CVL66348 OLIT 2023 HB1 Alternative Holdings LLC v. Martin Hearing on: Discovery Motions Moving Party: Plaintiff Tentative Ruling: See BelowThis is an unlawful detainer action involving a SFR located at 23240 Cresta Drive in TwainHarte, CA. The record owner of the property lost her ownership interest via nonjudicialforeclosure, but the human occupying the property has refused to leave. He has regularlyasserted a myriad of frivolous, and at times meaningless, theories to avoid having to findanother place to live, and yet also refuses to deposit to this Court any amount that wouldrepresent reasonable rent for the property. The matter is set to go to trial this day. Also beforethe Court this day are a number of discovery motions, several of which are moot in light of thefact that trial begins today. Nevertheless, this Court will address all of the motions as there is,presently, no opposition thereto.1Requests for AdmissionsThe primary purpose behind requests for admissions is to eliminate the need for proof and toset at rest triable issues so that they will not have to be tried. Stull v. Sparrow (2001) 92Cal.App.4th 860, 865. Requests for admissions may be directed to any matter that is incontroversy between the parties: facts, opinions or legal conclusions. See CCP §2033.010;Miller v. American Greetings Corp. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1055, 1066. So long as plaintiffconfirms that defendant has not provided substantially-complaint responses by the time of thehearing, plaintiff shall be entitled as a matter of law to an order that all five of the RFAs servedon defendant are deemed admitted for all purposes. Defendant is also entitled to an award ofsanctions in the amount of $500.00, which defendant shall pay within 5 days.Special InterrogatoriesThe party responding has an obligation to provide responses which are “as complete andstraightforward” as possible. In order to meet this obligation, the responding party is requiredto make a “reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information” from sources within itsreach/control. CCP §2030.220. For reasons not entirely clear, Defendant declined to provideany responses to the eighteen (8) special interrogatories served by plaintiff. Since the time for1 The only “response” to the discovery motions is defendant’s repeated claim of a mandatory stay in the proceedings basedupon some fanciful filing he created called a Notice of Constructive Service. That document is so chocked-full of gibberishit is remarkable that any sane person would file that in a court of law and retain a straight face. Rather than sanctiondefendant under CCP §128.5 for what amounts to an obvious fraud, this Court would prefer to simply ignore it and movethis case along to its inevitable conclusion. Dept. 4Civil Law and Motion Tentative Rulings for Friday, March 21, 2025, at 8:30 a.m.If you wish to appear for oral argument, you must so notify the Court at (209) 533-6633 and (209) 588-2316, andall other parties by 4:00 p.m. on the court day preceding the hearing, consistent with CRC 3.1308. The tentativeruling will become the ruling of the Court if notice for oral argument has not been provided.providing responses has passed, plaintiff is entitled to an order compelling a response, plussanctions. However, since trial is to commence this date, there is no reason to order a responseto discovery “within” 5-10 days from service of any order hereon. The discovery motion is toolate to serve any value and is therefore MOOT. So too is the request for fees. (Plaintiff couldhave, and should have, served this motion a motion ago.)Requests for DocumentsThe party served with a request for production of documents is obligated to provide one ofthree responses: (1) a statement of compliance, which includes the actual documents(organized and labeled or as they are kept in the usual course of business) or a clear indicationas to when and how the documents will be provided; (2) a statement of noncompliance basedon inability, confirming a “diligent search and reasonable inquiry” and the reason for theinability, to wit: the documents never existed, were lost/destroyed, or in the possession ofsomeone inaccessible; or (3) A statement of noncompliance based on objection, which mustdescribe responsive documents and set forth “clearly” the specific grounds for the objection.CCP §§ 2031.210-2031.280. Although defendant’s failure to response constitutes a misuse ofthe discovery process, this motion is likewise tardy because any order to comply would beenforceable after the trial is over. The discovery motion is too late to serve any value and istherefore MOOT. So too is the request for fees. (Plaintiff could have, and should have, servedthis motion a motion ago.)

CV66215 Johnson v. VOP Skyline Place Hearing on: Trial Setting Preference Moving Party: Plaintiff Tentative Ruling: MOOTThis is – at its core – a trip and fall case with tragic repercussions. Gordon Johnson was aresident at defendant’s memory care facility here in Sonora, and reportedly fell during a strollin the courtyard, striking his head. He died two days later. Before the Court this day is amotion by decedent’s surviving spouse (successor-in-interest) for statutory calendar prioritypursuant to CCP §36(a) due to her age, interest in the action, and potential health ramificationswith any avoidable delay. There is no opposition to the motion, and a cursory review suggeststhat perhaps her health conditions might support the requisite finding. See Pabla v. SuperiorCourt (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 599, 604; Fox v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 529, 534.However, in the intervening time between the filing of the motion and this day, trial hasalready been set for 06/03/2025 – which falls within the 120-day period prescribed by CCP§36. This Court does not freely grant trial continuances, so whether this case is officiallyanointed as preferential or not, it is expected to proceed to trial as currently scheduled.

CV65851 Jacobs v. County of Tuolumne et al Hearing on: Withdrawal of Counsel Moving Party: Plaintiff’s Counsel Tentative Ruling: Continued for Curative FilingsThis is a personal injury action involving an alleged dangerous condition inside the restroom inFacility A inside the Sierra Conservation Center. Plaintiff, an inmate, claims that a lightbulbabove his head exploded while he was in a stall in the lavatory, raining down shards of glass.The action was commenced more than a year ago, and yet there have been no appearancesmade by any named defendant. Before the Court this day is a motion by plaintiff’s counsel towithdraw from representation. The motion cannot be granted for three reasons.First, papers shall be served and filed at least 16 court days before the hearing. If the papersare served by mail, an additional 5 calendar days must be added to the notice period. CCP§1005(b). CCP §284(2) and CRC 3.1362(d) require attorneys to make requests to be relievedas counsel by noticed, written motion served on the client. In re Malcolm D. (1996) 42Cal.App.4th 904, 914. Since the client was served by mail on 02/24/25, the soonest thismotion could be heard is 03/28/25.Second, attorneys are required to use the MC forms for these motions, and the MC-053proffered by counsel has a typo in the case name on page 2 (Hernandez v. Aleman). Dept. 1Civil Law and Motion Tentative Rulings for Friday, March 21, 2025, at 8:30 a.m.If you wish to appear for oral argument, you must so notify the Court at (209) 533-6633 and (209) 588-2316, andall other parties by 4:00 p.m. on the court day preceding the hearing, consistent with CRC 3.1308. The tentativeruling will become the ruling of the Court if notice for oral argument has not been provided.Third, courts have a duty of inquiry regarding the grounds for the motion, and are not requiredto accept at face value vague, unsupported or uncertain representations as to reasons why anattorney wants out. Counsel has a corresponding duty to respond and to describe the generalnature of the issue, within the confines of any privilege. The degree of detail is on a slidingscale against counsel’s candor and trustworthiness. See Flake v. Neumiller & Beardslee(2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 223, 230; Manfredi & Levine v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th1128, 1134-1136; Aceves v. Superior Court (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 584, 592-593. Counsel’sMC-052 provides no information from which to glean the genuine need to withdraw. ThisCourt is not asking for counsel to disclose the content of any communications with the client,only an explanation for why – after sitting on the file for over a year and risking a number ofpotential issues for plaintiff – counsel is unwilling to remain.Hearing continued to 04/25/2025 at 8:30 a.m. Counsel to give notice. Counsel should also beprepared to discuss the status of defendant appearances.

