by Donald Spalding
From: AFV NEWS, Jan-Apr/1983 issue
This information is from a secret British Intelligence Objectives Sub-
Committee report. The information is now unclassified and entitled,
"Zimmerit" Anti-Magnetic Plaster for AFVs, which was reported by Major
J.W. Thompson and Mr. C.E. Hollis. The report is dated July 1945, and
is not complete due to insufficient information, or the failure to locate
persons with detailed knowledge of the subject.The investigation was
started with the hope that a way might be found to defeat magnetic mines
used against British armor in the war with Japan.
In 1943 the Germans adopted a thick coating for the vertical armored
surfaces of their tanks. This coating was designed to defeat the affects
of mines placed on armored vehicles, mainly tanks, by determined Russian
infantry assault teams. The mines were attached to the tanks and held in
place by magnets built into the bottom of the mines. The function of the
"zimmerit" was simply to provide a non-ferrous magnetic gap between the
steel armor and and the magnets, in other words a non-magnetic stand-off.
Early in 1944 samples of zimmerit were taken from captured vehicles and
instructions for its use obtained from prisoners of war. The composition
of zimmerit was analyzed by C.S.A.R. and found to be the following:
Polyvinyl Acetate-25%, as binder or glue; Wood Fiber-10%, as filler;
Barium Sulphate-40%; Zinc Sulphide-10%; Ochre Pigment-15%, for the
dark yellow color.
On August 14, 1945 the investigating team visited the Henschel Werke at
Kassel, Germany and interviewed the Director of Production and
Production Engineer. The following information was obtained. The
zimmerit was received in drums from Chemische Werke Zimmer in Berlin,
but they thought production had taken place in various centers because
of the large scale demands, and because of factory dispersal.
The material arrived in a consistency of soft putty (others have compared
it to paste, plaster or plastic). It contained a volatile solvent smelling
like acetone. No thinners were added before use as it worked very easily
even when handled by inexperienced personnel.
The surface of the tank did not need to be prepared before applying
zimmerit, but it was normal to coat the vehicle with anti-corrosive primer.
The zimmerit was applied to the surface in two coats, using a sheetmetal
trowel. The first coat was 5mm thick and was marked out in squares using
the edge of the trowel. This coat was allowed to dry at ordinary
temperatures for 24 hours. The second coat was applied thinner and
marked in wavy lines with a metal comb. The criss-cross squares increased
the adhesion of the second coat, while the comb markings gave a camouflage
finish, plus poor contact for mines.
After the application of both coats, the surface was treated by a gas
blow-lamp to harden it. This took about an hour per tank and no difficulty
was experienced in getting satisfactory hardness without the zimmerit
becoming brittle. (I have seen samples of aged zimmerit and it reminded
me of compressed sawdust.) During the hardening process the solvent was
removed by the heat of the blow-lamp on the surface. The chief thing to
watch was not to leave any soft spots which could be brushed off the
vehicle if not hardened properly. If the zimmerit was not heated with
a blow-lamp it took eight days to harden. This was impractical considering
the urgent need of tank delivery to the front.
The Production Engineer of Henschel Werke said that the company did not
help in the development of zimmerit, but simply applied it to vehicles.
He thought that zimmerit was dropped late in the war due to the development
of better anti-tank weapons. No mention was made of how successful zimmerit
was, however, when the British Army captured the Henschel Werke they
removed about 100 tons of zimmerit.
The investigating team next visited the Karl Freudenburg A.G. in Weinheim,
Germany and talked with the companyÍs Polyvinyl Acetate experts.
Again, this company had not helped in the development of zimmerit, but
did work on the P.I.B. mineral oil adhesives for sticky bombs. The Polyvinyl
Acetate was used as an emulsion in camouflage paints and as a solvent such
as Ethyl Acetate and Toluene during the war. It was mentioned that C.W.
Zimmer of Berlin was well known for paint manufacture during that time,
and probably used Polyvinyl Acetate.
