In the fields ofmechanism design andsocial choice theory,Gibbard's theorem is a result proven by philosopherAllan Gibbard in 1973.^[1] It states that for any deterministic process of collective decision, at least one of the following three properties must hold:

1. The process isdictatorial, i.e. there is a single voter whose vote chooses the outcome.
2. The process limits the possible outcomes to two options only.
3. The process is not straightforward; the optimal ballot for a voter "requiresstrategic voting", i.e. it depends on their beliefs about other voters' ballots.

A corollary of this theorem is theGibbard–Satterthwaite theorem about voting rules. The key difference between the two theorems is that Gibbard–Satterthwaite applies only toranked voting. Because of its broader scope, Gibbard's theorem makes no claim about whether voters need to reverse their ranking of candidates, only that their optimal ballots depend on the other voters' ballots.^{[note 1]}

Gibbard's theorem is more general, and considers processes of collective decision that may not be ordinal: for example, voting systems where voters assign grades to or otherwise rate candidates (cardinal voting). Gibbard's theorem can be proven usingArrow's impossibility theorem.^{[citation needed]}

Gibbard's theorem is itself generalized byGibbard's 1978 theorem^[3] andHylland's theorem,^[4] which extend these results to non-deterministic processes, i.e. where the outcome may not only depend on the agents' actions but may also involve an element of chance.

Gibbard's theorem assumes the collective decision results in exactly one winner and does not apply tomulti-winner voting. A similar result for multi-winner voting is theDuggan–Schwartz theorem.

Consider some voters${\displaystyle 1}$,${\displaystyle 2}$ and${\displaystyle 3}$ who wish to select an option among three alternatives:${\displaystyle a}$,${\displaystyle b}$ and${\displaystyle c}$. Assume they useapproval voting: each voter assigns to each candidate the grade 1 (approval) or 0 (withhold approval). For example,${\displaystyle (1,1,0)}$ is an authorized ballot: it means that the voter approves of candidates${\displaystyle a}$ and${\displaystyle b}$ but does not approve of candidate${\displaystyle c}$. Once the ballots are collected, the candidate with highest total grade is declared the winner. Ties between candidates are broken by alphabetical order: for example, if there is a tie between candidates${\displaystyle a}$ and${\displaystyle b}$, then${\displaystyle a}$ wins.

Assume that voter${\displaystyle 1}$ prefers alternative${\displaystyle a}$, then${\displaystyle b}$ and then${\displaystyle c}$. Which ballot will best defend her opinions? For example, consider the two following situations.

• If the two other voters respectively cast ballots${\displaystyle (0,1,1)}$ and${\displaystyle (1,1,1)}$, then voter${\displaystyle 1}$ has only one ballot that leads to the election of her favorite alternative${\displaystyle a}$ :${\displaystyle (1,0,0)}$.
• However, if we assume instead that the two other voters respectively cast ballots${\displaystyle (0,0,1)}$ and${\displaystyle (0,1,1)}$, then voter${\displaystyle 1}$ should not vote${\displaystyle (1,0,0)}$ because it makes${\displaystyle c}$ win; she should rather vote${\displaystyle (1,1,0)}$, which makes${\displaystyle b}$ win.

To sum up, voter${\displaystyle 1}$ faces a strategic voting dilemma: depending on the ballots that the other voters will cast,${\displaystyle (1,0,0)}$ or${\displaystyle (1,1,0)}$ can be a ballot that best defends her opinions. We then say that approval voting is notstrategyproof: once the voter has identified her own preferences, she does not have a ballot at her disposal that best defends her opinions in all situations; she needs to act strategically, possibly by spying over the other voters to determine how they intend to vote.

Gibbard's theorem states that a deterministic process of collective decision cannot be strategyproof, except possibly in two cases: if there is a distinguished agent who has a dictatorial power (unilateral), or if the process limits the outcome to two possible options only (duple).

Let${\displaystyle \mathcal{A}}$ be the set ofalternatives, which can also be calledcandidates in a context of voting. Let${\displaystyle \mathcal{N}=\{1,\dots ,n\}}$ be the set ofagents, which can also be calledplayers orvoters, depending on the context of application. For each agent${\displaystyle i}$, let${\displaystyle {\mathcal{S}}_i}$ be a set that represents the availablestrategies for agent${\displaystyle i}$; assume that${\displaystyle {\mathcal{S}}_i}$ is finite. Let${\displaystyle g}$ be a function that, to each${\displaystyle n}$-tuple of strategies${\displaystyle (s_1,\dots ,s_n)\in {\mathcal{S}}_1\times \cdots \times {\mathcal{S}}_n}$, maps an alternative. The function${\displaystyle g}$ is called agame form. In other words, a game form is essentially defined like ann-player game, but with no utilities associated to the possible outcomes: it describes the procedure only, without specifyinga priori the gain that each agent would get from each outcome.

