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Starting in 1996,
Alexa Internet has been donating their crawl data to the Internet Archive. Flowing in every day, these data are added to the
Wayback Machine after an embargo period.
The Wayback Machine - https://web.archive.org/web/20121202023937/http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com:80/menado.html
The city of Menado is situated on the MinahassaPeninsula in the north of Celebes Island and it is today an importanttrade harbour in Indonesia.
The Menado garrison ["Troepencommando Menado"] numbered approximately 1,500 men and officers;
- The commanding officer (Major B.F.A. Schilmöller) and his staff
-Compagnie Menado;a native unit 188 men strong. This company was reinforced with aVickers machine-gun section and was commanded by Captain W.F.J. Kroon.
-Mobiele Colonne;this mobile unit had about 45 men and was commanded by Sergeant-MajorA.J. ter Voert. It was intended to be used against Japaneseparatroopers and had three so called "overvalwagens" (armoured carsequipped with Madsen light machine-guns) available.
-Reserve Korps Oud Militairen (RK);this unit was made up from retired KNIL personnel with an average ageof over 50 and was commanded by Captain W.C. van den Berg. It had 5companies:
• A Company (8 brigades) commanded by 1st Lieutenant A.O. Radema
• B Company (8 brigades) commanded by 1st Lieutenant W.G. van de Laar
• C Company (8 brigades) commanded by 1st Lieutenant H. Fucher
• D Company (8 brigades) commanded by 1st Lieutenant J.G. Wielinga
• E Company (3 brigades) commanded by Sergeant Maliëzer
-Kort Verband Compagnie (KV) of nine brigades under the command of Captain J.D.W.T. Abbink.
-Europese Militie en Landstorm Compagnie (European Militia); about 200 men strong but poorly trained. Commanded by 1st Lieutenant F. Masselink.
-Menadonese Militie Compagnie (Native Militia); about 400 native troops under the command of Captain J.H.A.L.C. de Swert.
-Stadswacht(Home Guard); about 100 men strong and commanded by 1st Lieutenant M.A.Nolthenius de Man. This company did not even have the standard M95rifles but was armed with old hunting rifles instead.
- Two or three sections Vickers machine-guns; one section was attachedto the Compagnie Menado, the other 7 machine-guns were used to defendthe airfield.
- Two artillery guns (7.5cm Lang 35 Model 1902); very obsoletefield-artillery pieces. Their crews were made up from retired KNILsoldiers.
- Three very old 3.7cm naval guns; placed on trucks, they were used todefend Lake Tondano. They only had an effective range of about 1,000meters.
With these very limited forces Major Schillmöllerhad to defend the airfields at Langoan (Menado II) and at Mapanget(Menado I), the naval base at Tasoeka and Menado. If the enemy forceswere too strong, he was instructed to regroup his units inland andstart a guerrilla war.
-Sasebo Combined Landing Force;this unit fromthe Imperial Japanese Navy was about 2,500 men strong and under thecommand of IJN Captain Kunizo Mori. It had two reinforced battalionsand support units (engineers, medics etc.). The first battalion wascommanded by Major Masanari Shiga and the second battalion by MajorUroku Hashimoto. The Sasebo Combined Landing Force also had a lighttank company (equipped with the Model 95 tank) attached to it. It leftDavao on January 9th and during the early morning of January 11thlanded at two places, at 03:00 at Kema and at 04:00 at Menado.-1st Yokosuka Special Landing Force; thisparachutist unit from the Imperial Japanese Navy used 519 of itsparatroopers to attack Langoan airfield. Its commander was IJNCommander Toyoaki Horiuchi. The 26 transport aircraft from Davaodropped the first 334 troops on January 11th. The next day a further185 paratroopers were dropped at Langoan.
