Final report of the United Nations Commission of Experts
established pursuant to
security council resolution 780 (1992)
Annex IVThe policy of ethnic cleansing
Prepared by:
M. Cherif Bassiouni
Chairman and Rapporteur on the Gathering
and Analysis of the Facts, Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)
and
Peter M. Manikas, IHRLI Staff Attorney
Contributors to Part II:
Jan Brakel, IHRLI Staff Attorney
Duane Layton, IHRLI Volunteer Attorney, Attorney at Law,
Washington, D.C.
Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, IHRLI Volunteer Attorneys
Part III Prepared by:
Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights, Vienna, Austria
Part I of the following Annex briefly describes thehistorical antecedents to the current conflict in the formerYugoslavia.Part II describes the development of the policy of«ethnic cleansing» and the early stages of its implementation inBosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).Part III focuses upon one «ethniccleansing» campaign in the Bosnian city of Zvornik and describesthe military attack on and expulsion of the Muslim population ofthe city.
As used in this report, «ethnic cleansing» means renderingan area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation toremove from a given area persons from another ethnic or religiousgroup.
All parties involved in the conflict have committed «gravebreaches» of the Geneva Conventions and other violations ofinternational humanitarian law. These violations include thekilling of civilians, rape torture, and the deliberatedestruction of civilian property, including cultural andreligious property, such as churches and mosques. But, there aresignificant qualitative differences. Most of the violations werecommitted by Serbs against Bosnian Muslims. The second largestgroup of victims were Croats, whose perpetrators have been Serbsfrom Serbia, BiH, and the Krajinas. Both Bosnian Muslims andCatholic Croats have also victimized Serbs in BiH and Croatia,but in lesser number. The policy of «ethnic cleansing», however,has been systematically carried out by Serbs in BiH and Croatiaagainst their opponents, though Croats have also carried outsimilar policies, but on a more restricted scale, against Serbsin Croatia and Muslims in Herzegovina. Forceful populationremoval by BiH of Serbs has also occurred in some limited areas,but not as a policy. In fact, BiH occupied areas contain bothCroats and Serbs, while Bosnian Serb areas have been cleansed ofall but Serbs. The Krajinas in Croatia also have been cleansedof Croats, while eastern and western Slavonia (Croatia) have beencleansed of Serbs.
Croatian forces in the Republic of Croatia and BiH haveengaged in «ethnic cleansing» practices against Serbs andMuslims. Croats, for example, have conducted «ethnic cleansing»campaigns against Serbs in eastern and western Slavonia and inparts of the Krajina region, as well as against Muslims in theMostar area. While Bosnian Muslim forces have engaged inpractices that constitute «grave breaches» of the GenevaConventions and other violations of international humanitarianlaw, they have not engaged in «ethnic cleansing» operations. Thevast majority of reports alleging «ethnic cleansing» operationsinvolved Serbian forces who have used means, such as the masskilling of civilians, torture, sexual assault, the bombardment ofcities, the destruction of mosques and churches, and otherpractices to eliminate Muslim and Croat populations that liewithin Serb-claimed territory.
«Ethnic cleansing» by Serb forces has been systematic andapparently well-planned. As early as mid-1990, the Yugoslav Army(JNA) began to arm and supply local Serb forces in BiH. The«ethnic cleansing» campaigns in the early stages of the conflictinvolved coordinated attacks by JNA and paramilitary forces thatsometimes operated from the Republic of Serbia. As the war and«ethnic cleansing» continued, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia(FRY) persisted in supplying logistical support, arms, fuel, andother supplies to Serb forces in Croatia and BiH. «Ethniccleansing» has involved means, such as the mass killing ofcivilians, sexual assault, the bombardment of cities, thedestruction of mosques and churches, the confiscation of propertyand similar measures to eliminate, or dramatically reduce, Muslimand Croat populations that lie within Serb held territory.
According to the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission onHuman Rights, by late 1993, over 2.1 million people had beendisplaced from their homes since the conflict in the BiH region.*1
The Slavic people migrated from the caucuses to the Balkanpeninsula between the Sixth and the Eighth Century. Between theNinth and Twelfth Century, Croats, Bosnians, and Serbs developeddistinct historical and cultural identities.
The division of the Christian Church in 1054 reinforced thefault line that earlier divided the Roman Empire.*2 On theeastern side of the line lie the cultural heritage of the Greekworld, the Eastern Orthodox Church and users of the Cyrillicscript. On the western side lie the Roman Catholic Church.
In the 17th Century the Ottoman Turks encroached on theBalkan peninsula and defeated Serb, Bosnian, and Albanian forcesat the Battle of Kosovo Polje (Field of Blackbirds) in June 1389.The event was to become of particular historical significance tothe Serbs and is commemorated as the symbolic end to theindependent Serbian medieval kingdom.*3
Members of the Bosnian Church, which was distinct from theRoman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Churches, converted to Islamduring this period. These conversions were in part due to thepromise of better conditions by Turkish rulers.
In the 17th Century, the Ottoman and Hapsburg empiresclashed and the Treaty of Karlowitz transferred some Ottomanlands to Christian powers in 1699. The entry of the Europeanpowers into the region further accentuated the divisions that hadoccurred earlier. Croats and Slovenes were firmly part of thewest, embracing Catholicism and looking towards the westernpowers for leadership. The Serbs and Bosnians remained withinthe Ottoman Empire. For the Serbs, Russia became a growinginfluence, and as Ottoman power in the region waned Russiaassumed the rule of protector of all Orthodox Christians in theBalkans.
Independence movements appeared in Serbia in the early 19thCentury and by 1830, Serbia had achieved autonomous status withinthe Ottoman Empire. Strong nationalist sentiments continued togrow throughout the Nineteenth Century. Serbs increasinglyviewed their mission as one of liberating and unifying the landsin which Serbs lived. It was during this period that the idea ofa «Greater Serbia» first emerged.
Two Balkan wars were fought in 1912 and 1913, finallyfreeing the peninsula from Ottoman control.*4 Serbia madeterritorial gains by absorbing Kosovo and part of Macedonia.However, Serbia did not achieve its objective of uniting withSerbian regions of the Hapsburg Empire, including sections ofBosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Vojvodina.*5 The two Balkan warsexperienced ethnic conflict on a massive scale. The worstatrocities appear to have been related to efforts to unite thepeninsula's Serbian population. In 1914, an InternationalCommission found:
«[h]ouses and whole villages reduced to ashes, unarmed and innocent populations massacred en masse, incredible acts of violence, pillage and brutality of every kind--such were the means which were employed by the Serbo-Montenegrin soldiery, with a view to the entire transformation of the ethnic character of [these] regions.»*6
Serb nationalists, incensed by the Hapsburg annexations ofBosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinandin 1914. The event, on the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo,sparked the first World War.
Following the First World War, unity was finally achievedwhen King Alexander of Serbia proclaimed the Kingdom of Serbs,Croats and Slovenes. The new state, however, was plagued byethnic conflict from its inception. Croats, fearing Serbiandomination, sought greater self-government within a looserconfederation. It was during this period that the CroatianUstasa (Uprising) movement was born. Its goal was Croatianindependence, through violence if necessary.
Yugoslavia surrendered to the Axis powers in 1941, leadingto German and Italian occupation of the country. In Serbia, theGermans installed a regime headed by Serbian General Milan Nedic.During the war, the Croatian leadership launched a campaign ofannihilation against its Serbian population. Some Muslims joinedthe Croats' efforts against the Serbs, though many have foughtalongside the Ustase regime and against the Germans and theItalians. Pavelic sought to create an ethnically and religiouslyhomogenous state. The Serbs of Croatia were faced with thealternatives of extermination, expulsion, or conversion toCatholicism. Serb officials maintain that a system of deathcamps, covering 210 square miles, ran along the Sava River. Ithas been estimated that between 350,000 and 750,000 Serbs werekilled during this period.
In October 1944, Tito's partisans, with Soviet assistance,took Belgrade and a communist regime was established. A federalsystem was constructed, consisting of six Republics: Serbia,Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro.Serbia included two autonomous provinces, each containing a highconcentration of an ethnic minority: Kosovo and Vojvodina. Ethnictensions persisted in the post war years. Tito, however,effectively repressed ethnic and nationalist movements, such asthe Croatian reformist movement of the early 1970s.
After Tito's death in 1980, a resurgent Serbian nationalismwas led by Slobodan Milosevic. To achieve, and later toconsolidate his power, Milosevic organized massive demonstrationsin support of Serbs living in the province of Kosovo, which had apredominantly ethnic Albanian population. When disturbancesbroke out in Kosovo in 1989, Milosevic imposed martial law.
Within the Republic of Serbia, the tenor of political lifebecame increasingly strident. Faced with a disintegrating nation-state, Milosevic denounced his domestic political opponents as«enemies of Serbia».*7 His opponents in the other Republics werecompared to vampires and fascists.*8
In February 1989, the Serbian Republican Assembly amendedits constitution and revoked the autonomous status of Kosovo andVojvodina. This display of Serbian nationalism, coupled with theuse of force in Kosovo, generated apprehension within the otherRepublics. The resulting tension between the six Republics ledto the breakup of the League of Communists in early 1990. InJanuary of that year Slovenian delegates to the ExtraordinaryCongress of the League of Communists demanded an end to theCommunist party's «leading role» and the establishment of a multi-party state. Clashing with the Serbian delegates, the Slovenianswalked out of the Congress.
The present conflict emerged in early 1990 when Serbia andthree of the other five republics failed to reach an agreementconcerning the structure of the federal government. TheRepublics of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)sought a loose confederation in order to exercise greaterautonomy. Serbia, on the other hand, wanted a more centralizedfederation in order to maintain its dominant role. This conflictresulted in efforts by Croatia, Slovenia, and later BiH andMacedonia, to secede from Yugoslavia.
Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence on 25 June1991, Two days later, the Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA) attackedthe provisional militia. The war in Slovenia lasted only tendays, but it soon spread to Croatia , where the conflict would bemore protracted and bloodier.
In response to the Croatian vote for independence, Serbsliving in Croatia's Krajina region established a Serbian NationalCouncil and scheduled an August referendum on their secessionfrom Croatia. Breakaway republics were also established by theSerbs in BiH. These breakaway republics received small arms,artillery, missile launching systems and other support from theirsupporters in Serbia. In addition, Croats living in BiHestablished the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosna, and theyreceived arms and other assistance from supporters in Croatia.*9
The JNA, according to numerous reports, was involved in theconflict in Croatia from its inception. When the Serbs ofCroatia's Krajina region declared their independence, there was amassive transfer of heavy weapons from the JNA to Serbparamilitary forces. In addition, there was an influx ofsupplies from Serbia itself. Serb paramilitary units operatingin Croatia have worn federal army uniforms and used JNAtopographical maps. They also were able to obtain a large numberof sophisticated weapons and vehicles.*10
Coordination between the JNA and local Serb forces wasapparent in the destruction of Vukovar in 1991. A mass gravefound at Ovcara is thought to contain the remains of at least 200Croats who had been taken from a Vukovar hospital, summarilyexecuted, and buried in a shallow grave.
In April 1992, when the conflict in BiH broke out, the JNAhad approximately 80,000 troops deployed there. In early May,General Ratko Mladic was appointed JNA commander. Underpressure from the international community, on 19 May 1992, theFRY announced that it was withdrawing its forces. However,Yugoslav officials said that JNA personnel from BiH could remainthere and fight on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs (seeAnnex III,Military Structure).
In the weeks following BiH's recognition by the EuropeanCommunity, JNA and Bosnian Serb forces attacked Bosnian townssuch as Prijedor and other villages in the Kozarac region ofnortheast BiH, and Zvornik in northwest BiH. Similar attackshave occurred in many cities and villages along the Drina andSava Rivers. These areas of BiH have high concentrations ofBosnian Serbs. The purpose of the attacks seems clear: Serbforces have sought to consolidate their control over theseterritories and link them with each other, as well as with Serb-controlled areas of Croatia.
Although «ethnic cleansing» occurred to some extent in theconflict in Croatia, it was in BiH that a distinct pattern of«ethnic cleansing» could be discerned. First, Bosnian Serbparamilitary forces, often with the assistance of the JNA, seizecontrol of the area. In many cases, Serbian residents are toldto leave the area before the violence begins. The homes of non-Serb residents are targeted for destruction and cultural andreligious monuments, especially churches and mosques, aredestroyed. Second, the area falls under the control ofparamilitary forces who terrorize the non-Serb residents withrandom killings, rapes and looting. Third, the seized area isadministered by local Serb authorities, often in conjunction withparamilitary groups. During this phase, non-Serb residents aredetained, beaten and sometimes transferred to prison camps wherefurther abuse, including mass killings, have occurred. Non-Serbresidents are often fired from their jobs and their property isconfiscated. Many have been forced to sign documentsrelinquishing their rights to their homes before being deportedto other areas of the country.
According to one military expert of Jane's InformationGroup:
«[the Commander of the Bosnian Serb military forces] has a clear military aim: the consolidation of Serb-held territory of Bosnia; the eradication of Muslim enclaves within them, such as Gorazde, and the severance of any possible military link between Muslims in Bosnia and those in the Sanzak area of Serbia.»*11
The policy of «ethnic cleansing» has been implementedconsistently throughout an area incorporating an arc that rangesfrom north-eastern BiH through the regions of eastern and westernBiH, adjacent to the Serb Krajina area of Croatia.
The Serbs «ethnic cleansing» campaign was shaped by severalfactors. First, the demographics of the region ensured that anyattempt to establish «ethnically pure» areas would entailtremendous dislocations. In BiH, the pre-war population wasapproximately 40 per cent Muslim, 32 per cent Serb, and 18 percent Croat.*12 The areas of Serb preponderance are primarilylocated in the north-east, south-east and north-west portions ofthe country. However, these areas are neither homogenous norcontiguous. The areas in which Serbs are numerically dominantinclude substantial populations of Muslims and Croats.
Populations can be removed, even forcibly removed, withoutextreme bloodshed. Ethnic minorities could have been ejectedfrom their homes, gathered at a central locations, andtransported to another region. This, however, would haverequired a strong and well-organized regular army. The BosnianSerb Army was neither numerically strong enough, nor sufficientlywell-organized, especially in the first stages of the conflict inBiH, to accomplish this task. Thus, Serb officials relied on theuse of terror, entailing mass killings, torture, rapes, andprison camps to eradicate the non-Serb population. The non-Serbshad to be sufficiently terrorized to ensure that they would fleethe area and never return.
The character of «ethnic cleansing» was partly determined byits reliance on local officials and paramilitary leadership.Local officials relied on police and militia to help expel non-Serbs from Serb-controlled land, and these forces were often ill-equipped and untrained. The use of terror was their mostefficient weapon. Police and local militia were frequentlysupplemented by paramilitaries. These groups often operatedoutside any discernable centralized command and controlstructure. Paramilitaries were often recruited from a populationof rural, uneducated youth. Sometimes a deliberate effort wasmade to recruit those with criminal backgrounds. The apparentlack of control over paramilitaries conveyed the message that themost brutal acts would be permitted, or at least they would gounpunished.
The fragmentation of authority has provided FRY and BosnianSerb officials with «plausible deniability». If ties betweenparamilitaries and officials are obscured, government officialsmight be able to evade responsibility for «ethnic cleansing».Thus, even after the JNA became better organized and able toassert greater control in 1993, it did not establish effectivecommand and control over the paramilitaries.
While regular military units, militia, police and localcitizens have all participated in «ethnic cleansing» campaigns.Paramilitary units are responsible for some of the most brutalaspects of «ethnic cleansing.» Two of the units that have playeda major role in the «ethnic cleansing» campaign in BiH, the«Cetniks» associated with VojislavSeselj and the «Tigers»associated withZeljko Raznjatovic (Arkan), have been active inthe Republic of Serbia as well.Seselj's followers havereportedly waged «ethnic cleansing» campaigns against ethnicminorities in Serbia's provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo.Arkan's «Tigers» have staged military training exercisesallegedly designed to intimidate Albanian residents in Kosovo.
These paramilitary units have launched operations fromwithin the Republic of Serbia. In addition, paramilitarytraining camps are located within the Republic of Serbia.
The attack on Zvornik, in north-eastern BiH, reveals asimilar pattern of events that was repeated throughout much ofthe area. In the weeks prior to the attack (which occurred on 8April 1992), tensions between ethnic groups in the city hadincreased. Members of each ethnic group had obtained weapons fortheir personal use. Muslims were warned by their Serb friendsthat they should leave the area. Prior to 8 April, many Serbsleft Zvornik, apparently having been forewarned of the impendingattack. On the weekend before the attack, Serbs constructed abarricade, preventing many Muslims from reaching their work siteor school. In retaliation, Muslims also erected a barricade atthe same location. It was protected by Muslim police officersand armed volunteers.
On the day before the attack, JNA troops moved into theregion. On television, a Belgrade commentator reported that theJNA was needed in the region because they expected an attack byMuslim extremists.
On 8 April, Serb representatives of the Serbian DemocraticParty (SDS), as well as the paramilitary leader known as «Arkan,»called for the Muslims to peacefully surrender the city.Negotiations proceeded in which the division of the city intoMuslim and Serb enclaves was discussed. The negotiations brokedown, however, apparently because Arkan was dissatisfied with theresult.
After the failure to reach an agreement, the attack on thetown began. The JNA, using tanks, artillery and infantry units,was joined by Arkan's paramilitary troops, sometimes known as«Arkanovci.» There was heavy shelling of the Muslim sections ofthe city.
The next day Arkan's troops, along with paramilitary unitsknown as «Seseljovci» and the Beli Orlovi (White Eagles), enteredthe city. Serb territorial defense units (TOs) alsoparticipated. It was reported that these troops committed randomexecutions and rapes after entering Zvornik.
The next day, a provisional government was established thatwas headed by local Serbs, primarily members of SDS. A curfewwas imposed, and residents had to obtain a police permit totravel within the city. Several Muslims who went to the policestation to obtain a permit were taken into custody and deportedto an outlying prison camp. Except for indispensable personnelsuch as hospital employees, Muslim men were prevented fromworking. During the following days, paramilitary units continuedto patrol the streets, and there were many reports of looting,rape and other acts of brutality.
In late April, an appeal was made to Muslims to return tothe area from which they had fled. Many returned because theyfeared losing their property. On arriving in Zvornik, Muslimswere told that they must register their property. An «agency forthe exchange of houses» was established. In exchange forrelinquishing their homes, Muslims were promised the former homesof Serbs in Tuzla. Departure from the town was only possible onthe condition that their property was turned over to Serbauthorities. From late May to early June 1992, the entire Muslimpopulations of villages in the surrounding area were deported.The expelled Muslims were allowed to take few personalpossessions with them. Even these items were often stolen atSerb check-points on the roads leaving the area.
