Günther Prien | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Nickname(s) | Der Stier von Scapa Flow |
| Born | (1908-01-16)16 January 1908 Osterfeld,Province of Saxony,Prussia,German Empire |
| Died | 8 March 1941(1941-03-08) (aged 33) U-47,Western Approaches, offIreland |
| Allegiance |  Nazi Germany |
| Service |  Kriegsmarine |
| Years of service | 1933–1941 |
| Rank |  Korvettenkapitän |
| Service number | NSDAP #1,128,487 |
| Unit | 7th U-boat Flotilla |
| Commands | U-47 |
| Battles / wars | |
| Awards | Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves |
Günther Prien (16 January 1908 – presumed 8 March 1941) was a GermanU-boat commander duringWorld War II. He was the first U-boat commander to receive theKnight's Cross of the Iron Cross and the first member of theKriegsmarine to receive theKnight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves ofNazi Germany. It was Germany's highest military decoration at the time of its presentation to Prien.[Note 1]
Under Prien's command, the submarineU-47 was credited with sinking over 30Allied ships totalling about 200,000 gross register tons (GRT), along with the BritishbattleshipHMS Royal Oak at anchor in theHome Fleet's anchorage inScapa Flow.
Prien was one of three children of a judge and completed his basic education.[2] At the age of five, Prien had been living with relatives, thenotary Carl Hahn and his wife, inLübeck. There he attended theKatharineum, a humanistic secondary school.[3] After his parents separated, Prien moved with his mother and siblings toLeipzig where she eked out a living selling peasant lace.[4] Prien joined theHandelsflotte (Germanmerchant marine) in mid-1923 to ease the financial burden on his family.[2][5] He applied to and joined theFinkenwerder–Hamburg Seaman's School.[4] After eight years of work and study as a seaman, rising from cabin boy on a sailing ship, Prien passed the required examinations and became thefourth officer on apassenger liner,[2] theSS Hamburg.[4] Prien learnedtelegraphy, ship handling, leadership, andlaws of the sea. In 1931 he becamefirst mate and attended school for a commission. Prien received his sea master's certificate in January 1932.[2]
Unable to find work due to the severe contraction of the German shipping industry during theGreat Depression, he was forced to turn to theFreiwilliger Arbeitsdienst ('Voluntary Labour Service', FAD). He earned a living dredging fields and digging ditches.[2] Prien joined theNazi Party in May 1932, but had to resign his membership upon joining the navy prior to Hitler's ascent to power.[7] His membership in the party cemented Prien's image as a Nazi supporter, though his actions have been described as career advancing opportunism rather than genuine political conviction; one author wrote "it is hard to determine his politics."[7] However,Donald Macintyre described Prien as "the most Nazified U-boat captain", "an ardent ruthless Nazi".[8] Prien applied to theReichsmarine in January 1933 when he found the navy was offering officer-candidate programs for merchant marine officers. He was integrated into theReichsmarine as a member of "Crew 31" (the incoming class of 1931), but had the age and experience of a 1926 class.[2][9]
Prien received his military basic training in the 2nd company in the 2nd department of the standing ship division of theBaltic Sea inStralsund (16 January 1933 – 31 March 1933).[Tr 1][Tr 2][Tr 3] During this time he advanced in rank toFähnrich zur See (naval cadet) on 1 March. He then attended the main cadet course at theNaval Academy Mürwik and various weapons courses for cadets atKiel (1 April 1933 – 30 September 1934).[Tr 4][Tr 5] From 1 October 1934 to 30 September 1935, Prien served as watch and division officer on the light cruiserKönigsberg. On this assignment, he was promoted toOberfähnrich zur See (senior midshipman) on 1 January 1935 and toLeutnant zur See (acting sub-lieutenant) on 1 April 1935.[9] Prien then joined the U-boat training force.[2] Prien attended the U-boat school in Kiel from 1 October 1935 to 30 April 1936. His training included a specialized U-boat torpedo course which was held onU-3.[9]
On 11 May 1936, Prien was appointed first Watch Officer onU-26, serving under the command ofWerner Hartmann after forming a bond at the training school. At Hartmann's request Prien was assigned to his submarine, which served in theSpanish Civil War in 1937.[4][2] Prien rose steadily in rank, frommidshipman in 1933 toOberleutnant zur See (sub-lieutenant) on 1 January 1937.[9] On 1 October 1937, Prien was ordered to theGermaniawerft, the shipbuilding works in Kiel, for construction training of the newType VIIBU-47.[9] He commissionedU-47 on 17 December 1938 which was part of theWegener Flotilla. Prien was promoted toKapitänleutnant (Captain lieutenant) on 1 February 1939.[9]