On visiting I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. Hochst, Germany, the Plastics
Development Manager and Production Manager were interviewed. They said
that they had heard of the C.W. Zimmer Co., but also knew nothing of the
development of zimmerit. It was also mentioned that such things were kept
secret. After referring to the companyÍs records it was learned that
Mowilith 20 (a Polyvinyl Acetate) was sold to the C.W. Zimmer Co. in
July 1943, but they had no idea if the company or its personnel still
existed.
The general properties of Polyvinyl Acetate were discussed. Mowilith 20
was 50% benzene solution (this is what smelled and was burned off with
blow-lamps). It had an average MW of 3500 (Staudinger viscosity method,
1 - 2% solution) and a melting range of 40 to 50 degrees C.
It was also confirmed that the blow-lamp would remove the solvent and
adhere the zimmerit to the armor, thus increasing its resistance to shock.
In regard to adhesion, it was suggested that a clean or just painted
surface would be better than a greasy or rusty one. Also, that Polyvinyl
Acetate with a pigment mixture (zimmerit had 15% ochre) were somewhat
water-resistant, but due to thermal behavior of Polyvinyl Acetate its use
was limited in plastics as it became brittle when cold.
In conclusion, the team decided that the C.W. Zimmer Co. was responsible
for zimmerit and every effort should be made to contact them. They also
were wondering if zimmerit, thinned down, could have been sprayed on
vehicles to speed up application time. However, no follow-up research was
done due to the end of WW2.
I wish to gratefully acknowledge the help of the staff of the Imperial
War Museum who made this article possible.
\
by Thomas L. Jentz
FromAFV NEWS, Sept-Dec. 1986, Volume 21, No.3
Pz.Abt. (Funklenk) 300 was was shipped to the Eastern Front and assigned
to Heeres Gruppe Sud in late May/42. On June 7/42 it had 27 PzKpfw III
and still had 20 operational Pz.III by July 11/42. Before being
transferred to Heeres Gruppe Nord in early Sept/42 the active field
unit was renumbered from 300 to 301, and an experienced cadre returned to
Neuruppin, the home base for the Panzer Versuchs and Ersatz Abt.
(Funklenk) 300. Pz. Abt. (FKL) 301 with an operational strength of
25 PzKpfw III on Sept 17/42 remained with H-G Nord until Dec./42, when
it returned to Neuruppin to rest and refit.
The next major employment of the Funklenk units was at Kursk, when the
HQ of pz.Abt.(FKL) 301 was assigned to H-G Mitte with 3 new companies
(312, 313, and 314) under its command. These independent companies were
formed in Jan./43 and ordered to be operational by May/43. Instead
of PzKpfw III, StuG III were issued to the units for control and command.
Pz.Kp (FKL) 312 had 7 StuG, 313 had 7 and 314 had 9 on July 5/43.
The only detailed action account from 5th to 8th July comes from 312,
attached to sPz.Abt. 505 (with 31 Tigers and 15 Pz.III), is as follows:
"One B IV was sent 800 meters against a PaK Nest of 2 or 3 anti-tank guns
and detonated, destroying the guns along with their accompanying infantry.
A second B IV was sent 400 meters against a T34, which was destroyed when
it rammed the B IV. Three B IVs were sent 400 to 600 meters against three
concrete bunkers and destroyed them. Two B IVs were sent 800 meters
against an anti-tank gun position and an infantry gun position, destroying
both of them. One B IV reached a Russian position and was set on fire
by a Molotov Cocktail. It exploded and eliminated the position.
Pz.Kp.(FKL) 313 was attached to the II.Abt./sPz.Jag. Rgt. 656
(sPz.Jag.Abt. 654 with 44 Elefants). Its initial role was to clear a gap
thru the enemy minefield. Before reaching the minefield 4 B IVs were lost in
German minefields, and 4 made it thru to blow a gap thru which
the Elefants passed. Later, 3 B IVs destroyed two PaK Nests and a bunker.
Pz.Kp. (FKL) 314, attached to the I. Abt./sPz.Jag.Rgt. 656 (sPz.Jag.Abt.