According to an account in Vreme, the «cleansing» wasfollowed by organized looting. «Some stole gold, hardcurrencies, household appliances or cars. Others robbeddepartment stores. Electricity plugs were torn out of the wallsand children's toys were sold and bought. Even entire bedroomsuites could be seen floating down the river».*14
This overview is designed to place the current conflict inthe former Yugoslavia in a historical perspective. Many of theissues discussed in the following sections of this report, suchas those dealing with «ethnic cleansing» and military structure,have historical antecedents (seeAnnex III, Military Structure).Ethnic rivalries and the fear of Serbian hegemony in the region,for example, have deep historical roots. Events which occurredduring World War II that led to a large number of brutal killingsand expulsions of Serbs from Croatia are also relevant tocontemporary events. However, an appreciation of the tumultuoushistory of the Balkan peninsula can help understand theperspectives of the parties involved in the current war.
Mindful of the different historical perspectives, whatfollows is as objective an account that can be made of theconflict's historical background. It is only intended to providebackground and context to the extent that it is relevant to thepurposes of this Annex. No judgments are made regarding thepositions or historical claims of the warring factions.
Early in the First Century A.D., the Dalmatian Coast wasannexed by the Roman emperor, Tiberius. The Roman domaingradually moved inland, encompassing the land that would becomeYugoslavia. The Romans called this domain Illyria, named afterthe region's inhabitants.
The Roman empire was divided into eastern and westerndistricts during the reign of Diocletian (284-305). Thisboundary became one of the region's major fault lines. On theeastern side of the line lie the cultural heritage of the Greekworld, the Eastern Orthodox Church, and users of Cyrillic script;on the western side, lie the cultural heritage of the Romanworld, the Catholic Church, and users of the Latin alphabet.
The Slavic peoples migrated to the area from the Caucusesbetween the Sixth and Eighth Centuries. By the end of the EighthCentury, most of the area of the former Yugoslavia south of theSava-Danube line was colonized by the Slavs, whose influenceexpanded into Albania and Greece.*15
Throughout the Ninth Century, the Roman Catholic Church andthe Eastern Orthodox Church struggled to gain adherents among theSlavs. In 803 A.D., the Croats accepted the suzerainty of theHoly Roman Emperor, Charlemagne. The Serbs and the Macedoniansadopted the Christian faith in the mid-Ninth Century. In 891,the Serbs were placed under the jurisdiction of Byzantium andruled by theZupan (ruling prince) of Raska, a Serbianprincipality.
In the 10th Century, King Tomislav founded the kingdom ofCroatia. By the early 12th Century, Croatian nobles hadrelinquished power to the King of Hungary. This transfer ofpower began a relationship with Hungary which was to last forcenturies.
In the late 12th Century, a Bosnian state emerged, led byKulin Ban, who rejected Christianity and embraced the Bogomilheresy instead.*16 Other new converts were principally SlavicSerbs. Most of the Slavs who were to convert to the Islamicreligion in the 15th Century had belonged to the Bogomil sect,rather than the Catholic or Eastern Orthodox faiths.
In 1389, the Ottoman Turks defeated Serbian forces at thebattle of Kosovo Polje (Kosovo Field). By the end of the 15thCentury, the Ottoman Empire had gained control over much of thepeninsula. Ottoman rulers granted a considerable degree of self-government through churches and other local institutions.Nevertheless, persons who retained their religious identity werenot considered equals, and by converting to Islam a localinhabitant could enter a privileged section of society.*17
In the 16th Century, continuous Turkish encroachment on theborders of Croatia and Slavonia led the Hapsburgs to establish asouthern border region, called the Military Frontier. TheFrontier was to act as a bulwark against the Ottoman empire. TheFrontier, however, was sparsely settled. To establish aneffective line of defence, the Hapsburgs resettled the area withOrthodox Serbs.*18
The Treaty of Karlowitz transferred some Ottoman lands tothe Christian powers in 1699. The Hapsburg Empire acquiredCroatia, Slavonia and other Balkan territories.*19 Despite therepeated battles that were to take place during the 18th Centurybetween the Ottomans and the European powers, relatively littleterritory changed hands on a long-term basis during this period.
The entry of the major European powers into the Balkansadumbrated the conflicts that were to recur, and the alliancesthat would persist, for centuries. The Catholic Slovenes andCroats would look to the west, influenced by centuries of closecontact with Austria, Hungary and Italy. The Orthodox Serbs, onthe other hand, would look east towards Russia.
In the early 19th Century, a Serbian Rebellion against theOttomans was crushed. However, in 1815, another insurrection ledto substantial concessions. By 1830, Serbia had achieved anautonomous status within the Ottoman Empire.*20 It was during thistime that the Serbs forged close ties to Russia. Russia sharedthe Serb's desire to expel the Turks from the region. As theseat of the Orthodox Church, the Russians also shared a commonreligious background with the Serbs.
In 1867, the Hapsburg Empire split into two parts: one ruledby Austria from its capital in Vienna, the other ruled by Hungaryfrom Budapest. Austria assumed control over Dalmatia, Bukovinaand the Slovene lands, while Hungary ruled Croatia, Slavonia andVojvodina.*21 The Balkan peninsula was refigured again in 1878 bythe Congress of Berlin. This accord permitted Austria-Hungary toadminister Bosnia-Herzegovina, although the Ottoman Empireofficially retained sovereignty over that region. In addition,Serbia and Montenegro became independent states.*22
Throughout this period, Serbian nationalists viewed theirmission as one of liberating and unifying the lands in whichSerbs lived. According to the historian Barbara Jelavich,
«[t]heir [the Serbian nationalists'] major objective throughout the nineteenth century had been the unification of the lands they regarded as Serbian, including Bosnia- Hercegovina, Old Serbia, Macedonia and the Serbian-inhabited lands of the Habsburg Empire.»*23
In June 1903, Serbian King Alexander Obrenovic and his wifeDraga were assassinated by military officers. In an event thatreverberated throughout Europe, the assassins threw the king andqueen's mutilated bodies out of a palace window. The officersinvolved became members of the terrorist groups that were createdin the following years.
Intense Serbian nationalist sentiment led to the formationof secret societies. These societies--using distinctive symbols,flags, oaths and ceremonies--flourished at the end of the 19thcentury and in the early 1900s. In 1908, for example, theNarodna Odbrana (National Defence) was founded. It established anetwork of agents throughout South Slav lands.*24 Anotherorganization, Vjedinjenje ili Smrt (Union or Death), commonlycalled the Black Hand, appeared in 1911.*25 The Black Hand washeaded by Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevic (a.k.a. Apis) who hadparticipated in the assassination of King Alexander and his wife.
Two Balkan wars were fought in 1912 and 1913, finallyfreeing the peninsula from Ottoman control.*26 Serbia madeterritorial gains by absorbing Kosovo and part of Macedonia.However, Serbia did not achieve its objective of uniting withSerbian regions of the Hapsburg Empire, including sections ofBosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Vojvodina.*27 The two Balkan warsexperienced ethnic conflict on a massive scale. The worstatrocities appear to have been related to efforts to unite thepeninsula's Serbian population. In 1914, an InternationalCommission found:
«[h]ouses and whole villages reduced to ashes, unarmed and innocent populations massacred en masse, incredible acts of violence, pillage and brutality of every kind--such were the means which were employed by the Serbo-Montenegrin soldiery, with a view to the entire transformation of the ethnic character of [these] regions.»*28
Serbian nationalists were incensed by the Hapsburg'sannexations of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908. It was this Pan-Serbian sentiment that led to the 1914 assassination of Austria-Hungary's Archduke Franz Ferdinand by Gavrilo Princip, a BosnianSerb. The event sparked the First World War.*29 The Archduke, whowas the heir to the Hapsburg throne, and his wife were killed on28 June, the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo.
Following the First World War, unity was finally achievedwhen King Alexander of Serbia proclaimed the Kingdom of Serbs,Croats and Slovenes. The new state, however, was plagued byethnic conflict from its inception. Croats, fearing Serbiandomination, sought greater self-government within a looserconfederation. It was during this period that the CroatianUstasa (Uprising) movement was born. It was created by AntePavelic in 1929, with the support of Italian dictator BenitoMussolini. Its goal was Croatian independence, through violenceif necessary.*30 During these inter-war years, hundreds ofthousands of Bosnian Muslims, also fearful of Serbian hegemony,fled to Turkey.*31
In 1929, King Alexander attempted to deal with risinginternal conflicts by suspending the constitution, declaring adictatorship and changing the country's name to the Kingdom ofYugoslavia. These actions, however, further alienated thenation's non-Serbs and, in 1934, King Alexander was assassinatedby Macedonian terrorists.*32
Yugoslavia surrendered to the Axis powers in 1941, leadingto German and Italian occupation of the country. In Serbia, theGermans installed a regime headed by Serbian General Milan Nedic.In Croatia, an independent state, Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska(NDH), was established which included Bosnia-Herzegovina.*33 Therewere more than two million Serbs living within NDH, approximatelyone third of the entire population. Despite its status as anindependent state, Croatia was split into two spheres, thedividing line running north to south. Italy controlled thewestern section, adjacent to the Adriatic. The German militarycommand was assigned to Zagreb, to the east.*34 Mussolini,however, was permitted to determine who would be the head ofstate. He selected Ante Pavelic, the Ustasa leader.*35
During the war, the Croatian leadership launched a campaignof annihilation against its Serbian population.*36 Some Muslimsjoined the Croats' efforts against the Serbs.*37 Pavelic sought tocreate an ethnically and religiously homogenous state. The Serbsof Croatia were faced with the alternatives of extermination,expulsion, or conversion to Catholicism. Serb officials maintainthat a system of death camps, covering 210 square miles, ranalong the Sava River. It has been estimated that between 350,000and 750,000 Serbs were killed during this period.*38
Resistance to the Axis powers came from theCetniks, whotended to be anti-Croat and anti-Communist,*39 and from communistpartisan forces, led by Josip Broz Tito. Tito also served asgeneral secretary of the Yugoslav Communist Party. At first, theCetniks, who were loyal to King Peter's London-based government-in-exile, worked with the partisans to resist the Axis powers.However, serious disagreements over resistance strategy and overYugoslavia's post-war future soon became apparent. The twogroups struggled, each seeking a more favourable position in theemerging post war period. To enhance their position, theCetniksbegan collaborating with the Axis occupation forces.*40 When thiscollaboration became apparent to the British, the alliesdeveloped closer ties with Tito's partisan forces.*41
In October 1944, Tito's partisans, with Soviet assistance,took Belgrade and a communist regime was established.*42 A federalsystem was constructed, consisting of six Republics: Serbia,Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro.Serbia included two autonomous provinces, each containing a highconcentration of an ethnic minority: Kosovo and Vojvodina. Thecommunist party and Leninist ideology were centripetal forces.The Socialist Republic successfully established a federation ofethnic communities, each with its own territorial base.*43Although each Republic generally maintained its ethnic identity,the prewar boundaries of the Republics were altered in the peacenegotiations that followed the Second World War. Changes alsowere made by the Tito regime in the following years.
Ethnic tensions persisted in the post war years. Tito,however, effectively repressed ethnic and nationalist movements,such as the Croatian reformist movement of the early 1970s.*44 Inthe late 1960s, for instance, tensions between Croats and Serbsincreased when the Republic of Croatia demanded that the Serbianand Croatian languages be recognized as separate languages, withCroatian being used in the schools. Serbs countered with thedemand that the 700,000 Serbs living in Croatia be givenreciprocal rights.*45 The most significant Croatian grievances,however, were economic. Croats complained that the mostprosperous enterprises, including the nation's largest banks andinsurance companies, were located in Belgrade. Croatianofficials also complained that the Republic did not receive itsfair share of foreign currency. This was especially troubling,they argued, because a large proportion of that foreign currencywas earned by the tourist industry on the Dalmatian coast.Furthermore, most of Yugoslavia's foreign trade went throughCroatian ports.*46
The movement had begun with demands for greaterdecentralization and autonomy. By the end of 1971, however, thedemands had escalated. Croatian nationalists called for self-determination and the right to secede.*47 When Croatian officialsfailed to respond to Tito's warnings, he intervened. As aresult, 400 Croatian nationalist leaders were dismissed orresigned from their official positions.*48
In the late 1960s, problems also erupted in the Kosovodistrict of Serbia. Although the area's population isoverwhelmingly ethnic Albanian, Serbs had a disproportionatenumber of top state and party positions. Serbian officials alsocontrolled the local police and security forces. Allegations ofSerbian abuses of the Albanian population led to riots in 1968.In response, the districts of Kosovo and Vojvodina, an area witha large Hungarian population, were given greater autonomy.Kosovo was granted the use of its own flag and anthem. TheAlbanian language was also permitted greater use in education andlocal administration.*49
Political repression in Yugoslavia, however, was relativelybenign compared to its eastern European neighbours. Yugoslavs,for example, could travel fairly freely, visas were granted toforeign visitors or were not required at all, and foreign books,periodicals and newspapers were available.*50 In the 1950s and1960s, the economy was liberalized and laws were passedeliminating state control over most investments. It was theloosening of these political and economic bonds, however, thatfueled nationalist or ethnic sentiments.*51
After Tito's death in 1980, the power of Yugoslavia'scentral government rapidly diminished. Public corruptionscandals and the collapse of the Soviet Union impeded thegovernment's ability to deal with its mounting problems.*52 In1981, Albanian demonstrations broke out in Kosovo. Thedisturbances were suppressed by the Yugoslav military, but theyled to allegations that ethnic Albanians had committed atrocitiesagainst the district's minority Serb population.*53
A resurgent Serbian nationalism, led by Slobodan Milosevic,fueled Yugoslavia's crisis.*54 Milosevic, who had become Presidentof the League of Communists of Serbia in 1986, fanned the firesof Serbian nationalism, which he had opposed earlier in hiscareer. He proceeded to establish himself as a strongman ruler,gradually eliminated democratic opposition, and prepared for theeventual conflict and break-up of the federation.*55 By the late1980s, however, he was expressing sympathy with the Serbs ofKosovo. In 1988 and 1989, Milosevic orchestrated massdemonstrations by his supporters to topple communist partyleaders in Kosovo, Vojvodina and the Republic of Montenegro.They were replaced by leaders who were loyal to Milosevic.*56Disturbances again broke out in Kosovo in 1989, and Milosevicsent a large contingent of the Yugoslav army to support theregime. In 1989 and 1990, approximately 40 persons were killedin rioting within the province. Most of those killed were ethnicAlbanians.*57
The plight of Kosovo's Serbs was taken-up by Serbianintellectuals in the mid-1980s with the publication of a documentprepared by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU).*58Referred to as the SANU Memorandum, the document asserted thatSerbia had suffered economic discrimination within the Yugoslavfederation, especially in relation to the more prosperousRepublics of Croatia and Slovenia. However, the Memorandum'sgreatest concern was directed towards the Serbs of Kosovo. Thereport referred to the «genocide» of Serbs by Albanians and tocrimes including arson, murder, rape, and necrophilia.*59
The SANU Memorandum, according to Misha Glenny, «preparedthe ideological ground for Milosevic by focusing public opinionyet more tightly in the Kosovo issue . . . .» The report alsoindicated that «there was a real base among intellectuals for thenationalist assault on the leadership of the Serbian League ofCommunists».*60
The Memorandum permitted Milosevic to organize thedemonstrations by his supporters in the provinces. Thedemonstrations,
«were part of a well-organized plan designed to intimidate the non-Serb peoples of Yugoslavia, instill among Serbs the idea that their fellow Serbs were being widely discriminated against, but on a higher political plane, to underline Milosevic's determination to mark his territory as the undisputed master of post-Titoist Yugoslavia.»*61
In February 1989, the Serbian Republican Assembly amendedits constitution and revoked the autonomous status of Kosovo andVojvodina. This display of Serbian nationalism, coupled with theuse of force in Kosovo, generated apprehension within the otherRepublics.*62 The resulting tension between the six Republics ledto the break-up of the League of Communists in early 1990. InJanuary of that year Slovenian delegates to the ExtraordinaryCongress of the League of Communists demanded an end to theCommunist party's «leading role» and the establishment of a multi-party state. Clashing with the Serbian delegates, the Slovenianswalked out of the Congress.
The immediate origins of the present conflict emerged inearly 1990 when Serbia and three of the other five republicsfailed to reach an agreement concerning the structure of thefederal government. The Republics of Slovenia, Croatia andBosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) sought a loose confederation inorder to exercise greater autonomy. Serbia, on the other hand,wanted a more centralized federation in order to maintain itsdominant role.*63 This conflict resulted in efforts by Croatia,Slovenia, and later BiH and Macedonia, to secede from Yugoslavia.*64
In April and May 1990, Slovenia and Croatia held the firstfree elections in post-war Yugoslavia.*65 In both states, thenewly elected non-Communist governments threatened to secede ifYugoslavia was not transformed into a looser confederation.*66Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence on 25 June 1991.*67
In response to the Croatian vote for independence, Serbsliving in Croatia's Krajina region established a Serbian NationalCouncil and scheduled an August referendum on their secessionfrom Croatia. The Council proposed the establishment of acommunity of opstinas (counties) that would adopt the Cyrillicalphabet and celebrate Serbian holidays such as St. Vitus Day.*68
In August 1990, armed Serb irregular forces entered Croatia«to protect the villages of ethnic Serbs from discrimination».These troops took over the town of Knin and promised to hold areferendum on independence.*69 During the same month, a SerbianCouncil of National Resistance was formed. Its members includedMilan Babic, Milan Martic, and Jovan Raskovic.*70
Croatian Serbs declared their autonomy on 1 October 1990.*71President Milosevic urged federal forces to intervene to «defendSerbs from repression». When the Croatian Government labeled thedeclaration illegal, Vuk Draskovic, the leader of the SerbianRenewal Party, called for a declaration of war against Croatia.Between August 1990 and April 1991, almost 200 bombing and miningincidents, as well as 89 attacks on Croatian police forces, werereported. These attacks occurred mainly in Knin.*72
During 1990, tensions had increased considerably throughoutthe former Yugoslavia as newly elected governments in theRepublics expressed strong nationalist sentiments. In Croatia,for example, after Franjo Tudjman and the Croatian DemocraticUnion (HDZ--Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica) came to power inApril of 1990, a law was enacted adopting Croatian as theofficial language of state administration and the red and whitecheckered shield, a symbol of the Croatian nation, hanged frommany windows.*73 Furthermore, many Serbs were dismissed from theirjobs, especially within the police forces, and replaced byCroats.*74 In addition, the new Croatian constitution spoke of the«national state of the Croatian nation».*75 As one scholar put it,the constitution's repeated use of the term «Croatian nation»(Hrvatski narod) «has an ethnic rather then political connotationand excludes those not ethnically Croat».*76 In any case, theSerbian minority of BiH clearly felt threatened.*77 The symbols,such as the flag and coat of arms adopted by the new Croatiangovernment, were quite similar to those used by the fascistCroatian government during the Second World War.*78 The CroatianUstasa state, as mentioned earlier, had been responsible for thedeaths of hundreds of thousands of Serbs. Some of these symbolswere modified within a few months by the new government.However, many Serbs, especially those in the Krajina region, hadalready been alienated. Moreover, the fears of Croatian Serbswere undoubtedly heightened by officials in the Republic ofSerbia who asserted that a fascist Croatian state had beenreborn.