CV66799 Moyle Excavation, Inc. v. Iron Mechanical, Inc. Hearing on: Default Prove-Up Moving Party: Plaintiff Tentative Ruling: MOOTThis is a contract dispute which appeared to be proceeding via default judgment. However,just recently, the parties submitted what appears to a joint stipulation to set aside the entry ofdefault and vacate today’s hearing on the prove-up. Court will need to set a CMC.

CV65805 Ath v. McEvoy Hearing on: Status of Settlement/Dismissal Moving Party: N/A Tentative Ruling: N/AThis is a personal injury action involving a motor vehicle accident. On 01/30/2025, plaintiffcaused to be filed herein an Unconditional Notice of Settlement of the Entire Case. Pursuant toCRC 3.1385(b), “the court must dismiss the entire case 45 days after it receives notice ofsettlement unless good cause is shown why the case should not be dismissed.” Today (Friday)is 57 days since receipt of the Notice of Settlement, and no good cause is shown for delayingdismissal. As such, the case is hereby dismissed with prejudice. However, as a courtesy to theparties, this Court will of its own accord reserve jurisdiction for the limited purpose ofenforcing the terms of any existing settlement agreement. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.

CV64893 Kuffler v. North American Beverages, LLC Hearing on: MSA/MSJ Moving Party: Plaintiff Tentative Ruling: DeniedThis is a personal injury action involving a collision between a vehicle and a pedestrian onState Route 49 in Jamestown. The accident occurred in October of 2020. Plaintiff hired alawyer a few weeks later. According to plaintiff’s mother and lawyer, plaintiff has not beenseen or heard from since September of 2022, even though this lawsuit was filed after that.Largely because a claims examiner “agreed” to resolve the claim for $95,000, it appears thatplaintiff’s counsel has been prosecuting this personal injury claim without a client or a bonafide representative for quite some time. Counsel went so far as to appear at case managementconferences, and serve unverified discovery responses, maintaining what some might describeas a rouse in order to keep up appearances in the hopes that his wayward client would somedayresurface. So far that has not occurred. Dept. 1Civil Law and Motion Tentative Rulings for Friday, April 11, 2025, at 8:30 a.m.If you wish to appear for oral argument, you must so notify the Court at (209) 533-6633 and (209) 588-2316, andall other parties by 4:00 p.m. on the court day preceding the hearing, consistent with CRC 3.1308. The tentativeruling will become the ruling of the Court if notice for oral argument has not been provided.Recently, this Court provided both sides clear guidance on how to move this case along. Forthe plaintiff, that required either a CCP § 664.6 motion to enforce what plaintiff’s counselbelieves to have been a binding settlement agreement with the claims examiner many yearsago, or actual cooperation with discovery. For the defense, that required actual efforts toconduct discovery with concomitant law and motion for alleged discovery shortcomings.What was no longer acceptable to this Court was the bilateral apathy shown by both sides.Despite the referenced guidance, this Court is informed that (1) no §664.6 motion has beenfiled, and (2) no deposition of plaintiff has been set. Thus, it appears that the parties continueto languish in apathy-land.As for the “motion” pending this date, defense counsel is correct that there is no statutory basisin CCP § 437c for the type of order sought by plaintiff, to wit: the right to have the disputeresolved by a jury despite plaintiff’s failure to participate therein. As explained in CCP§437c(f), these summary judgment motions are used to completely resolve “one or morecauses of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims fordamages, or one or more issues of duty” – not a procedural question pertaining to the right tohave a jury. It is true that the parties can stipulate to expand the scope of these motions tocover any legal issue in the case worth tackling early (see CCP § 437c(t)), but the parties havenot utilized this narrow procedure to tee-up jury questions. Moreover, when this motion wasfiled (02/27/25), the operative statute required an 81-day period of notice, increased by 2 courtdays if noticed by e-mail. CCP §§ 437c(a)(2), 1010.6(a)(3)(B). Plaintiff gave 43 calendardays’ notice for this motion, roughly half the minimum notice period required by law.Notwithstanding the procedural and substantive shortcomings associated with the “motion”before the Court this day, this Court has already informed the parties that a trial court has noinherent power to force a party to be personally present at the trial of his or her own civilaction. See Cohen v. Hughes Market, Inc. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1693, 1700. However, thatimpotence has nothing to do with: 1. defendant’s power to compel attendance if defendant can serve plaintiff with a subpoena; 2. this Court’s power to dismiss the case pre-trial if plaintiff fails to cooperate with discovery; or 3. the fact that plaintiff already waived jury by failing to timely post fees (see CCP §631(f)(5); TriCoast Builders, Inc. v. Fonnegra (2024) 15 Cal.5th 766, 783-790.The motion is therefore meritless and moot. Dept. 1Civil Law and Motion Tentative Rulings for Friday, April 11, 2025, at 8:30 a.m.If you wish to appear for oral argument, you must so notify the Court at (209) 533-6633 and (209) 588-2316, andall other parties by 4:00 p.m. on the court day preceding the hearing, consistent with CRC 3.1308. The tentativeruling will become the ruling of the Court if notice for oral argument has not been provided.

