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Eurasianism (Russian:евразийство,romanized: yevrazíystvo[jɪvrɐˈzʲijstvə]) is asocio-political movement inRussia that emerged in the early 20th century under theRussian Empire, which states that Russia does not belong in the "European" or "Asian" categories but instead to thegeopolitical concept ofEurasia and the "Russian world", forming an ostensibly standaloneRussian civilization.
The first Eurasianists were mostlyémigré,pacifists, and their vision of the future had features ofromanticism andutopianism. The goal of the Eurasianists was the unification of themain Christian churches under the leadership of theRussian Orthodox Church.[1] A key feature of Eurasianism is the rejection of Russianethnic nationalism, which seeks to build apan-Slavic state. The Eurasianists strongly opposed the territorial fragmentation of theRussian Empire that had occurred due to theBolshevik Revolution and the followingcivil war (1917–1923). They used their geo-historical theories to insist on the necessity of the geopolitical reconstruction of the Russian state as a unified Eurasian great power.[2] Unlike many of theWhite Russians, the Eurasianists rejected attempts forTsarist restoration.[3]
To enable their return, Eurasianistémigré became supportive of theBolshevik Revolution, but not its stated goals of building acommunist state. Many viewed theSoviet Union as a stepping stone on the path of creating a new national identity that would reflect Russia's geopolitical situation. Eurasianist support for theSoviet Union began in the 1920s during theStalinist era, which witnessed the emergence of a distinctsocialist nationalism throughCPSU's enforcement of "Socialism in one country" policy. Despite this, all organized Eurasianist activities in the Soviet Union were ended during theGreat Terror ofJoseph Stalin (1936–1940). After theSecond World War, Stalin's efforts to empower anEastern Bloc of communist states opposed to theWestern capitalist world were seen by Eurasianist remnants as compatible with their own ideology.[4]
Eurasianism underwent a resurgence after thecollapse of the Soviet Union during the 1990s, and has been mirrored byTuranism inTurkic nations. This new Eurasianism has been described as a kind ofRussian neo-imperialism.[5] Modern Eurasianists have coalesced around three prominent ideological currents: the neo-fascist Eurasianist movement ofAleksandr Dugin; the communist Eurasianism ofGennady Zyuganov; and a state-sanctioned Eurasianism that advances Russian geopolitical interests.[4][6] Eurasianism has been officially endorsed in Russia's 2023 Foreign Policy Concept approved byVladimir Putin, which defined Russia as a "Eurasian and Euro-Pacific"civilizational-state closely aligned withChina, theMuslim world, and other countries of theGlobal South, seeking to replace Western hegemony by a "Greater Eurasian Partnership".[7][8][9]
"We do not belong to any of the great families of the human race; we are neither of the West nor of the East, and we have not the traditions of either"
The origins of Eurasianism were in the 19th century, when theRussian Empire was involved in constant wars with European powers to its west. Many philosophers, intellectuals and strategists were alienated from Europe and felt Europeanization was a threat to Russia's national identity.Russian poetFyodor Dostoevsky famously said in 1881: "In Europe we wereTatars, but in Asia too we are Europeans." In the aftermath of events like theCrimean War and the1878 Berlin Treaty, widely decried as a national humiliation in Russia, a new breed ofmonarchist elites who advocated eastward expansion, known asvostochniki (Orientalizers), emerged. Many of thevostochniki began emphasizing their "Asianness" to defend the Russian Empire from what they viewed as "intellectual colonization" from theRomano-Germanic cultures of Western Europe.Czaristvostochniki like the philosopherKonstantin Leontiev self-identified as a "Turanian" rather than Slavic, signalling a general Eurasianist cultural shift. EvenPan-Slavic intellectuals began stating their predisposition towards Asia against Europe,Islam andBuddhism aboveRoman Catholicism, andTurks over theLatins. However, the terminology deployed by thevostochniki had mostly remained ambiguous, with their ideas not attaining a structural ideological character, and served within the frame ofRussian imperial interests. The ideas of the monarchistvostochniki would, however, become the precursor to the Eurasianist movement that emerged in the aftermath of theBolshevik Revolution and advocated the formation of anation-state.[11]
