One of the reasons for the current explosion of interest in the studyof consciousness has been the development of new technologies for the studyof the brain. This has given rise to a widespread optimism within the neurosciencecommunity that a theory of consciousness could be just around the corner.
However many commentators have pointed out that although there has beenundoubted progress in the study of theneural correlates of consciousness,there is still an "explanatory gap." What sort of theory wouldit take to bridge the gap between brain processes and phenomenal experience?
PhilosopherDavid Chalmersgave eloquent expression to this at the first Tucson conference, when hedrew a distinction between the "easy problems" (cognitive functionslike discrimination and the focus of attention) and the "hard problem"(why should any of this be accompanied by phenomenal experience?).
TheJournal of Consciousness Studies is publishing a three-partspecial issue in which authors are invited to address this "hard problem".The first two issues are now available, and contain the following articles:
Additional Hard Problem articles appear in Issue3,No.3, Issue3, No.4, Issue3,No.5/6
Chalmers' response appears in Issue4, No.1
Full text for theChalmerskeynote paper is available and, for North American browsers, we alsoinclude a link to theUSconnection.
But it's a long paper, and who wants to sit in front of a computer allday anyway? So we have printed an extra 1000 copies of these two issueswhich we are making available at the special price of $US 8.50 (UK 5 pounds)each. The price includes accelerated delivery for US, UK and Europe, surfaceelsewhere (airmail extra $2.50 (UKP 1.50).
Or take out a subscription for the current year (Vol.4, 1997) and wewill send you the original special issue (containing David Chalmers' keynotearticle and six commentaries)free of charge.
If you would like to order these, then just emailsandra@imprint.co.uk
The "hard problem" is a major topic on the jcs-online emaildiscussion list. To participate or listen in on this discussion just sendan email tomajordomo@lists.zynet.co.uksaying:
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JCS,2 (3), 1995, pp. 200-19
David J. Chalmers,
Department of Philosophy,
University of California
Santa Cruz, CA 95064,
USA.
Email:chalmers@ling.ucsc.edu
Abstract:
Consciousness poses the most baffling problems in the science of themind. There is nothing that we know more intimately than conscious experience,but there is nothing that is harder to explain. All sorts of mental phenomenahave yielded to scientific investigation in recent years, but consciousnesshas stubbornly resisted. Many have tried to explain it, but the explanationsalways seem to fall short of the target. Some have been led to supposethat the problem is intractable, and that no good explanation can be given.
To make progress on the problem of consciousness, we have to confrontit directly. In this paper, I first isolate the truly hard part of theproblem, separating it from more tractable parts and giving an accountof why it is so difficult to explain. I critique some recent work thatuses reductive methods to address consciousness, and argue that these methodsinevitably fail to come to grips with the hardest part of the problem.Once this failure is recognized, the door to further progress is opened.In the second half of the paper, I argue that if we move to a new kindof nonreductive explanation, a naturalistic account of consciousness canbe given. I put forward my own candidate for such an account: a nonreductivetheory based on principles of structural coherence and organizational invarianceand a double-aspect view of information.
Thefull text is available.
JCS,2 (3), 1995, pp. 241-55
Thomas W. Clark,
7 Partridge Ave.,
Somerville, MA 02143,
USA.
Email:twc@world.std.com
Abstract:
This paper critiques the view that consciousness is likely somethingextra which accompanies or is produced by neural states, something beyondthe functional cognitive processes realized in the brain. Such a view createsthe `explanatory gap' between function and phenomenology which many supposecannot be filled by functionalist theories of mind. Given methodologicalconsiderations of simplicity, ontological parsimony, and theoretical conservatism,an alternative hypothesis is recommended, that subjective qualitative experienceis identical to certain information-bearing, behaviour-controlling functions,not something which emerges from them. This hypothesis explains the isomorphismbetween the structure of experience and neural organization, while providinga naturalistic account of qualia as relational properties of informationalstates, not a separate ontology of phenomenal essences. On this functionalistview, the hard, empirical problem of consciousness is to discover preciselywhich neural functions constitute subjective experience.
JCS,2 (3), 1995, pp. 231-40
C.J.S. Clarke,
University of Southampton,
Faculty of Mathematical Studies,
Highfield,
Southampton SO17 1BJ,
UK.