CV66036 Crites v. Wagner Hearing on: Set Aside Default Moving Party: Defendant Tentative Ruling: Grant, With ConditionsThis is an action for partition of real estate held by two siblings. Plaintiff resides at the subjectproperty; defendant does not. Before the Court this day is a motion by defendant seeking to setaside the entry of his default. Since the law generally abhors a forfeiture, particularly onecaused in part by attorney error, defendant shall be given his day in court. However, this is oneof those “be careful what you wish for” scenarios since returning defendant to the status antewill require defendant to put plaintiff in the status ante as well.To qualify as a proper ground to have a default set aside on equitable grounds, the aggrieveddefendant must demonstrate that the entry of default occurred – in whole or in part – as a resultof defendant’s inadvertence, mistake, surprise or excusable neglect. CCP §473(b). Basically,the question trial courts must answer is whether there is an objectively reasonable explanationfor why defendant failed to make a special or general appearance in the case. The quantum ofevidence needed, however, is not much: “it is the policy of the law to favor, whenever possible,a hearing on the merits … when a party in default moves promptly to seek relief, very slightevidence is required to justify a trial court's order setting aside a default.” Shamblin v. Brattain(1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478-479; in accord, Bonzer v. City of Huntington Park (1993) 20Cal.App.4th 1474, 1478.Here, defendant first asserts that he has no memory of being personally served with thesummons and complaint and allowed his default to be entered because, in his words: 1) “I was extremely busy with my plumbing business” 2) “I probably did not read the Complaint thoroughly” 3) “At the time I was having occasional age-related memory issues”See Wagner Decl Para 9. According to the Proof of Service, defendant was personally servedat his residence on Thursday, 03/21/2024, at around 8:00 a.m. The morning of a workday isusually a good time for those suffering from “age-related memory issues” to focus onimportant things like legal papers. However, since “press of business” alone is never enoughto warrant an order setting aside entry of default (see Martin v. Taylor (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d112, 117-118), this Court must conclude that defendant’s cognitive impairment is actuallymore severe than perhaps he is letting on. The combination of a serious cognitive impairmentplus the press of business can be sufficient to warrant relief. See Minick v. City of Petaluma(2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 15, 28; Bernards v. Grey (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 679, 683-686. Dept. 1Civil Law and Motion Tentative Rulings for Friday, March 21, 2025, at 8:30 a.m.If you wish to appear for oral argument, you must so notify the Court at (209) 533-6633 and (209) 588-2316, andall other parties by 4:00 p.m. on the court day preceding the hearing, consistent with CRC 3.1308. The tentativeruling will become the ruling of the Court if notice for oral argument has not been provided.But this only addresses the initial entry of default, not the subsequent delay in seeking relief orthe entry of what amounts to a default judgment (see Order After Hearing). Defendant hadlegal assistance navigating aspects of this case post-entry and was still unable to secure anyrelief within the allotted six months. Further inquiry is required.According to defendant, he retained an attorney to represent his interests in or about May of2024 (just after the default was entered). Based on the evidence provided by plaintiff’scounsel, which is both substantial and unrefuted, that attorney (James Cherry) was heavilyinvolved in the case for the ensuing six months. He participated in settlement negotiations, andappeared at the default prove-up hearing to make sure that the Order After Hearing conformedto the proposed sale by partition. This Court expressly reserved all issues pertaining toapportionment and allocation of costs, and only ordered an appraisal of the property withauthorization to sell publicly. Although this Court did not retain for defendant his option tobuy plaintiff out, clearly that was implied by the fact that the parties had already beenexploring this as one of the options post-appraisal. Thus, it is no surprise to this Court thatAttorney Cherry asked for no special terms to be included in the Order After Hearing.Then, on 01/17/2025, defendant filed in pro per a motion to set aside the entry of default andthe Order After Hearing, requesting permission to file an answer and a cross-complaint forpartition in kind, apportionment and waste. The fact that he filed this on his own, and thenfiled a Substitution of Attorney bringing in an attorney (Eric Mewes) rather than substitutingout Attorney Cherry informs this Court that perhaps defendant in fact never hired AttorneyCherry to represent his interests. There is no “sub-in” for Attorney Cherry in the case file, sono “sub-out” is technically required. All of this begs the question, was all the time AttorneyCherry spending just a waste of time? According to defendant “yes, it was.” Defendant statesthat he believed Attorney Cherry was going to set aside the default and let him file responsivepleadings. See Wagner Decl. Para 10. That is the relief defendant now seeks. Since defendantmakes a prima facie showing of positive misconduct by Attorney Cherry, this Court hasdiscretion to afford defendant relief for the delay and the ensuing Order After Hearing. SeeCarroll v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 892, 898; Seacall Develop., Ltd. v. SantaMonica Rent Control Bd. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 201, 205.Pursuant to CCP §437(b), the application “shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer orother pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted.” Itis not. However, this requirement is not jurisdictional, so defendant may be given brief leaveto have those papers on file. See Carmel, Ltd. v. Tavoussi (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 393, 403; inaccord, Dollase v. Wanu Water, Inc. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1315, 1324-1326. Defendant shallhave the answer and cross-complaint on file within 5 court days. Dept. 1Civil Law and Motion Tentative Rulings for Friday, March 21, 2025, at 8:30 a.m.If you wish to appear for oral argument, you must so notify the Court at (209) 533-6633 and (209) 588-2316, andall other parties by 4:00 p.m. on the court day preceding the hearing, consistent with CRC 3.1308. The tentativeruling will become the ruling of the Court if notice for oral argument has not been provided.Finally, pursuant to CCP §437(c)(1)(A) and (C), this court has discretion to impose upondefendant a sanction of $1,000 plus an obligation to reimburse plaintiff the legal fees sheincurred in securing the Entry of Default, the Order After Hearing, and all the effort in betweento settle this dispute with Attorney Cherry – who was quite obviously not authorized bydefendant to negotiate a settlement. See Vanderkous v. Conley (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 111,116; Rogalski v. Nabers Cadillac (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 816, 823. Counsel for plaintiff shallsubmit a redacted billing statement for reimbursement, and that shall be added to the $1,000sanction and defendant shall be required to pay that amount within 10 days of this Court’sconfirmation.The Order After Hearing dtd 08/02/24 is hereby vacated. Defendant’s default entered04/26/2024 is set aside. Defendant shall have 5 court days to file and serve an Answer toComplaint and a Cross-Complaint. Plaintiff’s counsel to submit proposed order on §473(c)reimbursement + sanction. Notice is waived.

