Authors:Yukou Kobayashi1;Naoto Yanai2;Kazuki Yoneyama3;Takashi Nishide1;Goichiro Hanaoka4;Kwangjo Kim5 andEiji Okamoto1
Affiliations:1University of Tsukuba, Japan;2Osaka University, Japan;3Ibaraki University, Japan;4National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology, Japan;5Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Korea, Republic of
Keyword(s):Password-based Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE), Threshold Cryptography.
RelatedOntology Subjects/Areas/Topics:Identification, Authentication and Non-Repudiation ;Information and Systems Security ;Insider Threats and Countermeasures ;Security in Distributed Systems ;Security Protocols ;Security Verification and Validation
Abstract:Password-based Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) allows a server to authenticate a user and to establisha session key shared between the server and the user just by having memorable passwords. In PAKE, conventionallythe server is assumed to have the authentication functionality and also provide on-line servicessimultaneously. However, in the real-life applications, this may not be the case, and the authentication servermay be separate from on-line service providers. In such a case, there is a problem that a malicious serviceprovider with no authentication functionality may be able to guess the passwords by interacting with otherparticipants repeatedly. Abdalla et al. put forward a notion of the server password protection security to dealwith this problem. However, their proposed schemes turned out to be vulnerable to Undetectable On-lineDictionary Attack (UDonDA). To cope with this situation, we propose the Gateway Threshold PAKE provablysecure against this password guessing attack by also taking the corruption of authentication servers intoconsideration.(More)
Password-based Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) allows a server to authenticate a user and to establish
a session key shared between the server and the user just by having memorable passwords. In PAKE, conventionally
the server is assumed to have the authentication functionality and also provide on-line services
simultaneously. However, in the real-life applications, this may not be the case, and the authentication server
may be separate from on-line service providers. In such a case, there is a problem that a malicious service
provider with no authentication functionality may be able to guess the passwords by interacting with other
participants repeatedly. Abdalla et al. put forward a notion of the server password protection security to deal
with this problem. However, their proposed schemes turned out to be vulnerable to Undetectable On-line
Dictionary Attack (UDonDA). To cope with this situation, we propose the Gateway Threshold PAKE provably
secure against this password guessing attack by also taking the corruption of authentication servers into
consideration.