Major Schilmöller had used his strongest company, theMenado Compagnie, to defend the coast line of Menado Bay. It had thetwo 7.5cm guns attached to it (one of them was out of action) but these188 troops had to defend a 2.5 km wide sector. The Menado Compagnie hadits left-flank protected by a small unit (35 men) from the Militia andLandstorm under the command of Lieutenant F. Masselink. The commandingofficer of the Menado Compagnie, Captain Kroon, was instructed to fallback to the Tinoör-stronghold, situated some five miles inland, if hewas in danger of being cut off by the enemy.The Japanese landed almost unopposed. Shortlyafter he heard about the Japanese landings, Captain Kroon came to theconclusion that the situation was hopeless and he ordered his troops towithdraw towards Tinoör. He forgot however to warn Masselink's sectionand the crew of the 7.5cm gun. The crew of this gun managed to fire afew rounds at the landing enemy but was quickly put out of action.Masselink's section also engaged the landing enemy. He recalls: » Ifired at the landing Japanese, realising that I forgot to give my menthe order to open fire. When I finally did so, we forced the enemy totake cover. Then they opened up on us with automatic weapons from avery short distance.».
Wanting to cover the withdrawing Compagnie Menado,Masselink gave his men the order to fall back towards theMenado-Tomohon road. Here he engaged the enemy again. During thisfire-fight, Masselink could clearly hear wounded Japanese soldiersscreaming for help. He continued: » While we held our ground, eighttrucks passed us and drove towards Tomohon. We kept firing till thelast truck was out of sight and then, assuming that we had completedour task, I gave my men the order to withdraw to Tinoör.».The Compagnie Menado failed its task completely.When Captain Kroon reached Pineleng, halfway between Menado and Tinoör,he saw that Japanese troops already had occupied this town. Havingalready lost control of most of his troops, due to poor communication,he gave up the idea to defend the Tinoör-line and went with what wasleft of his company to Koha instead. Only five brigades of B Company(RK), under the command of Lieutenant van de Laar, were left now todefend Tinoör, but they were reinforced by Masselink's group whomanaged to reach the line at 07:00. At 10:30 four Japanese tanksappeared, three of them being put out of action by concentratedmachinegun fire and a large tree, brought down by the KNIL troops ontop of the tanks. The fighting at Tinoör lasted until 15:00 hours whenthe KNIL troops ran out of ammunition and had to retreat towardsKakaskasen, where they engaged the Japanese again. 1st LieutenantW.G. van de Laar wrote about his men: » These old warriors kepttheir high morale, though they never witnessed a modern battle beforeand knew fully well that they didn't stand a chance against thisformidable enemy. Without ever receiving orders from our commandingofficer, we engaged the enemy time after time again.».
Lieutenant Radema's A Company (RK) was responsible forthe defence of Kema. He had two of his brigades placed along the coastline and one at his CP at Ajermadidih, where some sort of defensiveposition was created with a few pill-boxes. The rest of the company hadto defend Mapanget airfield, Likoepang and Bitoeng.The landings at Kema started at 0300 on 11 January1942 and were made swiftly. The Japanese transport ships quickly leftthe area. When Radema heard about the Japanese landing he immediatelyordered his troops to regroup at Ajermadidih. When the first Japanesetroops, including three tanks, reached Ajermadidih at 09:00, only a fewof them had actually managed to do so. With the few troops available,Radema tried to stop the Japanese advance. Corporal Pinon Toan, one ofthe defenders, wrote: » The fighting seemed to last forever. We musthave hit a lot of them but they outnumbered us completely and kept oncoming. When they reached our position we were ordered by SergeantWantania to withdraw. During our retreat we were covered by SergeantRoemambi and Privates Iniray and Poesoeng. They kept on firinguntil their pill-box was destroyed by one of the Japanese tanks. Noneof them survived but they probably saved our lives.».
When Radema had to abandon his position atAjermadidih, he intended to regroup his troops and start a guerrillawar. Due to the fact that many of his native troops deserted, he had togive up this plan.
The defence of Lake Tonadano and the airfield atLongoan fell under the responsibility of the so called Tactical CommandKakas. The commanding officer was Captain W.C. van den Berg. Theairfield itself was defended by 41 brigades under the command of 1stLieutenant J.G. Wielinga. This unit was reinforced with one of theovervalwagens. Wielinga had his CP at the kampong Langoan, where heheld 11 brigades back in reserve. The rest of his troops and theovervalwagen were placed at the airfield. Sergeant-Major H.J. Robbemondwas in command.