CV66392 Ruibal v. FCA US, LLC Hearing on: Review Hearing Moving Party: N/A Tentative Ruling: Stay ImposedThis is a “lemon law” case. On 12/26/2024, defendant removed the action to the United StatesDistrict Court for the Eastern District of California based on diversity of citizenship. In sodoing, this Court has now been presumptively divested of subject-matter jurisdiction unlessand until a clerk of the federal court serves an order for remand. See 28 USC §1446(d);ClipperJet Inc. v. Tyson (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 521, 527-529. The case here shall be stayedindefinitely until further order. Plaintiff is free to voluntarily dismiss without prejudice.

CV66762 Selesia v. Varvayanis Hearing on: CMC Moving Party: N/A Tentative Ruling: Continued to 06/13/25 at 9:30 a.m.This is a personal injury action, commenced on 12/12/24. Today is a case managementconference, set at 8:30 a.m. in error. Nevertheless, plaintiff’s counsel is requesting acontinuance of 60 days to continue working with defendant’s carrier in the hopes of securing apre-litigation settlement. Based on that representation, this Court intends to find sufficientgood cause under CRC 3.110(e) to relieve counsel of the initial timing requirements for serviceof the Complaint and to set a continued CMC for 06/13/25 at 9:30 a.m. Plaintiff to give notice.Service of the complaint must be completed by that date.

CV65688 Yates v. Titan Solar Power CA Hearing on: Motion to Dismiss Stay Moving Party: Plaintiff Dept. 1Civil Law and Motion Tentative Rulings for Friday, March 21, 2025, at 8:30 a.m.If you wish to appear for oral argument, you must so notify the Court at (209) 533-6633 and (209) 588-2316, andall other parties by 4:00 p.m. on the court day preceding the hearing, consistent with CRC 3.1308. The tentativeruling will become the ruling of the Court if notice for oral argument has not been provided. Tentative Ruling: Denied without prejudiceThis is a contract dispute involving the installation of solar panels at plaintiffs’ bed andbreakfast in Groveland. Previously, this Court granted defendant’s motion to compelcontractual arbitration. Shortly after that ruling, defendant filed for bankruptcy, whichostensibly means that the arbitration never took place. Plaintiffs did not move to withdraw thedispute from arbitration, and instead apparently negotiated a settlement directly withdefendant’s claims administrator. After that settlement was reached (but not consummated inwriting), defense counsel filed a Notice of Stay based upon the bankruptcy case. Before theCourt this day is a motion by plaintiffs to “lift” that stay in order to consummate the settlement.Both sides have touched upon the impact of a Chapter 7 filing, but neither have done so in away which actually addresses the issue at hand.Upon the filing of a bankruptcy proceeding, federal bankruptcy law imposes an automatic stayon “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or toexercise control over property of the estate.” 11 USC §362(a)(3). The stay attaches toproceedings taken outside the bankruptcy court against the debtor and the debtor's property.Shaoxing County Huayue Import & Export v. Bhaumik (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1189, 1196.However, when a putative creditor seeks to recover for the alleged wrongdoing of a debtor inbankruptcy from the debtor’s liability carrier only, and that carrier has agreed to provide acomplete defense without a reservation of rights thereto, those fees/costs are ordinarily not partof the bankruptcy estate … unless the debtor has so many potential claimants seeking recoveryfrom the same policy that interpleader is contemplated. See Forsyth v. Jones (1997) 57Cal.App.4th 776, 781; In re OGA Charters, LLC, 901 F.3d 559, 603-605 (5th Cir. 2018); In reBeeney, 142 B.R. 360, 362-363 (9th Cir. BAP 1992); In re Edgeworth, 993 F.2d 51, 55-56 (5thCir. 1993); In re Titan Energy, Inc., 837 F.2d 325, 329 (8th Cir. 1988); Landry v. ExxonPipeline Co., 260 B.R. 769, 785-788 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2001). By properly framing the test, itshould be evident that – with the limited amount of information provided for this Court – it isnot feasible to determine whether the bankruptcy stay applies or not. It is unknown if plaintiffsfiled a claim in the bankruptcy court, or if there are other claims in the bankruptcy courtcovered by the same commercial policy. As such, this Court is required to err on the side ofcaution and find the stay remains. Defense counsel is correct that the best practice here is tobring the motion in federal court for permission to lift the stay there and proceed toconsummate the settlement agreement.