Eurasianism is a political movement with origins in theRussian émigré community in the 1920s who had fled Russia in the aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution, theRussian civil war and witnessed the socio-political turbulence of theInterwar period. The movement posited that Russian civilization does not belong in the "European" or "Asian" categories and constituted a separate "third continent within theOld World". Asanti-monarchists and proponents of anauthoritarianrepublic, Eurasianists praised many aspects of theOctober Revolution, and they portrayed theBolshevik movement as a necessary reaction to the rapid modernization of Russian society. Eurasianism was based on a combination ofThird-Worldism, resistance toWesternization, championing what it views as the "cultural superiority" of the East over the Western World and defined Eurasia in geographical terms, shared by peoples ofRussian-Turkic heritage.[12]
Stalin's "Socialism in one country" policy served as a vindication ofSoviet Union in the eyes of many Eurasian activists. These Eurasianists criticized the anti-Bolshevik activities of organizations such asROVS, believing that the émigré community's energies would be better focused on preparing for this hoped for process of evolution. In turn, their opponents among the emigres argued that the Eurasianists were calling for a compromise with and even support of the Soviet regime, while justifying its ruthless policies (such as thepersecution of theRussian Orthodox Church anddemolition of churches) as mere "transitory problems" that were inevitable results of the revolutionary process. Acommunist Eurasianist faction led byPyotr Suvchinsky gained traction during the 1920s, which began denouncing the anti-Soviet critics as "bourgeois".[13]
The key leaders of the Eurasianists were PrinceNikolai Trubetzkoy,Pyotr Savitsky [ru],Pyotr Suvchinsky,D.S. Mirsky,Konstantin Chkheidze, Pyotr Arapov,Lev Karsavin, andSergei Efron. PhilosopherGeorges Florovsky was initially a supporter, but backed out of the organization claiming it "raises the right questions", but "poses the wrong answers".Nikolai Berdyaev wrote that he may have influenced the Eurasianists' acceptance of theBolshevik Revolution as a fact, but he noted that a number of key Eurasianist tenets were completely alien and hostile to him: they did not love freedom as he did, they were statists, they were hostile to Western culture in a way Berdyaev was not, and they accepted Orthodoxy in a perfunctory manner.[14]
In October 1925 a congress was held in Prague with the intention of creating a seminar.[1] One of the participants was Vladimir Nikolaevich Ilyin (1890-1974), a philosopher, theologian and composer fromKyiv and not related toIvan A. Ilyin who has been presented in the literature by various authors as belonging to the group.[1][15]
Several members of the Eurasianists were affected by the Soviet provocationalTREST operation, which had set up a fake meeting of Eurasianists in Russia that was attended by the Eurasianist leader P.N. Savitsky in 1926 (an earlier series of trips were also made two years earlier by Eurasianist member P. Arapov). The uncovering of the TREST as a Soviet provocation caused a serious morale blow to the Eurasianists and discredited their public image.[16]
In the late 1920s, Eurasianists polarized and became divided in to two groups, the left Eurasianists, who were becoming increasingly pro-Soviet and pro-communist and the classic right Eurasianists, who remained staunchly anti-communist and anti-Soviet.[17] After the emergence of "left Eurasianism" in Paris, where some of the movement's leaders became pro-Soviet, Trubetzkoy who was a staunchanti-communist heavily criticised them and eventually broke with the Eurasianist movement.[18] The Eurasianists faded quickly from the Russian émigré community.[19][20] By 1929, the Eurasianists had ceased publishing their periodical. Several organizations similar in spirit to the Eurasianists sprung up in the émigré community at around the same time, such as the pro-MonarchistMladorossi and theSmenovekhovtsi.[citation needed]
During the mid-1930s, representatives of the Eurasianist movement who had settled in the Soviet Union were suppressed during theStalinist purges and émigré Eurasianists had mostly scattered throughout Europe. By 1938, all organized Eurasianist movement had ceased to exist.[16][21]
Early proponents of Eurasianist themes in the West argued that control of theEurasian heartland was the key to geopolitical dominance.[22] It influencedOswald Spengler, as well as variousfar-right extremists. These included the American white nationalist andneo-NaziFrancis Parker Yockey,[23] the Belgian Nazi collaboratorJean-François Thiriart and interwar GermanNational Bolsheviks.[24]