Prien married in 1939 to Ingeborg; the couple had two children. Ingeborg Prien later married anOberstleutnant in theBundeswehr and changed her name to Inge Sturm-Prien.[10]
World War II commenced during Prien's first patrol inU-47, following theGerman invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939. Prien had departed Kiel on 19 August for a patrol lasting 28 days. On 5 September, he sank the BritishBosnia of 2,407 gross register tons (GRT), the second ship of the war to be sunk by a U-boat.[11] Theprize regulations were in force at the time, so Prien was obliged to stop the ship. After identifying her as British he surfaced alongside her and fired a warning shot from thedeck gun. The ship turned away to escape and it took six hits and a fire in her hold full of sulphur to bring it to a stop. Prien asked a passing neutral Norwegian ship to take the crew. The damaged ship was finished with a torpedo.[12] His boat sank two British vessels,Rio Claro of 4,086 GRT on the 6th, andGartavon of 1,777 GRT on the 7th.[11] The sinkings were notable for Prien's use of the deck gun, which was rare.[13]U-47 returned to Kiel on 15 September having sunk a total tonnage of 8,270 GRT.[14] Prien was recalled by Dönitz to prevent all boats returning simultaneously leaving none on patrol.[12]
On 1 October 1939,Karl Dönitz became aKonteradmiral (rear admiral) and "Commander of the Submarines" (Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote,BdU). Dönitz had been encouraged inoperations against warships by the sinking ofaircraft carrierCourageous in September 1939. On 28 September 1939 he said, "it is not true Britainpossesses the means to eliminate the U-boat menace."[15] Dönitz was busy convincing Hitler of the need for 300 operational boats to achieve decisive success against Britain.[16] Dönitz was attracted to the prospect of attacking theRoyal Navy anchorage atScapa Flow at the outbreak of war, to win a victory for his command. InWorld War I, two German submarines had tried and failed. Undaunted he ordered German submarineU-16 to reconnoitre the region and requestedLuftwaffe reconnaissance. From the air and sea reports Dönitz concluded that there was an 18-yard gap in the northeast entrance, betweenblockships sunk to bar the gap fromLamb Holm and the mainland.[16] Dönitz selected Prien andU-47 for the task.[17] Prien was his favourite, and according to Dönitz "possessed all the personal qualities and professional abilities required."[18]
Prien left port to navigate the shallowNorth Sea on 8 October and did not brief his crew until mid-mission.[20] He avoided all shipping and sat on the sea bed in daylight if possible.[20] Prien approachedOrkney in the evening of the 14 October. He surfaced four hours sailing time from the anchorage. While surfaced Prien observed theaurora borealis, which exposed the German submarine.[20] In a post-patrol account Prien remarked it was "disgustingly light" and that – in his words – "the whole bay is lit up".[21] At 22:00 the Orkneynavigation lights came on for thirty minutes which allowed Prien to fix his position.[20] His watch officers spotted a merchant ship and Prien dived to avoid it, but shadowed the vessel and carried out a practice attack. Despite the presence of the lights he could not see the ship through the periscope. With visibility poor while submerged he decided to carry out the attack on the surface.[20]
Prien pressed on and passed through the narrow entrance to the sound. He selected the wrong channel—between Lamb Holm andBurray—recognising the mistake in time. He disregarded Dönitz's idea to pass south of the two blockships and instead sailed between the centre and northern block ship. The tide allowed the entry to be made rapidly. Prien and his crew were temporarily snared, or ran aground. Only by reversing at maximum revolutions did the U-boat free itself.U-47 entered the Flow at 00:27.[20] Prien and his watch officers found the anchorage to be empty. Eventually they spotted "two battleships", in reality, just one;Royal Oak. The other was the 6,900 GRT seaplane tenderPegasus. Prien began the attack at 00:55 and concluded it at 01:28.[20] He fired seven torpedoes, some of which failed or ran widely off target. Nevertheless, the battleship was struck by several of the second salvo and sank in 13 minutes. The sinking killed 835 of her crew, including Rear AdmiralHenry Blagrove, commander of the2nd Battle Squadron.[20] At 02:15U-47 exited the Flow and ordered flank speed to escape. He logged in the war diary, "a pity that only one was destroyed."[20] Prien thought he had damaged theRepulse lying behindRoyal Oak, but it was not present—thePegasus was not hit.[22] In the U-boat's war diary at 02:15 he wrote, "I still have five torpedoes for any merchant targets that come our way."[23]