Email:cjsc@maths.soton.ac.uk
Abstract:
The dominance in normal awareness of visual percepts, which are linkedto space, obscures the fact that most thoughts are non-spatial. It is arguedthat the mind is intrinsically non-spatial, though in perception can becomecompresent with spatial things derived from outside the mind. The assumptionthat the brain is entirely spatial is also challenged, on the grounds thatthere is a perfectly good place for the non-spatial in physics. A quantumlogic approach to physics, which takes non-locality as its starting point,offers a non-reductive way of reconciling the experience of mind with theworld description of physics. For further progress it is necessary to placemind first as the key aspect of the universe.
JCS,2 (3), 1995, pp. 266-71
E.J. Lowe,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Durham,
Durham, UK.
Email:E.J.Lowe@durham.ac.uk
Abstract:
This paper challenges David Chalmers' proposed division of the problemsof consciousness into the `easy' ones and the `hard' one, the former allegedlybeing susceptible to explanation in terms of computational or neural mechanismsand the latter supposedly turning on the fact that experiential `qualia'resist any sort of functional definition. Such a division, it is argued,rests upon a misrepresention of the nature of human cognition and experienceand their intimate interrelationship, thereby neglecting a vitally importantinsight of Kant. From a Kantian perspective, our capacity for conceptualthought is so inextricably bound up with our capacity for phenomenal consciousnessthat it is an illusion to imagine that there areany`easy' problemsof consciousness, resolvable within the computational or neural paradigms.
JCS,2 (3), 1995, pp. 220-30
Colin McGinn,
Dept. of Philosophy,
Rutgers University,
P.O. Box 270,
New Brunswick,
NJ 08903-0270,
USA.
Abstract:
Consciousness lacks extension and other spatial properties. But howcan this be, if it arises from matter in space? The paper argues that thisconundrum can only be solved by recognizing that our current conceptionof space is fundamentally inadequate. However, no other conception is availableto us.
JCS,2 (3), 1995, pp. 272-88
William Seager,
University of Toronto,
1265 Military Trail,
Scarborough,
Ontario M1C 1A4,
Canada.
Email:seager@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
Abstract:
The generation problem is to explain how material configurations orprocesses can produce conscious experience. David Chalmers urges that thisis what makes the problem of consciousness really difficult. He proposesto side-step the generation problem by proposing that consciousness isan absolutely fundamental feature of the world. I am inclined to agreethat the generation problem is real and believe that taking consciousnessto be fundamental is promising. But I take issue with Chalmers about whatit is to be a fundamental feature of the world. In fact, I argue that takingthe idea seriously ought to lead to some form of panpsychism. Powerfulobjections have been advanced against panpsychism, but I attempt to outlinea form of the doctrine which can evade them. In the end, I suspect thatwe will face a choice between panpsychism and rethinking the legitimacyof the generation problem itself.
JCS,2 (3), 1995, pp. 255-65
Max Velmans,
Department of Psychology,
Goldsmiths, University of London,
New Cross,
London, SE14 6NW,
England.
Email:mlv@gold.ac.uk
Abstract:
Within psychology and the brain sciences, the study of consciousnessand its relation to human information processing is once more a focus forproductive research. However, some ancient puzzles about the nature ofconsciousness appear to be resistant to current empirical investigations,suggesting the need for a fundamentally different approach. In Velmans(1991a; b; 1993a) I have argued that functional (information processing)accounts of the mind do not `contain' consciousness within their workings.Investigations of information processing are not investigations of consciousnessas such. Given this, first-person investigations of experience need tobe related nonreductively to third-person investigations of processing.For example, conscious contents may be related to neural/physical representationsvia a dual-aspect theory of information. Chalmers (1995) arrives at similarconclusions. But there are also theoretical differences. Unlike ChalmersI argue for the use of neutral information processing language for functionalaccounts rather than the term `awareness'. I do not agree that functionalequivalence cannot be extricated from phenomenal equivalence, and suggesta hypothetical experiment for doing so - using a cortical implant for blindsight.I argue that not all information has phenomenal accompaniments, and introducea different form of dual-aspect theory involving `psychological complementarity'.I also suggest that the hard problem posed by `qualia' has its origin ina misdescription of everyday experience implicit in dualism.