653 with 45 Elefants), used 12 BIVs to blow a gap thru deep enemy minefields.
The StuGs used as control vehicles moved thru, but the Pioniers could not
mark the gaps since they were pinned down by heavy artillery fire.
The Elefants lost track of the gap and some were disabled on the mines,
delaying the attack considerably. Later that day, two BIVs were sent into
a woodline held by enemy infantry. After detonating, enemy resistance ceased
to exist. The companies under command of Pz.Abt. (FKL) 301 had lost 20
BIVs in 4 days. Only 4 BIVs didn't reach their assigned targets due to
being hit by A/T and artillery fire. Two of these were burnt out and two
were recovered.
Those BIVs that did not have the spring detonators set, did not explode
but burned when hit. Overall, the unit was pleased with the performance,
but the radio control proved to be effective for a range of 800 - 1000 meters
instead of the desired 2000 meters.
The unit commander requested that Tigers replace the StuGs as a much more
effective control tank, due to the thicker armor and higher profile to view
the BIV's progress.
All 3 companies were quickly decimated in the heavy fighting in H-G Mitte
during July and August, and returned to rebuild in Germany in late 1943.
A fourth company, 311, was not was not ready for Kursk and was later sent
to H-G Sud in mid-August, outfitted with 10 StuGs, and remained on the East
Front until May 18/44, when it was ordered back for refit with Pz.Versuchs
und Ausbildung Abt. 300 in Eisenbach. The HQ of Pz.Abt. (FKL) 301 returned
to Neuruppin and again took over command of its original 3 companies.
In Sept./43 the unit was outfitted with 32 StuG. In addition, two new
companies, Pz.Kp. (FKL) 315 and 316 were formed and each was issued 10 StuGs
in Aug./43. At the close of 1943, all of the Funklenk units except 311
were in training centers in the West, with the following strength as of
Dec. 31/43:
301 had 31 StuG; 311 had 7 StuG; 312 had 2 StuG; 313 had 10 Pz.III/N;
314 had 4 StuG;
315 and 316 each had 10 StuG.
In response to the Allied landings at Anzio, in Jan./44 Pz.Abt.(FKL) 301
was sent to help reinforce the front, remaining in action there until Mar./44.
A new phase in the deployment of Funklenk units occurred in Dec./43 when
313 was assigned to sPz.Abt. 508 as its 3. Kompanie. 314 was sent to sPz.Abt.
504 as its 3. Kompanie in Jan./44, and 316 was assigned to the Pz.Lehr Abt.
All 3 of these units were to receive Tigers as control tanks, as dictated
by KStN 1176f dated Feb. 1/44:
SCHWERE PANZER KOMPANIE "TIGER" (F.K.L.) Kompanie Trupp: 2 PzKpfw Tiger (SdKfz 181 or 182)
1. Zug: 4 PzKpfw Tiger (SdKfz 181 or 182) and 9 Sprengstofftrager (SdKfz 301),
plus 1 mSPW (251/1)
2. and 3. Zug: Same as 1. Zug. Sondergerat Reserve of 9 SdKfz. 301.
The 3. Kp of sPz.Abt 508 with 14 Tiger I was sent to Italy to the Anzio
beachead in Feb./44, and the 3. Kp of sPz.Abt 504 with 14 Tigers was sent
to Italy in June/44. Both of them remained in Italy until October, when
their personnel were sent back to Germany for further employment with other
units.
Pz.Kp. (FKL) 316 under the Panzer Lehr Rgt.received the first 5 production
Tiger IIs to replace their StuGs in Feb./44. When the Allied landed in Normandy
the Tiger IIs were mechanically unsound and it was decided to ship them back to
Germany. However, transport could not be arranged and the 5 Tiger IIs
remained in France at Chateaudun where they were subsequently destroyed
to prevent capture.
The Funklenk company fought in Normandy with the Pz.Lehr Rgt., starting
with an operational strength of 9 StuG and 3 Tiger Is. They still had
7 operational StuG on July 1/44 and were pulled out of the front later
in July to join the newly formed Pz.Abt (FKL) 302.