Violent confrontations took place in western Slavonia inMarch 1991 when Croat officials replaced Serb personnel in thetown of Pakrac. In early May, Croat forces attacked thepredominantly Serb village of Borovo Selo where apporoximately 20Serb civilians were killed. After the fighting in Borovo Selo,the conflict escalated.*79
Throughout 1991, the leadership of the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia (FRY) appeared to be unable to assert control over theescalating crisis.*80 The State Presidency, for example, wasunable to maintain its ethnic balance when Croat Stipe Mesicresigned his position. Prime Minister Ante Markovic alsoresigned in late 1991 after a no confidence vote by one chamberof the Federal Assembly. Markovic resigned in December,protesting a war budget in which 80 per cent of the nation'sexpenditures were designated for the military.*81 Thus, during theyear, power within the federal government slipped away from themoderates and the national executive was left in the hands of pro-Serb forces.
Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence on 25 June1991.*82 Two days later, on 27 June, the Yugoslav's Peoples' Army(JNA-- Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija), attacked the provisionalSlovenia militia. Slovenian officials announced that a «state ofwar» existed, and appealed for international assistance.*83
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE),on 1 July 1991, called for a cease-fire between Slovenia and theJNA. Less than one week later, European Community (EC) mediatorsobtained an agreement providing for withdrawal of JNA forces inSlovenia and the disarming of the Slovenian militia.*84 Theconflict between Slovenia and the Federal Republic had lasted for10 days. However, violence within the former Yugoslavia eruptedagain in late June 1991 when Serbian irregular forces, with thehelp of the JNA, mounted an attack on Osijek, in eastern Croatia.This area, called «Slavonia», was depicted by news agencies asthe «fighting in Slovenia».*85
On 27 August 1991, the EC indicated that it would notrecognize any border changes as a result of the conflict. The ECalso denounced the military support that the JNA had provided tothe Serbian minority within Croatia*86 and called upon the partiesto agree to arbitration. On 1 September 1991, a cease-fireagreement was reached.*87 The agreement, however, was not long-lasting. The truce collapsed when JNA and Serb irregular forceslaunched attacks on Croatian towns in Dalmatia, as well as thecity of Vukovar. The fighting intensified throughout September1991. Lord Carrington, who had been asked by the EC to helpmediate the dispute, negotiated another cease-fire agreement inmid-September. However, that same day Yugoslav ships began theirblockade of Croatia's Adriatic coast. On the following day, theCroatian cities of Split and Zagreb were shelled.
The United Nations Security Council adopted resolution713on 25 September 1991, which imposed an arms embargo prohibitingweapons from entering the region.*88 Following the adoption of theResolution, the United Nations Secretary-General, Javier Perez,asked former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to represent theUnited Nations as a mediator and to cooperate with LordCarrington of the EC in resolving the conflict.*89
As the fighting in Croatia continued, a coalition of BosnianMuslims and Croats supported a declaration of sovereignty thatwas adopted by BiH's legislature. Bosnian Serbs, members of theSerbian Democratic Party (SDS - Srpska Demokratska Stranka),refused to support the measure. Instead, they organized areferendum in predominantly Serb areas of BiH. The vast majorityof Serbs voted to remain in «a common Yugoslav state».*90
Between September and November 1991, ethnic Croatian regionswithin BiH formed their own «Croatian Communities». Thesecommunities, located in western Herzegovina, threatened secessionif BiH became part of a Serb-dominated Yugoslav state.*91 TheCroatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the party to which most BosnianCroats belong, was split on the issue of independence. MateBoban, the leader of Herzegovina's Croats, urged an irredentistposition, seeking the linkage of Croat controlled areas in BiHwith Croatia. Other prominent Croats, such as then VicePresident Stjepan Kljujic, were committed to maintaining a multi-ethnic, independent state.*92
On 18 October 1991, Lord Carrington proposed a draftdocument calling for the protection of human rights and theestablishment of autonomous regions in areas in which a minorityethnic group was dominant. Presidents of five of the sixRepublics agreed to the plan which also provided for a looseconfederation. Serbia, however, rejected the agreement on 5November.*93 In early November, the coastal resort city ofDubrovnik fell under heavy bombardment and the EC ordered itspeace monitors to withdraw from the city. By mid-November, thecity of Vukovar fell to Serbian forces after an 86-day siege.Several early battles in Croatia occurred in the Krajina region,which is densely populated by Serbs. The conflict then spread toSlavonia, the region between Zagreb and Belgrade. In a majorcampaign, Croat forces attempted to expel Serbs from over 20villages in western Slavonia, forcing thousands of Serbs to fleeBiH. The Serbs, on the other hand, expelled thousands of Croatsfrom villages in eastern Slavonia.*94
On 20 November 1991, Serbia petitioned the ArbitrationCommission*95 to recognize the post-conflict borders between Serbiaand Croatia, and between Serbia and BiH, as international bordersbased on principles of international law.*96 The Commissionextended the protection of Article 2(4) of the United NationsCharter--concerning the principles of territorial integrity andpolitical independence of member states--to the individualrepublics. This action marked the first time that theinternational community extended the concept of territorialintegrity to political subdivisions within a state.
Representatives of Croatia, the FRY, and the Republic ofSerbia, signed a «Memorandum of Understanding» on 27 November1991. The agreement pledged the parties to comply withparticular provisions of the Geneva Conventions.*97
The EC released guidelines in mid-December, which theRepublics had to endorse before the EC would consider recognizingthem as states. The guidelines required the Republics to respectthe Charter of the United Nations, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act,and the Charter of Paris. The Republics were also required todisavow any territorial claims on the territories of other UN-recognized states. They were also to provide guarantees for therights of ethnic groups and minorities.*98
Slovenia and Croatia accepted the EC guidelines and appliedfor recognition as independent states.*99 A cease-fire agreementwas reached between Croatia and Serbian forces on 3 January 1992.The agreement effectively ended the conflict. However,approximately one-third of Croatian territory was occupied bySerbian forces and there were hundreds of thousands of refugees.On 15 January 1992, the EC granted recognition to Slovenia andCroatia.*100
BiH accepted the EC's guidelines on 20 December 1991 andapplied for recognition as an independent state. The ArbitrationCommission, however, determined that the will of the Serbianminority had not been expressed in BiH's earlier declaration ofsovereignty.*101 Consequently, a referendum was held on 29 Februaryand 1 March - 63 per cent of the population supportedindependence. The Bosnian Serbs, however, boycotted theelection, fearing that they would become a disadvantagedminority, permanently aligned against a coalition of BosnianMuslims and Bosnian Croats.
To help safeguard the cease-fire agreement in Croatia, theUnited Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) was established on 21February 1992.*102 The UN deployed 14,000 troops, which were inplace by July. The troops were deployed in United NationsProtected Areas (UNPAs) in Croatia where ethnic Serbs are in themajority.*103 UNPROFOR's original mandate in this region was toprevent a renewal of the conflict between Croats and Serbs,oversee the withdrawal of JNA forces, and assist in the return ofdisplaced persons.*104 In the summer of 1992, UNPROFOR's mandatewas expanded to provide for the delivery of humanitarian aid toBiH.*105 UNPROFOR's role has repeatedly been strengthened, and byJune 1994 UNPROFOR could request air power to enforce themandate.*106
Early in March 1992, the EC attempted to negotiate anagreement that would bring peace to the area. At a meeting heldin Brussels, between 7 and 9 March 1992, the EC approved a planthat would have maintained BiH's independence. However, the planalso permitted the division of BiH into ethnic cantons. The planfailed to receive the support of the various factions. The Serbsand Croats could not agree on how BiH's territory was to bedivided. The Bosnian Muslims remained skeptical of any plan topartition the country.*107
Bosnian Serb leaders approved a constitution for the SerbianRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SRBiH) on 27 March 1992. Thebreak-away republic would become part of a reconstituted all-Serbstate of Yugoslavia, containing--in addition to a large portionof BiH--Serbia, Montenegro and parts of Croatia.*108 On 6 April1992, the EC formally recognized BiH.*109 It was on this weekend,between April 4th and 6th, that the JNA and Bosnian Serbs beganthe shelling of Sarajevo.
Following the referendum in late February and early March,sporadic conflicts between Bosnian Serbs and Muslims occurredthroughout the country. Road blocks, for instance, were set-upby Bosnian Serbs to demonstrate their displeasure with thereferendum results. On 22 March, fighting broke out betweenBosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims in Gorazde. In late March, thefighting spread to Bosanski Brod and Kupres, where Bosnian Serbsbattled Bosnian Croats for the control of territory.*110
In late March and early April 1992, the fighting spread tonorthern and eastern Bosnia, along the Serbian border. It wasthere that a pattern of «ethnic cleansing» first clearly emerged,with the JNA shelling a village, followed by an attack byparamilitary forces sent in to «cleanse the territory».*111
The UN condemned, on 24 April, the use of force and demandedthat all outside parties cease interfering in the conflict inBiH.*112 The UN also called for an immediate cease-fire anddemanded that unrestricted access be given to all humanitarianorganizations.*113 On 27 April 1992, the former Republics of Serbiaand Montenegro proclaimed the FRY (FRY).*114
The Republic of Croatia, on 11 May 1992, declared that itwas bound by the four Geneva Conventions and the two additionalProtocols. At approximately the same time, BiH indicated that itconsidered itself bound by general treaty obligations undertakenby the socialist FRY.*115 On 22 May 1992, the UN admitted Slovenia,BiH, and Croatia as member states.*116
The JNA announced the withdrawal of its forces from BiH on19 May 1992. However, the troops, including General RatkoMladic, who were from BiH, were permitted to stay and fight aspart of the forces of the Serb Republic of Bosnia. Thus,approximately 80 per cent of the JNA troops stationed in BiH werepermitted to remain. The tanks, equipment and supplies thatbelonged to the Yugoslav Army also stayed in BiH.*117
This report examines the policy and practice of «ethniccleansing» in the former Yugoslavia. As used in this report, theterm «ethnic cleansing» means rendering an area ethnicallyhomogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons ofgiven groups from the area. Reports received by the Commissionof Experts allege that all of the parties involved in theconflict in the former Yugoslavia have committed «grave breaches»of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of internationalhumanitarian law. But, as the Commission noted in its FinalReport, there are qualitative and quantitative differences.Thus, no «moral equivalence» argument should be advanced. Thegrave breaches and other violations of international humanitarianlaw include acts such as the killing of civilians, rape, torture,destruction of civilian, public, and cultural property, lootingand pillaging, and the forcible relocation of civilianpopulations.*118 Croatian forces in the Republic of Croatia and inBiH have engaged in «ethnic cleansing» practices against Serbsand Muslims. Croats, for instance, have conducted «ethniccleansing» campaigns against Serbs in eastern and westernSlavonia and some parts of the Krajina region, and againstBosnian Muslims in the Mostar region.
Bosnian Muslim forces have also engaged in practices whichconstitute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and otherviolations of international humanitarian law. However, abuses byBosnian Muslims have not been part of an «ethnic cleansing»campaign, and the number of reported violations is substantiallylower than for those of the other warring factions.*119
The vast majority of reports received by the Commissionallege that Serbian forces have used means such as the masskilling of civilians, rape and sexual assault, torture, thebombardment of cities, the destruction of mosques and churches,the confiscation of private property, unlawful detention ofcivilians in harsh and sometimes inhuman conditions, and otherunlawful practices designed to eliminate Muslim and Croatpopulations that lie within Serb-claimed territory. Unlike theviolations committed by the other warring factions, «ethniccleansing» by the Serbs appears to be the result of a highly-developed policy that has been planned, coordinated, and financedby Serb officials with support from the FRY and the JNA whichwas, at times, directly involved in some of these operations.*120
«Ethnic Cleansing», as a practice, is not new to history*121nor, as the previous section on the history of the conflict hasshown, is it entirely new to the Balkans. Ethnic conflict hasbeen involved in efforts to establish nationhood and definenational boundaries in the Balkans since the 19th century.*122 Thisreport, however, discusses «ethnic cleansing» as part of abroader policy, pursued by Serbian forces within BiH, Croatia,and the FRY, to create a «Greater Serbia».
The described events are put in a historical context.However, inPart I of this Annex, no attempt is made to assessthe validity of historical claims by any of the warring factions.There is no justification under international law for committingcrimes such as the deliberate killing, rape, and torture ofcivilians during an armed conflict. The distinction between jusad bellum and jus in bello instructs us that combatants are notnecessarily responsible for the outbreak of war, but they areresponsible for their conduct during the war.*123 Even a just warcan be fought unjustly. Those who have committed seriousviolations of international law should be held accountable,regardless of the justifications offered for the conflict itself.
While the notion of establishing a «Greater Serbia» has deephistorical roots, the concept gathered new momentum within Serbiaduring the mid-1980s. It was then that Serbian intellectuals andpolitical leaders began to embrace a new nationalism. The decadeof 1980 began with the death of President Josip Broz Tito andwith demands by Kosovo's ethnic Albanian population for greaterautonomy. While Kosovo's population is overwhelmingly Albanian,*124the province contains Kosovo Polje, the site of the Serbs' defeatby the Ottoman Turks in 1389. Kosovo is widely considered bySerbs to be the cradle of their culture. Demonstrations byAlbanian students in Spring 1981 led to military intervention byYugoslav military forces and the brutal repression of thedissenters.*125 The demonstrations, which were accompanied by someviolence against Serbs, gave rise to the allegation that theSerbs of Kosovo faced genocide at the hands of Albanians.
In the mid-1980s, Serb intellectuals, as well as publicofficials, took up the cause of Kosovo's Serb minoritypopulation. The SANU Memorandum, referred to inPart I of thisAnnex,*126 expressed in emotional terms the plight of Kosovo'sSerbs. The Memorandum, drafted by the Serbian Academy of Artsand Sciences, was considered by many to be the heralding of a newethnic nationalism. It was, apparently, instrumental inspreading anti-Albanian sentiment. Perhaps most important, italso placed the imprimatur of Serbia's most prestigiousintellectuals on the cause of militant Serbian nationalism.*127Political figures such as DobricaCosic, who was to becomePresident of the FRY, and Slobodan Milosevic, the President ofthe Republic of Serbia, embraced the cause of Kosovo's minoritySerb population. Allegations of «genocide» against Kosovo'sSerbs became commonplace.*128
The Serbs'*129 sense of injustice was not confined to concernover events in Kosovo. The writings of Serbs throughout thedecade reflect a strong sense of victimization. «The Serbs»,Aleksa Djilas has written, «more than any other nation of theformer Yugoslavia, are fully convinced that history has treatedthem unfairly».*130 Thus, the Serbs' collective historic memoryrecounts domination by the European powers, conquest by theOttoman Turks, occupation by the Axis powers during the SecondWorld War, betrayal by their fellow Slavs of the Croatian Ustasaregime, and discrimination under President Tito's communistgovernment.*131
This «dark vision»,*132 stressing the role of the Serbiannation as a victim, has led to the demonization of Serbia'sadversaries and the promotion of an idealized image of the Serbs.*133Thus, Croats have been repeatedly referred to as «Ustase» and«fascists», recalling the animosities of the Second World War.In addition, Bosnian Serbs have been warned of the impendingestablishment of a fundamentalist Islamic State, although BosnianMuslims are largely secular and committed to a multi-ethnicstate.*134
Just as political opponents of the regime were demonized,the attributes of Serbs were idealized. Jovan Raskovic, who wasto become a founder of Croatia's Serbian Democratic Party (SDSC),for example, wrote that «[t]he Serbs are . . . the only ones withan instinct for leadership and they must exercise it over theother peoples of Yugoslavia. They must dominate them.»*135 Croats,according to Raskovic, «are castrated and afraid of everything.They cannot exercise any authority. It is up to the Serbs toguide them.» On the other hand, «Muslims have anal-eroticpersonalities and are the sort who love to amass riches.»*136
Raskovic, a psychiatrist, helped to organize the referendumon political autonomy for the Krajina Serbs in Croatia. Theevent led to an armed confrontation between Croats and CroatianSerbs.*137 Shortly before he died, Raskovic stated on Belgradetelevision that he felt responsible for having «lit the fuse ofSerbian nationalism». There has been much speculation thatRadovan Karadzic, also a psychiatrist, may have been influencedby Raskovic's theories of Serb superiority.*138 In May 1990, whenKaradzic was asked if he had a role-model or mentor, heresponded, «above all, Jovan Raskovic».*139
Although the war in the former Yugoslavia is fueled by pasthatreds, it has also involved discrete policy choices bygovernmental leaders. «[H]istory can be a weapon, and traditioncan fuel ethnic conflict», Donald Horowitz has said, «but acurrent conflict cannot generally be explained by simply callingit a revived form of an earlier conflict».*140
As the Yugoslav nation disintegrated in the late 1980s and1990s, each of the Republics that composed the state began toexpress strong nationalistic sentiments. AsPart I of this Annexindicated, many Serbs living in Croatia were dismissed from theirjobs and suffered other forms of discrimination as Croatiaapproached statehood. Croat officials also restored many of thesymbols of the Ustasa state, which had been responsible for themass murders of Serbs, Jews and Gypsies during the Second WorldWar. Later, during the conflict in Croatia in the Spring of1991, Croat forces «cleansed» Serb villages in western Slavonia.Croat paramilitary forces, such as the «Glavas Unit» headed byBranimir Glavas, have committed atrocities against Serbs similarto those committed by Serb paramilitary forces.*141 Serbs living inCroatia then were genuinely fearful of Croatian nationalism.These apprehensions were exploited by some Serb leaders whoincreasingly viewed the cause of a «Greater Serbia» as the pathto power.
Slobodan Milosevic, for instance, reportedly pursued adomestic political strategy based «on appeals to a xenophobic andauthoritarian version of Serbian nationalism».*142 The strategy wasdesigned to help him attain and consolidate his political power.*143In the late 1980s and early 1990s, for example, PresidentMilosevic used appeals to nationalist sentiment and Serbian unityto obtain and maintain his hold on the party leadership. Inlaunching an «anti-bureaucratic revolution», the party leaders ofVojvodina--who were critical of Milosevic's leadership--wereaccused of being «autonomists» (seekers of autonomy and opposedto Serbian unity) and removed from power. By 1989, Kosovo hadbeen placed under martial law and the party leadership ofMontenegro--who were also potential adversaries of Milosevic--wasforced to resign. As a result, according to Branka Magas, «by1989 Serbia had acquired control of four out of eight votes onthe federal state presidency», and control over the leadership ofthe League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY).*144 Thus, as the 14thExtraordinary Congress was about to convene in January 1990,Serbia had already revoked the autonomous status of its twoprovinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo); established considerablecontrol over Montenegro; and used military force (in Kosovo) toenforce Serbian rule.