CV63591 Redick v. Sonora Police Department Hearing on: insedit quisquiliarum Moving Party: Plaintiff Tentative Ruling: See BelowThis is a type of “malicious prosecution” case filed by an individual who was charged with, butnever prosecuted for, shoplifting. The sordid details have been supplied in various priorwritten rulings, and are not necessary to repeat here except to note that the criminal complaint(CRF58586) languished for almost two years, only to be voluntarily dismissed by the DAwhen questions arose about ID’ing Mr. Redick on the supplied in-store video. Unsatisfied withjust the voluntarily dismissal, Mr, Reddick filed civil lawsuits against Lowe’s, the DistrictAttorney, the jail, the County and the Sonora PD (see CV63539, CV63591, CV63592, andCV63593). Due to a remarkably unfortunate series of clerical mishaps back in 2021, Mr.Redick was able to secure defaults in those cases for a combined total of $107,733,000.00.When the local agencies learned what had occurred, it took very little for this Court and legalresearch to see (and correct) the miscarriage. Since that time, Mr. Redick has wagedunrelenting warfare in a singular effort to regain a taste of those fraudulent defaults. In sodoing, he has now crossed the line from zealous advocate to vexatious litigant, as will bediscussed in conjunction with the various “motions” set for hearing before the Court this day.Although the common definition of a vexatious litigant is someone who regularly files boguslawsuits against anyone, the definition can also include a person who (1) repeatedly relitigatesany issue of fact or law already decided involving the same defendant or (2) repeatedlyengages in frivolous behavior in the litigation of one particular case. See CCP §391(b)(2)-(3).Here is where plaintiff excels.As a preliminary matter of housekeeping, on 07/13/2021, all of the parties herein stipulated toconsolidating for all purposes CV63592 and CV63593 into CV63591, with the latter case Dept. 1Civil Law and Motion Tentative Rulings for Friday, March 28, 2025, at 8:30 a.m.If you wish to appear for oral argument, you must so notify the Court at (209) 533-6633 and (209) 588-2316, andall other parties by 4:00 p.m. on the court day preceding the hearing, consistent with CRC 3.1308. The tentativeruling will become the ruling of the Court if notice for oral argument has not been provided.serving as the lead. (CV63539 had already been removed to federal court by that time.) So,papers filed and actions taken in any of the three cases were experienced in all three, andtherefore can be considered as part of the total package.Here are the “main” unmeritorious papers that Mr. Redick has filed in these cases:  Proof of Service on Sonora Police Department (02/18/2021). POS does not state in Para 4 that the service package included summons, complaint, or civil case cover sheet. POS does not state in Para 5 the name of the individual served, or the address where the service took place. Finally, plaintiff used POS-040, which is expressly not for service of a summons (as clearly stated on Page 3). See Minute Order dtd 08/23/21.  Proof of Service on Tuolumne County Jail (02/18/2021) and Tuolumne County District Attorney Office (02/18/2021). POS does not state in Para 4 that the service package included summons, complaint, or civil case cover sheet. POS does not state in Para 5 the name of the individual served, or the address where the service took place. Finally, plaintiff used POS-040, which is expressly not for service of a summons (as clearly stated on Page 3). See Minute Order dtd 08/23/21.  Request for Entry of Default against Sonora Police Department in the amount of $33,000,000.00 (04/07/2021). Despite the requirement to mail a copy to the defendant (CCP §587), Para 6 does not indicate service to the defendant at all.  Request for Entry of Default against Tuolumne County Jail and the Tuolumne District Attorney Office in the amount of $33,000,000.00 (04/07/2021). Despite the requirement to mail a copy to the defendant (CCP §587), Para 6 does not indicate service to the defendant at all. In addition, this was filed after counsel for Tuolumne County already made a CCP §430.41 appearance, violating Fasuyi v. Permatex (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 681, 701.  Document title motion to strike defendant’s answer to defendant’s motion to set aside default and plaintiff’s memorandum of points in support thereof (06/28/2021)  Opposition to Defendant’s motion to set aside entry of default, stating that agreement to set aside default was on condition that defendant agree to settle on plaintiff’s terms and that plaintiff was “told” that serving Board of Supervisors was sufficient (04/20/2021);  Petition for Writ of Certiorari to lift the stay imposed here while the case against Lowe’s proceeds in federal court (12/28/2022);  Motion to reinstate the defaults previously entered (but subsequently set aside) involving the defendants (10/21/2024);  Appeal to the 5th Appellate District (F088816) regarding trial court’s refusal to reinstate defaults. Order is not appealable.  Ex parte application to stay proceedings to permit review by the California Supreme Court (02/10/2025), filed just two months after plaintiff filed a motion to lift the stay and resume litigation in the case (11/26/2024) Dept. 1Civil Law and Motion Tentative Rulings for Friday, March 28, 2025, at 8:30 a.m.If you wish to appear for oral argument, you must so notify the Court at (209) 533-6633 and (209) 588-2316, andall other parties by 4:00 p.m. on the court day preceding the hearing, consistent with CRC 3.1308. The tentativeruling will become the ruling of the Court if notice for oral argument has not been provided.  Motion to strike trial court proceedings pending review of writ of supersedes for review before the California Supreme Court (02/10/2025);  Emergency motion to compel, motion to dismiss, and notice of intent to appeal regarding trial court’s alleged failure to specially-set plaintiff’s ex parte application to stay the trial court proceedings (02/11/2025)  Notice of writ of mandate, transfer request for stay of proceedings (02/13/2025);  Petition for writ of mandate with the 5th Appellate District (F089344). Summarily dismissed same day it was filed.  Cover sheet emergency petition for writ of mandate and motion to disqualify Judge Seibert (02/26/2025);  Plaintiff’s conditional objection to case management conference and notice of jurisdictional challenge (02/26/2025);  Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (filed 02/28/2025), set for hearing the same date it was filed, naming Judge Seibert as one of the defendants as well as the Judge assigned to decide the motion. There is no separate statement of undisputed fact. There is no memorandum of points and authorities.  Petition for writ of mandate with the 5th Appellate District (F089475). Summarily dismissed one week after it was filed.  Plaintiff’s “Final Legal report and Settlement Demand” indicating that “the merits of this case have been conclusively resolved in favor of plaintiff [and that] the defendants have been found liable for malicious prosecution” and that plaintiff demands $151.6 million in order to settle and avoid further lawsuits (extortion). Filed 03/04/2025. This “notice” is accompanied by a “motion” set for hearing this date (03/28/2025), and includes as new defendants Verizon and Google.  “Emergency motion to immediately remove this case from the County of Tuolumne and Judge Kevin M. Seibert’s Jurisdiction, stay proceedings, and reaffirm consolidation of cases; request for criminal investigation into the judicial misconduct and violations of due process to all parties and their attorneys of record” (03/10/2025).  Motion for default judgment (03/11/2025);  Motion to stay and postpone case management conference and all related proceedings (03/19/2025);  Ex Parte Motion to Stay and Postpone the Case Management Conference (CMC) and All Related Proceedings; and for Entry of Default Judgment and Sanctions for Procedural Noncompliance (03/21/2025)In the above list, one can see that he has repeatedly asked this Court to reinstate his bogusdefaults at least three times, and has already asked both the Court of Appeals and theCalifornia Supreme Court to intervene (without success). Mr. Redick has also asked this Courton at least five different occasions for a stay in the proceedings, hoping to drag these cases out Dept. 1Civil Law and Motion Tentative Rulings for Friday, March 28, 2025, at 8:30 a.m.If you wish to appear for oral argument, you must so notify the Court at (209) 533-6633 and (209) 588-2316, andall other parties by 4:00 p.m. on the court day preceding the hearing, consistent with CRC 3.1308. The tentativeruling will become the ruling of the Court if notice for oral argument has not been provided.indefinitely. Mr. Redick’s behavior in these consolidated cases is quite patently designed tocause unnecessary delay, to run up the legal fees for this County to “punish” it for charginghim with shoplifting, and, to most reasonable observers, to make a mockery of the judicialsystem by filing papers replete with completely unmeritorious claims and contentions.As noted, plaintiff has filed scores of unmeritorious motions – which makes him a vexatiouslitigant. He has also engaged in tactics that are “totally and completely without merit or for thesole purpose of harassing an opposing party.” See CCP §§ 128.5, 391(b)(3). Of course, thisCourt’s impression that Mr. Redick is a vexatious litigant is not “deemed to be a determinationof any issue in the litigation or of the merits thereof” (CCP §391.2), and if Mr. Redick couldsimply color in the lines of his malicious prosecution action this Court would certainly keep anopen mind on the merits, but rather than color in the lines Mr. Redick seems wildly obsessedwith chasing defaults that he was never entitled to in the first instance, and which no courtwould ever condone in a prove-up hearing after default. Even though defendants herein havenot asked this Court to have plaintiff declared a vexatious litigant, there is nothing in thestatutory scheme to suggest that a trial court lacks the authority to initiate the process suasponte. See, e.g., Karnazes v. The Lauriedale Homeowners Association (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th275, 281 [“an appellate court may declare a litigant vexatious in the first instance”]. However,since plaintiff was not provided notice that this issue was being considered by this Court, thisCourt will give plaintiff an opportunity to be heard before a formal order is entered. All ofplaintiff’s “motions” set for hearing this day (strike trial court proceedings, disqualify Hon.Seibert, declare plaintiff the winner, confirm settlement demand, stay litigation, continueCMC, transfer case to another county) are denied with prejudice.