We say that${\displaystyle g}$ isstrategyproof (originally called:straightforward) if for any agent${\displaystyle i}$ and for anystrict weak order${\displaystyle P_i}$ over the alternatives, there exists a strategy${\displaystyle s_i^{\ast }(P_i)}$ that isdominant for agent${\displaystyle i}$ when she has preferences${\displaystyle P_i}$: there is no profile of strategies for the other agents such that another strategy${\displaystyle s_i}$, different from${\displaystyle s_i^{\ast }(P_i)}$, would lead to a strictly better outcome (in the sense of${\displaystyle P_i}$). This property is desirable for a democratic decision process: it means that once the agent${\displaystyle i}$ has identified her own preferences${\displaystyle P_i}$, she can choose a strategy${\displaystyle s_i^{\ast }(P_i)}$ that best defends her preferences, with no need to know or guess the strategies chosen by the other agents.

We let${\displaystyle \mathcal{S}={\mathcal{S}}_1\times \cdots \times {\mathcal{S}}_n}$ and denote by${\displaystyle g(\mathcal{S})}$ the range of${\displaystyle g}$, i.e. the set of thepossible outcomes of the game form. For example, we say that${\displaystyle g}$ has at least 3 possible outcomes if and only if the cardinality of${\displaystyle g(\mathcal{S})}$ is 3 or more. Since the strategy sets are finite,${\displaystyle g(\mathcal{S})}$ is finite also; thus, even if the set of alternatives${\displaystyle \mathcal{A}}$ is not assumed to be finite, the subset of possible outcomes${\displaystyle g(\mathcal{S})}$ is necessarily so.

We say that${\displaystyle g}$ isdictatorial if there exists an agent${\displaystyle i}$ who is adictator, in the sense that for any possible outcome${\displaystyle a\in g(\mathcal{S})}$, agent${\displaystyle i}$ has a strategy at her disposal that ensures that the result is${\displaystyle a}$, whatever the strategies chosen by the other agents.

We assume that each voter communicates astrict weak order over the candidates. Theserial dictatorship is defined as follows. If voter 1 has a unique most-liked candidate, then this candidate is elected. Otherwise, possible outcomes are restricted to his equally most-liked candidates and the other candidates are eliminated. Then voter 2's ballot is examined: if he has a unique best-liked candidate among the non-eliminated ones, then this candidate is elected. Otherwise, the list of possible outcomes is reduced again, etc. If there is still several non-eliminated candidates after all ballots have been examined, then an arbitrary tie-breaking rule is used.

This game form is strategyproof: whatever the preferences of a voter, he has a dominant strategy that consists in declaring his sincere preference order. It is also dictatorial, and its dictator is voter 1: if he wishes to see candidate${\displaystyle a}$ elected, then he just has to communicate a preference order where${\displaystyle a}$ is the unique most-liked candidate.

If there are only 2 possible outcomes, a game form may be strategyproof and not dictatorial. For example, it is the case of the simple majority vote: each voter casts a ballot for her most-liked alternative (among the two possible outcomes), and the alternative with most votes is declared the winner. This game form is strategyproof because it is always optimal to vote for one's most-liked alternative (unless one is indifferent between them). However, it is clearly not dictatorial. Many other game forms are strategyproof and not dictatorial: for example, assume that the alternative${\displaystyle a}$ wins if it gets two thirds of the votes, and${\displaystyle b}$ wins otherwise.

Consider the following game form. Voter 1 can vote for a candidate of her choice, or she can abstain. In the first case, the specified candidate is automatically elected. Otherwise, the other voters use a classic voting rule, for example theBorda count. This game form is clearly dictatorial, because voter 1 can impose the result. However, it is not strategyproof: the other voters face the same issue of strategic voting as in the usual Borda count. Thus, Gibbard's theorem is an implication and not an equivalence.

Gibbard's 1978 theorem states that a nondeterministic voting method is only strategyproof if it's a mixture of unilateral and duple rules. For instance, the rule that flips a coin and chooses a random dictator if the coin lands on heads, or chooses the pairwise winner between two random candidates if the coin lands on tails, is strategyproof. Nondeterministic methods have been devised that approximate the results of deterministic methods while being strategyproof.^[5][6]

• Arrow's impossibility theorem
• Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem

• Voting theory
• Economics theorems
• Theorems in discrete mathematics

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