client state could not officially be a basis for taxation.[33] The overall fact is that, despite extensive conquests, the Romans did not settle down nor extracted revenues in any subdued territories between 200 and 148 BC.[34] The first good evidence for regular taxation of another kingdom comes from Judea as late as 64 BC.[35]
The Roman hegemony of the late Republic left to the Mediterranean kings internal autonomy and obliged them not to enter alliances hostile to Rome and not to wage offensive wars without consent of the Senate. Annexations usually followed when client kings broke this order (Macedonia in 148 BC andPontus in 64 BC). In the course of these and other annexations, Rome gradually evolved from hegemony into empire. The last major client state of the Mediterranean – thePtolemaic Kingdom – was annexed byAugustus in the very beginning of his reign in 30 BC.
Augustus initiated an unprecedented era of peace, shortly after his reign calledPax Romana. This peace however was imperial rather than hegemonic. Classic and modern scholars[36] who callPax Romana "hegemonic peace," use the term "hegemony" in its broader sense which includes both hegemony and empire.
In 7th century India,Harsha, ruler of a large empire in northern India from AD 606 to 647, brought most of the north under his hegemony. He preferred not to rule as a central government, but left "conquered kings on their thrones and contenting himself with tribute and homage."[38]
From the late 9th to the early 11th century, the empire developed byCharlemagne achieved hegemony in Europe, with dominance over France, most of Northern and Central Italy,Burgundy and Germany.[39]
From the 11th to the late 15th centuries theItalianmaritime republics, in particularVenice andGenoa held hegemony in the Mediterranean, dominating trade between Europe and the Orient for centuries, and having naval supremacy.[40] However, with the arrival of theAge of Discovery and theEarly modern period, they began to gradually lose their hegemony to other European powers.[41]
InThe Rise of the Qi Ye Ji Tuan and the Emergence of Chinese Hegemony Jayantha Jayman writes, "If we consider the Western dominated global system from as early as the 15th century, there have been several hegemonic powers and contenders that have attempted to create the world order in their own images." He lists several contenders for historical hegemony:[42]
Phillip IV tried to restore the Habsburg dominance but, by the middle of the 17th century "Spain's pretensions to hegemony (in Europe) had definitely and irremediably failed."[43][44]
In late 16th- and 17th-century Holland, the Dutch Republic'smercantilist dominion was an early instance of commercial hegemony, made feasible by the development of wind power for the efficient production and delivery of goods and services. This, in turn, made possible the Amsterdamstock market and concomitant dominance of world trade.[45]
In France, KingLouis XIV (1638–1715) and (Emperor)Napoleon I (1799–1815) attempted true French hegemony via economic, cultural and military domination of most ofContinental Europe. However, Jeremy Black writes that, because of Britain, France "was unable to enjoy the benefits" of this hegemony.[46]
After the defeat and exile of Napoleon, hegemony largely passed to theBritish Empire, which became the largest empire in history, withQueen Victoria (1837–1901) ruling over one-quarter of the world's land and population at its zenith. Like the Dutch, the British Empire was primarily seaborne; manyBritish possessions were located around the rim of the Indian Ocean, as well as numerous islands in the Pacific Ocean and theCaribbean Sea. Britain also controlled theIndian subcontinent and large portions of Africa.[47]
In Europe, Germany, rather than Britain, may have been the strongest power after 1871, but Samuel Newland writes:
Bismarck defined the road ahead as … no expansion, no push for hegemony in Europe. Germany was to be the strongest power in Europe but without being a hegemon. … His basic axioms were first, no conflict among major powers in Central Europe; and second, German security without German hegemony."[48]
These fluctuations form the basis for cyclical theories byGeorge Modelski andJoshua S. Goldstein, both of whom allege that naval power is vital for hegemony.
The Soviet Union and the United States dominated world affairs during theCold War.