301 was built up to 4 companies by the addition of 312 as the 1. Kompanie.
When the Allies landed at Normandy 301 was attached to 2. Pz.Div. with an
operational strength of two Pz.III, 32 StuG, and 146 B IVs. The organization
had been updated by KStN 1171f dated 1/Jun/44 as follows:
LEICHTE PANZER KOMPANIE f
Kompanie Trupp: 2 StuG (SdKfz 142/1)
1. Zug: 4 StuG (SdKfz 142/1) and 12 Sprengstofftrager (SdKfz 301), plus
1 mSPW (SdKfz 251/1)
2. Zug: (Same as above 1. Zug). Sondergerat Reserve of 12 Sprengstofftrager
(SdKfz 301)
The unit was quickly decimated in June and July 1944 and pulled out to
rebuild.
Pz.Abt (FKL) 302 was formed in June 1944 and by the time of its employment
consisted of 4 Kompanies. Pz.Kp. (FKL) 316 became the 1. Kompanie, 315 the
2. Kp., 317 the 3. Kp., and 311 the 4. Kp. It was sent to Heeres Gruppe Mitte
in the East in Aug./44 with 3 PzKpfw IV, 40 StuG and 144 B IVs. It remained
there and reported having 38 StuG on Dec. 5/44, and 28 StuG on Jan. 15/45,
but was down to 3 StuG by Mar. 15/45. The unit ended its days in East Prussia.
The last independent company, Pz.Kp. (FKL) 319, was formed and sent west
in Sept./44. It had been outfitted with 10 StuG and 36 B IVs. the 319 took
part in the Ardennes Offensive in Heeres Gruppe B and reported an
operational strength of 10 StuG on Jan. 15/45. It was pulled out of the
front to help form the battalion sized Funklenk unit in Feb./45.
After leaving France, 301 was ordered on Aug. 19/44 to reorganize and
re-equip as sPz.Abt (Tiger/FKL) 301. Each of the 3 companies were to have
10 Tiger Is and the Abteilung HQ was to have 2 Tiger Is.
Since the Tiger I had gone out of production the unit was issued a total
of 31 Tiger Is that had been rebuilt, of which 10 were acquired from an
SS sPz.Abt. The new 301 also took part in the Ardennes Offensive under
Heeres Gruppe B.
Late in the war a third Abteilung, the Pz.Abt (FKL) 303 was organized by
pulling together the remains of 319, 301 and 302. On Feb. 17/45 it was
ordered to be formed as a normal Panzer Abteilung without Funklenk equipment.
Issued 31 Pz. IV, it was renamed Pz.Abt. "Schlesien" and sent to face the
Russians during the closing months of the war.
The last unit to be formed was Panther Zug (FKL) 303. It consisted of the
remnants of personnel and vehicles from Pz.Abt. (FKL) 303 and Pz.Versuchs
and Ausbildung Abt. 301. On Feb. 18/45 this platoon was ordered to be quickly
organized, issued 4 StuG and 12 B IV, and shipped to the Eastern Front and
attached to 35. Pz.Gren.Div. under H-G Mitte. The overall worth and
effectiveness of these Funklenk units in the closing months of the war
was minimal.
by D. Colt Denfeld
from the Sept-Dec, 1982 issue of AFV NEWS
As American forces pushed forward towards the Japanese homeland resistance in the
Central Pacific Islands intensified. The Japanese changed their tactics from a total effort
at the beach to prolonged fighting from well defended positions, such as caves in
Peleliu (Palau) and Okinawa. The invasion of Peleliu was viewed as one that would
be "short but tough". The new Japanese tactics, combined with the terrain made it
"prolonged and tough". The battle was supposed to last 2 or 3 days, ended up running
from Sept. 15 to Nov. 27, 1944.
