Brent Spar, known as Brent "E", was aNorth Seaoil storage andtanker loadingbuoy in theBrent oilfield, operated byShell UK. With the completion of a pipeline connection to the oil terminal atSullom Voe inShetland, the storage facility had continued in use, but by 1991, was considered to be of no further value. Brent Spar became an issue of public concern in 1995, when theBritish government announced its support for Shell's application for its disposal in deepAtlantic waters atNorth Feni Ridge (approximately 160 mi (250 km) from the west coast of Scotland, at a depth of around 1.6 mi (2.5 km)).
Greenpeace organized a worldwide, high-profile media campaign against this plan occupying Brent Spar for more than three weeks. In the face of public and political opposition innorthern Europe (including a widespread boycott of Shell service stations, some physical attacks and anarson attack on aservice station inGermany), Shell abandoned its plans to dispose of Brent Spar at sea — whilst continuing to stand by its claim that this was the safest option, both from anenvironmental and an industrial health and safety perspective. Greenpeace's own reputation also suffered during the campaign, when it had to acknowledge that its assessment of the oil remaining in Brent Spar's storage tanks had been grossly overestimated. Following Shell's decision to pursue only on-shore disposal options, as favoured by Greenpeace and its supporters, Brent Spar was given temporary moorings in aNorwegianfjord. In January 1998, Shell announced its decision to re-use much of the main structure in the construction of new harbour facilities nearStavanger,Norway.
Brent "E" was a floating oil storage facility constructed in 1976 and moored approximately 1.2 mi (2 km) from the Brent "A"oil rig. It was jointly owned by Shell andEsso, and operated wholly by Shell, which gave them responsibility for decommissioning the structure. Brent Spar was 482 ft (147 m) high and 95 ft (29 m) in diameter, anddisplaced 66,000 tonnes. Thedraft of the platform was such that manoeuvring in the North Sea south ofOrkney was not possible. The storage tank section had a capacity of 300,000 barrels ofcrude oil. This section was built from 0.79 in (20 mm) thick steel plate, reinforced by ribs and cross-braces. It was known that this section had been stressed and damaged on installation. This led to doubts on whether the facility would retain its structural integrity if it was re-floated into a horizontal position.[1]
Shell based its decommissioning decisions on estimates of the quantities of various pollutants, includingPCBs, crude oil, heavy metals, and scale, which it had calculated based on the operating activities of the platform, and metal that would remain in the structure after decommissioning.Scale is a by-product of oil production and, because of theradioactivity found in the rocks from which the oil is extracted, is considered to be low-levelradioactive waste. It is regularly dealt with on-shore by workers wearing breathing masks to prevent inhalation of dust.[citation needed]
Shell examined a number of options for disposing of the Brent Spar, and took two of these forward for serious consideration.[2]
The first option involved towing the Brent Spar to a shallow water harbour to decontaminate it and reuse the materials used in its construction. Any unusable waste could be disposed of on land. Technically, this option was more complex and presented a greater hazard to the workforce. This option was estimated to cost £41M. There was some concern that the facility would disintegrate in shallow coastal water, having a much more economically and environmentally significant effect.
The second option involved towing the decommissioned platform into deep water in theNorth Atlantic, positioning explosives around the waterline, then detonating them, in order to breach the hull and sink the platform. The facility would then fall to the seabed and release its contents over a restricted area. Due to the uncertainty associated with detonating explosives, a number of possible scenarios were envisaged. First, the structure would fall to the seabed in one piece, releasing its contaminants slowly, and affecting the seabed for around 1,600 ft (500 m) "down-current". Second, the structure might disintegrate as it fell through the water column. This would release contaminants in a single burst, and have an effect for 3,300 ft (1,000 m) "down current" of the final resting place, although this would last for a shorter time than in the first instance. Third, the structure could fail catastrophically when the explosives detonated, releasing its contaminants into the surface waters. This would affectsea birds and thefishing industry in that area. The cost of this option was estimated at between £17M and £20M.
Shell proposed that deep sea disposal was the best option for Brent Spar, arguing that their decision had been made on sound scientific principles and data. Dismantling the platform on-shore was more complex from an engineering point of view than disposal at sea. Shell also cited the lower risk to thehealth and safety of the workforce with deep sea disposal. Environmentally, Shell considered that sinking would have only a localised effect in a remote deep sea region which had littleresource value. It was considered that this option would be acceptable to the public, toHer Majesty's Government and to regional authorities. Shell acknowledged that sinking the Brent Spar at sea was also the cheaper option.