He returned to Germany on 17 October to instant fame.[20] Prien and his crew were flown toBerlin aboard Hitler's personal aircraft. At theReich Chancellery the following day, Hitler awarded Prien theKnight's Cross of the Iron Cross (Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes). For Dönitz, the operation was a personal triumph. U-boat production did not increase immediately, but he had succeeded in securing Hitler's attention.[20]Nazi propaganda exploited the success and gloated over damaged British morale.[24] TheHome Fleet did not return to Scapa Flow until March 1940, until the entry points were closed and air defences improved.[25] The fleet was moved toLoch Ewe, but on the way the battleshipNelson was damaged by a mine laid byU-31.[26]
Purportedly Prien did not enjoy being a propaganda tool, but he cooperated with theReich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, and conferenced withJoseph Goebbels.[27] The conference was unique in that it was the first time the Nazis showcased an individual military success.[28] American journalistWilliam L. Shirer met Prien but was not impressed by his lack of humility and wrote of Prien that he appeared "cocky" and a "fanatical Nazi."[29] The story that Prien had simply followed a ship into the harbour was rightly disbelieved; Prien said nothing of his route in.[29] Prien wrote a book of his experiences during the war,Mein Weg Nach Scapa Flow (My way to Scapa Flow), released in the autumn, 1940.[30] One historian wrote, "for a story of potentially high propaganda value, it is told with striking restraint."[31] The media compensated for this apparent modesty. TheIllustrierter Beobachter lionised Prien. It provided plenty of images of Prien, his crew and Hitler, exalting him as a hero. These sentiments were picked up and spread throughout Germany by other state-controlled media outlets.[31]
Prien received the nicknameDer Stier von Scapa Flow ("The Bull of Scapa Flow"); the emblem of a snorting bull was painted on the conning tower ofU-47 and soon became the emblem of the entire7th U-boat Flotilla. The reason, given by 1st watch officerEngelbert Endrass for this, was the sight of Prien's demeanour as U-47 entered Scapa Flow, "his frowning face and hunched shoulders reminded him of a bull in a ring."[32][33] All U-boats had their number removed from the conning tower in wartime, and commanding officers often applied their own motifs.[34] Two members of the Scapa Flow crew earned the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross during World War II: the chief engineer (Leitender Ingenieur)Johann-Friedrich Wessels and 1st watch officer (I.Wachoffizier) Engelbert Endrass.
Kept secret by the German naval command was the fact that Prien had fired a total of sevenG7e torpedoes at his target; only one from the first salvo hit the target and exploded on the bow, near the anchor chain. The stern torpedo also failed to hit or detonate. The second salvo did strike and explode.[35] The navy had long-standing problems with their depth, steering and their magnetic detonator systems. These problems continued to bedevil the German submariners for a long time.[36] In 2002, part of a torpedo fired during the attack resurfaced near to an anchored tanker. The warhead had detached but the missile contained compressed air necessitating its destruction by a bomb disposal team.[37]
The historian Riederer argues thatSonderunternehmen P (Special Operation P), the codename for the attack on Scapa Flow, was very likely predominantly motivated by Nazi propaganda. Following World War I, the GermanHigh Seas Fleet was interned at Scapa Flow under the terms of theArmistice whilst negotiations took place over the fate of the ships. Fearing that all the ships would be seized and divided amongst theAllies, AdmiralLudwig von Reuter decided toscuttle the fleet. Whilst the internment was considered a national humiliation by theKriegsmarine, the scuttling of the fleet was romanticised as an act ridding the navy of the shame associated with theKiel mutiny of 3 November 1918. The NS-propaganda spread the interpretation that Prien's success at Scapa Flow turned the symbolic triumph of scuttling the fleet, and had finally rid the older generation from the Scapa Flow traumata.[38]
U-47 under the command of Prien with 1st watch officer (I. WO)Oberleutnant zur See Engelbert Endrass and chief engineerOberleutnant (Ing.) Johann-Friedrich Wessels leftKiel on 16 November 1939.[39]U-47 attacked a British cruiser on 28 November 1939. Prien had identified the ship to be aLondon-class cruiser. Prien intended to launch a spread of three torpedoes, but only a single torpedo cleared the tube and detonated in the wake of the cruiser. When the periscope cleared the surface, Prien observed what he believed major damage to the stern of the cruiser, her starboard torpedo launchers dislodged and an aircraft tilted.U-47 surfaced and tried to pursue the cruiser but was driven off by depth charges dropped from the escort. It turned out the cruiser wasHMS Norfolk which was not damaged by the detonation. The war diary of theBefehlshaber der U-Boote (BdU) on 17 December 1939 stated that even though a hit was observed the cruiser was not sunk,[39] but German propaganda broadcast that "The bull of Scapa Flow" had sunk the cruiser. Upon inquiry from the Admiralty,Norfolk reported herself undamaged; she thought the explosion in her wake had been an aircraft bomb.[40]
On 5 December 1939,U-47 spotted nine merchant vessels escorted by five destroyers. At 14:40, Prien fired one torpedo.U-47 continued to attack Allied shipping in the Western Approaches, however eight out of twelveG7eU-47 carried, failed to detonate either missing or malfunctioning. On 18 December 1939,U-47 returned to Kiel via theKaiser Wilhelm Canal. The claims made by Prien are noted in the war diary of the BdU on 17 December 1939:
for a total of 31,000 GRT plus one British warship damaged, while the actual tonnage was only 23,168 GRT.[39] Three ships were confirmed sunk.[41] The identity of the vessels wereSS Navasota from OB 46 south ofFastnet was the first, tankerMV Britta south ofLongships Lighthouse, and finallyTanjandoen south-southeast ofThe Lizard.[42] From convoy OB 46, 37 sailors died aboardSS Navasota, another 45 were rescued by other merchant vesselsEscapade andClan Farquhar.[43]Louis Scheid rescued 62 men fromTanjandoen, but six perished.Britta lost six men, a Belgian ship rescued 25.[43]
Prien's fourth patrol started on 29 February 1940 from Kiel. The former 1st watch officer Endrass had been replaced byOberleutnant zur SeeHans-Werner Kraus. On this patrol,U-47 headed for the North Sea, theShetland Islands and theOrkney Islands. On 1 March,U-47 arrived inHeligoland for a four-day stop.[39] Back at sea again on 11 March,U-47 sank theBritta on 25 March.U-47 returned to Wilhelmshaven again on 29 March, ending this patrol.[44] The ship was torpedoed without warning northwest ofSule Skerry. 13 men died and five were rescued by the Danish shipNancy.[45]
Torpedo failures still afflicted the U-boat fleet but the number of sinkings rose in the first months of 1940. U-boat commanders, determined to enter the ranks of "aces" such as Prien, were prepared to take greater risks, most often attacking at night on the surface—the Admiralty noted that by February 1940 these reached 58 percent.[46]
In April 1940 the OKM plannedOperationsbefehl Hartmut to supportOperation Weserübung, the invasions ofDenmark andNorway.[47] The purpose was to provide seaborne protection for the German amphibious landings on Norway's large coast line from theRoyal Navy andFrench Navy. The German surface fleet could not fight a large-scale surface action against the British and win. Dönitz hoped the U-boats could compensate for this weakness. The faulty G7e torpedo rendered the German submarine fleet useless for the duration ofWeserübung.[48][36] The failure of torpedoes was a factor in the German naval defeat in theBattles of Narvik.[49]
Prien formed part of a group patrolling east of theShetland Islands,Vagsfjord andTrondheim.U-47 left Wilhelmhaven on its fifth patrol on 3 April, which ended on 26 April in Kiel. Prien's 1st watch officer was againOberleutnant zur See Kraus.[44][50] The boat formed part of a 28-strong fleet, practically the entire operational force, committed to waters off the Norwegian and British coast.[36] The German operation attracted an immediate counterattack by the Royal Navy, intense battles were fought at Narvik. The BdU's opposition, theRoyal Navy Submarine Service, achieved some success: theKarlsruhe was crippled and scuttled offKristiansand.[51]