CV66334 Carrera v. Toste Insurance Services et al Hearing on: Demurrer to Complaint Moving Party: SafeCo and Toste Insurance Services. Tentative Ruling: HEARING REQUIREDThis appears to be a civil action for property loss involving a stolen Chevrolet Camero inDecember of 2020, possibly owned by co-plaintiff Victor Valdez and insured by him throughSafeco Insurance (using Toste as the brokerage that placed said insurance). Valdez did notsign the complaint, and as such is not a party to the action. Valdez resides in Solano County.Someone named Carrera, who defendants concede no knowledge of, is the only plaintiff. Sheresides here in Tuolumne County. Carrera fails to set forth any facts explaining (1) what herownership interest in the vehicle was, (2) why she waited almost four years to bring her action,or (3) how it is that the insurance brokerage assisting Mr. Valdez insure the vehicle in 2020would be responsible for damages. The operative pleading failed to state facts and isuncertain. CCP §430.10(e) and (f). Carrera has asked for a Spanish interpreter (as has Valdez,who is not a party), but counsel has indicated that a proper §430.41 meet and confer took placewithout any reference to the need for an interpreter – so it is not clear to this Court the extent ofthe language barrier. This Court will do its best to have an interpreter available for the hearing,but does not have interpreters on-staff in this small county. Assuming plaintiff is able toeffectively participate in the hearing, it is this Court’s indication that the demurrer filed bySafeco and Toste must be sustained with leave to amend. Although the demurrer by Toste iscurrently set for hearing next week, that will be advanced to this date and ruled on accordinglyto obviate the need for a hearing next week.

CV66417 Bado v. Mile High Ski Club Hearing on: Motion to Serve Summons via Publication Moving Party: Plaintiff Tentative Ruling: MOOTThis is an action for adverse possession. Before the Court this day is an application forpermission to serve the defendant via publication. Although the application for noticed forhearing this day, plaintiff included with the noticed motion an ex parte application to shortentime – prompting this Court’s early review of the papers. That early review already resulted ina denial without prejudice, and a suggestion to counsel to first exhaust other service efforts,including Notice and Acknowledgement. There being no additional papers filed since thatorder denying, the noticed motion is deemed MOOT.

CV65832 Hawkins et al v. CA Department of Transportation Hearing on: Trial Continuance Moving Party: Plaintiff Tentative Ruling: HEARING REQUIREDThis is a personal injury action arising out of an automobile accident. Before the Court thisday is a defense motion to continue the current trial date. There is no opposition.This case was commenced on 01/17/2024 with the filing of the complaint. Defendants did notfirst appear in the action until 03/18/2024. At the initial Case Management Conference on05/17/2024, both sides agreed to have trial set for 12/02/2024. Since the initial CMC, theparties apparently decided that they needed far more time to ready this case for resolution thanfirst anticipated.Because trial continuances are strongly disfavored, any request to continue a trial must besupported by an affirmative showing of good cause, and must be made as soon as possibleonce the necessity for a continuance is discovered. See CRC 3.1332; Reales Investment, LLC v.Johnson (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 463, 468-469. Every motion for continuance “is addressed tothe sound discretion of the trial court;” however, “the refusal of a continuance which has thepractical effect of denying the applicant a fair hearing is reversible error.” Oliveros v. Countyof Los Angeles (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1395; in accord, Hamilton v. Orange CountySheriff's Department (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 759, 766. The factors which a trial court is toconsider when weighing the various interests implicated include: (1) The proximity of the current trial date (three months away); (2) Whether there were any previous continuances (one prior); (3) The length of the continuance requested (> 90 days); (4) The availability of alternative means to address the problem that gave rise to the motion or application for a continuance (diligent discovery and better dialogue between the attorneys); (5) The prejudice that parties or witnesses will suffer as a result of the continuance (none shown); (6) If the case is entitled to a preferential trial setting, the reasons for that status and whether the need for a continuance outweighs the need to avoid delay (none); (7) The court's calendar and the impact of granting a continuance on other pending trials (none); (8) Whether trial counsel is engaged in another trial (no contentions made); (9) Whether all parties have stipulated to a continuance (there have); (10) Whether the interests of justice are best served by a continuance, by the trial of the matter, or by imposing conditions on the continuance (unclear); and Dept. 1Civil Law and Motion Tentative Rulings for Friday, March 28, 2025, at 8:30 a.m.If you wish to appear for oral argument, you must so notify the Court at (209) 533-6633 and (209) 588-2316, andall other parties by 4:00 p.m. on the court day preceding the hearing, consistent with CRC 3.1308. The tentativeruling will become the ruling of the Court if notice for oral argument has not been provided. (11) Any other fact or circumstance relevant to the fair determination of the motion or application (none apparent).Counsel advises that a continuance is required because plaintiff is still not done with hertreatments, and the parties are not set for mediation until May. Based on a totality of thecircumstances, and the fact that this case has not yet reached the 18-month presumptivedeadline under the Fast Track guidelines (see TCSC Rule 2.06.0), a continuance to completediscovery and participate fully in mediation is reasonable. See CCP §§ 2024.020(b), 2024.050.Counsel shall appear and select new pre-trial conference and trial dates, which shall be firmand immoveable absent an imposition of monetary sanctions under CCP §177.5.

