 | The article'slead sectionmay need to be rewritten. Please helpimprove the lead and read thelead layout guide.(November 2020) (Learn how and when to remove this message) |
| Battle of the Bzura | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part ofInvasion of Poland,World War II | |||||||
 Polish cavalry brigade "Wielkopolska" during the battle | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 Germany |  Poland | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Erich Hoepner | Tadeusz Kutrzeba[1]Władysław BortnowskiEdmund Knoll-KownackiMikołaj BołtućRoman Abraham Leon Strzelecki | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 12 infantry divisions 5 armoured and motorized divisions 425,000 soldiers[1] | 8 infantry divisions 2–4 cavalry brigades 225,000 soldiers[1] | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 8,000 dead[2] 4,000 captured 50 tanks 100 cars 20 artillery pieces | 18,000[2]–20,000[1] dead 32,000 wounded[2] 170,000 captured[2] | ||||||
TheBattle of the Bzura (or theBattle of Kutno) was both the largest battle[3] and Polish counter-attack[4] of the Germaninvasion of Poland and was fought from 9 to 19 September.[5][6]
The battle took place west of Warsaw, near the Bzura River. It began as a Polish counter-offensive, which gained initial success, but the Germans outflanked the Polish forces with a concentrated counter-attack. That weakened Polish forces, and the Poznań and Pomorze Armies were destroyed. Western Poland was now under German occupation.[7]: 65–70
The battle has been described as "the bloodiest and most bitter battle of the entire Polish campaign".[8]Winston Churchill called the battle an "ever-glorious struggle".[9]
The Polish plan to defend from the German invasion,Plan West, called todefend the borders.[10] That was dictated more by political than military concerns, as Poles feared that the Germans, after they had taken over the territories that they had lost by theTreaty of Versailles, would try to end the war by keeping those territories.[1] Defending the borders was risky, but the Poles were counting on a British and French counteroffensive,which never came.[1] That madeArmy Pomorze, under GeneralWładysław Bortnowski, find itself in thePolish Corridor while it was surrounded by German forces on two fronts.Army Poznań, under GeneralTadeusz Kutrzeba, was pushed to the westernmost fringes of Poland and was separated from its primary defensive positions and from other Polish Armies.[1]
The German offensive proved the folly of the Polish border defence plan during the first days of the war.[11] Army Pomorze was defeated at theBattle of Bory Tucholskie and was forced to retreat to the south-east.[11] Army Poznań, meanwhile, did not face heavy German assaults but was forced to retreat to the east by defeats of its neighbours (Army Pomorze in the north andArmy Łódź in the south). Both of them were retreating and so Army Poznań was in danger of being flanked and surrounded by the German forces.[11] On 4 September, Army Poznań moved throughPoznań and abandoned it to the enemy although at that point, it was not in contact with any significant German forces.[11] By 6 September, Armies Pomorze and Poznań had linked and formed the strongest Polish operational unit in the campaign, and General Bortnowski accepted the command of General Kutrzeba.[11]
On 7 September, the Polish forces became aware of the German push towardsŁęczyca, which, if successful, could cut off the retreat route of Polish forces.[11] By 8 September, advanced German troops reached Warsaw, which marked the beginning of theSiege of Warsaw.[11] At the same time, German forces had lost contact with Army Poznań, and the German command assumed that the army must have been transported by rail to aid Warsaw's defence. They were unaware that in fact Army Poznań had merged forces with Army Pomorze, which they considered, since its defeat at Bory Tucholskie, to be no longer a significant threat.[11] On 8 September, the Germans were certain that they had eliminated major Polish resistance west of Vistula and so prepared to cross it and to engage the Polish forces on the other side.[2]