Prien succeeded in penetrating an Allied-held anchorage again at Vagsfjord fjord. Prien counted three large and three small transport ships, two cruisers, all slightly overlapping—he described it as a "wall of ships".[52] Prien fired eight torpedoes, but none hit.[53] The first four were fired at two of the large transports and two cruisers under the cover of darkness from ranges of 750–1,500 metres.[52] Unable to explain the failure, Prien surfaced after no discernible action was taken by the British. He went over the torpedoes and firing control data personally before another four-missile salvo was fired. The same result was observed. The torpedoes either missed, failed to detonate or struck rocks after running off course. While on manoeuvres to fire his stern torpedo on the surface, he ran aground damaging his starboard diesel engine as he attempted to break free. He could not wait forhigh tide to assist while within range of British guns, and daybreak, he noted, was only hours away. His crew eventually rocked the U-boat loose andU-47 escaped.[52]
On the way home Prien intercepted the battleshipWarspite on 19 April. He stalked her and fired two torpedoes with the same result—one exploded at the end of its run, alerting the escorts which counterattacked withdepth charges. A convoy was sighted later, but Prien did not bother attacking; he had lost faith in his main weapons. Prien angrily signalled Dönitz to tell him they had been sent into battle with "wooden rifles."[52] A full report was made by Prien: "we found ourselves equipped with a torpedo which refused to function in northern waters either with contact or magnetic pistols. To all intents and purposes, the, U-boats were without a weapon." The report was crushing to Dönitz.[54]
The commander-in-chief of U-boats conceded of the U-boat operation, "I doubt whether men have ever had to rely on such a useless weapon."[36] In no fewer than 40 attacks on Allied warships, not a single sinking was achieved.[55] Dönitz appealed toErich Raeder, and he was forced to agree on the hopeless situation. He ordered all but three submarines to port. The remaining trio were ordered to continue reconnaissance patrols.[52]
On his sixth war patrol (3 June – 6 July 1940), Prien interceptedConvoy HX 47, part of theHX convoys. This patrol, again Kraus served as 1st watch officer, started and ended in Kiel and targeted the shipping routes in the North Atlantic and theBay of Biscay west of theEnglish Channel.[44]
Prien was a Wolfpack leader and made the tactical decisions for this patrol line.Wolfpack Prien planned to attack HX 47, 400 nautical miles (740 kilometres; 460 miles) west of Lorient prior to its rendezvous with its home–home bound escort.[56] He sank the 5,834 GRT shipBalmoralwood.[57] The merchant had fallen behind. The ship carried 8,730 tons of wheat and four aircraft.[58]
The 13,056 GRTSan Fernando from HX 49 was sunk on 21 June.[59] The ship carried 13,500 tons ofcrude oil and 4,200 tons offuel oil; all the crew appear to have survived the sinking.[60] The patrol yielded another six ships sunk.[61] The most notable victim was the passenger linerArandora Star,[62] sunk west of theAran Islands.[56] The 14-year old ship sank with heavy loss of life. It was transporting hundreds of German and Italian internees toCanada.[63] Of the approximately 1,300 people, 200 guards, and 174 crew on board, 805 died.[56] The BdU credited Prien with ten ships sunk totalling 66,587 GRT. This made Prien's sixth war patrol the most successful U-boat operation to date.[44]
U-47 remained in Kiel until 27 August 1940 when it sortied again. The 1st watch officer on Prien's seventh patrol was again Kraus. Upon the conclusion of the patrol, which had takenU-47 into the North Atlantic west of theHebrides, Prien was ordered to the U-boat base atLorient, in occupied France where it arrived on 26 September 1940.[44] TheBattle of France and the occupation of the Atlantic coast afforded the BdU bases. They allowed German submarines to strike deeper into the Atlantic and spend much longer on patrol.[64]
Prien accounted for the destruction of six ships plus a further vessel damaged.[65] His largest victim wasTitan, over 9,000 GRT from convoy OA 207. Prien lost one man overboard during the patrol. 89 men survived and six were killed.[56] His greatest success was against the largeConvoy SC 2. He attacked and claimed four ships sunk afterU-65 led him to the scene.[66] The attacks were carried out on the surface in dark Atlantic night during poor weather.[67]U-28 sank another ship, butOtto Kretschmer inU-99 failed. Dönitz was disappointed, it was not the annihilation battle he hoped for.[68] Dönitz ordered Prien to act as a weather-boat at a point23° west, mainly forLuftwaffe air fleets engaged in theBattle of Britain.[67]