The political-cultural concept espoused by some inRussia is sometimes called the "Greater Russia" and is described as a political aspiration of pan-Russiannationalists andirredentists to retake the territories of the other republics of the formerSoviet Union, territory of the formerRussian Empire, theDemocratic Republic of Afghanistan, and amalgamate them into a single Russian state.Alexander Rutskoy, thevice president of Russia from 1991 to 1993, asserted irredentist claims toNarva inEstonia,Crimea inUkraine, andUst-Kamenogorsk inKazakhstan, among other territories.[25]
Beforewar broke out betweenRussia andGeorgia in 2008, Russian political theoristAleksandr Dugin visitedSouth Ossetia and predicted: "Our troops will occupy the Georgian capital Tbilisi, the entire country, and perhaps even Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula, which is historically part of Russia, anyway."[26] FormerSouth Ossetian presidentEduard Kokoity is a Eurasianist and argues that South Ossetia has never left theRussian Empire and should be part ofRussia.[27]
In March 2022 American journalistMichael Hirsh wrote that Russian PresidentVladimir Putin is a messianicRussian nationalist and a Eurasianist "whose constant invocation of history going back toKievan Rus, however specious, is the best explanation for his view that Ukraine must be part of Russia'ssphere of influence".[28]
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Drawing on historical, geographical, ethnographical, linguistic, cultural and religious studies, the Eurasianists suggested that the lands of the Russian Empire, and then of theSoviet Union, formed a natural unity. The first Eurasianists were mostlyÉmigrés,pacifists, and their vision of the future had features ofromanticism andutopianism. The goal of the Eurasianists was the unification of the main Christian churches under the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church.[29] According toFrench historianMarlene Laurelle, despite admiring aspects of European fascist movements, early Eurasianist intellectuals were repelled by their glorification of violence,militarism, extremism,racism, etc.[30]
A key feature of Eurasianism is the rejection of Russianethnic nationalism; which seeks apan-Slavic state. The Eurasianists strongly opposed the territorial fragmentation of the Russian Imperial state that had followed in the wake of the revolution and civil war, and they used their geo-historical theories to insist on the necessity of the geopolitical reconstruction of theRussian state as a unified Eurasian great power.[31] Unlike many of thewhite Russians, the Eurasianists rejected all hope for a restoration of the monarchy.[3] Aversion to democracy is an important characteristic of Eurasianism. Eurasianists consideredideocracy a good thing, provided that the ruling ideas were the right ones.[32]
For David Lewis, there are a number of people who assert "an alternative topography, articulated in a series of spatial projects – the 'Russian World', 'Eurasian integration', 'Greater Eurasia' – which aims to carve out a space in opposition to the 'spacelessness' of Western-dominated global order. Influential Russian foreign policy thinkers view the emerging twenty-first-century international order as being constituted not by institutions of global governance, but by a few major political-economic regions, dominated by major powers, a return to thesphere-of-influence politics of the past. It is Russia's goal [say these thinkers] to assert its own central role as a great power, in just such a 'Great Space', that of Eurasia.[35]
The head of theRussian Foreign Ministry's school for future diplomats,Igor Panarin, is a vocal Eurasianist, as is the head of theFaculty of World Economy and International Affairs at the MoscowHigher School of Economics,Sergey Karaganov. Academics such asNatalya Narochnitskaya,Yegor Kholmogorov, and Vadim Tsymburskii all espouse a messianic version of Eurasianism, and twin it with some form ofEastern Orthodox Church theology.[36][37]
TheEurasia Movement is aNational Bolshevik Russian political movement founded in 2001 by the writerEduard Limonov and political philosopherAleksandr Dugin.[38][39][40][41][42] The organization follows the neo-Eurasian ideology, which adopts an eclectic mixture ofRussianpatriotism,Orthodox faith,anti-modernism, and even someBolshevik ideas. The organization opposes "American" values such asliberalism,capitalism, andmodernism.[43]