The early 20th century, like the late 19th century, was characterized by multipleGreat Powers but no global hegemon. World War I strengthened the United States and, to a lesser extent, Japan. Both of these states' governments pursued policies to expand their regionalspheres of influence, the US inLatin America and Japan inEast Asia. France, the UK, Italy, the Soviet Union and laterNazi Germany (1933–1945) all either maintained imperialist policies based on spheres of influence or attempted to conquer territory but none achieved the status of a global hegemonic power.[49]
After theSecond World War, the United Nations was established and the five strongestglobal powers (China, France, the UK, the US, and the USSR) were given permanent seats on theU.N. Security Council, the organization's most powerful decision-making body.
Following the war, the US and the USSR were the two strongest global powers and this created a bi-polar power dynamic in international affairs, commonly referred to as theCold War. American hegemony during this time has been described as"Empire by invitation". The hegemonic conflict wasideological, betweencommunism andcapitalism, as well as geopolitical, between theWarsaw Pact countries (1955–1991) andNATO/SEATO/CENTO countries (1949–present/1954–1977/1955–1979). During the Cold War both hegemons competed against each other directly (during thearms race) and indirectly (viaproxy wars). The result was that many countries, no matter how remote, were drawn into the conflict when it was suspected that their government's policies might destabilize thebalance of power. Reinhard Hildebrandt calls this a period of "dual-hegemony", where "two dominant states have been stabilizing their European spheres of influenceagainst and alongside each other."[50] Proxy wars became battle grounds between forces supported either directly or indirectly by the hegemonic powers and included theKorean War, theLaotian Civil War, theArab–Israeli conflict, theVietnam War, theAfghan War, theAngolan Civil War, and theCentral American Civil Wars.[51]
A pie chart showing global military expenditures by country for 2019, in US$ billions, according to SIPRI
Various perspectives on whether the US was or continues to be a hegemon have been presented since the end of theCold War. American political scientistsJohn Mearsheimer andJoseph Nye have argued that the US is not a genuine global hegemon because it has neither the financial nor the military resources to impose a proper, formal, global hegemony[53] and cannot achieve many security, political and economic goals alone.[54] This theory is heavily contested in academic discussions of international relations.[55] According to Mearsheimer, global hegemony is unlikely due to the difficulties in projecting power over large bodies of water.[53] A historian analyzed the claim:
Disregarding recent (since 1492 AD) events, the hypothesis makes sense. In 1281, water and the "good wind" (kamikaze) indeed stopped the Mongols on the way to Japan. Later, however, even with all sorts of kamikaze, water ceased to stop. In 1945, the citizens of Hamburg and Dresden, Berlin and Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki (those who survived), would not describe water power as stopping; certainly not the double habakusha—those who survived in Hiroshima on August 6 and within next two days managed to reach Nagasaki. Had Mearsheimer arranged a poll of double habakushas on August 10, "Does, in your opinion, water power stop?" he would have collected unanimous negative, not necessarily literal, replies. Just the day before the anniversary of the original kamikaze (August 15), the Japanese announced the unconditional surrender. They knew: water will not stop. Not this time.[56]
TheFrench Socialist politicianHubert Védrine in 1999 described the US as a hegemonic hyperpower, because of its unilateral military actions worldwide.[57]
Pentagon strategistEdward Luttwak, inThe Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire,[58] outlined three stages, with hegemonic being the first, followed by imperial. In his view the transformation proved to be fatal and eventually led to the fall of the Roman Empire. His book gives implicit advice toWashington to continue the present hegemonic strategy and refrain from establishing an empire.
In 2006, authorZhu Zhiqun claimed that China is already on the way to becoming the world hegemon and that the focus should be on how apeaceful transfer of power can be achieved between the US and China,[59] but has faced opposition to this claim.[60] According to the recent study published in 2019, the authors argued that a "third‐way hegemony" or Dutch‐style hegemony apart from a peaceful or violent hegemonic rise may be the most feasible option to describeChina in its global hegemony in the future.[61]
In the historical writing of the 19th century, the denotation ofhegemony extended to describe the predominance of one country upon other countries; and, by extension,hegemonism denoted the Great Power politics (c. 1880s – 1914) for establishing hegemony (indirect imperial rule), that then leads to a definition ofimperialism (direct foreign rule).