JCS,3 (1), 1996, pp.4-6
Daniel C. Dennett
Center for Cognitive Studies,
Tufts University,
Medford,
MA 02155,
USA.
Abstract:
The strategy of divide and conquer is usually an excellent one, butit all depends on how you do the carving. Chalmer's (1995) attempt to sortthe `easy' problems of consciousness from the `really hard' problem isnot, I think, a useful contribution to research, but a major misdirectorof attention, an illusion-generator. How could this be? Let me describetwo somewhat similar strategic proposals, and compare them to Chalmers'recommendation.
JCS,3 (1), 1996, pp.7-13
Valerie Gray Hardcastle
Department of Philosophy,
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University,
Blacksburg,
Virginia 240610126,
USA.
Abstract:
In this essay, I hope to make clearer what the points of division betweenthe materialists and the sceptics are. I argue that the rifts are quitedeep and turn on basic differences in understanding the scientific enterprise.In section I, I outline the disagreements between David Chalmers and me,arguing that consciousness is not a brute fact about the world. In sectionII, I point out the fundamental difference between the materialists andthe sceptics, suggesting that this difference is not something that furtherdiscussion or argumentation can overcome. In the final section, I outlineone view of scientific explanation and conclude that the source of conflictreally turns on a difference in the rules each side has adopted in playingthe game.
JCS,3 (1), 1996, pp.14-25
William S. Robinson
Department of Philosophy,
Iowa State University,
Ames,
IA 50011,
USA.
Email: wsrob@iastate.edu
Abstract:
This paper offers an account of why the Hard Problem cannot be solvedwithin our present conceptual framework. The reason is that some propertyof each conscious experience lacks structure, while explanations of thekind that would overcome the Hard Problem require structure in the occurrencesthat are to be explained. This account is apt to seem incorrect for reasonsthat trace to relational theories of consciousness. I thus review a highlydeveloped representative version of relational theory (namely, David Rosenthal's,1986; 1990) and explain why I do not find it acceptable. This rejectionrequires a nonrelational alternative, which I describe and defend againsta certain further objection. Finally, I discuss implications of the foregoingfor the views of McGinn (1991) and Chalmers (1995).
JCS,3 (1), 1996, pp.26-32
Eugene Mills
Div. of Philosophy,
Virginia Commonwealth University,
915 West Franklin Street,
Richmond,
VA 23284-2025,
USA.
Email: eomills@gems.vcu.edu
Abstract:
David Chalmers (1995) calls the problem of explaining why physicalprocesses give rise to conscious phenomenal experience the `hard problem'of consciousness. He argues convincingly that no reductive account of consciousnesscan solve it and offers instead a non-reductive account which takes consciousnessas fundamental. This paper argues that a theory of the sort Chalmers proposescannot hope to solve the hard problem of consciousness precisely becauseit takes the relation between physical processes and consciousness as fundamentalrather than explicable. The hard problem of consciousness is, for reasonsChalmers himself gives, insoluble. Its insolubility does not, however,impugn the naturalistic respectability of consciousness.
JCS,3 (1), 1996, pp.33-35
Benjamin Libet
Department of Physiology,
University of California, San Francisco,
CA 94143-0444,
USA.
Abstract:
Solutions to the `hard problem' of consciousness must accept consciousexperience as a fundamental non-reducible phenomenon in nature, as Chalmerssuggests. Chalmers proposes candidates for an acceptable theory, but Ifind basic flaws in these. Our own experimental investigations of brainprocesses causally involved in the development of conscious experienceappear to meet Chalmers' requirement. Even more directly, I had previouslyproposed a hypothetical `conscious mental field' as an emergent propertyof appropriate neural activities, with the attributes of integrated subjectiveexperience and a causal ability to modulate some neural processes. Thistheory meets all the requirements imposed by the `hard problem' and, significantly,it is experimentally testable.
JCS,3 (1), 1996, pp.36-53
Stuart Hameroff
Departments of Anesthesiology and Psychology,
University of Arizona,
Tucson,
Arizona,
USA.
Roger Penrose
Mathematical Institute,
University of Oxford,
2429 St. Giles,
Oxford OX1 3LB,
UK.
