The concept of “Eurasia” illustrates well the problematic nature of geopolitics. “Eurasia” is one of the most important geopolitical concepts; as Zbigniew Brzezinski said, “ever since the continents started interacting politically, some five hundred years ago, Eurasia has been the center of world power.”[1] “Eurasia” encapsulates the problematic aspects of geopolitics, starting with semantics. Indeed, it is a portmanteau word with a slightly artificial ring to it, somewhat clumsily combining the words “Europe” and “Asia.” It is a typical geopolitical term; i.e. one whose different definitions reflect nations' different geopolitical interests.
Originally, “Eurasia” is a geographical notion: in this sense, it is simply the biggest continent; the combined landmass of Europe and Asia. However, geopolitically, the word has several different meanings, reflecting the specific geopolitical interests of each nation. In the widest possible sense, the geopolitical definition of “Eurasia” is consistent with its geographical area. This is sometimes the way the word is understood in countries located at the fringes of, or outside, this area. This is generally what is meant by “Eurasia” in political circles in the USA, Japan and India.[2] Two other, narrower definitions of “Eurasia” are also worth noting: the European one and the Russian one.
WhenWestern European political scientists talk about “Eurasia”, theygenerally mean Russia integrated into Europe (including Ukraine ofcourse), economically, politically, and even militarily. At leastsince Napoleon, if not since Peter the Great, European strategistshave understood the importance of allying with Russia, and thepotential consequences of failing to do so. However, the currentEuropean view of “Eurasia” is, for obvious reasons, a far morerecent concept, having emerged only in the last two decades, afterthe collapse of the Soviet Union. Incidentally, this political entityis about half the size, and has only 15% of the population, of thegeographical “Eurasia.” Two observations are necessary withrespect to what is assumed to be “Europe.” Firstly, in this case,“Europe” is seen as a single economic and political entity; i.e.the European Union.[3] Secondly,inthiscontextof“Eurasia,”“Europe”primarilymeansGermany.Not only has Germanyemergedas thede factoleaderof Europe botheconomicallyand politicallyafter therecent financial crisis,butitalsohasdeeperhistorical ties with Russiathan most other nations ofthe European Union. It also hasastronger geopoliticalinterest in apoliticalandeconomicintegrationwithRussia, than the rest of the EU.[4]
Therefore, from this Western European perspective, “Eurasia” means specifically the idea of Russia's close integration with the European Union in general and with Germany in particular (not the other way around, of course). What would this European concept of “Eurasia” mean in practice? As always, integration between nations can take place in several ways; economically, politically, militarily, and even culturally. “Eurasia” would mean at least the following, from a European point of view: at an economic level, the signing of trade agreements removing trade barriers and lowering tariffs as well as removing legal and bureaucratic hurdles to European investment in Russia; at a political level, an agreement of a EU integration model for Ukraine that is acceptable to Russia, the reduction of Russian border controls and Russian visa restrictions between the two entities, and increasing institutional collaboration; and at a military level, closer Russian alignment with the European Common Security and Defence Policy as well as, inevitably, NATO, as well as some coordination between security and military forces, and a substantial increase in procurement of European weapons by the Russian armed forces.[5] Most of these cooperation areas are already included in the concept of “Four Common Spaces” which was established in 2003 between the EU and Russia, but funded by the former.[6]
Europe'sgeopolitical interest in“Eurasia”,asunderstood byEuropeanpolicy-makers,isclear and the would-be advantagesfor Europe are well known.[7]However,thoughRussia wouldmakesome gains in the long termfromsuchanintegrationwithEurope,Russia'sgeopoliticalinterestsareclearlynotcomplementarywiththeEuropeanversionof“Eurasia.”[8]Asone of the few independent nations of the world, Russia insists onestablishing relationswithEurope,“on a basis ofequalityand mutual benefit.”[9]Thisis something thatEuropeneitherhastheinterest, nor the obligation, to accept.Notsurprisingly,andoften to the frustration of European policy-makers,naturallyinterestedin pushing their ownagendaof further integration,Russiahasdifferentgeopoliticalinterests,asbecomesclearfromtheRussiandefinition of “Eurasia.”
TheRussian concept of “Eurasia” is very different from the Europeanone. It is a view that has older roots than the European one - notsurprisingly, considering Russia's geographic position. Russianpolitologists traditionally view Russia itself, being both Europeanand Asian, as “Eurasian.” The geopolitical area of the Russianconcept of “Eurasia” corresponded initially more or less to theland area of Imperial Russia in 1914, including parts of EasternEurope.[10] There is undeniably an influence of Panslavism in thisdefinition; originally the idea of “Eurasia” was moreromantically rooted in natural geography. It was the idea that thepeople scattered across the land called “Eurasia” shared commonspiritual values due to its geographic traits, such as a flat landwith few coastlines but important rivers, a particular climate(continental, often harshly so), and a certain landscape (steppe, taiga,tundra). This idea was more or less realised, but withdifficulty, during the last phases of the Russian Empire and was thenrealised again with the Soviet Union after 1945, though not stablyenough for enduring success.