In the early 20th century, the ItalianMarxist philosopherAntonio Gramsci used the idea of hegemony to talk about politicswithin a given society. He developed the theory ofcultural hegemony, an analysis ofeconomic class (including social class) and how theruling class usesconsent as well as force to maintain its power. Hence, the philosophic and sociologic theory of cultural hegemony analysed thesocial norms that established thesocial structures to impose theirWeltanschauung (world view)—justifying the social, political, and economicstatus quo—as natural, inevitable, and beneficial to every social class, rather than as artificialsocial constructs beneficial solely to the ruling class.[4][6][64]
From the Gramsci analysis derived thepolitical science denotation of hegemony asleadership; thus, the historical example ofPrussia as the militarily and culturally predominant province of theGerman Empire (1871–1918); and the personal and intellectual predominance ofNapoleon Bonaparte upon theFrench Consulate (1799–1804).[65] Contemporarily, inHegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985),Ernesto Laclau andChantal Mouffe defined hegemony as a political relationship ofpower wherein a sub-ordinate society (collectivity) perform social tasks that are culturally unnatural and not beneficial to them, but that are in exclusive benefit to theimperial interests of the hegemon, the superior, ordinate power; hegemony is a military, political, and economic relationship that occurs as anarticulation within politicaldiscourse.[66] Beyer analysed the contemporary hegemony of the United States at the example of the Global War on Terrorism and presented the mechanisms and processes of American exercise of power in 'hegemonic governance'.[67]
In the field ofInternational Relations, hegemony generally refers to the ability of an actor to shape the international system. Usually this actor is a state, such asBritain in the 19th century or the United States in the 20th century. A hegemon may shape the international system through coercive and non-coercive means.[68] According to Nuno Monteiro, hegemony is distinct from unipolarity.[69] The latter refers to a preponderance of power within an anarchic system, whereas the former refers to a hierarchical system where the most powerful state has the ability to "control the external behavior of all other states."[69]
TheEnglish school of international relations takes a broader view of history. The research ofAdam Watson was world-historical in scope. For him, hegemony was the most common order in history (historical "optimum") because many provinces of "frank" empires were under hegemonic rather than imperial rule. Watson summarized his life-long research: There was a spectrum of political systems ranging between multiple independent states and universal empire. The further a political system evolved towards one of the extremes, the greater was the gravitational pull towards the hegemonic center of the spectrum.[70]
Hegemony may take different forms. Benevolent hegemons provide public goods to the countries within their sphere of influence. Coercive hegemons exert their economic or military power to discipline unruly or free-riding countries in their sphere of influence. Exploitative hegemonies extract resources from other countries.[71][72]
A prominent theory inInternational Relations focusing on the role of hegemonies ishegemonic stability theory. Its premise is that a hegemonic power is necessary to develop and uphold a stable international political and economic order. The theory was developed in the 1970s byRobert Gilpin[73] andStephen D. Krasner,[74] among others. It has been criticized on both conceptual and empirical grounds. For example,Robert Keohane has argued that the theory is not a proper theory because it amounts to a series of allegedly redundant claims that apparently could not be used predictively.[75]
A number of International Relations scholars have examined the decline of hegemons and their orders. For some, such decline tends to be disruptive because the stability that the hegemon provided gives way to a power vacuum.[76][77] Others have maintained that cooperation may persist in the face of hegemonic decline because of institutions[75] or enhanced contributions from non-hegemonic powers.[78]
There has been a long debate in the field about whether American hegemony is in decline. As early as in the 1970s,Robert Gilpin suggested that the global order maintained by the United States would eventually decline as benefits from the public goods provided by Washington would diffuse to other states.[73] In the 1980s, some scholars singled out Japan's economic growth and technological sophistication as a threat to U.S. primacy.[79] More recently, analysts have focused on the economic and military rise of China and its challenge to U.S. hegemony.[80]
Scholars differ as to whetherbipolarity or unipolarity is likely to produce the most stable and peaceful outcomes. Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer are among those who argue that bipolarity tends to generate relatively more stability,[81][82] whereas John Ikenberry and William Wohlforth are among those arguing for the stabilizing impact of unipolarity. Some scholars, such asKarl Deutsch andJ. David Singer argued that multipolarity was the most stable structure.[83]