In the early 1990s, Serbia's political leadership faced notonly a dissolving nation-state, but also growing oppositionwithin the Republic.*145 Milosevic labeled the Serbian anti-regimeprotesters «enemies of Serbia».*146 In referring to his politicalopponents in the other Republics, the rhetoric became even lessrestrained. In addressing Serbia's parliament in 1991, forexample, Milosevic, said that:
«Serbia and the Serbian people are faced with one of the greatest evils of their history: the challenge of disunity and internal conflict. . . . All who love Serbia dare not ignore this fact, especially at a time when we are confronted by the vampiroid, fascistoid faces of the Ustashas, Albanian secessionists and all other forces in the anti-Serbian coalition which threaten the people's rights and freedoms.»*147
Within Serbia, some of Milosevic's political opponents havepromoted an even more aggressive nationalism.*148 The SerbianRadical Party (SRS),*149 led by VojislavSeselj, for instance, hasaccused Milosevic of being too timid in protecting the rights ofSerbs who reside outside of Serbia.*150 An even more vehementlynationalistic party, the Serbian Unity Party (SSJ), was formed inNovember 1993 byZeljko Raznjatovic (Arkan). The SSJ, which isbased in Kosovo, failed to win any parliamentary seats in the1993 election.*151
BothSeselj and Arkan control paramilitary units that haveconducted «ethnic cleansing» campaigns in BiH. Arkan's «Tigers»allegedly have also engaged in ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and inSerbia's Sandzak region, where a large Muslim community islocated.*152
Vuk Draskovic, the leader of the Democratic Opposition ofSerbia (DEMOS), while more moderate thanSeselj and Arkan, hasalso criticized Milosevic for failing to adequately advocate a«Greater Serbia».*153 The criticisms of Milosevic suggest that hispolitical opponents believe that even the most militant appealsto nationalistic sentiment resonate among Serbs.
In response, Milosevic and the ruling party have takenrepressive measures against the ruling party's opponents on boththe right and left. Vuk Draskovic, for example, was arrestedafter a demonstration in June 1993 and his party offices wereraided by police.*154 The Serbian Prosecutor General has asked theConstitutional Court to ban Draskovic's Serbian Renewal Party.*155The Constitutional Court previously had been asked to ban anotherpolitical rival, the Sandzak Democratic Party.*156
Government control and manipulation of the mass media havebeen used to generate support for a «Greater Serbia» and toselectively punish dissenters within the mass media.*157 The UN'sSpecial Rapporteur on Human Rights recently expressed concernover «the incitement to national and religious hatred in publiclife and in the media».*158 He also stated that «leading politicalfigures make inflammatory and threatening statements againstminority groups on a regular basis». According to the report ofthe Special Rapporteur on Human Rights,
«[t]he prevailing climate of ethnic and religious hatred is also encouraged through misinformation, censorship and indoctrination by the media. . . . In particular, the coverage of atrocities committed in the conflict between Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina is selective and one-sided. The media denigrates Muslims and Islam through sensationalist and distorted accounts of historical and existing `crimes' which they have committed `against the Serbian people' while grave violations perpetuated against Muslims are either rarely reported or discounted as malicious accusations forming part of an `anti-Serbian conspiracy.'»*159
There have also been allegations that President Milosevicordered the dismissal of journalists who have publicly criticizedthe government's war policies.*160 Glenny, for example, has statedthat Milosevic ordered a thorough purge of Politika and Radio-Television Belgrade.*161
The resentments bred by virulent nationalism have alsoproved to be instrumental in engendering the support of someBosnian and Croatian Serbs. For instance, Serb leaders,including Karadzic and Milosevic, have taken advantage of theresentments that had grown among the recently urbanized Serbpopulations in BiH and Croatia. In BiH, for example, many Serbshad emigrated to more urbanized areas in the hope of findinggreater material prosperity. Often, however, they have remainedless affluent than their Muslim neighbours. The allure ofpillaging Muslim and Croatian communities has become a means ofattracting new adherents to the cause of a «Greater Serbia».*162
The growing nationalistic sentiment, and the repression ofdissent, created an environment in which support for establishinga «Greater Serbia» could flourish. In fact, the objective ofestablishing a «Greater Serbia» has been endorsed by the majorSerbian leaders and political parties both within and outside ofthe Republic of Serbia. President Milosevic, for instance, whois also the leader of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), hasrepeatedly stated that all Serbs should enjoy the right to beincluded in Serbia.*163 In August 1991, the Belgrade newspaper,Borba, reported that:
«[Milosevic] believes he now has the historic opportunity to, once and for all, settle accounts with the Croats and do what Serbian politicians after World War I did not--rally all Serbs in one Serbian state.»*164
VojislavSeselj,*165 the head of the Serbian Radical Party(SRS), stated that he hoped to see «the republics of BiH,Macedonia and Montenegro, and the Serbian areas of Croatia. withthe borders at Karlobag, Karlovac, and Virovitica» incorporatedinto Serbia.*166
The Serbian Renewal Movement (SRM), headed by Vuk Draskovic,also has called for the creation of a «Greater Serbia» whichwould include Serbia, Kosovo, Vojvodina, Macedonia andMontenegro, as well as regions within BiH and Croatia with highconcentrations of Serbs.*167 In addition, Mihajlo Markovic, theVice President of the Main Committee of Serbia's Socialist Party,has urged the rejection of any solution that would make Serbsoutside Serbia a minority.*168 The optimal solution, according toMarkovic, would entail establishing a federation consisting ofSerbia, Montenegro, BiH, Macedonia and Serbs residing in theSerbian Autonomous Region of Krajina, Slavonia, Baranja, andSrem.*169
A preliminary step towards formally creating a «GreaterSerbia» took place when representatives from the Serb Republic ofBiH and delegates from the break-away Serb republic in Croatiavoted to merge into «one government, one army, one police and oneadministration».*170 However, the President of the Serb Republic ofBosnia, Radovan Karadzic, has repeatedly denied that the creationof a «Greater Serbia», is the Bosnian Serbs' objective.*171
These factors framed the backdrop to the resurgent Serbiannationalism that emerged. This revived nationalism would spurthe quest for a «Greater Serbia» and help to launch the «ethniccleansing» campaign that was to follow.
The history and demographics of the BiH region leave littledoubt that any attempt to establish «ethnically pure» areas willnecessarily entail tremendous dislocations and bloodshed. EthnicSerbs constituted approximately 34 per cent of the population ofthe former Yugoslavia, according to the prewar census.*172 WithinBiH, Serbs accounted for approximately 31 per cent of thepopulation. In BiH, however, the areas of Serb preponderance arenot contiguous; they are primarily located in the north-east,south-east and north-west portions of the country. Moreover, theareas in which Serbs are dominant include substantial percentagesof ethnic minorities, primarily Bosnian Muslims and Croats.*173
Prior to its break-up, a central political problem of theYugoslav state lay in the numerical and political dominance ofthe Serbs over other ethnic groups. A critical issue in BiH hasbeen how Bosnian Serbs could come to terms with a numerically andpolitically dominant coalition of Bosnian Muslims and BosnianCroats.*174 Facing the prospect, real or imagined, of becoming apermanent minority aligned against a coalition of Muslims andCroats, the Serbs adopted an irredentist strategy. Serbsresiding outside the Republic of Serbia would be united into onepolitical unit - a «Greater Serbia». As a military strategy,this has been described as «the consolidation of Serb-heldterritories in BiH, the eradication of Muslim enclaves withinthem such as Gorazde, and the severance of any possible militarylinks between Muslims in BiH and those in the Sandzak area ofSerbia».*175 The strategy is reflected in the Serbs' «ethniccleansing» campaign. The areas that have been cleansed can berepresented by an arc which extends from Gorazde in the south-east and follows the Drina River through Zvornik, Banja Luka andPrijedor. The arc continues along the Sava and Korenica Rivers,which form the boundaries with the Serb Krajina area. Throughthe practice of «ethnic cleansing», the goal of creating a«Greater Serbia» has largely been achieved. Serbian forces nowcontrol approximately 70 per cent of BiH and one-third ofCroatian territory.
In late June 1991, as the 10-day conflict with Slovenia wascoming to an end,*176 violence again erupted as the Yugoslav Army(JNA) and Serb paramilitary groups mounted an attack on theSlavonian village of Osijek, in eastern Croatia. In thefollowing weeks, similar attacks would occur in numerous Croatianvillages, such asCelije and Bobota. In these villages, thehomes of non-Serbs were looted and burned as the Serbs' «ethniccleansing» campaign commenced. In the months that followed, thecity of Vukovar in eastern Slavonia would be almost completelydestroyed. On the Dalmatian coast, the ancient city of Dubrovnikwould be shelled.
The shelling of Dubrovnik (like the later attack onPrijedor, in BiH) indicates that Serbian ethnic cleansing is notconfined to areas in which Serbs are a majority of thepopulation. Ethnic Serbs occupied approximately 11.6 per cent ofCroatia and 32 per cent of BiH prior to June 1991. As wouldlater occur in BiH, a breakaway government (The Serb Republic ofKrajina) was formed in Krajina, an area of Croatia heavilypopulated by Serbs. By the time a cease-fire was signed inSpring 1992, Serbian irregular forces and the JNA had capturedone-third of Croatia's territory; over 16,000 persons werekilled, and there were hundreds of thousands of refugees.*177
In a pattern that would be repeated in BiH, local Serbforces in Croatia would coordinate their military operations withthe JNA. In Serb-controlled areas such as Knin, in the Krajinaregion, and in eastern Slavonia on Serbia's border, non-Serbswould be expelled from their homes. The forced evacuation of non-Serbs would often be followed by the resettlement of Serbs in thehomes of those who had fled. There is strong evidence thatmassive human rights violations have occurred in Croatia,including the mass execution of Croatian prisoners in Ovcara,outside of Vukovar in November 1991. Helsinki Watch has alsoreported that in Serbian Krajina, Serb authorities have executedSerbs who were willing to reach an accommodation with Croatofficials.
The first sustained clashes between Serbian and BosnianMuslim forces occurred in the Spring of 1992.*178 This violenceerupted after BiH's Declaration of Independence on 1 March ofthat year. The level of violence escalated following theEuropean Community's recognition of BiH's statehood on 6 April1992.*179 There is evidence, however, that the JNA, the Republic ofSerbia and Serbs in Croatia and BiH were preparing for war asearly as 1990. It was then that the Yugoslav military beganproviding arms to Croatian and Bosnian Serb groups andencouraging unrest in Serb-populated regions of Croatia and BiH.*180In a project (operating under the acronym «RAM») coordinated fromBelgrade, thousands of weapons were reportedly delivered to Serbsin Bosanska Krajina in the north-west, Herzegovina in the south-west, and Romanija, a mountainous area east of Sarajevo.*181
In August 1991, Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovicreleased a tape- recorded conversation between Serbian PresidentMilosevic and Radovan Karadzic, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs.According to Misha Glenny, the tape recording revealed thatMilosevic instructed Karadzic to accept delivery of weapons. Thearms would be supplied by General Nikola Uzelac, the head of theBanja Luka Corps.*182
According to a report appearing in the Ljubljana newspaperDelo, an additional plan was developed by the JNA to supplementRAM. The plan reportedly called for the mass killings of Muslimsand the use of mass rapes as a weapon of psychological warfare.*183According to the Delo article, the JNA plan stated that,«[a]nalysis of the Muslim's behaviour showed that their morale,desire for battle, and will could be crushed most easily byraping women, especially minors and even children, and by killingmembers of the Muslim nationality inside their religiousfacilities».*184
As the war in Croatia continued, the JNA began militarymovements in BiH.*185 The federal army relocated its troops fromthe cities to the countryside and deployed units at majorcommunications points.*186 In late 1991 and early 1992, as the warin Croatia came to a close, the JNA redeployed troops fromCroatia to BiH.*187 The 37th Corps, for instance, was transferredto the 4th military district in Sarajevo.*188 The Corps'headquarters was established in Mostar, the capital ofHerzegovina.*189 JNA's General Staff appointed only Serbs andMontenegrans to fill the higher posts in the redeployed units.*190
The JNA also adopted a new defence plan in early 1992calling for the protection of the Serbian population outside ofSerbia. Territorial defence units in Croatia and BiH were to besupplied with small arms, artillery, armour and missile launchingsystems.*191 Moreover, the Ministry of Defence of the SerbianAutonomous Regions (SAOs) in Croatia and BiH were to besubordinated to the Serbian Ministry of Defence. The JNA and theSAOs were to coordinate their defence plans and jointly protecttheir external borders and constitutional system.*192
In the months preceding the independence referendum, the JNAalso began to disarm Bosnian troops. The JNA maintained that inorder to secure the peace in BiH, it must place all of theRepublic's weapons in the hands of the federal army.*193 Thedisarmament campaign ostensibly included weapons held by BosnianSerbs, thus the campaign to collect the weapons initially had thesupport of the Bosnian government.*194 The net effect of thesemeasures, however, was that by Spring 1992, the JNA was in anadvantageous position to launch its «ethnic cleansing» campaignand establish a «Greater Serbia». According to James Gow, amilitary analyst at King's College, University of London:
«[a]s a result of these measures, the Serbs had succeeded in prepositioning their forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of their strategy of securing the infrastructure that was to be a part of a `mini-Yugoslavia', carving up the new state in the process: the eastern part was to be attached to Serbia, the southern part to Montenegro, and the western part to Serb-populated and -occupied regions in Croatia.»*195
In April 1992, when the conflict in BiH broke out, the JNAhad approximately 80,000 troops deployed there. In early May,General Ratko Mladic was appointed JNA commander. Underpressure from the international community, on 19 May 1992, theFRY announced that it was withdrawing its forces. However,Yugoslav officials said that JNA*196 personnel from BiH could remainthere and fight on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs.*197 Thus, GeneralMladic and 55,000 JNA troops, as well as JNA military weaponryand equipment, were transferred to the Territorial Defence Forcesof the SRBiH.*198
In the weeks following BiH's recognition by the EuropeanCommunity, JNA and Bosnian Serb forces attacked Bosnian townssuch as Prijedor*200 and other villages in the Kozarac region*201 ofnorth-east BiH, and Zvornik*202 in north-west BiH. Similar attackshave occurred in countless cities and villages along the Drinaand Sava Rivers. The purpose of the attacks seems clear - bothnorth-east and north-west BiH have high concentrations of BosnianSerbs. Serb forces have sought to consolidate their control overthese territories and link them with each other, as well as withSerb-controlled areas of Croatia.*203
These attacks have followed a similar pattern. First,Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces, often with the assistance ofthe JNA, seize control of the area. In many cases, Serbianresidents are told to leave the area before the violence begins.The homes of non-Serb residents are targeted for destruction andcultural and religious monuments, especially churches andmosques, are destroyed.*204 Second, the area falls under thecontrol of paramilitary forces who terrorize the non-Serbresidents with random killings, rapes and looting.*205 Third, theseized area is administered by local Serb authorities, often inconjunction with paramilitary groups.*206 During this phase, non-Serb residents are detained, beaten and sometimes transferred toprison camps where further abuse, including mass killings, haveoccurred.*207 Non-Serb residents are often fired from their jobsand their property is confiscated. Many have been forced to signdocuments relinquishing their rights to their homes before beingdeported to other areas of the country.*208
In Prijedor, for example, witnesses have stated that therewas tension between the three ethnic groups, Muslims, Croats andSerbs, prior to the Serbs' seizure of the town on 30 April 1992.*209Serbian authorities assumed control of Prijedor through anighttime coup. The next day, Muslims were dismissed from theirjobs at hospitals and schools. Bosnian Serb snipers positionedthemselves on rooftops.*210
The takeover was engineered by the Serbian Democratic Party(SDS),*211 working in conjunction with the JNA. In addition,paramilitary forces, known as «White Eagles» roamed the streets.A curfew was imposed between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.*212 In thefollowing weeks, prominent non-Serb residents were arrested, suchas the President of the local chapter of the Croatian DemocraticUnion (HDZ). In mid-May, the JNA attacked surrounding villagesand towns.*213
On 30 May 1992, the military attack on Prijedor began.There was some resistance from the Patriotic League, a group ofMuslims and Croats who served in the local militia, but thebattle lasted less than fourteen hours.*214 JNA and paramilitaryforces took an active part in the conflict. The following dayMuslims and Croats were forced out of their homes andinterrogated. In many cases, their homes were robbed duringtheir absence. Many non-Serbs were later taken to prison camps.*215In Bosnian villages such as Bukovica, Mala Vukovica, Tombak andZajir, similar attacks occurred and the entire non-Serbpopulations of these towns appear to have been killed ordeported.*216
According to a report by Medecins Sans Frontiers (DoctorsWithout Borders), the non-Serb population in the outlyingvillages in the Kozarac region suffered a similar, and sometimesworse, fate.*217 Based on interviews with 60 residents from theKozorac region who had been held in prison camps, the study foundthat:
The attack on Zvornik, in north-eastern BiH, reveals asimilar pattern of events.*219 In the weeks prior to the attack(which occurred on 8 April 1992), tensions between ethnic groupsin the city had increased.*220 Members of each ethnic group hadobtained weapons for their personal use. Muslims were warned bytheir Serb friends that they should leave the area.*221 Prior to 8April, many Serbs left Zvornik, apparently having been forewarnedof the impending attack. On the weekend before the attack, Serbsconstructed a barricade, preventing many Muslims from reachingtheir work site or school. In retaliation, Muslims also erecteda barricade at the same location. It was protected by Muslimpolice officers and armed volunteers.*222
On the day before the attack, JNA troops moved into theregion. On television, a Belgrade commentator reported that theJNA was needed in the region because they expected an attack byMuslim extremists.*223
On 8 April, Serb representatives of SDS, as well as theparamilitary leader known as «Arkan», called for the Muslims topeacefully surrender the city.*224 Negotiations proceeded in whichthe division of the city into Muslim and Serb enclaves wasdiscussed. The negotiations broke down, however, apparentlybecause Arkan was dissatisfied with the result.*225
After the failure to reach an agreement, the attack on thetown began. The JNA, using tanks, artillery and infantry units,was joined by Arkan's paramilitary troops, sometimes known as«Arkanovci».*226 There was heavy shelling of the Muslim sections ofthe city.*227
The next day Arkan's troops, along with paramilitary unitsknown as «Seseljovci»*228 and the Beli Orlovi (White Eagles),*229entered the city. Serb territorial defence units (TOs) alsoparticipated. It was reported that these troops committed randomexecutions and rapes after entering Zvornik.*230
The next day, a provisional government was established thatwas headed by local Serbs, primarily members of SDS. A curfewwas imposed, and residents had to obtain a police permit totravel within the city. Several Muslims who went to the policestation to obtain a permit were taken into custody and deportedto an outlying prison camp. Except for indispensable personnelsuch as hospital employees, Muslim men were prevented fromworking.*231 During the following days, paramilitary unitscontinued to patrol the streets, and there were many reports oflooting, rape and other acts of brutality.*232
In late April, an appeal was made to Muslims to return tothe area from which they had fled. Many returned because theyfeared losing their property.*233 On arriving in Zvornik, Muslimswere told that they must register their property. An «agency forthe exchange of houses» was established. In exchange forrelinquishing their homes, Muslims were promised the former homesof Serbs in Tuzla. Departure from the town was only possible onthe condition that their property was turned over to Serbauthorities.*234 From late May to early June 1992, the entireMuslim populations of villages in the surrounding area weredeported. The expelled Muslims were allowed to take few personalpossessions with them. Even these items were often stolen atSerb check-points on the roads leaving the area.*235
According to an account in Vreme, the «cleansing» wasfollowed by organized looting. «Some stole gold, hardcurrencies, household appliances or cars. Others robbeddepartment stores. Electricity plugs were torn out of the wallsand children's toys were sold and bought. Even entire bedroomsuites could be seen floating down the river».*236
The events in the Kozarac region and in Zvornik demonstratethe use of terror to expel Muslims from Serb-claimed land.Killings, rapes and torture were carried out in a manner that wasdesigned to frighten the non-Serb population into leaving andnever returning to the area. Thus, killings, and sometimesrapes, are committed openly, often in front of large numbers ofwitnesses.*237 In other instances, however, killing seems to havebeen an end in itself. The UN's Special Rapporteur for HumanRights, for example, found that Serb troops prevented civiliansfrom escaping the encircled town of Cerska by ambushing Muslimsas they attempted to flee.*238
Borislav Herak, a captured Serbian fighter, has stated thatbefore attacking Muslim families near the village of Vogosca,Serbian commanders described the military operation as «ciscenjeprostora» (cleansing the region).*239 According to Herak, his unithad been told to leave no one alive.*240 Herak stated that his unitwas:
«. . . told that Ahatovici [a village near Vogosca] must be cleansed Serbian territory, that it was a strategic place between Ilidza and Rajlovac, and that all the Muslims there must be killed . . . We were told that no one must escape, and that all the houses must be burned, so that if anybody did survive, they would have nowhere left to return to. It was an order, and I simply did what I was told.»*241
Herak admitted to killing 29 persons. He killed many ofthem in their homes by shooting them or slitting their throats.He also said that he had raped and murdered eight Bosnian Muslimwomen and abandoned their bodies on hilltops and other desertedplaces.