Having decided on a preferred method of disposal, Shell contractedFisheries Research Services (FRS) to investigate possible sites for sinking the facility. There were two stipulations to this search: firstly, that the site was within theUKexclusive economic zone,[3]and secondly, that the site be deep enough that the sunken buoy would present no hazard to shipping. FRS identified three sites as 12 by 12 mi (20 by 20 km) squares, which were considered suitable; the Maury Channel, the North Feni Ridge and theRockall Trough.
At these three sites, FRS carried out:
The North Feni Ridge was found to include a narrow channel. The Rockall Trough area was found to be a gently slopingbasin between theAnton Dohrn Seamount and theWyville-Thomsom Ridge. The Maury Channel area was found to be a flat, gently sloping area.
Infaunal communities were found to be high indiversity and low inabundance, characteristic of unimpacted sediments. These communities were thought to have a limited food supply, which is also normal in deep water communities.
The final conclusions of FRS were that abundance and diversity were greater than had been expected, especially in the North Feni Ridge area, however the limited extent of sampling precluded detailed analysis of data for the entire area. On the basis of the data which FRS gathered, there was little to choose between the three potential disposal areas. Analysis of the North Feni Ridge area may indicate that this area may have beenaccumulative, but that this would not preclude deep-sea disposal of the platform.[4]
Having received these conclusions, Shell opted for the North Feni Ridge site, and applied to the British government for a licence to dispose of the rig at sea. This was approved in December 1994.
Greenpeace became aware of the plan to sink the Brent Spar at sea on 16 February 1995. The organization had been campaigning against ocean dumping in the North Sea since the early 1980s, monitoring the dumping of radioactive waste and waste from titanium dioxide production and on occasion using high-seas civil disobedience tactics to physically hinder the perpetrators, and lobbying for a comprehensive ban on ocean dumping through theOSPAR convention.[5]
Greenpeace objected to the plan to dispose of the Brent Spar at sea on a number of issues:
Greenpeace claimed that the scientific arguments for ocean dumping were being used as a way of disguising Shell's primary aim, which was to cut costs.[6][citation needed]
Four Greenpeaceactivists first occupied Brent Spar on 30 April 1995. In total, 25 activists, photographers and journalists were involved in this stage of occupation. They decided to cover up the Exxon logos on the platform.[citation needed] At this time, activists collected a sample of the contents of the Spar and sent it for testing, to determine the nature of the pollutants which the platform contained. This sample was collected incorrectly, leading to a large overestimate in the contents of the facility. Although Greenpeace quoted Shell's own estimate of the amount of heavy metals and other chemicals on board, they also claimed there were more than 5,500 tonnes of oil on the Spar – while Shell's estimate was 50 tonnes. For context, theExxon Valdez oil spill involved around 42,000 tonnes.
Greenpeace mounted an energetic media campaign that influenced public opinion against Shell's preferred option. It disputed Shell's estimates of the contaminants on the Brent Spar, saying that these were much more than initially estimated. On 9 May, theGerman government issued a formal objection to the British government, with respect to the dumping plan. On 23 May, after several attempts, Shell obtained legal permission to evict the Greenpeace protesters from the Brent Spar, and they were eventually taken by helicopter toAberdeen,Scotland, where they held a press conference.
Towing of the platform to its final position began on 11 June. By this time, the call for a boycott of Shell products was being heeded across much of continentalnorthern Europe, damaging Shell's profitability as well as brand image. German ChancellorHelmut Kohl protested to theBritish Prime Minister,John Major at aG7 conference inHalifax,Nova Scotia. Support from within the oil industry was not unanimous. Although oil production companies supported Shell's position, influential companies in the offshore construction sector stood to make money from onshore dismantling if a precedent could be set, and consequently supported the Greenpeace point of view.[citation needed]
On 20 June, Shell had decided that their position was no longer tenable, and withdrew their plan to sink the Brent Spar. They released the following statement:
"Shell's position as a major European enterprise has become untenable. The Spar had gained a symbolic significance out of all proportion to its environmental effect. In consequence, Shell companies were faced with increasingly intense public criticism, mostly in Continental northern Europe. Many politicians and ministers were openly hostile and several called for consumer boycotts. There was violence against Shell service stations, accompanied by threats to Shell staff."