Meanwhile, General Kutrzeba and his staff officers had suspected, even before the German invasion, that it would be the neighbouring armies that would bear the German attack and so they had developed plans at an offensive to the south to relieve Army Łódź.[12] During the first week of the campaign, however, those plans were rejected by the Polish commander-in-chief, MarshalEdward Rydz-Śmigły.[12] By 8 September, Kutrzeba had lost contact with Rydz-Śmigły, who had relocated his command center from Warsaw toBrest. Those factors made Kutrzeba decide to go forward with his plan.[12] His situation was dire, as German forces were close to surrounding his units: theGerman 8th Army had secured the southern bank of theBzura river, and theGerman 4th Army had secured the northern bank ofVistula, fromWłocławek toWyszogród, and its elements were attacking the rear of the Armies Pomorze and Poznań from the direction ofInowrocław and crossing theVistula nearPłock.[12]
The Polish forces consisted ofArmy Poznań andArmy Pomorze.[1] The German forces included the8th Army underJohannes Blaskowitz and10th Army underWalther von Reichenau ofArmy Group South (Heeresgruppe Süd), elements of the4th Army underGünther von Kluge of theArmy Group North (Heeresgruppe Nord) and air support (Luftflotte 1 andLuftflotte 4).[1]
| Polish | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
| German | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
The battle can be divided into three phases:
On the night of 9 September, the PolishPoznań Army commenced a counterattack from the south of theBzura river, its target being the German forces from the 8th Army advancing betweenŁęczyca andŁowicz towardsStryków.[13][14] The commander ofPoznań Army,Tadeusz Kutrzeba noticed that the German8th Army, which was commanded by GeneralJohannes Blaskowitz, was weakly secured from the north by only the30th Infantry Division, which stretched over a 30 km defensive line while the rest of the army was advancing towards Warsaw. The main thrust of the Polish offensive were the units under GeneralEdmund Knoll-Kownacki, which were known as the Knoll-KownackiOperational Group (Polish14th,17th,25th and26th Infantry Divisions).[13][14][15] The right wing of the offensive, in the areaŁęczyce, included thePodolska Cavalry Brigade under Col. L. Strzelecki, and on the left, advancing fromŁowicz to the area ofGłowno, theWielkopolska Cavalry Brigade under GeneralRoman Abraham.[13][14][16] These groups inflicted considerable losses on the German defenders from the 30th Infantry Division and the24th Infantry Division, with some 1,500 German soldiers killed or wounded and an additional 3,000 lost as prisoners during the initial push.[13][14][17] The cavalry brigades, supplemented withTKS andTK-3 reconnaissance tanks, moved to threaten the flanks and the rear of the advancing German units.[18]
The German forces were thrown back approximately 20 km, and the Poles recaptured several towns, includingŁęczyca andPiątek, and the village ofGóra Świętej Małgorzaty.[13] On 10 September, thePolish 17th Infantry Division met theGerman 17th Infantry Division at Małachowicze. The following day, Polish forces continued their attack and advanced onModlna,Pludwiny,Osse andGłowno.[13]
Initially underestimating the Polish advance, the Germans decided on 11 September to redirect the main force of theGerman 10th Army, theGerman 4th Army, the reserves of theArmy Group South and aircraft from 4th Air Fleet towards the Bzura. The forces included theGerman 1st Panzer Division,German 4th Panzer Division and the newly-formed SS Infantry regimentLeibstandarte Adolf Hitler.[19] German air superiority had a significant impact by making it very costly and difficult for the Poles to move units during the day.[14] The following day, the Poles reached the line Stryków-Ozorków. That day, GeneralTadeusz Kutrzeba learned that units ofArmy Łódź had retreated to theModlin Fortress and decided to stop the offensive and instead sought to try to break throughSochaczew and theKampinos Forest to reach Warsaw.[14][19]
On the morning of 14 September, GeneralWładysław Bortnowski's26th and16th Infantry Divisions crossed the Bzura near Łowicz. ThePolish 4th Infantry Division reached the road linking Łowicz with Głowno. At that point, however, Bortnowski ordered the 26th Infantry Division to retreat. He had learned of the withdrawal of theGerman 4th Panzer Division from the outskirts of Warsaw and was concerned that the Panzer division posed a threat to his men.[19]