According to a news report of Herak's confession, «hisaccount offered new insights into the ways that tens of thousandsof civilian victims of the war have died, most of them in townsand villages where there have been no independent witnesses».For example, Herak said that he saw a Serb unit machine-gun 120men, women and children in a field outside of Vogosca. Theirbodies were transported to a railway yard, piled in an open pit,doused with gasoline, and set afire.*242
A similar pattern of killing occurred in many prison camps.Although the prisoners had already been forcibly removed fromtheir homes, many were deliberately tortured and killed anyway.In the Omarska camp, for example, Serbian guards were said tohave executed prisoners in groups of 10 to 15 every few days.*243Instances such as these suggest that mass killings are not alwayscommitted for the purpose of terrorizing others into fleeing. Inat least some instances, the killing of non-Serbs appears to bean alternative means of «cleansing» Serb-claimed territory.
According to Pero Popovic, a former prison guard at theBosnian-Serb prison camps of Susica, executions at that camp werea nightly occurrence from June through September 1992.*244 A victimof the camp also reported that men were frequently shot to makeroom for more civilians who came from the nearby town ofVlasenica. The former prison guard stated that mass executionsalso took place, generally in reprisal for the killing of a localSerb. In mid-June 1992, he stated that he witnessed the killingof 26 persons. However, he estimated that at least one thousandpersons had been executed in mass killings at the camp during thesummer of 1992. Popovic also reported that shortly before thecamp was closed, a decision was made to execute the 200 survivingprisoners. According to Popovic, «[o]ver half of them were takenup to the ravine and shot», while the others were put to workdigging trenches.*245
«Ethnic cleansing» campaigns have continued through 1994.In September 1994, for instance, over 500 Bosnian Muslims werereportedly driven from their homes in Bijeljina, in northern BiH.In addition, more than 2,000 persons were expelled from theirhomes in the areas of Banja Luka and Rogatica. A United Nationsofficial characterized these expulsions as «a final push tocreate a Serb-only state».*246
Among Bosnian Serbs, there appears to be widespreadinvolvement in various aspects of «ethnic cleansing». Neighbourshave attacked Bosnian Muslim and Croat families whom they haveknown for years; and they have guarded them at prison camps aswell. Serb families have moved into the homes of Muslims andCroats who had been killed or expelled. Serb civilians have alsotaken part in looting the homes and stealing the possessions ofMuslim and Croat families.*247 In many cases, however, it is notknown whether civilians acted pursuant to orders from Serbauthorities.*248
Many Serbs, on the other hand, have taken actions to helppersons of other ethnic groups and have protected them from harm.Serbs who have helped their neighbours, however, risk beinglabled as traitors by local Bosnian-Serb officials.
The involvement of civilian police units in «ethniccleansing» has primarily involved the deportation and detentionof non-Serbs. Serb police forces, for example, were chieflyresponsible for the forced movement of civilian prisoners fromthe detention facility at Trnopolje to the town of Travnik inBiH.*249 Reports indicate that from 150 to 200 men were taken fromtwo buses and summarily executed in a mountainous area known asVlasic.*250 In addition, police units were involved inadministering the detention facility at Omarska.*251
Paramilitary units are responsible for some of the mostbrutal aspects of «ethnic cleansing». Two of the units that haveplayed a major role in the «ethnic cleansing» campaign in BiH,the «Cetniks» associated with VojislavSeselj and the «Tigers»associated withZeljko Raznjatovic (Arkan), have been active inthe Republic of Serbia as well.*253Seselj's followers havereportedly waged «ethnic cleansing» campaigns against ethnicminorities in Serbia's provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo.*254Arkan's «Tigers» have staged military training exercisesallegedly designed to intimidate Albanian residents in Kosovo.*255
In addition, Mirko Jovic's «Knights» and Dragoslav Bokan's«White Eagles» are also based in Serbia.Seselj, Arkan and Jovicare also leaders of political parties in the Republic of Serbia.*256
Seselj's «Cetniks» have reportedly committed some of theworst atrocities of the conflict. In the Krajina region ofCroatia, for example, members ofSeselj's «Cetnik» forces arebelieved to have participated in the torture of Muslim civiliansat the Prijedor detention facility.*257
A former monarchist,Seselj dropped his support of PrinceAlexander when the Prince praised the democratic elections heldin Slovenia and Croatia.*258 He has stated that he envisions aSerbia whose borders encompass all of BiH, as well as Macedoniaand Serbian areas of Croatia.*259 In August 1991,Seselj told a DerSpiegel interviewer that his troops received weapons fromBelgrade.Seselj's troops are sent «from Belgrade to the crisisareas» in Croatia and BiH. «If there are 20 to 30Cetniks inevery village, this is sufficient to encourage the people there»,Seselj said.*260 Troops loyal toZeljko Raznjatovic (Arkan) havebeen most active in eastern BiH,*261 such as Zvornik*262 and Bijeljina.*263The «Tigers» have a reputation for extreme brutality.Photographs taken at Bijeljina, for instance, show Arkan'ssoldiers shooting Muslims and kicking their corpses.*264
The «Tigers», and Arkan himself, allegedly have beeninvolved in organized plunder. A Belgrade journalist who waswith the «Tigers» at Zvornik reported that Arkan's troops stoletelevision sets and VCRs. After expelling Muslim families fromtheir homes, they even dug up gardens looking for buriedvaluables, such as jewelry.*265 These plundered goods are loadedonto trucks and transported across the Danube to Serbia wherethey are resold.*266
Although Arkan has described himself as being a «sweet shopproprietor», he is reported to be involved in a number ofbusinesses including a detective agency, a chain of money-exchange shops and gas stations.*267 Arkan, who was born inSlovenia, reportedly has a criminal record dating back to histeens.*268 He is alleged to have been involved in bank robberiesthroughout Europe. Sweden, and other countries, have outstandingwarrants for his arrest on charges of bank robbery, attemptedmurder and other crimes.*269 According to NIN, Serbia's major newsweekly magazine,*270 the Italian police are seeking Arkan inconnection with the 1974 murder of a restaurant owner. TheYugoslav press has also reported that Arkan is suspected of beinginvolved in the 1983 slaying of a Croatian oil company executive.*271
Seselj's Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and Arkan's SerbianUnity Party (SSJ) have competed in elections for Serbia'sparliament. Arkan's SSJ is based in Kosovo and has pursued amilitantly anti-Albanian policy.*272 SRS has a substantial presencein Serbia's parliament, having 39 seats in the 250-seatlegislature.Seselj's party received 13 per cent of the votescast in the December 1993 elections. Arkan's Serbian Unity Partyfailed to take any seats.*273
During the 1993 election campaign, Milosevic's SocialistParty (SPS) accused SRS and its supporters of committing warcrimes against Bosnian civilians. According to an account inBorba, Milosevic supporters «furnished allegations and eyewitnessaccounts» ofCetniks underSeselj's command slaughteringcivilians and stealing property.*274 The allegations appear to havebeen prompted by a motion of no confidence in Milosevic'sgovernment that SRS introduced on 7 October 1993.*275Seselj hasaccused members of Serbia's Socialist party of committing warcrimes, as well.*276
Dragoslav Bokan's «White Eagles» borrowed its name from anorganization that was active during the Second World War.According to Bokan, it was «the only orthodox anti-communistmovement at the time».*277 Bokan revived the former organizationwhen he returned from the United States in 1990.*278
The «White Eagles» were active in Borovo Selo, Croatia in1991.*279 According to Bokan, his troops operated under thedirection of the Territorial Defence units (TOs) established inSerb-controlled territory in Croatia and BiH. Bokan has statedthat the «White Eagles» were not permitted to control territorythat had been seized.*280
Dragoslav Bokan was arrested in 1992 for the possession of ahand grenade and bullets found in his apartment. He received asuspended sentence of six months imprisonment.*281 Following hisarrest, Bokan severed his relationship with Mirko Jovic, the headof the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO).*282 When the war in BiHbroke out, Bokan said that he «started [his] private war»,*283 anddeparted for Rajlovac in BiH. Although Bokan has been identifiedas a suspected war criminal, he has claimed that he does not«belong to [sic] the same bag with the people on the list ofHelsinki Watch»*284 (i.e., Arkan andSeselj).
The paramilitary forces of Arkan andSeselj appear to havereceived support from the Serbian government, or agencies withinthe government. For example, while Serbia's Defence Minister hasdisavowed any involvement with Arkan, he has indicated that Arkanis protected by Interior Ministry officials.*285
Seselj has criticized the federal army and has stated that«[w]e retreat immediately if the army appears».*286 However, he hasalso stated that his paramilitary forces have received weaponsfrom the JNA, if only «discarded German guns».*287Seselj, as amember of Serbia's parliament, is a public official.
The top civil and military leaders of the break-awayrepublic have also been identified as having committed warcrimes.*288 For example, Radovan Karadzic, the President of theSerbian Republic, and General Ratko Mladic, Commander of the BSA,may be held accountable under the principle of commandresponsibility for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions andfor crimes against humanity committed under their direction orwith their knowledge.*289
President Karadzic cooperated with Serbian PresidentMilosevic in arming Bosnian Serbs.*290 Karadzic's role in planning«ethnic cleansing» activities with Milosevic was mentionedearlier.*291 President Karadzic has continued his control over themilitary units that have shelled civilian targets in Sarajevo.*292He has also publicly stated that «almost all of the [BosnianSerb] commanders are under our [the Serbian Republic's] control».*293
Roy Gutman has also reported that close associates ofKaradzic have been directly involved in military assaults, suchas the attack on Foca in April 1992.*294 For instance, VeliborOstojic, a minister in the Serbian break-away government, is saidto have
«conceived and organized war crimes in the Foca region, helped plan and organize the arming of Serbian Democratic Party members, prepared the attack and invited paramilitary forces from Serbia `to undertake the armed conquest of a large portion of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and ethnic cleansing through annihilation, terror, persecution, detention, mistreatment and murder'».*295
General Ratko Mladic, a former officer in the JNA, became acommander for the breakaway Serb Republic of BiH in May 1992,just days after he had been assigned to BiH by Serbia's PresidentMilosevic.*296 Before coming to BiH, he had commanded troops in thewar in Croatia.*297 He is known to have ordered the shelling ofSarajevo's civilian areas.*298
Mladic's military campaigns are characterized by fierceartillery barrages designed to level enemy towns.*299 Colonel GajoPetkovic, a former editor of the military journal Narodna Armija,has described Mladic's tactics as «giving vent to his inherentsadism».*300 Several groups have identified Mladic as a suspectedwar criminal; most recently, allegations have centred on Mladic'sshelling of the civilian population of Gorazde which killed 390persons and wounded more than 1,000 of the city's residents.*301 Ithas also been reported that General Mladic has recruited personsconvicted of violent crimes to serve in the Bosnian Serb Army.Persons serving lengthy prison terms for violent acts have hadtheir sentences suspended after agreeing to join the Bosnian Serbtroops.*302
There is substantial evidence that President SlobodanMilosevic and JNA forces have been involved in the conflict inBiH from its inception. Moreover, their involvement hascontinued.
As previously mentioned, paramilitary units operating withinBiH are based in the Republic of Serbia and have also conducted«ethnic cleansing» operations within the Republic of Serbia (inVojvodina, Kosovo, and Sandzak).*304Seselj reportedly hasregularly transported plundered goods from BiH across the Danubeto Serbia, with the apparent permission of Serb authorities. Inaddition, paramilitary groups have established training centresin Kosovo, where they operate free from interference from Serbianpolice and the JNA.*305
The JNA, according to numerous reports, was involved in theconflict in Croatia from its inception. When the Serbs ofCroatia's Krajina region declared their independence, there was amassive transfer of heavy weapons from the JNA to Serbparamilitary forces. In addition, there was an influx ofsupplies from Serbia itself. Serb paramilitary units operatingin Croatia have worn federal army uniforms and used JNAtopographical maps. They also were able to obtain a large numberof sophisticated weapons and vehicles.*306
Coordination between the JNA and local Serb forces wasapparent in the destruction of Vukovar in 1991. A mass gravefound at Ovcara is thought to contain the remains of at least 200Croats who had been taken from a Vukovar hospital, summarilyexecuted, and buried in a shallow grave.
According to military analyst James Gow, after the FRYannounced its withdrawal from BiH in May 1992, its assistance toBosnian Serbs continued. The Belgrade government, for example,continued to supply Bosnian Serb troops. Gow has stated that«General Ratko Mladic maintained daily contact with both theBosnian Serb and the federal Yugoslav Defence Ministries inBelgrade; and officers in the field claimed that they could nothold their fire until they received orders from Belgrade».*307
Milan Vego, writing in Jane's Intelligence Review, has alsoreported that the defence plan adopted by JNA in 1992 called forthe federal army to protect Serbs outside of Serbia.*308 The plancalled for the transfer of JNA's
«command structures into Territorial Defence Units and supplying these forces with small arms, artillery, armour and missile launching systems. The Ministry of Defence of the self-proclaimed Serbian Autonomous Regions (SAO) in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina was subordinated to the Serbian Ministry of Defense.»*309
According to UN observers, the JNA's involvement has beeneven more direct. For example, a Yugoslav army jet was observedas it dropped a cluster bomb on a Muslim-controlled hill near thecentre of Sarajevo in June 1992.*310 UNPROFOR officials have alsostated that the JNA has been directly involved in the attacks onSrebrenica. According to a US Senate Committee report, JNAartillery units positioned themselves in Bratunac, or Bosnianterritory, in order to better target the city.*311
Reports from military analysts also indicate that Serbianforces in BiH regularly receive supplies and military equipmentfrom Serbia. This includes fuel for aircraft, tanks and armouredvehicles. Serbian tractor-trailers, including oil tankers,reportedly deliver supplies to BiH on a daily basis. Serbvehicles transport these supplies and equipment from north-westBiH, across the Drina River to Bijeljina and then to Banja Lukaand other cities in western BiH.*312
For the military discussion, and the implementation of thepolicy of «ethnic cleansing», seeAnnex III, Military Structure;Annex III.A, Special Forces; andAnnex VIII, Prison Camps. Thecase-study of Zvornik follows in this Annex and the case study ofPrijedor is contained inAnnex V.
In August 1994, President Milosevic tacitly admitted thatthe Belgrade government had supplied arms to Bosnian Serbs. Inannouncing that it would severe most political and economic linksto Serb-held portions of BiH, Milosevic stated that the self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb state «would not survive» without aidfrom Serbia.*313 News reports of the embargo imposed by Serbia onSerb-controlled territory in BiH noted that Milosevic'sgovernment has been the «principal source of weapons, suppliesand political support» for Bosnian Serbs.*314
This report reconstructs the genesis and pattern of theexpulsion («ethnic cleansing») of nearly the entire Muslimpopulation of the city of Zvornik. While attempting to evaluateevents in a detailed and chronological manner, the investigationfocused primarily on the identification of those responsible forthe military operations, for war crimes and for human rightsviolations. The study also sought to identify a likely structureor distinct system of operations, ranging from the attack on thecity to the expulsion of its Muslim citizens.
The investigation relied on information that the LudwigBoltzman Institute for Human Rights (BIM) obtained from apreliminary evaluation of 500 interviews which were part of aninterview study of some 900 Bosnian refugees from the Zvornikregion. It was conducted within the context of the researchproject «Human Rights Violations in Bosnia-Herzegovina andPerspectives for Repatriation and Integration of BosnianRefugees» (subsequently «BIM-project»). In addition,complementary information was obtained from additionalinterlocutors, as well as from 31 in-depth interviews conductedby the BIM.
The Institute designed a complex questionnaire using openand closed question techniques, as well as a special «check list»available to the interviewers only. The purpose of the latterwas to double-check and question events and reports recountedalready once, and to clarify remaining questions. The BIMinterviewed individuals whose names and addresses were known tothe Institute, and who are knowledgeable about the eventsdescribed in this report. Some of the interviewees had occupiedkey positions in the socio-political life of the city.
In one part of the questionnaire the respondents were askedto identify the groups participating in the military attack andin the expulsion units of the former Yugoslav People's Army (JNA)and paramilitary units. Furthermore, respondents were asked torender these troops' positions during the military operations,and to describe any likely cooperation between the single units.
The expelled respondents were also asked to reconstruct thecourse of the events in chronological order. The followingphases were identified for this purpose:
Subsequently, the expelled respondents could recount freelyhow they had experienced the individual phases, with particularfocus on the behaviour of units of the former JNA, theparamilitary troops (former territorial defence units andguerilla units), the members of the militia, and the SerbianDemocrat Party (SDS), all of which stayed in the city. Theinterviewers initiated the response to each phase asking thefollowing question: «Please describe as exactly as possible howyou experienced the respective phase». In addition, theinterviewer could use the above-mentioned «check-list» on everyphase to complement the open-question technique, if necessary.Furthermore, structured questions had been prepared regardingimportant events during the attack, as well as during theoccupation (ultimatums, call to return after the first escapewave, forced registration, forced expropriation, deportation,detention in camps, war crimes, human rights violations, etc.).