In early July, theNorwegian government gave Shell permission tomothball the Brent Spar inErfjord. It remained there for several years while other options for disposal were considered.
| Contaminant | Shell Co est. (kg) | DNV audit est. (kg) |
|---|---|---|
| PCBs | trace | 6.5 – 8.0 |
| Hydrocarbons | 50,700 | 75,000 – 100,000 |
| Aluminium | 28,677 | 24,000 – 40,000 |
| Arsenic | 0.3 | 0.0 |
| Bismuth | 29.0 | 0.0 |
| Cadmium | 16.4 | 1.0–3.8 |
| Copper | 13,542.9 | 7,500 – 13,200 |
| Indium | 10.2 | 5.0 – 21.0 |
| Lead | 9.5 | 0.11 |
| Mercury | 0.3 | 0.4 |
| Nickel | 7.4 | 0.9 – 1.5 |
| Silicon | 48.0 | 0.0 |
| Titanium | 8.8 | 0.0 |
| Zinc | 13,811.4 | 5,200 – 8,300 |
| Scale (oil production residue) | 30,000 | 7800–9400 |
Having moored the Brent Spar in Erfjord, Shell commissioned the independent Norwegian consultancyDet Norske Veritas (DNV) to conduct an audit of Spar's contents and investigate Greenpeace's allegations. Greenpeace admitted that its claims that the Spar contained 5500 tonnes of oil were inaccurate and apologized to Shell on 5 September. This preempted the publication of DNV's report, which endorsed Shell's initial estimates for many pollutants.[7] Greenpeace noted that its opposition to the dumping had never been solely based on the presence or absence of oil, however, and that opposition to the disposal plan was part of a larger campaign opposing the dumping of all waste into the North Sea.[citation needed]
Shell received over 200 individual suggestions for what could be done with the Brent Spar. One of these came from the Stavanger Port Authority. They were planning a quay extension atMekjarvik, to provide newRoll-On/Roll-Off ferry facilities. It was hoped that using slices of the Spar's hull would save both money and energy that would otherwise have been spent in new steel construction. The Spar was raised vertically in the water by building a lifting cradle, placed underneath the Spar and connected by cables tojacks on board heavybarges. Jacking the cables upwards raised the Spar so that its hull could be cut into 'rings' and slid onto a barge.[8]
After cleaning, the rings were placed in the sea beside the existing quay at Mekjarvik and filled with ballast. The construction of the quay extension was completed by placing aconcrete slab across the rings. The Spar's living quarters and operations module were removed and scrapped onshore at a Norwegianlandfill site.[9]
While the Brent Spar was being dismantled, quantities of the endangered cold-water coralLophelia pertusa were found growing on the legs of the platform.[10] At the time, this was considered unusual, although recent studies have shown this to be a common occurrence, with 13 of 14North Sea oil rigs examined havingL. pertusa colonies.[11] The authors of the original work suggested that it may be better to leave the lower parts of such structures in place — a suggestion opposed by Greenpeace campaigner Simon Reddy, who compared it to "[dumping] a car in a wood – moss would grow on it, and if I was lucky a bird may even nest in it. But this is not justification to fill our forests with disused cars".[12]
According to a poll of 1000 adults carried out by Opinion Leader Research on 26 January 1996 on behalf of Greenpeace, a majority of the British public were aware of the Brent Spar (57%). Of these, 57% were opposed to the dumping of Brent Spar in the Atlantic, and 32% were in favour of it.
Although Shell had carried out an environmental impact assessment in full accordance with existing legislation, they had severely underestimated strength of public opinion. Shell were particularly criticised for having thought of this as a "Scottish", or "UK" problem, and neglecting to think of the effect which it would have on their image in the wider world. The final cost of the Brent Spar operation to Shell was between £60M[13] and £100M, when loss of sales were considered. Although Shell and the offshore industry consider that Brent Spar did not set a precedent for disposal of facilities in the future, signatory nations of theOSPAR conventions have since agreed that oil facilities should be disposed of onshore, so it is difficult to see how this does not set a precedent.Shell claimed that spending such an amount to protect a small area of remote, low resource value, deep sea was pointless and this money could be much more constructively spent.
The overestimation of the contents of the Brent Spar damaged the credibility of Greenpeace in their wider campaigns. They were criticised in aneditorial column in the scientific journalNature for their lack of interest in facts.[14] Greenpeace moved to distance itself from its "5500 tonnes" claim, after the Brent Spar argument was won.
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