CV66223 John v. Skyline Place Senior Living et al Hearing on: Demurrer and Strike to First Amended Complaint Moving Party: Defendants Tentative Ruling: Sustained, 30 days leave to amendThis is a wrongful death and elder abuse case. It is alleged that Jean Diana John (hereinafter“decedent”), had a precipitous change/decline in her overall functioning (vomiting, lack ofappetite, dizziness, confusion) over the course of 44 hours which the staff at Skyline SeniorLiving failed to recognize/appreciate. Decedent’s family secured a medical transfer to thelocal Adventist Health emergency room, where decedent was assessed as having a seriousbrain bleed and a skull fracture. Decedent was transferred to a trauma facility in Modesto,which effectively concluded that decedent was at end-stage dementia. Soon thereafter, Dept. 1Civil Law and Motion Tentative Rulings for Friday, March 28, 2025, at 8:30 a.m.If you wish to appear for oral argument, you must so notify the Court at (209) 533-6633 and (209) 588-2316, andall other parties by 4:00 p.m. on the court day preceding the hearing, consistent with CRC 3.1308. The tentativeruling will become the ruling of the Court if notice for oral argument has not been provided.decedent was transferred to a private hospice provider in Stanislaus. Decedent passed awayfrom acute respiratory failure, secondary to “non-traumatic head injury.” The death certificatedoes not list dementia as a contributing factor.Before the Court this day is a demurrer and motion to strike filed by co-defendants MilestoneRetirement and Skyline Place. The demurrer is procedurally defective in that it purports to bedirected at specified portions of plaintiffs’ first (elder abuse) cause of action (see 2:12-14), butit is reasonably understood that the demurrer is intended to attack the whole of the first andfourth (willful misconduct) causes of action. The motion to strike, on the other hand, isdirected at plaintiffs’ various damage prayers. Since plaintiffs appeared to have no troublenavigating the intended scope of the motions, this Court will overlook the technical defects.Demurrer to FACWith the original pleading, this Court pointed out a holistic issue with standing. Since thattime, plaintiffs have cured the issue by bringing onboard all of the heirs.With the revised pleading, the first and fourth causes of action now include significantly moreevidentiary facts, but the issue with the original pleading was not solely the quantum ofevidentiary facts pled but also the lack of ultimate facts to support the type of claims beingasserted in this case. Have plaintiffs done better? Yes, and no.To state a claim under the Elder Abuse Act, the plaintiff must plead with particularity factssufficient to permit a trier of fact to conclude by clear and convincing evidence that eachdefendant in the action: (1) assumed a significant measure of ongoing responsibility for attending to one or more of an elder's basic needs that an able-bodied and fully competent adult would ordinarily be capable of managing without assistance; (2) failed to provide for the elder’s basic needs such as hygiene, nutrition, hydration, shelter, safety, and medication; (3) while deliberately disregarding a high probability that injury will occur (more than mere inadvertence, incompetence or failure to take precautions); and (4) proximately causing harm to the elder as a result thereof.See Winn v. Pioneer Medical Group, Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 148, 158; Covenant Care, Inc. v.Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771, 783; Delaney v. Baker (1999) 20 Cal.4th 23, 32;Kruthanooch v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1109, 1134-1135; Dept. 1Civil Law and Motion Tentative Rulings for Friday, March 28, 2025, at 8:30 a.m.If you wish to appear for oral argument, you must so notify the Court at (209) 533-6633 and (209) 588-2316, andall other parties by 4:00 p.m. on the court day preceding the hearing, consistent with CRC 3.1308. The tentativeruling will become the ruling of the Court if notice for oral argument has not been provided.Cochrum v. Costa Victoria Healthcare, LLC (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1034, 1049-1050; Carterv. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 396, 406-407.The first element is presumptively satisfied by the mere fact that the facility evaluated andaccepted decedent. See 22 Cal.C.Regs. §§ 87452-87463, 87605-87704. Defendants do notcontend otherwise. In fact, defendants readily concede that decedent was in their “excellent”care for almost four months.As to the second element (the actus reus), plaintiffs allege that “defendants” (collectively)failed to provide for decedent’s “basic needs” by failing to monitor her and recognize signs ofdistress over the course of 2½ days. Plaintiffs do not allege that defendants withheld hygiene,nutrition, hydration, shelter, safety, medication, care or comfort – at least not in the traditionalsense. What plaintiffs are concerned about is that defendants apparently did not tend todecedent with sufficient alarm or concern, at least not until she was discovered post-strokelying face-down in her bed. The physiological signs she was demonstrating in the days leadingup to the discovery of her, face down in bed, in the morning on 12/06/22, surely seemed – inhindsight – to suggest that she may have been experiencing small, pre-stroke TIAs in theevening of 12.04/22 and perhaps midday on 12/05/22. Since decedent was in defendants’custodian care during those days, there is no question that elder abuse could include the failureto call 911 if doing so was absolutely warranted. The parties ascribe different degrees ofculpability to the decision not to call 911, but in order for plaintiffs to take advantage of theenhanced remedies available for elder abuse, it is necessary for plaintiffs to at least plead factsthat would leave no room for substantial doubt that staff believed decedent would suffer harmby their decision not to call 911. In other words, 9 of 12 must be of the reasoned opinion that itwas egregious to watch decedent suffer, opine what that suffering might mean, send faxes to aphysician after-hours, and decide not to call 911. Is it failing to take precautions, or aconscious disregard? It is impossible to say. However, the new allegations set forth inParagraphs 30-37, if true, are sufficient to show that the defendants failed “to provide medicalcare for physical and mental health needs” and failed “to protect from health and safetyhazards” (§15610.57(b)) not by failing to actually provide specialized medical care, but ratherby failing to summon specialized medical providers to evaluate decedent when she was clearlynot herself and her physician was presumed not to be sitting at the fax machine. In otherwords, if it was concerned enough to contact a doctor at all, it was concerning enough tocontact someone who would actually answer the call.In it important to note, for present purposes, that defendants have not demurred to the firstcause of action on either the third (mens rea) or the fourth (causation) elements of the cause ofaction, and for that reason this Court shall