Scholars disagree about the sources and stability of U.S. unipolarity. Realist international relations scholars argue that unipolarity is rooted in the superiority of U.S. material power since the end of the Cold War.[84][85] Liberal international relations scholarJohn Ikenberry attributes U.S. hegemony in part to what he says are commitments and self-restraint that the United States established through the creation of international institutions (such as the United Nations,International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization).[86] Constructivist scholarMartha Finnemore argues that legitimation and institutionalization are key components of unipolarity.[87]
Academics have argued that in thepraxis of hegemony, imperial dominance is established by means ofcultural imperialism, whereby the leader state (hegemon) dictates the internal politics and the societal character of the subordinate states that constitute the hegemonicsphere of influence, either by an internal, sponsored government or by an external, installed government. The imposition of the hegemon's way of life—an imperiallingua franca andbureaucracies (social, economic, educational, governing)—transforms the concrete imperialism of direct military domination into the abstractpower of thestatus quo, indirect imperial domination.[88] J. Brutt-Griffler, a critic of this view, has described it as "deeply condescending" and "treats people ... as blank slates on which global capitalism's moving finger writes its message, leaving behind another cultural automaton as it moves on."[89]
Culturally, hegemony also is established by means oflanguage, specifically the imposedlingua franca of the hegemon (leader state), which then is the official source of information for the people of the society of the sub-ordinate state. Writing on language and power, Andrea Mayr says, "As a practice of power, hegemony operates largely through language."[90] In contemporary society, an example of the use of language in this way is in the way Western countries set up educational systems in African countries mediated by Western languages.[91]
Adopted from the work of Gramsci andStuart Hall, hegemony with respect to media studies refers to individuals or concepts that become most dominant in a culture. Building on Gramsci's ideas, Hall stated that the media is a critical institution for furthering or inhibiting hegemony.[94]
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^Guanzi: Economic Dialogues in Ancient China, ed. Adam K. W. Wen, Connecticut: New Heaven, 1954, p. 60.
^Encyclopædia Britannica,"Ch'i": "As a result, Ch'i began to dominate most of China proper; in 651 BC it formed the little states of the area into a league, which was successful in staving off invasions from the semi-barbarian regimes to the north and south. Although Ch'i thus gained hegemony over China, its rule was short-lived; after Duke Huan's death, internal disorders caused it to lose the leadership of the new confederation."
^abMearsheimer, John (2001).The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W.W. Norton. pp. 40, 138.
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^See Snidal, Duncan (1985). "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory."International Organization 39 (4): pp. 580–614.
^Grunberg, Isabelle (1990). "Exploring the ‘Myth' of Hegemonic Stability."International Organization 44 (4): 431–477.
^abGilpin, Robert (1975).U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation. New York: Basic Books.
^Krasner, Stephen D. (1976). "State Power and the Structure of International Trade."World Politics 28 (3): 317–347.
^abKeohane, Robert O. (1984).After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.[ISBN missing]
^Kindleberger, Charles P. (1981). "Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy."International Studies Quarterly 25: 242–254.
^Gilpin, Robert (1981).War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
^Snidal, Duncan (1985). "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory."International Organization 39 (4): 580–614.
^Schweller, Randall L., and Xiaoyu Pu (2011). "After Unipolarity: China's Vision of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline."International Security 36 (1): 41–72.
^Ikenberry, G. John (Winter 1998–1999). "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order".International Security.23 (3):43–78.doi:10.1162/isec.23.3.43.JSTOR2539338.S2CID57566810.
^Kissinger, Henry (1994).Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster. pp. 137–38.ISBN0-671-65991-X.European coalitions were likely to arise to contain Germany's Nazis growing, potentially dominant, power As well as p. 145: "Unified Germany was achieving the strength to dominate Europe all by itself—an occurrence which Great Britain had always resisted in the past when it came about by conquest".
Anderson, Perry (2017).The H-Word: The Peripeteia of Hegemony. London: Verso.[ISBN missing]
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