The signals from the 53-strong convoy were decoded on 30 August which gave the time, position and arrival times enabling the BdU to order Prien and a Wolfpack into action.[69] Prien had known where to search. Dönitz and the BdU were reading Admiralty codes and this information had been passed to Prien. The information led to the sinking ofVille de Mons in ten minutes. All but one of the crew were saved. The captain reported the sighting of three U-boats, two of which approached him and asked for his ship's identity. They were eventually rescued by an Allied merchant ship.[70] The U-boats were forced to abandon the attack when aShort Sunderland appeared and they lost contact with the convoy.[67]
Prien formed part of aWolfpack that attackedConvoy HX 72. While searching for the previous convoy they ran into HX 72. While the operation was a German success, Prien damaged only one ship with his only remaining torpedo. Six ships were sunk by other U-boats.[67] The Germans waited for the sole escort,Jervis Bay to turn away. Prien maintained contact to guideU-29,U-43,U-46,U-48 andU-65 into attack. 12 ships were sunk from the convoy amounting to 77,863 GRT. On the patrol Prien sank 35,005 GRT of shipping, with another 5,156 damaged.[71] On 21 SeptemberU-48 relieved Prien on shadowing duties.[72]
Prien tookU-47 on its eighth war patrol on 14 October 1940, the last with Kraus as 1st watch officer, patrolling the sea routes in the North Atlantic, from theNorth Channel toRockall.[73] A five-strong U-boat pack that were too far away to tackleConvoy SC 7 was called into assist.[74] Prien, who was trying to reach SC 7,[75] formed a wolfpack withU-28,U-38,U-48 andU-100.Convoy HX 79 was spotted byU-47 in the morning of the 19 October, just as its 10-ship anti-submarine escort arrived. OnlyU-28 failed to get into an attack position by evening.[76] On 20 October 1940, Prien attacked Convoy HX 79 and sank the transportsLa Estancia,Bilderdijk andWandby.Shirak is also believed to have been sunk by Prien and his crew in the battle.[77] When added to Prien's hits, theFocke-Wulf Fw 200s of I.Gruppe ofKampfgeschwader 40 increased the tally to 12 ships sunk.[78]
While at sea, Prien received the message on 21 October that he had been awarded theKnight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves (Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes mit Eichenlaub) the day before. He was the fifth member of the Wehrmacht and first of theKriegsmarine to be so honored.[79]U-47 returned to Lorient on 23 October.[73]
Heinz Rühmann,Hans Brausewetter andJosef Sieber sang apersiflage of the 1939 song "Das kann doch einen Seemann nicht erschüttern" ("That won't shake a sailor"), written byMichael Jary from the filmParadies der Junggesellen—Bachelor's Paradise, on occasion of the Oak Leaves presentation to Prien. The reworded lyrics are "Das muss den ersten Seelord doch erschüttern" ("That must shake the First Sea Lord", alluding toWinston Churchill).[80][Note 2] The lyrics also refer toNeville Chamberlain and mock the songRule, Britannia! by adapting an English phrase into German: "die Waves zu rulen ist jetzt schluß" ("the rule of the waves is over").[83]
The ninth war patrol began on 3 November 1940 from Lorient and tookU-47 to the North Atlantic, west of the North Channel. After 34 days at sea,U-47 returned to Lorient on 6 December.[73] On this patrol, Prien damaged theGonçalo Velho on 8 November,[77] and sank theVille d'Arlon and damagedConch on 2 December 1940.[84] The tanker survived Prien's attack, then withstood a three torpedo salvo fromU-95. The ship finally sank after a single torpedo fromOtto Kretschmer'sU-99.[56]
On 20 February 1941,U-47 departed from Lorient on its tenth and final war patrol.[73] Prien located well south of the main wolfpack concentrations. He intercepted and repeatedly attacked convoy OB 290. The solitary attacks sank two ships. Prien continued to pursue the convoy but did not succeed again. West ofIreland, Fw 200s sank seven ships from this convoy making it the most successful intervention of German aircraft in the Atlantic.[85] The success of the Fw 200s, well out to sea, depredations of U-boat concentrations between Iceland and Britain simultaneously withOperation Berlin, in which battleshipsScharnhorst andGneisenau cruised the convoy lanes was an anxious and operationally complex period for the German Admiralty.[85]