American casualties were heavy, losing about 40% of the amphibious forces. The total U.S.
losses for the First Marine Division, Naval Forces, and the 81st Infantry Division (U.S. Army)
were 1,618 killed. The grip on the island on D-Day was rather shaky, and an effective
counter attack could have driven the First Marine Div. into the ocean. Instead of a well
coordinated infantry attack, the Japanese chose an armored assault. They challenged the
American M4 Shermans of the Marines with 13 Type 95 Ha-Go tanks. The Type 95 was no
match for the M4 and all 13 were quickly dispatched.
The two battles were so quickly decided that it was not clear exactly what happened, so
accounts vary greatly. The Operations Report of the 1st Marines states that at 16.15 the
Japanese sortied on the northern edge of the airfield. Seven of the 13 tanks drove across
the airfield at top speed, 40kph, hitting the American lines at about 16.50. They struck
where the 1st Marines (Regiment) and 5th Marines met. This line was about 150 meters
inland of the western invasion beaches. Some witnesses of the battle say that Japanese
infantrymen were tied to the tanks.
It was claimed that 10 to 15 were tied to each of the 7 tanks. Others claim that the infantry were
hidden by the dust of the tanks, and followed behind. In any event, it may have been an effort
on their behalf to deliver infantry at high speed to assist the tanks break the beachhead.
Another story states that Japanese infantry rode in up-ended oil drums attached to the back of
each tank. However, Lt. Col. 'Jeb' Stuart, commanding officer of the 1st Tank Bn, the division's
organic tank unit, does not give much credence to any of the stories, except for the possibility that
some Jap infantry may have ridden in oil drums. He idi see a drum attached to one of the tanks he
inspected after the battle. He was more interested in the audacity of the Japanese. "I have tried
my best to determine what the Japanese were up to; how they hoped to succeed, and can only
suppose that they thought we had not been able to get out tanks ashore", he said.
"They knew the capabilities of our Shermans, and that we outgunned them, and I don't know
how they could have failed to see our tanks come ashore. They had perfect observation from the ridges." (McMillan, G. THE OLD BREED:
A HISTORY OF THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION IN WW2,1949)
The Japanese tanks were knocked out so fast that arguments ensued as to who actually got
what tank. One American tank commander recalled changing from armor piercing to high
explosive shells with instantaneous fuses to compensate for the light armor of the Type 95.
The light armor and the 37mm gun of the Type 95 put it at a clear disadvantage to the Shermans with 75's.
The remaining six Japanese tanks struck at the American lines at 17.25 that same day and
were quickly destroyed by counter fire from Marine tanks and infantry weapons.
Today, one of the Type 95s still rests on the battlefield as a silent reminder of that
attack. Japanese visitors to Peleliu leave memorial markers, Sake and food at this tank.
The turret is missing and battle damage has sped up the rusting process.
The Marine Shermans were then used during the capture of Peleliu, and seven of those M4s
were then used during the invasion of nearby Ngesebus Island. Here they were left behind
in coral stone revements to be used as coastal defense guns. Today, one of those seven
still sits in its sheltered position with its gun pointed seaward.
In addition to the Type 95 and M4 Sherman there are 7 LVTs on Peleliu. There is one of the
amphibious tank models, one is the 37mm equipped version, and there are the personnel
carries LVT4A. An LVT personnel carrier on Ngesebus Island has stencilled on the driver's
compartment "Miss Philadelphia". Peleliu and Angaur in the Palau Island Group were captured
to provide airfields to support McArthur's push into the South Pacific, and to neutralize Western
Caroline bases such as Yap and the northern Palau Islands. To the north of Palau was the island
of Babelthuap with 25,000 Japanese troops. Another 5,000 were on Koror Island nearby.
A large amount of Japanese equipment was left behind in the jungle there. In one sector of
Babelthuap are 5 of the Type 2 Ka-Mi amphibious tanks. One more is on Koror and mounts
a Type 96, 25mm dual mount AA gun. The Ka-Mi tanks are in good condition (l981) in spite
of over 37 years of neglect. The Ka-Mi is based on the design of the Type 95 Ha-Go and was
produced for the Navy beginning in 1942. Its armament was a 37mm gun and 2 machineguns.
These are samples