On 15 and 16 September, Army Pomorze took up defensive positions on the north bank of the Bzura. GeneralStanisław Grzmot-Skotnicki's group betweenKutno andŻychlin, GeneralMichał Karaszewicz-Tokarzewski's units nearGąbin and parts of Army Poznań by the Bzura nearSochaczew were ready to begin their drive towards Warsaw. To encircle and to destroy the Polish forces, the Germans used most of their 10th Army, including two armoured, one motorized and three light divisions, which was equipped with some 800 tanks altogether. The attack from all sides on Polish positions started on 16 September with the support of theLuftwaffe. On 15 September, the Poles were forced out ofSochaczew, a town on the Bzura river, and were trapped in a triangle of Bzura, Vistula and German forces.[14][20] TheGerman 1st Panzer Division, after crossing the Bzura between Sochaczew andBrochów and engaging the Polish 25th Infantry Division, managed to captureRuszki, but its advance was then halted. Poles began to cross the Bzura near the Vistula, north of Sochaczew, and retreat towards Warsaw.[14][20][21]
The Polish forces were forced to abandon most of their heavy equipment while they crossed the river.[20] On 17 September, German heavy artillery was shelling the crossing north of Brochów, and the largest air operation of the campaign began, with the Luftwaffe attacking the retreating Polish forces.[14][20]
During the night of 17 September, the main forces of Army Poznań attacked the German forces to break out of the German encirclement betweenWitkowice and Sochaczew. The 15th Infantry Division and Podolska Cavalry Brigade again crossed the Bzura in Witkowice. In Brochow, the 25th and the 17th Infantry Divisions crossed the Bzura. The 14th Infantry Division was concentrated inŁaziska. At the same time, Army Pomorze marched towards the villages ofOsmolin,Kierozia andOsiek.
In the morning, the Germans started their drive towards the south along both banks of the Bzura and were supported by more than 300 aircraft and heavy artillery.[20] Germanhowitzers, taking advantage of their position on the high ground of theVistula's right bank, shelled Polish positions for the entire day.[20] After two days of heavy fighting, with no ammunition or food rations remaining, further attempts at a breakout for the Poles became impossible.[10]
"[My soldiers fought] in one of the biggest and most destructive battles of all times."
— Johannes Blaskowitz, Order of the 20th September[1]
Only a few Polish units managed to break out of the encirclement.[20] The groups crossed the Kampinos Forest and fought German units in the area (such as at theBattle of Wólka Węglowa), then entered Warsaw and Modlin, mostly around 19 and 20 September.[14][22] Among them were Generals Kutrzeba, Knoll-Kowacki and Tokarzewski, two cavalry brigades (Wielkopolska and Podolska) of General Abraham and the 15th and 25th Infantry Divisions. The remainder (4th, 14th, 17th, 26th and 27th Infantry Divisions), which did not manage to cross the river, surrendered with General Bortnowski between 18 and 22 September.[2][14] Polish casualties were estimated at 20,000 dead, including three generals:Franciszek Wład,Stanisław Grzmot-Skotnicki andMikołaj Bołtuć.[1] German casualties are estimated at 8,000 dead.[2]
After the battle, the remaining German divisions rushed towards Warsaw and Modlin and soon encircled both. The Bzura campaign ended in defeat for the Poles, but because of the initial Polish local successes, the German advance on Warsaw was halted for several days. The Wehrmacht was required to divert units from its push towards Warsaw.[23] That helped the Polish units defending Warsaw and its environs to organise their own long-term but ultimately failed defence of the capital.[24]
The campaign also showed the importance of taking initiative, proved that horse cavalry units were still an important factor on the battlefield, proved the importance of air superiority and confirmed that simple numerical superiority still mattered.[1][25]