Today,though this Russian geopolitical interest still exists, the physical area of the Russian“Eurasia” is now more realistically assessed. The Russian viewtoday is that “Eurasia” consists of the land lying between Europeand Asia proper; namely, those made up of Western and Central Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, part of Caucasus, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, andKyrgyzstan.[11] Just as in the case of the European concept of“Eurasia,” the Russian version of “Eurasia” is a geopolitical interestthat underpins foreign policy in that part of the world. Thus, it isnot surprising that today one of Russia's main geopolitical interestslies in ever closer integration with those countries that itconsiders part of “Eurasia.”
Thisreview of the main definitions of the concept of “Eurasia”clearly bring forth the many different geopolitical interests that are understood by this word. The next post will treat theconcept of “Eurasia” by looking at the important tacticalaspect of geopolitics; namely the question of therealisation of theconcept of “Eurasia.”
Notes:
[1]Z. Brzezinski, highly influential NationalSecurity Adviser under US President Jimmy Carter. The quote is fromhis book “The Grand Chessboard” (Basic Books), p. xiii. Further:“A power that dominates“Eurasia” would control two of the world’s three most advancedand economically productive regions. A mere glance at the map alsosuggests that control over “Eurasia” would almost automaticallyentail Africa’s subordination, rendering the Western Hemisphere andOceania geopolitically peripheral to the world’s central continent.About 75 per cent of the world’s people live in “Eurasia”, andmost of the world’s physical wealth is there as well, both in itsenterprises and underneath its soil. “Eurasia” accounts for aboutthree-fourths of theworld’sknown energy resources.” (p.31)
[2]For instance, this isthe wayZbigniewBrzezinskisees ”Eurasia”,naturally taking the US position.
[3]Indeed, both Ukraineand Turkey have their own very specific historical, economic, andgeopolitical relationship with Russia. And as for “Europe”meaning the EU in this case, this is not to say that the EU is notstill quite farfrom being such a “singleeconomic and political entity.”
[4]Thisis all the moretruetoday since Germany in thefinancial crisis has further increased its economic and politicaldominationof the European Union.Atthe same time, theBritishareprobablydistancingthemselvesfrom the EU, if notdejureyet, at leastrhetorically,and France hasdeep structural problems of its own, preventing it from driving theEU project together with Germany like it hasin the past.Germanyexport-oriented industry is perfectly suited to address the Russianmarket,and at the same timeit needs Russia's resources.Further, Germany has alreadygotthemost developed economic tieswithRussia of any major nation.
[6]At the St. Petersburg Summit in May 2003,the EU and Russia agreed to reinforce their co-operation by creating,in the long term, four common spaces in the framework of thePartnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1997: a common economicspace; a common space of freedom, security and justice; a space ofco-operation in the field of external security; and a space ofresearch, education, and cultural exchange.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia%E2%80%93European_Union_relations#The_Four_Common_Spaces
[7]Main advantages:Thewealthy but strugglingeconomiesoftheEuropean Unioncouldcertainly benefitfromtighterintegrationwiththeRussianeconomyforthe resourcesthelatterhas to offer. Theseinclude boththehumanand naturalresourcesof Russia.Thereis an obvious interest in gettingcloseaccess to alarge,low-wageand relatively well-educatedpopulation.Itwould bringenergy securityto Europe by removingonceand for all thepoliticaland bureaucratic obstacles to the cheapandjointuse ofRussia'srichnaturalresources(gasand oil, but not only).Economically,therealisation of this concept of“Eurasia”would mean thatEuropeancompanies would gain direct access to the hugeinvestmentneedsofRussiansociety.Fromamilitary perspective, a closer collaboration with Russia would addprecisely the element of“hard”power that Europelacksin order tofulfil itsgeopolitical interest ofdominatingtheworldonceagain.Itwouldalsocloseonce and for all the securityissuethat Europeperceivesin havingan independentRussiasoclose to its easternborders,asthe adherence to NATO of many Eastern European countries show.
[10]ThisRussianconceptof“Eurasia” can traceitsorigintocertainRussianémigrésinthe1920s Berlin, Pragueand Sofia.For more detailsregarding the entire paragraphabove,seeИсторияевразийского движения,at:www.gumer.info/bibliotek_Buks/Polit/nart/04.php