Abstract:
Whatis consciousness? Some philosophers have contended that`qualia', or an experiential medium from which consciousness is derived,exists as a fundamental component of reality. Whitehead, for example, describedthe universe as being comprised of `occasions of experience'. To examinethis possibility scientifically, the very nature of physical reality mustbe re-examined. We must come to terms with the physics of spacetime as is described by Einstein's general theory of relativity and its relationto the fundamental theory of matter as described by quantum theory. Thisleads us to employ a new physics ofobjective reduction:ORwhich appeals to a form of `quantum gravity' to provide a useful descriptionof fundamental processes at the quantum/classical borderline (Penrose,1994; 1996). Within theOR scheme, we consider that consciousnessoccurs if an appropriately organized system is able to develop and maintainquantum coherent superposition until a specific `objective' criterion (athreshold related to quantum gravity) is reached; the coherent system thenself-reduces (objective reduction:OR). We contend that this typeof objective self-collapse introduces non-computability, an essential featureof consciousness.OR is taken as an instantaneous event the climaxof aself-organizing process in fundamental spacetime and a candidatefor a conscious Whitehead-like `occasion' of experience. How could anORprocess occur in the brain, be coupled to neural activities, and accountfor other features of consciousness? We nominate anOR process withthe requisite characteristics to be occurring in cytoskeletal microtubuleswithin the brain's neurons (Penrose and Hameroff, 1995; Hameroff and Penrose,1995; 1996).
JCS,3 (1), 1996, pp.54-68
Jonathan Shear
Dept. of Philosophy,
Virginia Commonwealth University,
Richmond,
VA 232842025,
USA.
Email: jcs@richmond.infi.net
Abstract:
It stands to reason that full understanding of what is involved inthe `hard problem' will emerge only on the basis of systematic scientificinvestigation of the subjective phenomena of consciousness, as well asthe objective phenomena of matter. Yet the idea of such a systematic scientificinvestigation of the subjective phenomena of consciousness has largelybeen absent from discussions of the `hard problem'. This is due, apparently,both to philo- sophical objections to the possibility of such a scienceof consciousness, and to the absence of appropriate subjective investigativemethodologies. The present paper argues (1) that cognitive-developmentalresearch on the development of the mental/physical distinction in youngchildren undercuts standard philosophical objections to the possibilityof an appropriate scientific study of the phenomena of consciousness, (2)that methodologies for exploring the contents and dynamics of consciousnessakin to those developed in Eastern cultures could play a significant rolein the development of such a science of consciousness, and (3) that theexperience of `pure consciousness' often reported in association with thesemethodologies suggests reformulation of our ordinary ideas about the relationshipsbetween consciousness, qualia, and the objective world that may prove particularlyuseful for resolution of the `hard problem'.
JCS,3 (1), 1996, pp.69-75
David Hodgson
Supreme Court of New South Wales,
Queens Square,
Sydney,
NSW 2000,
Australia
Abstract:
David Chalmers distinguishes the hard problem of consciousness whyshould a physical system give rise to conscious experiences at all withwhat he calls the easy problems, the explanation of how cognitive systems,including human brains, perform various cognitive functions. He arguesthat the easy problems are easy because the performance of any functioncan be explained by specifying a mechanism that performs the function.This article argues that conscious experiences have a role in the performanceby human beings of some cognitive functions, that can't be realised bymechanisms of the kind studied by the objective sciences; and that accordinglysome of Chalmers' easy problems will not be fully solved unless and untilthe hard problem is solved.
JCS,3 (1), 1996, pp.76-88
Dept. of Philosophy,
Sycamore 026,
Indiana University,
Bloomington,
IN 474052601,
USA.
Email: ghrosenb@phil.indiana.edu
Abstract:
If experience cannot be explained reductively, then we must embracea revised understanding of nature to explain it. What kind of revisionis required? A minimal revision would merely append a theory of experienceonto an otherwise adequate theory of cognition, without going far beyondconsiderations peculiar to the study of the mind. I argue that we willneed a more expansive revision, requiring us to rethink the natural orderquite generally. If this is right, we will view the mind as a special contextin which something new to our understanding of the world, and much moregeneral, is being manifested.
Journalof Consciousness Studies