During the interviews, the expelled respondents could relyon two city maps: one of the city of Zvornik itself and the otherof Karakaj industrial area situated outside the city limits.These maps served to identify the positions of the troopsparticipating in the attack, the starting points, targets, andthe developments of the military operations, as well as the siteof «concentration camps», particularly in Karakaj.
The interviews were conducted by experienced, bilingualinterviewers, who had been particularly trained for the specialrequirements of the report. They took place in the Austrianfederal states of Vienna, Lower Austria, Styria, in the refugeecamp near Gabelkovo, Slovakia, and in the refugee shelter inDusseldorf, Germany, between 10 and 28 March 1994. Theinterviewers themselves translated the records from the Bosnianor Croatian language into German.
According to the 1991 census data, the district of Zvornikhad a population of 81,111: 48,208 (59.4 per cent) of which wereBosnians Muslims and 30,839 (38 per cent) were of Serbiannationality. A total of 14,600 people lived in the city ofZvornik, 8,942 (61.0 per cent) of them were Bosnians Muslims,4,281 (29.2 per cent) of the Serbian nationality, 74 (0.5 percent) of Croatian nationality, and 1,363 (9.3 per cent) weredefined as «others».
The following additional municipalities are relevant for thestudy: The municipality of Jardan north of Zvornik, whichincludes the towns of Jardan and Lipovac, had a population of2,503, with a 53.1 per cent share of ethnic Serbs, and a 46 percent share of Bosnians (Muslims). These villages were situatedat the border to the industrial area of Karakaj, where JNA unitswere stationed prior to the attack; later the «headquarters» ofboth the «Serbian militia» and the JNA units were moved there,and several camps were established. The municipality ofCelopek,situated north of Jardan, had a population of 1,894, of which93.1 per cent were of Serbian nationality and 6.3 per cent wereBosnians (Muslims). Well before the attack, units of the formerJNA were stationed inCelopek.
In 1981, a total of 27,095 (38.5 per cent) people held jobs- 9,487 of them in the farming and forestry sector and 18,308 inthe non-agrarian sector. The total number of self-employed was2,202. The «Birac» company in the industrial area of Karakaj wasthe biggest single local employer. It produced preliminarymaterial for aluminum production (it was one of the biggestproducers world-wide and part of the «Energo Invest» concern inSarajevo).
Being a border town situated at the Bosnian-Serb Drinariver, Zvornik had a strategically important position. It issignificant because Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia are linkedat that point not only through a road bridge between the Zvornikurban area and the Karakaj industrial zone, and another one inZvornik itself, but also via a railroad bridge between Karakajand the town ofCelopek. Thus, Zvornik represents an importantlink along the Belgrade-Sarajevo line, as well as within theBelgrade-Tuzla line.
Control over Zvornik meant that possible troop or logisticalmovements from Serbian territory towards Tuzla or Sarajevo couldbe accomplished without any hindrance. The early deployment ofunits of the former JNA indicates that the plan to secure controlover the two corridors of Belgrade-Tuzla and Belgrade-Sarajevo,via control over Zvornik, was pre-conceived. For the Bosnianside, Zvornik was strategically important only in a defensivesense, i.e., to interrupt the above-mentioned supply lines.Moreover, because of its geographic location, Zvornik was notrelevant to the armed conflicts and military movements within BiHand Herzegovina.
Apart from units of the former JNA, paramilitary units(guerilla-type units, «volunteers», and members of the formerTerritorial Defence units (TO)) participated in the attack aswell as in the ensuing occupation of the city. The followingformations could be identified as the main participants:
Officially, there was no garrison of the former JNA in theZvornik district. The Zvornik region itself was controlled bythe 17th Corps Tuzla. Up to the fall of 1991, the 17th Corpsconsisted of 3 brigades and one partisan brigade, and was part ofthe First Military District of Belgrade.
After the re-organization of the JNA in the spring of 1992,it formally fell under the command of the Second MilitaryDistrict of Sarajevo, but most likely continued to be led by theFirst Military District of Belgrade.
By the turn of the year 1991/1992, preliminary tank units(apparently from the abandoned Jastrebarsko garrison in Croatia)were stationed near Zvornik. By February or March 1992 (at thetime of the referendum on independence), additional units of theformer JNA-tank units and artillery and anti-aircraft positionswere stationed in the Zvornik region. Initially, the tanks stillcarried the JNA emblems. It was only later that they werereplaced by the Serbian flag and the coat-of-arms emblem. But,the troops themselves, officers and soldiers, had Serbian badges(showing a Serbian flag on the front part of the beret and on theupper arm).
On the Serbian side of the Drina river bank, various tankpositions could be identified as well. Additional forces,including artillery, anti-aircraft weaponry, and tanks were beingpositioned there.
According to witness accounts, former JNA troops from thefollowing garrisons were involved during the attack:(a) Garrisons
Members of the units from Tuzla were already stationed nearZvornik, particularly on the Bosnian side of the Drina riverbank, prior to the attack. InCelopek, in the «Dom Kulture»,there were «small barracks» housing roughly 100 soldiers(infantry unit); moreover, there were also barracks in «NoviStandard» in Karakaj, which purportedly housed more soldiers thanthe ones inCelopek. According to accounts by some of theindividuals interviewed, the soldiers accommodated in both townswere from Tuzla; even General Jankovic from Tuzla is said to havevisited the unit. But there is also some evidence that theinfantry units in «Novi Standard» belonged to a newly-formed so-called territorial defence force (seeB. Paramilitaries, below),while the one at the «Dom Kulture» inCelopek was the reserveunit from Bijeljina. Another facility for soldiers was said tohave been located in an apartment building in Meterize. Soldierswere put up in the workers' apartments of the «Birac» company,while the Muslim population was expelled.
The planes and helicopters which participated in theaggression are also reported to have come from Tuzla.
Prior to the attack, these units were partly stationed alongthe Serbian side of the Drina river bank, and partly on theBosnian side. They further participated in the attack onZvornik, operating from Serbian territory. One unit fromSabacpurportedly was housed in the «Dom Kulture» in Mali Zvornik. Itwas further claimed that there was a «small barracks» also inRadalj north of Mali Zvornik. (a) Nis (Serbia)*319
There were indications that a «special unit» from Nis mighthave been involved in the attack on Zvornik and later onKulagrad. This could have been part of the 63. Airborne BrigadeNTS of the «Special Task Corps Belgrade». It was speciallytrained to handle «issues pertaining to the policies of domesticsecurity».
Infantry units which had been withdrawn from the combat areain Croatia (Vukovar) and which were reported to have beeninvolved in the aggression against Zvornik could not be allocatedin greater detail.
A number of commanding officers were reported, but theirnames were not included for confidentiality and prosecutorialreasons. Zvornik was part of the second Military district of theJNA after its reorganization.
Canons 122 millimetres and 130 millimetres; howitzers 60millimetres, 80 millimetres, and 120 millimetres, T 12; Anti-aircraft artillery; Samohodka; Tanks T 55, T 84, T 72 and 3«Marda(er)» armoured personnel carriers with 2 automatic canons;T 54, T 55, T 34, older versions; transporters; 2 kinds of anti-tank grenade launchers; Machine-guns M 70A and M 70B; handgrenades fired from M 59 and M 66; (portable) mortars; knives andbayonets.
(b) Infantry
Machine-guns M 52, M 65, M 66, M 70A, M 70B, M 72; handgrenade launchers Zolja; kalashnikov; knives.
(c) Air Force
MIG 21 and Mig 29, Jastreb with machine-guns and gunners,Gallop, «Eagles» (aerial photographs); helicopters MT 6 or MT 8,actually only for procurement of food and weapons (except for anattack operation against Liplje and Sekovici on April 9 around12:00) MT 9, Gazella.
Paramilitary units, except for Arkanovci, were under theauthority of two identified JNA officers. However, regardingtheir non-military actions, the paramilitaries operated withoutany reservations, particularly when murdering or looting.
Apart from the Arkanovci, who participated in the attack,the most important paramilitary units were the «territorialdefence units» (TO), theSeseljovci, and the Beli Orlovi. It wasnot possible to distinguish these three units clearly from eachother, nor from the infantry divisions of the former JNA.
Regarding the infantry units, there is evidence that theseunits were not only composed of the «regular members» of theformer JNA and of mobilized reserve forces, but also of«volunteers». Several of the individuals interviewed said thatthey had noted that prior to the attack, (i.e., in March 1992),and throughout the attack, the soldiers--and, some claimed,officers as well--no longer wore the badges of the former JNA.Instead, they had Serbian badges and cockades. However, at thattime, the vehicles and machinery still had the old Yugoslavidentity symbols. Moreover, many soldiers wearing «old JNAuniforms», used a «white band» on the upper arm as additionalidentifying marks. This identification only made sense ifsomebody wanted to distinguish himself from the uniformly dressedsoldiers. At the time of the attack on Zvornik and during itsoccupation, such a distinction was only relevant if one stood outamong «other JNA units», or among «forces in JNA uniforms» whichparticipated (with the «Serbian side») in the attack, since aMuslim counterpart did not exist in this form. Furthermore, thesoldiers wore long beards, which would not have been permittedfor a regular member of the former JNA. Moreover, thedescription of how these units looked and where they werestationed corresponded to the description and location of the«territorial defence units», theSeseljovci, and the Beli Orlovi,provided by other respondents. Members of the latter three unitshave also frequently taken part in the attack in composite units.
Some of the officers of this reserve infantry unit came fromthe Zvornik region while at the same time being well-known SDSactivists.
In addition, respondents said they had recognized the samepersons from the surrounding towns in Serbia proper showing upone time with theSeseljovci, another time with the Beli Orlovi,and then again with the «volunteer forces».
The so-called «territorial defence» (TO) was reportedlyintegrated into the infantry units of the JNA at a later point.
Most of the members of the Beli Orlovi could be recognizedby their «white eagles». TheSeseljovci could be recognizedbecause of the fur caps and cartridge bands which they carried ina cross-shaped manner over their chests.
Thus, it is fair to assume that an essential part of theinfantry belonged to the newly-formed «territorial defenceunits», which purportedly were established for the Zvornik regionapproximately six months prior to the attack on the city.
Nevertheless, a differentiation of these groups has beenmade below. Regarding the units of the former JNA, it wasassumed that infantry units had already existed.
Shortly after the dissolution of the Yugoslav territorialdefence in BiH (in the fall of 1991), SDS leaders in Zvornikbegan recruiting, equipping, and apparently also training a new«Serbian territorial defence». Most of their members came fromSerbian villages (Celopek,Scemlije) near Zvornik, or from Serb-populated parts of Zvornik (Lisicnjak). Its commando base was inKarakaj.
However, many of those interviewed also pointed out that theTO's headquarters was reportedly in Lisicnjak. The unit itselfstayed at the «Novi Standard» in Karakaj. These forces wore oldJNA uniforms. Like all other paramilitary units, they cooperatedwith the JNA and honoured their command. Being locals, theycould have had a special role, i.e., as informants for themilitary officers, and later in the looting and the turning-overof rich and important Muslims to the Arkanovci. The TO arrivedearly in the attack, shortly after the arrival of the Arkanovci.
Their hair was cut short, and they wore black woollen caps,black gloves cut off at mid-finger, and black badges on the upperarm. According to descriptions by other witnesses, they woremulti-colored uniforms, red arrows, knit caps, a badge showingthe Serbian flag on the right arm, and an emblem showing a tigerand the words «Arkanove delije» on the shoulder.
A main characteristic was their strict disciplinary code.The supreme command was held by Arkan. Other well-known figuresapart from Arkan included «Rambo» (Arkan's brother-in-law, whowas killed in the battles over Kulagrad) and a number ofidentified persons who committed and ordered torture, killings,and other violations.
The Arkanovci, and in particular Arkan himself, areunanimously described as the key figures in the attack. Duringthe actual attack operations, Arkan's standing was reportedlyabove that of the commanders of the former JNA, as well as thatof the leading figures of the local SDS.
Arkan reportedly arrived in Zvornik on 8 April. It has beenconfirmed that he not only participated in «negotiations» onZvornik's future on 8 April and the following day, but that heactually dominated those talks. An ultimatum for the surrenderof the town and of the weapons in the morning of 9 April wasreported to have been announced by Arkan himself. Members of theArkanovci were reported to have been present in the city sincethe end of March.
Their participation in the fighting began on 8 April withmortar fire and attacks by snipers located in Mali Zvornik. Theyconquered the city and assumed control of it on 9 April. Theyconquered the most important bases and took control of the cityuntil they could hand it over to the Serbian administrators.Throughout the battle, the Arkanovci were supported by JNAartillery and logistics.
Later the securement of the city was taken over by othergroups,Seseljovci, Beli Orlovi, the so-called «territorialdefence», and «volunteers» from neighbouring towns in Serbia.After the occupation of the city (10 or 11 April) the core troopsleft Zvornik, but later returned when necessary, as was the casewith the attack on Kulagrad.
The Arkanovci were highly mobile and had many privatelyowned vehicles. Apart from their «military tasks», the Arkanovciwere responsible for many of the atrocities and lootings. Arkanhimself ordered Muslims and patients from the hospital to theexecution sites. They were responsible for mass killings andmurders. For example, Arkanovci murdered 4 men in the house ofSalim Donjic, and committed massacres in Zamlas and Hrid (about150 people). In the morning of April 9, they were said to havecommitted another massacre in Vidakove Njive and at the accessroad in Zvornik. Also, they purportedly committed a massacre inthe «Klempic» coffee house that same morning. However, thismight refer to the same massacre, as the coffee house wassituated in the direction of Vidakove Njive.
They had a reputation of being extremely cruel. There isindication that they had lists containing the names of richMuslims whose gold and money were stolen. Local Serbs wereaccused of having drawn up these lists. For example, theArkanovci were reported to have been accompanied by local Serbsduring the first few days as they went from house to house,killing and raping the residents and looting the buildings. The«right to be the first to loot», which they apparently enjoyed,obviously served as a means of «payment».
Their armament included: guns and grenades; automaticrifles M 70A, M 70B and US rifles, «Skorpion» rifles, handgrenades; anti-tank launching grenades; ropes for choking people;long «Rambo-style» knives; only light weapons; bullet-proofjackets.
They are described as «bearded» men. They wore Serbianmilitary berets with the Serbian flag on the front side, or blackfur hats with a Serbian cockade. A further identifyingcharacteristic was their ammunition which they wore in a cross-shaped manner over their chests, and the hand grenades on theirbelts.
The leaders wore a giant pointed fur hat with a coat ofarms. Several of them were identified.
Reports said they were always drunk, and they alwaysrecruited additional new people, criminals, or «weekendfighters». They are said to have been particularly active asregards violence against civilians.
It was difficult to identify their headquarters. Somementioned the «Standard» in Karakaj, the companies «Inzinjering»,«Alhos», and «Vezionica» in Karakaj, the hotel «Drina» and thepre-school in the radio station.
Members of theSeseljovci were already present as civiliansprior to the attack. It is further reported thatSeselj himselfhad been in Zvornik to meet with his local party friend BoskoCeranic. They participated in the attack very early on andstayed involved throughout the entire period of the occupationuntil the seizure of Kulagrad. They assumed control of variousparts of the city and were responsible for lootings everywhere.They always cooperated with the JNA, both with regard to strategyand command structure.
Their armament included: automatic rifles M 59, M 66, M70A, M 70B; long, curved knives, hand grenades; ammunition wornin cross-shape over chest.
They were sloppily dressed and wore uniforms from variousJNA stocks, or civilian clothes, and had a white eagle badge onthe cap and the upper arm. For the most part they came fromsurrounding towns in Serbia (Loznica, Valjevo, etc.). Theirheadquarters, too, was hard to locate. They reportedly havestayed in the «Alhos» together with the Arkanovci, and in the«Jezero» hotel.
They only participated (like theSeseljovci) in the secondwave of the attack. Their «task» was to assist in the fighting,and to secure strategic points. They participated in theshelling, siege, and occupation of the city, as well as in thelater attack on Kulagrad.
Apparently, however, they were primarily responsible forarrests, deportations (securing of deportations), and looting.They were frequently seen near road crossings, in the streets,etc., drunk or provocative. They repeatedly held up or arrested«suspects» on the street, or took what the Arkanovci had leftafter pillaging the city. They drew white eagles on houses andstorage buildings, and it was forbidden to remove them. Theycooperated with the JNA.
They had only light weaponry (no details given).
The Draganovci of «Kapetan Dragan» (Captain VasiljkovicDragan) was another important unit. Although it did notparticipate in the attack, it played a key role later in theoccupation of Zvornik. Members wore red (French) berets, wererather well disciplined and dressed properly. Their commander«Kapetan Dragan» was described as second in importance to Arkan.The Draganovci arrived at the end of May and participated onlyoccasionally in the fighting. Their «main task» was patrollingthe city, executing deportations, and intimidating thepopulation. Their headquarters was at the hotel «Vidikovac» inDivic.
They had only light weaponry (no details given).
Other formations participating during the entire course ofthe raid included: Anticevci (who are being blamed for onemassacre in the district of Srpska Varos on 15 April); specialforces of the local Serbs wearing a stocking tied over the knee;Serb volunteers from Loznica,Sabac, Valjevo (dressed in black),who may have been part of the Beli Orlovi; the «Dusan Silni» unitwhich also may have been part of the Beli Orlovi; the Group ofPusula from Rastosnica, a Group from Padinska Skela (prisoners;big black hats with shining ribbons; cowboy-look); and theVukovarci.
Many partisans, particularly from the towns of Loznica,Valjevo, andSabac, apparently came to the city as part ofseveral groups (Seseljovci, Beli Orlovi, «volunteers»), and atvarious times. All of these partisan units carried only lightarms.
For a chronology of the aggression, the followingclassification was used: after a brief outline of the timepreceding the attack, the period of the aggression isdifferentiated along two lines of development. The first linecovers the military events, i.e., the (military) attack onZvornik and the decisive attack on Kulagrad just two weeks later.The second line illustrates the civilian development in the town,which can be clearly split into different phases that are linkedto the military developments. Accordingly, the crucial moment inthe civilian development line is the attack on Kulagrad on April26. A further decisive disruption of civilian life occurred inmid-May.
As could be observed in the context of the BIM project,social life between the various ethnic groups rapidlydeteriorated in the months before the attack. There weretensions in the workplace, at school and in the neighbourhood.Each ethnic group began to distance itself from the others.There was an increasing militarization of the society, and theSerbian side was suspected by the respondents to have beeninformed about any kind of impending action.
There are various pieces of evidence indicating that boththe attack and the expulsion of the Muslim population was pre-planned.