An mentioned exponent of neo-EurasianismAlexander Dugin, who initially followed the ideology ofNational Bolshevism, brought into Eurasianism the idea of a "third position" (a combination of capitalism and socialism), geopolitics (Eurasianism as atellurocracy, opposing the Atlantic Anglospherethalassocracy of the USA and NATO) andStalinistRussian conservatism (the USSR as a major Eurasian power). In Dugin's works, Eurasian concepts and provisions are intertwined with the concepts ofEuropean New Right. Researchers note that in the formulation of philosophical problems and political projects, he significantly deviates from classical Eurasianism, which is presented in his numerous works very selectively, eclectically. In the neo-Eurasianism of Dugin's version, the Russian ethnos is considered "the most priority Eurasian ethnos", which must fulfill the civilizational mission of forming a Eurasian empire that will occupy the entire continent. The main threat is declared by the United States and theAnglosphere in general under a "neo-liberal" ideology he calls "Atlanticism". The most preferred form of government is a Russian fascist dictatorship and atotalitarian state with complete ideological control over society. In the 1990s, Dugin criticizedItalian fascism andGerman Nazism as "not fascist enough", and accused China of anti-Russian subversion. In subsequent years he abandoned direct apology for fascism and prefers to speak from the positions of theconservative revolution and National Bolshevism, which, however, researchers also refer to varieties of fascism called theFourth Political Theory. Thus, Marlene Laurelle has portrayed Dugin's neo-Eurasianism as being very similar to the militant mentality ofinter-warfascist movements in Europe.[30] In 21st century, Dugin has become a semi-official philosopher of the Putin regime and his ideas has become an integral part ofPutinism.[44][45] He headed 2023 establishment theIvan Ilyin Higher School of Politics at theRussian State University for the Humanities.
Modern Eurasianism has been criticized as aRussian neo-imperialist[5][46] andexpansionist ideology rooted inTsarist notions of "Russian exceptionalism" that attempts to maintainRussian ethnic hegemony over non-Russian minorities living inmodern Russia's spheres of influence, through the creation of a newnational mythos. The anti-Western orientation of Eurasianism has been weaponized inPutinist Russia to shut down any dissent from the officialKremlin line.[47] Political scientistAnton Shekhovtsov defined Dugin's version of Neo-Eurasianism as "a form of afascist ideology centred on the idea of revolutionising the Russian society and building atotalitarian, Russia-dominated Eurasian Empire that would challenge and eventually defeat its eternal adversary represented by theUnited States and itsAtlanticist allies, thus bringing about a new 'golden age' of global political and culturalilliberalism".[48]
Australian russologistPaul Dibb identifies Putin, supported by Panarin, Karaganov and Dugin, as having "begun to stress the geopolitics of what they call 'Eurasianism', which is an intellectual movement promoting an ideology of Russian–Asian greatness." In this context, a westernizedUkraine would be in the words of Karaganov "a spearhead aimed at the heart of Russia".[49] Eurasianism would seem negatively to impact theBaltic countries,[50] as well asPoland.[36]
Igor Torbakov argued in June 2022 that "According to the Kremlin's geopolitical outlook, Russia could only successfully compete with the United States, China or the European Union if it acts as a leader of the regional bloc. Bringing Russia and its ex-Soviet neighbours into a closely integrated community of states, Russian strategists contend, would allow this Eurasian association to become one of the major centres of global and regional governance."[51]
According to Clover, Eurasianism appeared to be all the rage in early 21st-century Russia. One commentator noted that during Putin's later years, it was "one of the best known and most frequently mentioned political movements of the period."[52]
Ideologically, President ofKazakhstanNursultan Nazarbayev's speech in March 1994 atMoscow State University became the starting point for the implementation of a pragmatic Eurasianism. He proposed anintegration paradigm that was fundamentally new at the time: to move towards a Eurasian Union based on economic integration and common defense.[53] This vision has been later materialized in theEurasian Economic Union and theCollective Security Treaty Organization. Eurasianism in Nazarbayev's reading is seen as a system of foreign policy, economic ideas and priorities (as opposed to a philosophy). This type of Eurasianism is unequivocally open to the outside world.