U-47 went missing after interceptingConvoy OB 293 on 7 March. His attack prompted a five-hour chase from 00:23 on 8 March. At 05:19 Prien was caught on the surface and dived but could not escape the rapid depth charge attack from the escorts.[86]U-47 has generally been thought to have been sunk by the BritishdestroyerHMS Wolverine west of Ireland; the submarine was attacked byWolverine andHMS Verity, which took turns covering each other'sASDIC blind spots and dropping patterns of depth charges untilU-47 rose almost to the surface before sinking and then exploded with an orange flash visible from the surface.[87] Other British reports of the action mention a large red glow appearing deep below the surface amid the depth charge explosions.[86]
To date, there is no official record of what happened toU-47 or her 45 crewmen, though a variety of possibilities exists, including mines, a mechanical failure, falling victim to her own torpedoes, and possibly a later attack that did not confirm any kills by thecorvette team ofHMS Camellia andHMS Arbutus.[88][89][90] Posthumously on 18 March, Prien was promoted toKorvettenkapitän (corvette captain/lieutenant commander), effective as of 1 March 1941.[14]
Prien's death was kept secret until 23 May.[87] Churchill had personally announced it to theHouse of Commons, and propaganda broadcasts to Germany had repeatedly taunted listeners with the question "Where is Prien?" until Germany was forced to acknowledge his loss.[91] The announcement was made in theWehrmachtbericht on 24 May 1941 stating: "The U-boat under the command ofKorvettenkapitän Günter Prien did not return from his last patrol against the enemy. The loss of the boat has to be assumed."[92] The importance of Prien was known to the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda. To offset the negative impact his death might have on the German population, the message was hidden among the information about the tonnage sunk by U-boats.[93]
According to one biographer, in contrast with Kretschmer, Prien was purportedly a strict disciplinarian who rarely allowed humanity to compromise or interfere with the running of his boat. His crew despised him for it. He harboured much bitterness because of his difficult beginning. He could be genial among fellow officers but his reputation among subordinates was low.[94]
The 1958 war filmU 47 – Kapitänleutnant Prien, directed byHarald Reinl, was loosely based on Prien's combat record and command ofU-47. Prien was portrayed by the German actorDieter Eppler.[95] Prien was portrayed byWerner Klemperer in the 1957 US TV seriesThe Silent Service in the episode, "The U-47 in Scapa Flow".[96]
Prien was a subject of ahagiographic 1981 account by German authorFranz Kurowski,Günther Prien, der Wolf und sein Admiral (Günther Prien, the Wolf and his Admiral). The German scholarHans Wagener [de] classifies Kurowski's book, published by extreme right-wing publisherDruffel Verlag [de], as an "almost perfect example of a skillful distillation of the Nazi understanding of the Second World War".[97] The Canadian historian Michael Hadley commented on the narrative's goals as follows:[98]
Here he [Kurowski] wished to commemorate the "meritorious soldier and human being Günther Prien [who is] forgotten neither by the old submariners nor" —and this would have startled most observers in Germany today [in 1995] —"by the young submariners of the Federal German Navy".
TheWest German navy, at the time named theBundesmarine (Federal Navy), had considered Prien asnamesake for the 1967 commissionedguided missile destroyerLütjens. However the legend surrounding Prien, that he had distanced himself from Nazism and had become an active member of theGerman resistance and was held captive at theWehrmachtgefängnis Torgau (Torgau Wehrmacht Prison), turned out to be false. Consequently, the nameLütjens, named after AdmiralGünther Lütjens, was chosen instead.[99]
The street "Günther-Prien-Straße" inSchönberg, Plön, is named after him.[100]
According to Busch and Röll, Prien sailed on ten war patrols and sank 30 commercial ships of 162,769 GRT, one warship with a displacement of 29,970 long tons (30,450 t), and damaged eight commercial ships for 62,751 GRT and one warship of 10,035 long tons (10,196 t).[73] According to Blair, the one warship of 10,035 long tons, the heavy cruiserNorfolk was not damaged.[40]
| 1 March 1933: | Fähnrich zur See (naval cadet)[9] |
| 1 January 1935: | Oberfähnrich zur See (senior midshipman)[9] |
| 1 April 1935: | Leutnant zur See (acting sub-lieutenant)[9] |
| 1 January 1937: | Oberleutnant zur See (sub-lieutenant)[9] |
| 1 February 1939: | Kapitänleutnant (captain lieutenant/lieutenant)[9] |
| 18 March 1941: | Korvettenkapitän (corvette captain/lieutenant commander), effective as of 1 March 1941[14] |
