Insocial choice andoperations research, theegalitarian rule (also called themax-min rule or theRawlsian rule) is a rule saying that, among all possible alternatives, society should pick the alternative which maximizes theminimum utility of all individuals in society. It is a formal mathematical representation of theegalitarian philosophy. It also corresponds toJohn Rawls' principle of maximizing the welfare of the worst-off individual.[1]
Let be a set of possible `states of the world' or `alternatives'. Society wishes to choose a single state from. For example, in asingle-winner election, may represent the set of candidates; in aresource allocation setting, may represent all possible allocations.
Let be a finite set, representing a collection of individuals. For each, let be autility function, describing the amount of happiness an individuali derives from each possible state.
Asocial choice rule is a mechanism which uses the data to select some element(s) from which are `best' for society. The question of what 'best' means is the basic question ofsocial choice theory. Theegalitarian rule selects an element which maximizes theminimum utility, that is, it solves the following optimization problem:
Often, there are many different states with the same minimum utility. For example, a state with utility profile (0,100,100) has the same minimum value as a state with utility profile (0,0,0). In this case, the egalitarian rule often uses theleximin order, that is: subject to maximizing the smallest utility, it aims to maximize the next-smallest utility; subject to that, maximize the next-smallest utility, and so on.
For example, suppose there are two individuals - Alice and George, and three possible states: statex gives a utility of 2 to Alice and 4 to George; statey gives a utility of 9 to Alice and 1 to George; and statez gives a utility of 1 to Alice and 8 to George. Then statex is leximin-optimal, since its utility profile is (2,4) which is leximin-larger than that ofy (9,1) andz (1,8).
The egalitarian rule strengthened with the leximin order is often called theleximin rule, to distinguish it from the simpler max-min rule.
The leximin rule for social choice was introduced byAmartya Sen in 1970,[1] and discussed in depth in many later books.[2][3][4][5]: sub.2.5 [6]
The leximin rule is Pareto-efficient if the outcomes of every decision are known with certainty. However, by Harsanyi's utilitarian theorem, any leximin function is Pareto-inefficient for a society that must make tradeoffs under uncertainty: There exist situations in which every person in a society would be better-off (ex ante) if they were to take a particular bet, but the leximin rule will reject it (because some person might be made worse off ex post).
The leximin rule satisfies thePigou–Dalton principle, that is: if utility is "moved" from an agent with more utility to an agent with less utility, and as a result, the utility-difference between them becomes smaller, then resulting alternative is preferred.
Moreover, the leximin rule is the only social-welfare ordering rule which simultaneously satisfies the following three properties:[5]: 266
The egalitarian rule is particularly useful as a rule forfair division. In this setting, the set represents all possible allocations, and the goal is to find an allocation which maximizes the minimum utility, or the leximin vector. This rule has been studied in several contexts: