The transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) from the United States to the South Korea (formally the Republic of Korea, or ROK) once again is a widespread topic of discussion and debate inWashington andSeoul. Although OPCON transition, in one form or another, has been an official alliance policy for two decades if not longer,its implementation has been fitful. A constellation of cross-cutting variables has shaped the policy process, at times propelling it forward and at others obstructing it. Successive U.S. and South Korean administrations have been inconsistent in how and to what extent they have prioritized OPCON transition, largely because of the cacophonous operation of the different variables. 

Recent political transitions in Washington and Seoul brought into office policymakers eager to prioritize once more the policy of wartime OPCON transition, if driven by distinct and potentially clashing motivations. That U.S. and South Korean officials appear to have linked OPCON transition with a broader modernization of the alliance could be a positive development, especially considering that changes to the alliance’s military command architecture reflect – and will affect – core aspects of the relationship. Nonetheless, analysts and policymakers must consider the array of variables surrounding OPCON transition and the complex ways they have interacted in the past and very likely will in the future. Otherwise, they will produce poor analysis and potentially counterproductive or even destabilizing policy. 

This series of articles explores each of the key variables that have shaped the policy process around OPCON transition and how they have aligned or clashed with one another to either advance or complicate – if not outright delay – the policy. The first two articles in the series will explore one of the more consequential if difficult to measure variables, namely the “control rod” logic. Subsequent articles will explore the South Korean “sovereignty narrative,” variations in alliance command concepts and structures, the conditions of the Condition-based Operational Control Transition Plan (COTP), how wartime OPCON transition relates to the regional role of U.S. forces and the alliance, and the role on the U.S.-led United Nations Command in a post-OPCON transition environment. 

Wartime OPCON transition has been alliance policy since 2007. However, it was in2014 that U.S. and South Korean officials “decided to implement the ROK-proposed conditions-based approach to the transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) from the U.S. forces-led Combined Forces Command (CFC) to a new ROK forces-led combined defense command.” And,in 2015, they endorsed and signed the Conditions-based Operational Control Transition Plan (COTP) and “decided to implement the COTP faithfully in order to ensure a stable wartime OPCON transition at a proper time.” 

COTP marked a shift away from a time-based approach and planning for a parallel command structure, which U.S. and ROK officials had pursued since 2007, and signaled a more stringent process for implementing the transition. For some, COTP was interpreted as a deliberate effort by Seoul’s conservative national security establishment and elements within the U.S. government to kick the can down the road on OPCON transfer. 

The 2014 Security Consultative Meeting’s (SCM)Joint Communique noted “the conditions-based approach ensures that the ROK will assume wartime OPCON when critical ROK and Alliance military capabilities are secured and the security environment on the Korean Peninsula and in the region is conducive to a stable OPCON transition.” It would take time and money to acquire, integrate, and exercise such critical South Korean and alliance capabilities. In addition determining the security environment was “conducive” to transition, was inherently interpretive, a potential barrier to transition even if the necessary capabilities were acquired.

When examining the conditions of COTP and the fitful process by which they have been implemented, the annual SCM Joint Communique is a useful resource. U.S. and South Korean officials painstakingly draft these communiques, using language that reflects both sides’ individual and shared positions, which they mutually agree upon before public release. While any one communique is not particularly informative, textual analysis of successive communiques reveals important patterns and subtle (or not so subtle) shifts in position and policy and in the details of COTP. 

2017-2020: From Heady Momentum to Pulling Back on the Reins 

Presidents Moon Jae-in and Donald Trump’s entry into office in 2017 provided newfound momentum to OPCON transition. Following theirJune 2017 summit, during which they decided “to expeditiously enable the conditions-based transfer of wartime operational control,” the2017 communique reaffirmed that decision, with South Korea committing to acquire critical capabilities alongside its defense reforms. Importantly, the communique also signaled, for the first time, a draft organization of the future Combined Forces Command (F-CFC), plans to refine F-CFC through combined exercises and certifications, a commitment to develop Alliance Guiding Principles for the post-OPCON transition combined defense, and a decision to “reexamine the implementation plan” and “jointly update COTP” by the next year’s SCM. 

The 2017 communique’s language signified the Moon administration’s preference for charging ahead. Furthermore, the spirit of South Korea’s effort aligned with the Trump administration’s position that allies needed to bear more of the cost and burden in their defense. The expanded language on OPCON showed the alliance had shifted to more concretely examine the implementation process and look ahead to a post-transition environment. 

Nonetheless, slight textual inconsistencies were already apparent. The defense authorities were going to “implement steadily” the leader-level political decision to “enable the expeditious” transfer of wartime OPCON. It checked out that Defense officials – responsible for implementation – stressed a steady approach. This likely informed their expressed decision to reexamine the implementation plan itself. Yet the “expeditious” thrust from political leadership was a powerful demand signal. The distinction between “steady” and “expeditious” suggested potential frictions. In the near term, however, the alliance pushed forward.

In the2018 communique, the section on OPCON doubled in size and its positioning in the communique signified the U.S. secretary of defense and South Korean minister of defense were taking greater ownership of the issue. It included some telling shifts in language. Both sides again highlighted the alliance’s effort to enable an “expeditious” transfer and emphasized speed, mentioning their commitment to meet conditions at “an early date” and pledging “to determine the specific timing of OPCON transition.” The change in language, from “proper” or “appropriate” timing in 2014-2016 to “specific” timing in 2018, demonstrated the political impetus behind the effort. 

Notably, the South Korean defense minister specifically mentioned “the ROK commitment to complete expeditiously the preparations necessary to exercise OPCON,” including its acquisition of critical capabilities. The South Korean defense authority’s emphasis demonstrated the persistent internal drivers on Seoul’s side of the equation. And, for the first time, the U.S. secretary of defense mentioned “the U.S. commitment to continue to provide bridging capabilities until the ROK fully acquires an independent defense capability and enduring capabilities.” Differing views on what was meant by “bridging” and “enduring” would soon complicate the process. 

Still, the alliance was progressing. U.S. and South Korean defense officials signed the jointly developedAlliance Guiding Principles, confirming the F-CFC would maintain the existing CFC structure yet have an ROK four-star general as commander and a U.S. four-star general as deputy commander. In essence, the alliance would ensure stability in the post-transition environment by maintaining unity of command within its longstanding integrated, combined structure, merely flipping the hats of the commander and deputy commander. Moreover, they signed the revision of the 2015 COTP – later called the 2018 COTP Change 1 – and endorsed an updated set of documents laying out future relationships between the ROK JCS, United Nations Command (UNC), and F-CFC. Finally, both sides said they would work towardinitial operational capability (IOC) certification in 2019, the first phase testing Seoul’s ability to lead the combined defense and alliance response to North Korea. 

It is important to contextualize these developments. 2018 marked a sudden turn toward historic U.S.-North Korea and inter-Korean diplomatic engagement. Moon and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un met three times in 2018, culminating in Moon’s September trip to Pyongyang and release of theAgreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA). For his part, Trump met Kim in Singapore in June. In both instances, U.S. and South Korean leaders took actions that would impact COTP’s implementation. 

Following his meeting with Kim, Trump abruptly – andreportedly to the surprise of South Korean and U.S. military officials – pledged to end alliance military exercises. Meanwhile, the Moon administration embraced scaled-down exercises to maintain diplomatic momentum with Pyongyang. Furthermore, its sudden announcement of the CMA – representing the implementation of the earlierPanmunjom Declaration in the military sphere – reinforced the impetus for lowering the scale of exercises, but also apparently left South Korean military commanders confused about how to abide by the CMA without changing their combat readiness posture. 

These developments impacted COTP in various ways. First, scaled down exercises potentially adulterated the conditions under which the IOC and later assessments and certifications would be conducted. Scaled-down exercises could mean less realistic training, lowering the bar for what was being assessed.

Second, the heady effects of diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang created a sense that conditions on and around the peninsula were becoming more conducive to OPCON transition, thus amplifying the Moon administration’s political push to expeditiously move forward. However, despite Pyongyang’s concessions, U.S. military and defense officials remained severely skeptical about its ultimate intentions to denuclearize and were not prepared to accept that North Korea presented less of a threat.

Third, potential discordance between the CMA and UNC’s role and authorities fostered the conditions for friction between South Korean aspirations for autonomy and agency and a larger perception about U.S.-led command structures constraining the same. 

In this context, the2019 communique showed progress but subtle changes. Both sides noted the importance of combined command post training in conducting an IOC certification assessment. The U.S. secretary of defense and South Korean minister of defense reviewed the results but did not confirm IOC completion. Further, they would pursue aFull Operational Capability (FOC) assessment for F-CFC in 2020 and would need to develop strategic documents for the process. 

Additionally, in striving to meet COTP’s conditions, they noted a special Permanent Military Committee (PMC) was held to assess critical military capabilities and “promoted the credibility of the evaluation,” implying the need for such promotion. South Korea, moreover, added new language about acquiring capabilities necessary to command the F-CFC and pursue OPCON transition in a “systematic” and “proactive” manner, while again pledging to “expeditiously” acquire such capabilities. Yet there was no longer bilateral mention of an expeditious process. The U.S. repeated its previous commitment to provide bridging capabilities and enduring ones into the future. In retrospect – and before further COVID-related disruption – the 2019 document appears like a slightly positive holding pattern before sudden discordance in 2020.

While the2020 communique showed some continued progress, it marked a definitive shift. Both sides discussed a way forward in COTP and toward the F-CFC, including FOC certification, the development of a “single set of bilaterally formulated strategic documents for IOC and FOC assessment,” and applauded completion of the IOC certification in the fall of 2020. Nonetheless, whereas South Korean officials expected FOC certification during the alliance exercises, U.S. officials focused on greater joint readiness. 

Further, the communique’s section on OPCON dropped all mention of “expeditiously” progressing, and noted for the first time that both defense leaders “reaffirmed that the conditions stated in the mutually agreed COTP must be fully met before wartime OPCON transition to the F-CFC.” In terms of the communique’s curated and often anodyne bureaucratic language, this was a clear shot across the bow at a time when South Korean defense experts were openly arguing the conditions were too stringent and should be revised.

Similar discordance was evident in relation to the capabilities acquisition process. The alliance held multiple PMCs to, again, promote the credibility of the evaluation and “understanding of the conditions.” The latter phrase, newly added, indicated a lingering lack of understanding. Seoul reaffirmed it would acquire the capabilities established in COTP signed in 2015 and its change in 2018. Also, the alliance initiated a “joint study on bridging and enduring capabilities,” given lack of clarity or agreement on what specifically fell under each designation. The United States would provide bridging capabilities but needed “first to understand ROK acquisition plans in order to determine what specific capabilities are needed, and for how long.” South Korea – based upon its “economic and military advances” – would acquire, develop, and provide these capabilities and commit to a more robust discussion of acquisition planning. 

As diplomacy with Pyongyang entered an extended stalemate and North Korea re-started testing of short-range missiles, U.S. doubts about engagement’s efficacy were confirmed and concerns about military preparedness grew. Simultaneously, amid faltering engagement and the perception COTP’s conditions were overly restrictive, the Moon administration testily reacted as two long-cherished goals of achieving military sovereignty and a peace regime faced truculent realities. 

2021-2024: Revising, Harmonizing, andSlowing the Process

As the Biden administration entered office in 2021 intent to deepen engagement with allies, the process around COTP appeared to enter a more refined and deliberate pace. The2021 communique restated that COTP’s “bilaterally approved” conditions (enhancing the previous year’s “mutually agreed”) “must be met before wartime OPCON is transitioned to the F-CFC.” They pledged to conduct the FOC assessment in 2022 yet did not mention FOC certification and committed to complete the joint study the following year on “COTP capabilities,” including “annex and appendix rewrites” to the 2018 COTP Change 1. 

The communique presented a much closer textual and procedural linkage of “ROK critical military capabilities and Alliance comprehensive response capabilities.” Both sets of capabilities had been mentioned in the original 2014 shift to a conditions-based approach, yet had appeared disconnected in the intervening years’ communiques. Meanwhile, South Korea repeated it would “systematically and actively” pursue critical capabilities, and the U.S. reaffirmed that it would provide bridging and enduring capabilities. 

The 2022 communique – in addition to repeating the injunction that all “bilaterally approved” conditions must be met – signaled the most notable refinement yet in the COTP process. Both sides applauded and approved the “completed set of the COTP annexes with appendices and tabs.” Despite a successful FOC assessment of the F-CFC, FOC certification would not be discussed until completion of “the bilateral evaluation of Conditions #1 and #2 capabilities and systems” and review of “the overall status of acquiring bilateral approved-upon levels of capabilities and systems.” 

“Conditions #1 and #2 capabilities and systems” – the first time such language appeared in the communique – referred to South Korea’s critical military capabilities and alliance’s comprehensive response capabilities, respectively. Notwithstanding the apparent distinction, both involved South Korean acquisitions, and their constant reference indicated they were not being acquired. While Seoul reiterated it would continue to acquire and pursue efforts to meet the conditions in a “systematic and stable manner,” words like “expeditiously” and “proactively” no longer appeared. The communique again mentioned management of U.S. bridging and enduring capabilities but noted for the first time that it would be done through the “OPLAN planning process.”

The 2022 communique demonstrated a more detailed, joint, and tightly linked assessment on the full range of required capabilities and a distinct effort to harmonize the assessment and acquisition of those capabilities with the FOC and operational planning process. Importantly, these changes occurred during the first year of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration. 

Like his conservative predecessors, Yoon rhetorically maintained a commitment to wartime OPCON transition, yet his advisors simultaneously warned against a “perfunctory” approach. Under Yoon, Seoul’s central priority was not to take the lead. Rather, Yoon aimed to gain assurances and shore up consultations and joint planning around the U.S. extended deterrence guarantee whilementioning the possibility of an indigenous South Korean nuclear weapon capability and soon-to-be established ROKstrategic command as a means of intra-alliance bargaining.

The2023 communique marked the last detailed update on COTP, containing language suggesting an increasingly integrated approach. Both sides reiterated that “bilaterally approved” conditions must be met, adding “in a stable and systematic manner.” Further, they noted progress on a bilateral evaluation of conditions #1 and #2 capabilities and systems based upon “assessment criteria and standards bilaterally agreed through joint study.” Also, for the first time since 2014, they made explicit mention of condition #3, stating “meaningful progress had been made in conducting the first assessment of the regional security environment, based on bilaterally agreed assessment methods and criteria.” The growing prevalence of such language, however, seemed to imply that the allies lacked shared assessment criteria, standards and methods in previous years. 

That said, the communique did reveal more detail on how – during the year’s enhanced alliance exercises – different combined component commands within CFC made progress either on Full Mission Capability (FMC) or FOC assessments and further collective effort would go into transitioning them to standing component commands. Yet, once again, it reaffirmed that FOC certification of F-CFC would only be pursued once bilateral evaluation of conditions #1 and #2 capabilities and systems met the bilaterally agreed-upon levels. Meanwhile, the language on bridging and enduring capabilities had disappeared.

Deviating from the 2018-2023 pattern, the2024 communique’s section on COTP was notably shorter. It repeated the previous year’s injunction that bilaterally approved conditions must be met stably and systematically; that results from the bilateral evaluation of conditions #1 and #2 capabilities and systems based on bilaterally-approved assessment criteria and standards were received; that F-CFC’s FOC certification would only be pursued once those capabilities and systems has met mutually approved levels; and that both sides would remain in close consultation for the assessment of the security environment (i.e., condition #3). 

Along with lingering South Korea difficulties in meeting the conditions, the curtailed coverage of COTP in 2024 may have reflected that it came at the tail end of Biden’s term. Recent alliance efforts had centered around institutionalizing the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) and nuclear-conventional integration, and concern was growing regarding the scale and scope of North Korea-Russia ties. As was the case in 2016 and 2020, the final years of the Obama and Trump administrations, the communique’s coverage of COTP was curtailed and indicated progress was still to be made.

2025: Continuity Yet Potential Change

The confluence of the Trump and Lee Jae-myung administrations, like Trump and Moon’s arrival in 2017, has once again created political (and even strategic) impetus to achieve wartime OPCON transition. The Trump administration has amplified its demands that allies do more for their own defense and in support of U.S. strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific, evinced byTrump’s approval of Seoul’s pursuit of nuclear-powered subs. For his part, Lee hasreiterated a well-worn South Korean ambition to achieve self-reliant defense. Integral to this ambition is completing wartime OPCON transition.

In their long-awaitedJoint Fact Sheet released on November 13 Trump and Lee committed “to continue alliance cooperation toward the transition” of wartime OPCON, and with U.S. support the “ROK pledged to accelerate efforts to strengthen its military capabilities necessary to lead the combined conventional defense” against North Korea. On the one hand, the leader-level statement unremarkably reaffirms existing alliance policy. On the other hand, like in the late 2010s, it reintroduces language indicating a more expedited process may be underway. 