not drill down deep into those two areas. However,these concerns are relevant to the prayer for punitive damages and will be addressed in detail Dept. 1Civil Law and Motion Tentative Rulings for Friday, March 28, 2025, at 8:30 a.m.If you wish to appear for oral argument, you must so notify the Court at (209) 533-6633 and (209) 588-2316, andall other parties by 4:00 p.m. on the court day preceding the hearing, consistent with CRC 3.1308. The tentativeruling will become the ruling of the Court if notice for oral argument has not been provided.there. For present purposes, this Court would be remiss if it failed to at least draw attention tothe fact that decedent’s overall condition did not easily permit a reliable conclusion that greatervigilance by the staff on 12/04/22 or 12/05/22 would more likely than not have increased thequality or duration of decedent’s life.Plaintiffs have satisfied their pleading burden as it pertains to a claim for elder abuse againstthe individuals taking care of decedent. However, plaintiffs are not suing any of thoseindividuals. Plaintiffs are only suing the corporate employing entities, and for that there is anadditional element that must be met. As explained in Covenant Care (at 790), to the extent theplaintiffs seeks to hold a corporate defendant liable for the acts or omissions of its employee,the plaintiffs must also plead facts showing that the employer “authorized or ratified thewrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression,fraud, or malice.” See W&I Code §15657(c).Plaintiffs allege first that defendants had a “managing agent” on site who directly participatedin the decision to withhold summoning medical responders for decedent. These facts are setforth in FAC Para 33, 34 and 57. Plaintiffs allege that Taleen Sayyed, Director of HealthWellness at the Sonora location, is a managing agent. In order to qualify as a managing agent,plaintiffs would have to allege facts showing that Ms. Sayyed exercised substantial andindependent authority and judgment over significant aspects of the business such that herdecisions would ultimately determine corporate policy. White v. Ultramar (1999) 21 Cal.4th563, 576-577; Colucci v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 442, 451-454. Theoperative pleading is bereft of such averments, and given that the FAC alleges that Milestone isin Vancouver, Washington, there is reason to believe that Ms. Sayyed is not one of itsmanaging agents.Plaintiffs next allege that defendants had an “executive director” on site who directlyparticipated in the decision not to compel sufficient staffing to meet the requirements fornighttime safety checking of residents every 1-2 hours (as set forth in the Residence and CareAgreement). These facts are set forth in FAC Para 54-60. The staffing issue is an obvious redherring in this case because the plaintiffs are not claiming that decedent was neglected as aresult of insufficient staffing. Quite the contrary, plaintiffs are alleging that there wassufficient staffing, but that the staffing was untrained and functionally inept. The suggestionthat more staff would have meant more bed checks is meaningless if decedent was asleep inher bed all night. Since decedent was found in her bed, one has to conclude that after she fell,she was able to get herself back into bed without any assistance, so additional bed checkswould have yielded no benefit. Thus, this issue is a nonstarter. Dept. 1Civil Law and Motion Tentative Rulings for Friday, March 28, 2025, at 8:30 a.m.If you wish to appear for oral argument, you must so notify the Court at (209) 533-6633 and (209) 588-2316, andall other parties by 4:00 p.m. on the court day preceding the hearing, consistent with CRC 3.1308. The tentativeruling will become the ruling of the Court if notice for oral argument has not been provided.Finally, plaintiffs allege that defendants had a direct business model designed to hireknowingly unfit individuals to work in the facility, with a conscious disregard of a known riskthat these unfit individuals would be unable to properly distinguish circumstances in whichmedical assistance should be summoned. These facts are set forth in FAC Para 48-61. Thereare no actual facts set forth to support this remarkable contention, and decedent’s stay at thefacility for four months belies the suggestion that the staff was unfit to care for her needs. Thistoo appears to be a red herring tossed in with the hope of having something stick.As attacked, the demurrer to the elder abuse cause of action must be sustained once again.Since plaintiffs are not suing individuals, plaintiffs shall be given one last chance to plead anelder abuse claim against corporate employers. Since plaintiffs likely have no facts to showdirect involvement by a managing agent, or advance knowledge of employee unfitness, itseems that plaintiffs’ only chance would be via ratification. (Plaintiffs referred to ratificationrepeatedly, but in fact offered no facts or argument on the topic.) Plaintiffs shall be allowed 30days leave to amend.As for the fourth cause of action for willful misconduct, this Court noted previously that thereis a dispute amongst courts and scholars as to whether “willful misconduct” is actually a causeof action (as opposed to an aggravated form of negligence). This dispute, which wasrecognized in Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, LP (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1148 (at 1163 n.8), has its roots inpre-comparative fault jurisprudence as an exception to the harshness of the contributorynegligence “all or nothing” rule. Since the abolition of contributory negligence, the concept ofwillful misconduct has very limited application. The court in Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152Cal.App.4th 518, concluded with apparent ease (at 526) that willful misconduct is not a stand-alone cause of action. The court in Doe v. United States Youth Soccer Association, Inc. (2017)8 Cal.App.5th 1118, 1140, followed Berkley in noting that “willful misconduct is not a separatetort from negligence.” Similar, the court in Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC(2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 396, described a cause of action labeled “willful misconduct” as aversion of professional negligence. Id. at 413. Neither party accepted the implied invitation toaddress the issue, and instead decided to merge the claim into the elder abuse cause of action.Either way, since it has the same elements as elder abuse, but does not include the enhancedremedies, it is meaningless in this case. Since plaintiffs made no effort to fight for it, thedemurrer will be sustained without leave to amend.Motion to StrikeThe motion to strike is, once again, moot. Dept. 1Civil Law and Motion Tentative Rulings for Friday, March 28, 2025, at 8:30 a.m.If you wish to appear for oral argument, you must so notify the Court at (209) 533-6633 and (209) 588-2316, andall other parties by 4:00 p.m. on the court day preceding the hearing, consistent with CRC 3.1308. The tentativeruling will become the ruling of the Court if notice for oral argument has not been provided.