About 2-3 months prior to the attack, military trainingexercises lasting up to 2 weeks were conducted in Osmaci nearKalesija and other villages. The JNA organized these exercisesand only Serbs were invited under the pretext that the TO had tobe trained.
Already in the weeks prior to the attacks, members of allethnic groups procured weapons for their personal use. Accordingto those interviewed, Serbian citizens of Zvornik obtained theirweapons mainly through the SDS or the JNA, while the Muslimpopulation procured weapons through «private channels».*320
In regard to the month of March preceding the attack, therewas agreement among the respondents--and this was also consistentwith the results of the BIM project--that many Serbs left thecity for the weekend, but showed up back at work on the followingMonday. It cannot be proven that this was an SDS-organizedtraining exercise for the evacuation of Serbian citizens in theevent of an actual attack on Zvornik. However, there were strongreasons to assume that this was an organized action. Forexample, a majority of Serbian families had left town over theweekend. Likewise, women and children of Serb nationality wereaway from the town when the attack began.
In the days preceding the attack, respondents wererepeatedly warned by Serbian friends and colleagues that they hadbetter leave the town rather soon. This supported the assertionof many respondents that the Serbian inhabitants of Zvornik hadbeen informed about the attack, at least on short-notice.
On the weekend before the attack (4 or 5 April), a barricadewas erected near Meterize by Serbs using company trucks owned bythe firm «Boksit» (a bauxite pit at Milici, 30 km south ofZvornik). On the following day, 6 April, Muslims were preventedfrom going to work. Additionalluy, students going to thetechnical training centre at Karakaj were forced to turn back atthe barricade.
These events, as well as the fear of a military conflict,were also causing many Muslim families to leave the town via theOld Bridge. In reaction to the Serbian barricade, the Muslimserected a barricade of their own at the same site which wascomposed of trucks and protected by the Muslim police and byarmed volunteers. Initially, however, there were only verbalconflicts going on at the barricades. Demonstrations were heldat the barricades, in the course of which members of all ethnicgroups advocated a state of peaceful coexistence.
On 6 April, a few days before the attack, the local policeforce was divided. The police headquarters in Zvornik wasliberated by the Serbian police staff, who transported theweaponry, equipment and vehicles to the industrial zone ofKarakaj in the north of Zvornik. In the weeks before that, therehad still been joint patrols driving around the town and at thebridges in order to demonstrate the togetherness of the twoethnic groups.
Already, on 6 and 7 April, a large part of the Muslimpopulation of Lipovac and Karakaj fled to Zvornik. On theevening of 7 April, i.e., one day before the attack, the largenumbers of JNA units present were explained by the Belgrade TVstation as being due to an impending attack by «Muslimextremists» positioned on the Kulagrad hill.
On 8 April, negotiations took place in Mali Zvornik betweenthe SDS from Zvornik (Branko Grujic), the Party of DemocratAction (SDA) from Zvornik (district president Asim Jusbasic), andArkan. The talks reportedly aimed at a «peaceful surrender ofthe city», i.e., a «capitulation by the Muslim population».Moreover, the two representatives from Zvornik apparently reachedan «agreement» which aimed at dividing the city. The centre ofthe city of Zvornik would remain «Muslim», while the northernpart, including the Karakaj industrial zone, would be «awarded»to the Serbs. According to one person interviewed, who hadbriefly talked with the chief negotiator of the SDA shortly afterthe meeting, the SDS and the SDA agreed to this scenario.However, the SDA representative still feared an attack, sinceArkan was said to have been dissatisfied with this meeting andreportedly announced that he would take charge of things fromthen on. According to similar reports, Arkan even attacked thetwo other individuals. In the morning of 9 April, negotiationswere also conducted in Mali Zvornik, but they were notsuccessful. This pattern of negotiations was designed to calmthe other side, while concurrently preparing a military attack,which had been observed on the international level, was thusapplied locally as well.
The military attack on Zvornik occurred on 8 April. Later,there were sporadic military operations with units of the formerJNA cooperating with paramilitary units. These operations mainlyfocused on the medieval fortress of Kulagrad, situated to thesouth-west of Zvornik, where some dozen resistance fighters wereholding out. However, on 26 April, this fortress was conqueredin a concerted attack by former JNA troops, with air support, andby paramilitary units. Immediately after the fall of Kulagrad,the town of Divic, situated south of Zvornik, was attacked.Divic was almost exclusively populated by Muslims and wassituated at the hydro-electric power plant. Since Divic couldalso be controlled from Kulagrad, the aggressors did not considera decisive attack on Divic possible until after the capture ofKulagrad. Divic was also considered a «Muslim stronghold» fromwhere strong resistance could be expected, and where the powerplant dam might possibly have been mined.
The attack on the town was conducted both from the Serbianside and from Bosnian territory, using tank forces, artillery,and infantry units with portable mortars. JNA units andparamilitary units cooperated. Arkanovci operated in front-linepositions, taking the city. Their core troops left the cityafter the successful attack to prepare a raid on the next city,Bratunac.
The attack began on the morning of 8 April, with mortar fireon the Bukovik and Meterize city districts, as well as on theMuslim-held defence positions on the Debelo Brdo hill. It camefrom the artillery positions in Karakaj, from the Bosnian sidebefore Meterize, and from the Serbian side of the River Drina(Mali Zvornik). First shots were fired in the Meterize suburb.This attack was mainly carried out by the heavy equipment of theJNA (artillery and tanks). There are also reports of Arkanovcisnipers firing from Mali Zvornik on the opposite river bank, andof snipers aiming at residents from positions on highrisebuildings in Zvornik itself. The Muslim position on Debelo Brdo,however, fell on that same day and was occupied by theaggressors.
During the night there was heavy shelling of the town. Thecapture of the city did not begin until the following day, 9April. In the morning, there were again negotiations with Arkan,which ended in an ultimatum for the surrender of weapons and thetown by 8:00 a.m. At 8:00 a.m. artillery fire started again,followed by the capture of the town by the infantry. TheArkanovci assumed a leading role in the take-over of the city,proceeding from the north via the Bukovik and Meterize citydistricts heading for the city centre. In addition, infantryunits of the JNA in cooperation with «Serb volunteers»(Seseljovci, Beli Orlovi, «TO») also took part in the seizure ofthe city. They approached the city primarily from the west--fromScemlije and Lisicnjak in a «second wave». It was reported thaton the very first day, as well as during the subsequent weeks,there were random executions, rapes, and massacres. In these,the units of theSeseljovci, Beli Orlovi and the so-called«territorial defence» were also involved. On 10 and 11 April,Zvornik was captured. The Kulagrad fortress north of Zvornik andthe town of Divic bordering Zvornik to the South had not yet beenoccupied.
Kulagrad is a settlement in the vicinity of a medievalfortress on the Kula hill, located on the south-western outskirtsof Zvornik. In view of the geographical location of Zvornik andthe strategic positioning of the attacking units, there were onlytwo escape routes open to the population after the beginning ofthe artillery fire: either to the east across the Old Bridge toSerbia or in a south-western direction via Kulagrad and Liplje toTuzla. Kulagrad and Liplje were only used as short stopoversand, during the period after the attack, had to accommodatehighly fluctuating numbers of refugees.
On 9 April, artillery attacks on Kulagrad started as theattacking units were expecting major Muslim resistance forces.Even before the attack, Serbian media reported that «severalthousand Muslim extremists» were hiding in Kulagrad. In fact,there were probably no more than a few dozen armed Muslims underthe command of a former JNA officer who spontaneously organized aresistance movement with light equipment (small arms).
From 11 April onward, there were almost daily attempts bysmall combat groups from various paramilitary units to capturethe fortress. These attempts failed, however, despite the factthat Kulagrad was constantly under fire from mortars, anti-aircraft guns and tanks. The reason for this failure might bedue to the apparent lack of coordination of the attacks, as wellas deficiencies in the training of the infantry units involved.
On 25 April, an identified senior JNA officer presented anultimatum to the inhabitants of Divic to turn in their arms. Thedefenders of Kulagrad had been given a number of ultimatums sincethe beginning of the attack on April 11. The last ultimatum cameon 26 April, the day of the decisive attack on Kulagrad.
In the morning of 26 April, the villages around Kulagradwere the first to fall in the wake of a concerted attack. At thesame time, Kulagrad and Divic were attacked by heavy artilleryfire from the Serbian bank of the Drina river. This enabled theattackers, who this time had coordinated their actions, tocapture Kulagrad. The units were able to approach the fortressfrom all directions, including from the power station in thesouth. In addition, the attack was conducted more effectively.Some respondents stated that a special unit, possibly members ofthe 63rd Nis parachute brigade, were involved in the decisiveattack and the seizure of Kulagrad.
The Muslims remaining in Kulagrad, along with the otherinhabitants and refugees in Kulagrad (approximately 100 persons),left town at approximately 10:30 a.m. together via Liplje in thedirection of Tuzla. In Liplje, they were only able to stay verybriefly, as later that afternoon this village was also taken bythe aggressors without any resistance. On the same afternoon,paramilitary units marched into Divic and pillages were reported.Some time later, Divic was also occupied by the JNA.
Thus, the attack on Zvornik and the capture and occupationof the city took place before 5 May (i.e., prior to the time whenthe Yugoslav national Presidium officially gave up the supremecommand over the units of the JNA in BiH). Those troopsoriginating from «left-over Yugoslavia» were given orders by theBelgrade national Presidium to withdraw from BiH.
Control over the «civil administration» was first in thehands of the so-called «emergency staff» which above all includedmembers of the local SDS and the militia. Some of these personswere also integrated into the so-called «territorial defence».On the basis of a document, it becomes clear that the «emergencystaff» not only was in existence on 8 April, but had alreadydecided on an «ordinance on the introduction of the general workrequirement» within the borders of the Serbian district ofZvornik. All workers were required to report to their employer.However, already during the early days of the aggression (around10 April), a «Provisional Government» of the so-called «SerbianDistrict of Zvornik» was founded.
A few days later (around 10 or 11 April) the above-mentioned«ordinance on the introduction of the general work requirement»,along with an extension of the deadline, was broadcast by RadioZvornik. But this appeal was not followed either, as there werestill numerous paramilitary troops in town who were looting andterrorizing the locals. Therefore, the appeal was broadcast oncemore a few days later (approximately 15 or 16 April). Theoverall response to these appeals was however rather poor. Theexperiences of those who did follow the appeal to return to theworkplace showed that the true purpose of this appeal, and ofothers that followed, was to monitor the male Muslim inhabitants.
Immediately after the occupation of the town, a night curfewwas imposed which remained in force until the «ethnic cleansing»was completed. During the day, men were allowed to move aroundonly with a permit issued by the Serbian police*321 at Zvornik.Many of the men who went to Karakaj (or later to the policeoffice in Zvornik) in order to apply for a «permit» were suddenlydeported into one of the camps in the industrial district ofKarakaj. While at the camp, they were subjected to severetorture and murder, in particular by members of the paramilitarytroops whose quarters were partly in the same buildings as thosein which the prisoners were detained.*322 The detainees wereentirely at the mercy of their torturers.*323 Many of the men,therefore, did not dare to pick up their passes themselves, butremained in hiding in houses. However, even persons with a passwere not safe from random aggressions by the numerousparamilitary units in town. It was reported by some witnessesthat immediately upon leaving the police station, they had theirpasses taken away or torn into pieces by members of aparamilitary group. Some of them were attacked and deported intocamps.
Women were permitted to leave the house during the daytimein order to go shopping. However, they were obliged to cross theold bridge to Mali Zvornik (Serbia) as the stores in Zvornik hadalready been looted. At the check-points on the bridge, thewomen were frequently molested. There were also several reportsof rape.
From the onset of the occupation, Muslims were prohibitedfrom working, except for persons deemed indispensable by theaggressors (e.g. hospital personnel, who were not released untilthe end of May). Everyday life was dominated by the fact thatmaraudering paramilitary troops, who were not controlled by anyauthority, terrorized the Muslim population of Zvornik.
There is little available data on the behaviour of the localSerb population because the respondents were almost exclusivelyMuslims. Also, there were only a few Serbs left in Zvornik atthe time of the attack. When asked why they thought the Serbshad left town during that period, many respondents expressed asuspicion that the Serbs «had been fully informed» and hadtherefore left town in time before the attack. This suspicion issubstantiated by the fact that some of the Muslims were warned bySerbian friends about an impending attack. Apart from that,local Serbs took part in numerous acts of violence in town asmembers of paramilitary groups and units of the police and theSDS. Apparently, it was disadvantageous for local Serbs to talkto the Muslim inhabitants. However, there were also reportsindicating a positive behaviour on the part of the Serbs. Thesereports included cases of food being supplied as well as the much-cited example of a young Serbian woman whose throat was cut byfighters of paramilitary units when she tried to protect herMuslim friends.
There is agreement on the fact that after the fall ofKulagrad the situation in Zvornik became less strained. Manymembers of the paramilitary units, as well as parts of the troopsof the former JNA, were reported to have left town by the end ofApril. Many of the Serb inhabitants who had also fled fromZvornik returned to town. The SDS started to organize anadministration in the new «Serbian District of Zvornik».
At the end of April, probably immediately after the fall ofKulagrad, the «Serbian District of Zvornik» issued a furtherappeal for the Muslim refugees to return to Zvornik. On thebasis of a large number of consistent reports, the message of theappeal could be summarized as follows: the situation in town wasback to normal and everyone would be able to return unharmed.Any personal property would have to be registered with theZvornik police by 15 May as it would otherwise fall to the«Serbian District of Zvornik». This appeal to return wasbroadcast daily for a period of approximately two weeks by RadioZvornik, Radio Loznica and, most likely, also by the Belgrade TVstation in a variety of versions. The appeal was more successfulwith the escapees than an earlier appeal to return to theworkplace.
The fear of losing their property as well as the situationin town seemed to have been the decisive reason for anastonishingly large number of persons to return. However, thenormalization and the establishment of a regular municipalorganization, in connection with the appeal to return, had graveconsequences for the Muslim inhabitants. Now that theparamilitary groups had left town again, it was possible toconvert the existing general chaos into an organized «Serbianadministration» of the town. The systematic conduct of the«ethnic cleansing» procedure was only possible after a large partof the Muslim escapee population had returned. Therefore, it wasnot until the fall of Kulagrad that one could actually speak ofan organized expulsion of the Muslim population.
Consequently, after a relatively short time, around 10 May,the situation for the Muslim inhabitants began to deteriorateagain. New paramilitary units came into town, breaking intoMuslim homes, frightening the residents and mistreating them in avariety of ways, as well as frequently deporting men in the campsat Karakaj. In particular, former members of the SDA fell victimto such deportations into the camps in Karakaj or Batkovic nearBijeljina. The militia and other local Serbs who were frequentlyreferred to as members of the SDS appear to have been regularlyinvolved in these aggressions. There seems to have been afurther exacerbation of the situation around the end of May orthe beginning of June. This is seen by some respondents as beinglinked to the arrival of the Draganovci in town.
After the stage of «unorganized» expulsion of the Muslimpopulation by means of terror, the next step was to prepare thetotal expulsion of the Muslim inhabitants with the support ofadministrative measures. The first step had already been theappeal to return. The registration of property that wasmandatory for all inhabitants, including the Serbian population,served above all the purpose of registering the male Muslimpopulation. For this reason, only men were eligible forregistration, which had to be completed before the «Serbianmunicipality» or the «Serbian militia», even if a property wasoriginally registered under the wife's name. As a result, theseregistrations led to arrests and deportations to camps,apparently on the basis of pre-established lists.
An «agency for the exchange of houses» was set up, to whichthe Muslim inhabitants were to transfer their houses. In return,the Muslims were promised houses belonging to Bosnian Serbs (e.g.in the Tuzla region) who supposedly had also assigned their homesto the agency. In order to make this «offer to exchange houses»more attractive looking, Serbian radio stations transmittedbroadcasts about the successful exchange of houses by prominentMuslim inhabitants. These exchanges were, in many cases, foundout to be falsified, incorrect, or conducted under coercion.
Departure from the town was only possible on the conditionthat the property was renounced and transferred to the «SerbianDistrict of Zvornik». This forced transfer of property wasexecuted by the «Serbian District of Zvornik» in cooperation withthe police and paramilitary units, especially the Draganovci.Eventually, the Muslims were glad to sign the deed in order toget away from the terror.
It is difficult to precisely reconstruct the «model type»procedure employed by the authorities for the conduct of theethnic cleansing during the following weeks. The measures offorced registration and assignment of property preceding theactual expulsion were characterized by a variety of approaches.Despite the fact that there was no clear indication as to themethod used for expulsion, the following pattern emerges from alarge number of consistent cases:
After their return, the refugees first had to be registered.This registration had no immediate consequences for the«organized deportations». Registration was, however, aprerequisite for the subsequent transfer of property.Registration had to be done before the police, and, in manycases, it immediately preceded the actual deportation. Theforced transfer of property to the «Serbian District of Zvornik»made registrants eligible for obtaining an official entry ofchange of domicile on their ID card. This ID card entry was aprerequisite for being allowed to leave the town. Someexpellees, especially men, were also required to prove that theyhad «donated blood» (large quantities were indeed taken bycoercion from many of the camp prisoners).*324
Documents that had to be shown upon leaving the townincluded:
From the end of May to early June, there were days in whichthe Muslim populations of entire municipal districts orneighbouring villages were deported. A chronologicalaccumulation of deportations could be observed on 22 and 23 June.These organized deportations were reportedly carried out by meansof vehicles provided by the firm «Drinatrans», which brought thedeportees to Mali Zvornik and from there via Loznica to Subotica*325or into the Bosnian territory of Tuzla. The deportees were onlypermitted to take a very limited number of personal belongingsalong with them. Quite frequently, however, even these weretaken away from them at the check-points.
A detailed assessment of the level of involvement of theformer JNA in the attack on Zvornik is possible only to a limiteddegree. What is certain is the fact that units of the former JNAwere involved.
It is also certain that a tank unit (or parts thereof) wasdeployed that, until the winter of 1991, had been stationed inJastrebarsko/Croatia and integrated into the 17th Corps Tuzla,following the abandonment of JNA positions in Croatia. The unitwas stationed in the village ofCelopek north of Zvornik, with anumber of tanks located in the industrial district of Karakaj andproceeding towards the Zvornik city limits (precinct of Meterize)when the attack began. The artillery and air defenceemplacements localized on the Bosnian side may be counted as partof the former JNA.
As regards the infantry units, which some of the refugeeshave attributed to the JNA, there are indications that they arenot composed exclusively of «regular members» of the former JNAand draftees of the reserve corps, but also of «volunteers».This assumption is supported by several factors.
First, according to some respondents, the soldiers and theofficers had, prior to the attack (i.e., in March 1992) as wellas during the attack, begun to wear Serbian badges and cockadesinstead of the badges of the former JNA on their uniforms.Vehicles and machinery, however, still had the old Yugoslavidentification signs. Many of the soldiers wearing «old JNAuniforms» were also using a «white ribbon» around their arms orother identification marks. These identifications only makesense, if they serve to differentiate the person using them fromothers wearing basically the same uniforms. Such adifferentiation, however, was only relevant at the time of theattack or the occupation of Zvornik in regard to «other JNAunits» or «units in JNA uniforms» taking part in the attack (onthe «Serbian side»), since there was no counterpart on the Muslimside.