Shortly after 09:00 hours 334 Japanese paratroopers were dropped on and around the airfield.They suffered heavy casualties; according to Japanese sources the commanding officer (Captain Someja), two lieutenants, two NCO's and30 troops were killed during this action. A further 90 paratroopers were wounded.Captain van den Berg ordered the two remaining Overvalwagens (under Sergeant-Major Ter Voert) to attack the airfield.The first Overvalwagen (Sergeant Bojoh) managed to reach the airfield but the second (Ter Voert) had its engine shot to pieces and was left immobile.The native soldiers Tauran and Toemoedi kept on firing their machine guns, giving the rest of the crew the opportunity to escape.Though wounded both soldiers managed to escape towards Kakas but Toemoedi was later executed by the Japanese.
Enraged by the heavy losses, the Japanese executed a large number of KNIL POW's.Shortly after the capture of Langoan airfield the D Company Commander 1st Lieutenant J. Wielinga,Sergeant-Major Robbemond, foerier B. Visscher and nine native soldiers were bayonetted or beheaded.Two more native soldiers died in captivity after they were tortured.Knowing that the battle was lost, van den Berg ordered his remaining troops to retreat inland and start a guerrilla war.
On several places the remaining KNIL forces tried to start a guerrilla war against the Japanese invaders.Captain Kroon assembled what was left of the Menado Compagnie (about 50 men) and retreated towards Kembes,hoping to start an active guerrilla war from this place.Due to regular desertions by his native soldiers he reached Kembes with only nine men left.Here the group was taken prisoner by the Japanese.All European members, except Kroon himself, were executed at Langoan on January 26th.(Sergeant-Major J.H. Kersten, Sergeant-Major G. Bottinga, Sergeant J.W. Meijer, Sergeant G.H.J. Wissink, Private G.H. Couzijn and Private H.J.A. Rolff).Sergeant Maliëzer from E-Company did not want to surrender and started a guerrilla war with fifteen of his men.On February 8th they attacked a Japanese unit at Kanejan.The fighting lasted the whole day and the Japanese counter-attack failed.Outraged they burned the nearby Kampong and executed five civilians (including two women).On February 12th they came back with a larger force and this time captured Maliëzer's group.Maliëzer too was executed at Langoan with twelve of his men.Also executed on this day was another woman, Mrs.Hofman, who took part in the guerrilla war because the Japanese hadexecuted her husband, a former knight of the Militaire Willemsorde.
Captain van den Berg and his group were taken prisoner on February 20th.His group, made up out of pensioners, attacked the Japanese units on several occasions and inflicted heavy casualties.Out of respect for the high average age and fighting spirit, the Japanese commander spared their lives.
Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger (KNIL Army)
Local Command "Menado", commander was KNIL Major B.F.A. Schilmöller.
• RK Battalion in Menado with four infantry companies
• RK Depot
• MG Detachment (two sections of machine guns with 2 Madsen light machine guns each)
• Artillery Detachment (2 x 75mm L/35 guns)
• AT Truck Borne Detachment (3 naval 37mm guns)
• KNIL Infantry Company in Menado numbering approximately 50 men.This company was actually comprised of 3 brigades, which was the standard formation of the pre-1940/1941 KNIL Army.Each ''brigade'' was an independent formation and usually had 15-18 men apiece.They operated independent in the field but if necessary multiple brigades could/would be grouped together to form a larger unit.This formation was equipped with 3 armoured cars and one armoured lorry and was a response against Japanese paratroopers.This formation was equipped with Squad Automatic Weapons (SAW), which was the Danish Madsen light machine gun.
• KV Infantry Company in Menado
• Infantry Company of EuropeanMilitie andLandstorm, comprised of approximately 100 Europeans.They were poorly armed and poorly trained and had no automatic weapons.
• Infantry Company of Menadoan Militie
•Stadswacht Infantry Company
• Mobile Column with 3 independent squads and 3 armoured cars and one "armoured" lorry
plus various auxiliary formations from the KNIL's Artillery, Engineers, Transport, Military Police and AA branches.
Bibliography .Article List .Geographic Names
Forgotten Campaign: The Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941-1942
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