The Eurasian Economic Union was founded in January 2015, consisting ofArmenia,Belarus,Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, Russia and observer membersMoldova,Uzbekistan andCuba, all of them (except Cuba) being previous members of the Soviet Union. Members include states from both Europe and Asia; the union promotes political and economic cooperation among members.
The Collective Security Treaty Organization is anintergovernmentalmilitary alliance that was signed on 15 May 1992. In 1992, six post-Soviet states belonging to theCommonwealth of Independent States – Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan, andUzbekistan – signed the Collective Security Treaty (also referred to as the "Tashkent Pact" or "Tashkent Treaty").[54] Three other post-Soviet states –Azerbaijan,Belarus, andGeorgia – signed the next year and the treaty took effect in 1994. Five years later, six of the nine – all but Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan – agreed to renew the treaty for five more years, and in 2002 those six agreed to create the Collective Security Treaty Organization as a military alliance. Uzbekistan rejoined the CSTO in 2006 but withdrew in 2012.
Eurasianist sentiments have been on the rise across Russian society since the ascent ofVladimir Putin in the country. In a poll conducted byLevada Center in 2021, 64% of Russian citizens identify Russia as a non-European country; while only 29% regarded Russia to be part of Europe.[55]
Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of theSecurity Council of Russia and former Russian President, in 2022, has declared on his Telegram channel the state goal "to finally build Eurasia fromLisbon toVladivostok."[56]
In 2023, Russia adopted a Eurasianist,anti-Western foreign policy strategy in a document titled "The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation" approved byVladimir Putin. The document defined Russia as a "unique country-civilization and a vastEurasian and Euro-Pacific power" that seeks to create a "Greater Eurasian Partnership" by pursuing close relations with China, India, countries of theIslamic World and rest of theGlobal South (Latin America andsub-Saharan Africa). The policy identifiesUnited States and otherAnglosphere as "the main inspirer, organizer and executor of the aggressiveanti-Russian policy of the collective West" and seeks the end of geopoliticalAmerican dominance in the international scene. The document also adopts aneo-Soviet posture, positioning Russia as the successor state of USSR and calls for spreading "accurate information" about the "decisive contribution of the Soviet Union" in shaping thepost-WWIIinternational order and theUnited Nations.[57][58][59]
Since the late 1990s, Eurasianism has gained some following inTurkey among neo-nationalist (ulusalcı) circles. The most prominent figure who is associated with Dugin isDoğu Perinçek, the leader of thePatriotic Party (Vatan Partisi).[60]
In the future time depicted inGeorge Orwell's novelNineteen Eighty Four, the Soviet Union has mutated intoEurasia, one of the three superstates dominating the world. Similarly,Robert Heinlein's story "Solution Unsatisfactory" depicts a future in which the Soviet Union would be transformed into "The Eurasian Union". Whether or not there is any connection between these uses of the term "Eurasia" and the geopolitical ideology of Eurasianism is unclear.
After unsuccessful interventions in post-Soviet party politics, Mr. Dugin focused on developing his influence where it counted – with the military and policymakers... In Mr. Dugin's adjustment of Eurasianism to present conditions, Russia had a new opponent – no longer just Europe, but the whole of the 'Atlantic' world led by the United States. And his Eurasianism was not anti-imperial but the opposite: Russia had always been an empire, Russian people were 'imperial people,' and after the crippling 1990s sellout to the 'eternal enemy,' Russia could revive in the next phase of global combat and become a 'world empire.' On the civilizational front, Mr. Dugin highlighted the long-term connection between Eastern Orthodoxy and Russian empire. Orthodoxy's combat against Western Christianity and Western decadence could be harnessed to the geopolitical war to come.
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