For those former JNA units that were stationed on theSerbian side, such a detailed distinction is not possible. Here,temporary military barracks were installed (in Radalj and MaliZvornik). The unit stationed in the «Dom Kulture» in MaliZvornik was said to have come fromSabac.
The responsible officers of the former JNA during the attackand occupation periods were identified. After the fall ofKulagrad and the final consolidation of «Serbian control» overZvornik, the respondents identified the successor commanders.
This change from the former JNA to a (newly established)«territorial defence» (and not to the «Serbian Army in Bosnia andHerzegovina») may be seen as yet another indication that therehad already been cooperation between «regular» members of theformer JNA and «irregular» members (reserve, volunteers) at thetime of the attack on Zvornik.
From the analysis of these factors the following can beconcluded:
The strategic preparation of the attack was carried out byofficers of the former JNA who were also responsible forcoordinating and directing the actual attack.
The squads, which were identified by many respondents as JNAunits, were to a large extent at least composed of «volunteers»or «reservists». This assessment is consistent with the factthat the former JNA was already suffering from great personnellosses during the Croatian war and, above all, at the end of themilitary actions there (especially with many «non-Serbian»recruits refusing to report for active duty and many «non-Serbian» soldiers and officers deserting). The personnel-intensive infantry units, in particular, required additionalmanpower, a fact which is supported by the observations made inZvornik. The fact that local SDS activists were named as«officers», especially of the infantry, also suggests that theyacted in their capacity as «officers of the reserve» or asofficers of the so-called territorial defence.
The tank units, which were also active in Zvornik, were lesslabour-intensive, but required better training. This suggeststhat these units were made up of «regular» JNA personnel.Intelligence reports and observations of the troops in combatfurther showed that there were only rare occasions where acomplete brigade was deployed and that «combat groups» wereinstead usually formed consisting in parts of infantry, artilleryand tank units.
In May 1992, the Commander of the JNA's Tuzla Corpsresigned. JNA officers and military equipment, however,continued to be part of the attack and occupation of the city andsurrounding areas. This implies orders and coordination fromanother command source.
The attack was initiated by barrage fire from artillery andtank units of the former JNA that supported the seizure of thetown by units of the Arkanovci. According to severalrespondents, destruction caused by artillery and tank fire wasrather infrequent. There was no indication that the town was tobe destroyed, but rather that the aim was to frighten andterrorize the inhabitants. This suggests that the attackerswanted to take over the town.
The seizure of the town was carried out by a «special unit»of the Arkanovci. This assumption is supported by the fact thatmembers of the Arkanovci who were involved in the capture of thetown left again a few days later, whereas other Arkanovci stayedin town and were joined by more members of Arkanovci. Theseizure of the town may therefore have been carried out by a«special unit», which had already captured Bijeljina and whichafter the seizure of Zvornik, went on to occupy Bratunac. Theother paramilitary units arrived in a second wave, led bySeseljovci, with the Beli Orlovi and the so-called «Serbianterritorial defence» with «volunteers» from adjacent Serbianvillages or from neighbouring towns in Serbia.
It is difficult to determine which groups exerted controlover Zvornik at the various stages following the occupation ofthe town. In general, supreme control has frequently beenascribed to the JNA. The fact that these were high-profilepersonalities and former JNA officers may have led many expelleesto assume that supreme control was in the hands of the JNA.Indeed, these two officers had supreme control over the town,albeit not as JNA, but as leading officers of a new «territorialdefence» which had been established by local leaders. This laterformed the core element of the «Serbian Army in Bosnia andHerzegovina» in the region of Zvornik and was officially declaredin May 1992.
It may be assumed, however, that there was a concertedeffort to distribute responsibilities and thus authority over thetown. At least during the period until the fall of Kulagrad,there appears to have been a sharing of power between theofficers of the former JNA (Pejic and Pavlovic) and SDS (Grujic)and the militia.
These testimonies, though, were modified by the fact thatnearly all of the respondents said that the various paramilitaryunits marauder around Zvornik had unlimited freedom of action(terrorizing the civilian population, randomly performingexecutions and arrests or looting). The JNA units were reportedby the respondents to have participated in war crimes and severehuman rights violations only to a very limited degree throughoutthe entire period. They were, however, accused of looting.Guards working in those camps where war crimes and human rightsviolations were committed were partly members of JNA units. Itis unclear, though, whether they were «regular units», draftedreservists or members of the so-called «territorial defence».
There are many indications that the complete freedom ofaction on the part of the paramilitary units led to a toleratedchaos, which was due to the fact that the potential authoritiesof the JNA and local militia were not accepted as such by theseviolent paramilitary units. The Arkanovci, especially, actedcompletely autonomously and rarely bowed to the authority of JNAofficers or, even less, to the local authorities. Overall, thedescriptions given by the respondents create the impression thatthe various paramilitary units only accepted the authority oftheir respective «leaders» and that many of the less strictlyorganized paramilitary groups regarded their complete freedom ofaction as a kind of «remuneration» for their work. Thiscircumstance may, however, also be seen as suggesting that theuncertain distribution of power only served to cover-up thoseresponsible for the war crimes and human rights violations. Atthis point, the violent chaos may not yet have been associatedwith the aim of using the terror exerted by the paramilitarygroups in order to accelerate the expulsion of the Muslimpopulation.
After the attack, the control authority was initially in thehands of the «emergency staff», which later became known as the«Serbian District of Zvornik». Its president became the apparentprincipal decision maker.
The logistics of the attack on Zvornik appear to have beenprepared on the civilian level. In February, for example, atruck was reported to have brought uniforms and arms to BoskoCeranic, and another respondent stated that VojislavSeseljvisited Ceranic on 25 March 1992 and brought arms into the churchofScemlije.
The civilian preparations also included an «evacuationexercise» on the last or next to the last weekend in March 1992.On that weekend, to the surprise of the Muslim inhabitants ofZvornik, the greater part of the Serbian families had left townon Friday and did not return until Monday.
The local SDS representatives, who were reported to have hadcontacts withSeselj's Radical Party in Serbia, had already madeprovisions for enforcing their seizure of power, during themonths preceding the attack. Back in the fall of 1991, they haddeclared Zvornik to be part of the «Autonomous Serbian Region ofSemberija and Majevica». As can be seen from the document on thedismissal of a Muslim citizen from his workplace, the «emergencystaff» had decided on 4 April on an «ordinance on theintroduction of the general work requirement». Apparently,preparations for an «access to power» were already being taken onthe civilian administrative level as well.
The preparations for the attack seem to have beencoordinated with the regional business leaders, several of whomwere identified by the respondents. Some of the business leaderswere seen distributing arms, while others provided means totransport expellees from Zvornik to Serbia. The director of thelargest local employer was also accused by the press in the fallof 1991 of having provided the SDS with large quantities of fuel.
Shortly after the dissolution of the Yugoslav territorialdefence in BiH and Herzegovina in the fall of 1991, SDS leadersin Zvornik began with the recruiting, equipping, and apparenttraining of the new «Serbian Territorial Defence» (TO). Duringthe months before the attack, there were also military exercisesorganized by the JNA. Only Serbs were drafted for theseexercises, which were allegedly held for the purpose of trainingthe «territorial defence».
This new «territorial defence», which had taken part in theattack on Zvornik as part of an infantry unit, was mostly dressedin old JNA uniforms or camouflage uniforms. Men dressed incivilian clothing were also involved in the combat activities.They were equipped, at least during the attack, with traditionalinfantry armament. Among them were former members of theterritorial defence from the Serbian villages near Zvornik orfrom Zvornik which had been dissolved in the fall of 1991, aswell as SDS members from the suburbs ofScemlije, Lisicnjak,Celopek, and newly recruited Serbs from the neighbouringvillages.
One possible indication supporting this hypothesis is thefact that many Serbs from the neighbouring villages who wereknown by name could be identified either as Territorial Defencecommanders (among them important SDS members). Others arereported to be JNA officers.
They arrived in town early (either together with or afterArkan, but in any case, during the attack and together with theSeseljovci). This frequently-made statement is supported byfurther allegations. After the assault detachment of theArkanovci, which was protected by mortar sections had capturedthe town, the second line of combat became operational. Thesecond line of combat included local Territorial Defence unitsand theSeseljovci, consisting mostly of people from the nearbyplaces in Serbia. One of their tasks at that time was to deliverto the Arkanovci outstanding Muslim personalities on the basis ofpre-established lists.
The military operations against the Muslim-controlledposition at Kulagrad, which started after 11 April, were mostlyconducted by the «territorial defence» (TO) and by «volunteers»from Serbia and the neighbouring villages. In the actual attackon Kulagrad, the tanks were followed by operations also carriedout by the TO and the Beli Orlovi.
After the fall of Kulagrad on 26 April, the situation inZvornik became more stabilized. The SDS began to rebuild thelocal administration and simultaneously started to prepare forthe expulsion of the Muslim inhabitants of Zvornik.
The first step was, paradoxically, an appeal to the escapedMuslim inhabitants to return. In that appeal, which wasbroadcast by Radio Zvornik and Radio Loznica, as well as by theBelgrade TV station, the escapees were called upon to come backas the situation had returned to normal. They were required toreturn by a certain date (probably 15 May) in order to have theirproperty registered. They would otherwise lose any title totheir property. The exact wording of the appeal could not beascertained anymore as it was apparently broadcast frequently andin a number of different versions. Similarly, there were severaltestimonies as to who had issued the appeal. Essentially,however, these statements are consistent with each other.
The registration, which the respondents were required to dofrom the end of April onward (first mentioned on 28 April), hadto be done before the «Serbian municipality» or the «Serbianmilitia». When people showed up for registration, the truepurpose of the procedure was revealed: a registration of maleinhabitants. Only men were permitted to register with theauthorities. There were even reports of cases where a man had toregister for an apartment despite the fact that this apartmenthad been registered under his wife's name. In line with the truepurpose of the registration, men were arrested and deported intocamps on the basis of lists which had apparently been preparedbeforehand. The conduct of these forced registrations was theresponsibility of the new local administration (SDS) and themilitia.
After the forced registration, the situation of the Muslimpopulation deteriorated rapidly. The increasing terror causedby, to the greatest extent, the newly arrived unit of one«Kapetan Dragan» was the preparatory stage for the ultimate,forceful expulsion of the Muslim inhabitants of Zvornik.
Some time later, around the end of May to early June 1992,the first forced deportations were carried out, preceded by a«compulsory transfer of property», without which it was notpossible to leave the town. The Serbian administration thenissued documents which «permitted» the person to leave the townin the direction of Mali Zvornik and which were frequentlyconnected with an ID card entry stating that the person moved toa Serbian town. These documents had to be shown upon departureor were a prerequisite for being «allowed» to leave the town.The task of the militia was to organize these compulsoryassignments, while the subsequent forced expulsions were carriedout in cooperation with the paramilitary units.
It may be concluded on the basis of the present facts thatnot only were the aggression and the expulsion of the Musliminhabitants intended and initiated by the local Serbianauthorities but other hierarchically superior institutions werealso involved both in the preparation and the actual attack andexpulsion operations.
The employment of heavy equipment, trained personnel andofficers of the former JNA can be proved. The squads themselves,especially the personnel-intensive infantry units, were composedof drafted reservists, «volunteers» and members of paramilitaryunits. The equipment of these units came partly from the JNA,and partly from other sources, such as supplies of the formerterritorial defence or private arms, and was equivalent to theusual infantry equipment.
Several important facts are indicative of an involvement ofsupra-local institutions:
All in all, these facts also support yet another hypothesis,namely that these newly equipped units formed the core element ofthe subsequent «Serbian Army in Bosnia and Herzegovina». The«Serbian Army in Bosnia and Herzegovina», as those members of theformer JNA who had remained in BiH were called, was notofficially founded until 5 May 1992. However, the attack onZvornik was carried out one month earlier. The establishment ofthis new army and the furnishing of its equipment must thereforenot only have been planned sometime before (i.e. long before theattack on BiH), but was already carried out in March 1992.
The local civilian preparations for the conduct of theimpending attack, as well as the local measures aimed at thecreation of a «Serbian territorial defence» in Zvornik, coincidewith the establishment of a new «Serbian Army» in BiH. Thisterritorial defence may even have been involved in thepreparations for the new «Serbian Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina» andmay have served as a basis for the 36th infantry brigade of theDrina corps of the «Serbian Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina»,meanwhile stationed in Zvornik.
The expulsion of the Muslim inhabitants of Zvornik, like themilitary attack, required preparation. When the various stagesof the assault are examined, an underlying systematic approach isrevealed.
The SDS leadership had declared in the fall of 1991 thatZvornik formed part of the so-called «Autonomous Serbian Regionof Semberija and Majevica». Before the attack, requests for aseparation of the town according to ethnic principles were voicedby representatives of the local SDS. During the militaryoccupation phase, lasting until the fall of Kulagrad on 26 April1992, the aim of the violent chaos imposed on the town by theparamilitary units and the massive and systematic war crimes andhuman rights violations was not yet intended to accelerate theexpulsion of the Muslim inhabitants. However, the preparationsfor a total and final expulsion had commenced at that stage. Thespecific terror activities designed to expel the Muslimpopulation only started in May 1992.
These preparations for a total, and final, and systematicexpulsion became obvious when the proclamation for the Musliminhabitants to return to Zvornik was announced. Apart from anallegation that order and peace in the town were restored, theproclamation was linked to an appeal to the Muslims to return inorder to have their property registered. If owners failed to doso, their property would fall to the «Serbian District ofZvornik». A great number of expellees followed the appeal. Theydid so not only in view of the above-mentioned allegation andappeal, but also because many of them were concerned about thefate of members of their families who had stayed in town.
The registration conducted upon their return revealed theprimary purpose of the appeal: to register all male Musliminhabitants. The men who had fled to surrounding Bosnian andSerbian regions were to be neutralized as potential resistancefighters. As a result, many of the returning men wereimmediately deported into a camp.
The appeal to return, however, had yet another, even further-reaching aim: the systematic expulsion of the Muslim population.For it was only after the Muslim inhabitants, not only from thetown but from the entire region, had returned and were thus readyto be «gathered» that their total and final expulsion becamepossible. This enabled the aggressors not only to move them awayfrom Zvornik, but also to deport them in an organized andcomprehensive manner across the national boundaries of the formerYugoslavia. The geographical location of Zvornik, as a bordertown to neighbouring Serbia, enabled the Bosnian-Serb leaders todeport the expellees from of BiH to other countries without anyproblems. By means of bussed mass deportations, the expelleeswere brought as far as Subotica at the Serbian-Hungarian border.There, many of them were issued a «Yugoslavian passport», withwhich they were sent, mostly in corridor trains, via Hungary toAustria.
The reference to places and camps as well as to perpetratorsis based on corresponding statements by witnesses. It istherefore safe to say that these did, in fact, exist. However,one has to take into account that the list is by no meanscomplete.
The Dom Kulture has served as headquarters since December1991 and is said to have served as an internment camp as well.
Ekonomija was an agricultural cooperative. Due to itssecluded location, its buildings were used in particular totorture and kill numerous individuals. According tocorresponding witness accounts, this must have been the «worst»of all camps. In a chamber which used to be a slaughter area,people were literally butchered. Not only people from Zvornikand its surroundings were detained there, but also members of theCroatian National Guard (ZNG), among others.
The principal, Fehim Kujundzic, was murdered by Arkanovci inthe Technical School Centre on 9 or 10 April. In the school'straining labs in particular many acts of violence were committed.
Alhos was a garment factory. Initially, the factoryaccommodated the police (from 6 April on). In addition, theemergency staff also stayed there.
Novi Standard was a new building of the shoe factorycomplex. At the time of the attack, the entire shoe productionhad been stopped. For some time it served as headquarters of theSerbian police (it was moved from Alhos to Novi Standard). Itfurther accommodated paramilitary units--reportedly theArkanovci,Seseljovci, and the «volunteers» from Loznica.Individuals who had picked up their pass certificate from thepolice were kept there for days and severely tortured. Inaddition, citizens who had been randomly arrested were carriedoff to the quarters of the paramilitary units, where they wereseverely tortured.
At the time of the attack, Novi Izvor consisted of twoplants: «Kamenolom», a quarry, and «Ciglana», a brick factory.Both were in operation during the attack. Captured Muslims wereforced to work alongside regular Serbian employees in threeshifts. The Muslims routinely faced violent attacks by variousgroups. In early June, the camp counted about 70 prisoners.Some of them had been held there since mid-April. Many acts oftorture and killings are reported.
A number of persons were identified as guards and torturersin the camps (in some cases only the nick-names are known).
At this prison inmates were tortured during interrogation,and several were killed.
This building was turned into a prison. Women and childrenfrom Divic who had witnessed and/or survived the massacre atCelopek were detained and mistreated there.
This hotel served as quarters for the police. Acts oftorture and arrests are reported.
In mid-April, Arkan took all patients hostage, so that theremains of his brother-in-law «Rambo» be handed over to him. Menwere detained on the street and forced to donate blood. Murderseven occurred as a result of excessive withdrawal of blood.Patients and staff were frequently attacked, in particular byArkanovci. Several people were detained in the basement.
On 15 July, a great number of prisoners from various campswere transferred to Batkovic near Bijeljina. It is unclearwhether any prisoners were left behind.
Based on numerous, consistent witness accounts, thefollowing mass graves can be identified.
Kazanbasca: Kazanbasca is a Muslim cemetery in Zvornik'sMeterize district. According to reports, the first mass graveswere dug there very soon after the attack.
City dumping grounds: These grounds are situated by theDrina. Their name is unknown.
Krecana: Krecana is a lime pit in Mali Zvornik.
Ranun Grob: This site is located between Radakovac andScemlije.
Sljunkara:Sljunkara is a flint pit north ofCelopek by theDrina.
Drina: Many respondents stated that numerous corpses werethrown into the Drina (mostly from bridges).
The BIM holds a list of numerous massacres and mass killingsby gun shots. In order to prevent any premature attribution ofguilt, the following list includes only those perpetrators whohave been identified independently and in consistent statementsby several witnesses. Moreover, we have witness accounts ofmassacres and mass shooting deaths by individual respondents.
Thirty citizens from Divic, who had been deported therearound mid to end of May, were shot to death.
On 9 April, Arkanovci randomly shot to death people they haddragged out of basements in Hrid and Zamlaz.
Seseljovci and Arkanovci together committed mass killings inHrid and Bukovik.
At the checkpoint by the Old Bridge in Zvornik, Muslims wereshot to death and dumped into the Drina river.
Around mid to end of May, a considerable number of Muslimpatients were shot to death in front of the hospital of Zvornikby Arkanovci. In the pediatric ward, dozens of babies weremurdered with bare hands.