The 2025 SCM’sJoint Communique, initially delayed and then released nearly simultaneously with the Joint Fact Sheet, showed a similar balance between continuity and potential change. Like all the communiques since 2020, it reaffirmed the conditions in the bilaterally approved COTP “must be met before wartime OPCON is transitioned in a systematic, stable, and proactive manner.” Yet both U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and South Korean Minister of Defense Ahn Gyu-back “pledged to develop a roadmap to acquire the capabilities necessary to expedite the fulfillment of conditions required for wartime OPCON transition” and pursue FOC certification in 2026. 

Reporting has understandably highlighted this recent thrustto accelerate the wartime OPCON transition process, including by achieving FOC certification next year. However, we have seen such language before, and the alliance has ostensibly been on the verge of FOC certification for nearly five years. 

Textual Takeaways andReading Between the Lines 

The textual analysis above reveals several dynamics that have shaped and complicated a seemingly well-defined plan and process around COTP. These takeaways help explain where COTP stands and provide some insight into possible path(s) ahead. 

First, despite the internal development and refinement of detailed lists of COTP capabilities, there has been a lack of clear consensus between the U.S. and South Korean on different aspects of ROK acquisitions, including: the timeliness and adequacy of ROK acquisitions under COTP and the degree to which Seoul continues to depend upon U.S. capabilities instead of acquiring or developing them itself. 

By depending on U.S. “bridging” capabilities, Seoul can avoid the increased costs that come with acquiring its own and spend limited resources on other priorities. Additionally, there is a longstanding South Korean sense of ownership over U.S. capabilities on the peninsula, at times manifesting in a belief they somehow belong to Seoul, even though they do not. Tied to this is a fear that if South Korea meets all such required COTP capabilities, and the United States no longer needs to “bridge” the difference, Washington will reduce or remove certain assets, amplifying perceptions of a waning U.S. commitment. 

Second, South Korean COTP acquisitions are interrelated with a phased process by which its ability to lead the combined defense and alliance response to North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities has been assessed and certified during alliance exercises and training (i.e. the IOC, FOC, and FMC process). Yet Seoul’s acquisitions and the assessment and certification process appear to have taken time to become more tightly synchronized, due partly to the disruption or scaling down of alliance exercises given diplomatic engagement with North Korea and the COVID pandemic, and because South Korean and U.S. officials were not in synch regarding the standards by which the assessment and certification process should be judged. That appeared to have changed around 2022. 

Third, although COTP is a decade old, a belief permeates within South Korea that the conditions are fungible. Some security analysts are surprisingly ignorant of the conditions and assessment and certification processes. Others, while knowledgeable, see COTP’s conditions as changeable depending on the political will of U.S. and South Korean leaders. Such beliefs are likely a result of the fact that past wartime OPCON transition plans have, indeed, evolved due to shifting political agendas. COTP itself has been revised, from the 2015 Base Plan to the 2018 COTP Change 1 to the 2022 annex and appendix rewrites. 

Fourth, alongside the belief in a fungibility of COTP’s conditions, is a lingering feeling that the conditions are U.S.-imposed barriers and reflect the“control rod” logicexplored in myearlier pieces. Critics claim that the U.S. is trying to hold South Korean to an unreachable standard, so Washington never has to transition to an ROK commander with OPCON over U.S. forces. These beliefs are problematic in properly achieving COTP if they seep into assessment and certification processes. 

Fifth and finally, COTP’s refinement over the last ten years, evinced by more detailed language in successive joint communiques, reflects ongoing disagreements between U.S. and South Korean officials but also a learning process born of those disagreements. Based upon the textual analysis above, the alliance now seems to have a very clear plan for wartime OPCON transition. 

The Lee J administration has madeclear it intends to complete wartime OPCON transition within Lee’s term. Five years is a long time, and based on the progress already achieved, transition is viable within that period. That said, there is already a roadmap for the conditions-based approach, namely, COTP. If Seoul’s intention is to create a new plan, it could cause frictions in the alliance. On the other hand, it may provide a clearer description of how Seoul will meet the conditions it has already agreed to, which could help advance the existing plan. Additionally, if U.S. officials are themselves on board and eager to progress, the alliance realistically could be on the path to a faster transition and broader transformation of the alliance.