Early in 1995, Rev Nababan told a rapt Jakarta congregationof the Batak Protestant Church HKBP of his recent adventures inNorth Sumatra:
It was no use, wherever I went I was tailed. So I left forPrapat, together with two ministers I considered brilliant.Arriving there we were told to go down to Sibaganding, where noone expected us. A speed boat transferred us to Samosir Island,again landing in an unexpected spot. The trip took only 13minutes. Extraordinary! The speed boat driver said: 'MisterEphorus, don't be afraid. This is the fastest speed boat on LakeToba. No one will ever catch us'.
The four of us went into a house in a lonely place, withoutattracting attention. We were then put in a vegetable truck withone light missing. Travelling at high speed we were not stopped,and entered the church at 8pm in heavy rain. Afterwards I wastold the authorities had that afternoon told church officialsthat Mr Nababan was not allowed to come here, and that anywayeverything had been sealed off. They did not know I was alreadythere.
By 10am the next day, Sunday, only a few dozen had turned up.By noon only about 350. There were more people guarding me thanturning up for church. The committee was getting scared. Suddenlyabout half past one people started flooding in. More than 4000within an hour. Apparently all boats had been stopped fromlanding at Ambarita, the main jetty on Samosir. So they landed5-7 km away in a place they were not expected, and walked back.At ten past two we came out of hiding. There were over 5000people for the church service.
'Mister Ephorus' is Dr S A E Nababan, ephorus, or archbishop,of the largest Protestant church in Indonesia, the 2.5 millionstrong HKBP. But why did he have to engage in these guerillatactics just to lead a church service on Samosir Island, in themiddle of the stunningly beatiful Lake Toba? The story of how thesecurity agency Bakorstanasda in 1992 issued an order simplydismissing Nababan from his position as ephorus, and replacinghim with someone more to its liking, is bizarre. It also makesa fascinating case study in the way religion and the stateinteract in modern Indonesia.
Most Indonesians are Muslim, but in certain areas around theouter rim of the country Christians are in the majority. NorthTapanuli in Sumatra is one such. Bataks there converted toChristianity under the influence of German missionaries at theend of the last century. Even today, the size of Sunday morningcongregations often amazes visitors from the post-Christian West.
As an organization, the HKBP has always been riven by internalconflict and even schisms. But never did disagreement lead tosustained violence until the state became involved from August1990.
In 1987 a synod of the church elected Nababan as its newephorus. Dr Nababan was educated in Germany, and was for yearsthe leading figure in the Indonesian Christian ecumenicalmovement. Becoming ephorus of the HKBP was for him actually astep down into provincial life. He was known as, at times, anauthoritarian figure, with enemies as well as fervent admirers.He also espoused a more socially active theology for thefaithful.
By early 1990 a non-government organization (NGO) known by theacronym KSPPM had sprung up under the church's protection. Itbegan taking on the horrendous environmental and land rightsabuses committed by the giant paper-pulp factory Indorayon,situated near Lake Toba.
Any large business venture in Indonesia needs to bepolitically well-connected, and Indorayon is too. Its need toprotect itself against citizen protests, mediated by the KSPPM,meshed with the personal ambitions of several local powerholders. As a result, the KSPPM was officially banned in August1990, though on such flimsy legal grounds that it was able toreopen two months later.
Not satisfied with harrassing a small organisation ofactivists, the powers felt that the backing for dissent had tobe rooted out completely. That meant getting rid of Nababan. Buthow do you eliminate a difficult leader of an otherwise legalorganisation? The normal method employed in Indonesia is covertlyto support a rival faction. This was done, for example, in thePDI in 1996.
The HKBP certainly offered plenty of rivalries open tocultivation. By November 1992 the Military Area Commander innorthern Sumatra, Maj-Gen R Pramono, was so deeply committed tothe anti-Nababan faction within HKBP that he ordered hundreds oftroops to disrupt a church synod where Nababan expected to be re-elected.
In his capacity as chief of the provincial joint securityagency Bakorstanasda, Pramono then brazenly ordered theappointment of Nababan's rival, Rev P W T Simanjuntak, to becomeHKBP ephorus instead.
Illegitimate power in a religious organisation is fragilepower, and Simanjuntak soon became painfully aware of it.Nevertheless an important advantage, to his mind, was that thekey to legitimacy in the HKBP is a very material one, namelypossession of quite concrete buildings.
During April and May 1993, under military protection, thugsused considerable violence to wrest control of many parsonagesand church buildings from the majority of ministers who remainedloyal to Nababan. The thugs were often members of PemudaPancasila, an organisation related to Golkar. They were hired bythe Simanjuntak faction.
Horrific stories of torture in police and military detentioncentres also began to appear. There was some violence from theNababan side too, but this was legally prosecuted, while none onthe Simanjuntak side were prosecuted for their offences.
Military Area Commander Maj-Gen A Pranowo, who replacedPramono in April 1993, soon betrayed his frustration atparishioners' stubborn persistence in sticking with Nababan evenif it meant abandoning formal worship and meeting in theirprivate homes. He said people should not believe only worship ledby Nababan was acceptable to God, while that led by Simanjuntakwas not.
Throughout 1993 and 1994 both sides energetically pulledstrings in Jakarta. Simanjuntak had the inside track, and lobbiedquietly with Cabinet ministers and the President. Nababan couldonly appeal to the people - to Parliament, and to the NationalCommission on Human Rights (of which his younger brother AsmaraNababan was a well-known member). Large delegations of women,ministers, and others came down from North Sumatra to supportNababan. All pleaded for the state not to interfere in religiousmatters. It was for him a new experience to be out on the marginsof power with the human rights and pro-democracy activists.
Official opposition to a Nababan-led HKBP was initially local.Jakarta long maintained an appearance of neutrality and paternalconcern at internal disunity. But in reality the government soonhardened against Nababan's return, even if Simanjuntak's violenttactics have not commended themselves to a somewhat image-conscious Jakarta elite.
After the huge labour demonstrations in Medan in April 1994,Nababan lost what little ground he had over against the state.Pranowo declared that the labour union SBSI that organised thedemonstrations had its roots in the HKBP under Nababan. That waswhy the government was opposed to both, he said. Indeed MuchtarPakpahan, leader of the labour union SBSI, had acted for theNababan side as a legal adviser in 1993. The most fearless SBSIleader in Medan, Amosi Telaumbanua, had found his activist feetin the KSPPM.
Since then the situation has remained indeterminate. Whilstnot enjoying the national press coverage it had between 1992 and1994, disturbing reports continue to surface.
Nababan now spends most of his time in Jakarta. The forayrecounted above took place in February 1995. He had originallyplanned to go to Paniaran, near Siborongborong. But truckloadsof fully armed soldiers blocked the roads and turned backvehicles carrying many thousands heading for the service.Resourceful supporters then took Nababan in the oppositedirection, to Lake Toba. There he managed to evade the 'seal' andmeet his enthusiastic followers.
Hoodlums thought to be in the pay of Simanjuntak continue toattack churches not yet under his control. So in June 1995 theyattacked at Labuhan Batu, near Pekan Baru, injuring a clergyman.In the same month a hundred thugs attacked a church in Binjai,10 km north of Medan, badly injuring 14 including a minister andhis family, one of whom later died.
In July 1995 police arrested 80 and even opened fire, injuringone, as they tried to stop 2000 HKBP youth holding a service inPearaja, 250 km southwest of Medan. In the same month a crowd of70 attacked a HKBP church in Padang, West Sumatra, injuring eightincluding a minister, and damaging the building. The followingweek they attacked again, injuring two. Only 30 of the 700 HKBPfamilies in Padang had gone over to the Simanjuntak side.
In April 1996 Abri adopted full battle posture to stopthousands attending an April Easter celebration led by Nababanin Tarutung, the heart of HKBP territory and normally underSimanjuntak control. But Nababan was dragged into church anywayby loyal parishioners who had managed to evade them, and he leda long service. Before that he had addressed 7500 in a borrowedCatholic church in Medan, and afterwards he spoke inSiborongborong, having been blocked by Abri in Porsea.
In July 1996 a fight was narrowly averted when Nababansupporters tried to move back into a church in Palembang, SouthSumatra, that had been sealed by the military. They were met byaggressive Simanjuntak supporters. The following week theconfrontation was renewed and riot police were called out.
Since the intervention began, it is estimated that around tenhave been killed, thousands injured and hundreds arrested, mostlyon the Nababan side. By taking the advice of the military, theJakarta government has created widespread dissatisfaction in anarea of Indonesia that was always loyal, and that has providedmany prominent individuals for its modernisation programmes. Yetthere are no signs that those with power to change things aredoing anything other than hope it will all go away.
The affair has nothing to do with anti-Christian sentiment inJakarta. It has everything to do with a fear of dissent growingwithin a large religious community. Urbanisation and the arrivalof environmental and labour problems associated with NorthSumatra's burgeoning industry is transforming Batak society. Thechurch is becoming a lens to focus the sense of injustice thistransformation is creating. If the government fails to rise tothe challenge this sense of injustice represents, and insteadcontinues to dismiss it with crude repressive methods, fear ofdissent may well become a self-fulfilling prophechy.
