Features | Diplomacy | Economy | East Asia
How BlackBerry Became Canada’s Indo-Pacific Cybersecurity Anchor
A Canadian company left for dead in 2016 is now advancing Ottawa’s regional interests more effectively than many government initiatives.
In Cyberjaya, Malaysia, a Canadian technology company that once dominated global smartphones has achieved something governments often struggle to attain: sustained regional engagement. BlackBerry Limited, the Waterloo-based software firm thatcollapsed from 50 percent U.S. market share to near-extinction by 2016, is currently enjoying an unexpected second act anchoring Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy through cybersecurity capacity-building across Southeast Asia.
This reverses the traditional diplomatic process whereby governments open doors for business. Instead, a private company’s commercial operation has created diplomatic opportunities that Ottawa couldn’t have achieved alone. It raises the question of whether Canada’s $2.3 billionIndo-Pacific Strategy can match the agility of private sector engagement.
BlackBerry was once a household name. At its 2011 peak,85 million subscribers worldwide relied on BlackBerry devices, and the company’s stock traded at $230 per share. Yet its fall was swift and total. U.S. market share fell from 43 percent in early 2013 to just 5.9 percent within months. By the final quarter of 2016, BlackBerrysold fewer than 208,000 devices – effectively zero percent market share – and abandoned hardware manufacturing.
Under CEO John Chen, who took over in November 2013, BlackBerry pivoted to software. The company acquiredCylance, an AI-driven cybersecurity firm, for $1.4 billion in 2018, built on its 2010 acquisition of QNX Software Systems (now embedded in 255 million vehicles globally), and purchased Secusmart for voice and data encryption in 2014. Today, BlackBerry secures “96 percent of the threat landscape” and manages over 500 million endpoints through its Cylance-powered security solutions, QNX automotive systems, andBlackBerry UEM endpoint management platform.
This transformation – from failed hardware maker to enterprise security leader – positioned BlackBerry for an improbable role: becoming Canada’s most effective diplomatic tool in Southeast Asia.
BlackBerry’s ASEAN footprint began modestly. In March 2024, the company launched theMCMC and BlackBerry Cybersecurity Center of Excellence in Cyberjaya, Malaysia. The facility, developed through partnership with Malaysia’s communications regulator, has since trained over 5,500 professionals, delivering more than 36,000 training hours across 55-plus courses developed with SANS, ISC2, CompTIA, and EC-Council.
In August 2025, BlackBerry expanded its Asia Pacific Secure Communications headquarters to three Malaysian locations: the original Cyberjaya training center, a central Kuala Lumpur sales and marketing hub in Q Sentral, and a 24/7 Regional Support Centre in Mont Kiara staffed by over 50 technical experts. The expansion coincided withCanada’s November 2024 investment of C$3.9 million in multi-year cybersecurity training funding announced during APEC.
Prime Minister Mark Carney elevated the partnership during his October 28 visit to the 47th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, announcing an additional C$226,000 allocation to train 100 government officials and civil society leaders over two years. The program targets approximately 3,500 participants across ASEAN, with 25 percent reserved for women.
A Diplomatic Opportunity
BlackBerry’s Malaysian presence has generated unexpected diplomatic returns. Canada nowco-chairs the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)’s cyber policy meetings alongside the Philippines – a position achieved largely BlackBerry’s establishment of regional technical credibility. According toCanada’s2023-2024 Indo-Pacific Strategy Implementation Update, this co-chair role includes leadership of the ARF Open-Ended Study Group on Confidence-Building Measures related to information and communications technologies, plus jointly hosting an ARF Workshop with Thailand and Japan on governance and security practices.
This public-private model contrasts with Canada’s broader ASEAN challenges. Despite elevating bilateral relations to a Strategic Partnership in September 2023 and ranking as ASEAN’sfourth-largest trading partner, Canada remains “nearly the last of ASEAN’s dialogue partners” to achieve meaningful institutional integration. ASEAN officials privately characterize Canada as a “fair-weather friend” whose engagement ebbs and flows with domestic political cycles.
BlackBerry’s sustained presence, and its company’s 18-month expansion from a single training center to three-location regional headquarters, demonstrates what sporadic government diplomacy cannot: long-term commitment backed by commercial incentives.
BlackBerry’s success forces policymakers to confront awkward realities about Canada’s Indo-Pacific engagement. Of Canada’s C$2.3 billion Indo-Pacific Strategy allocation (2022-2027), only C$92.6 million funds “Security Partnerships and Capacity-Building.” An additional C$87.8 million strengthens domestic national security agencies’ regional capacity. By contrast, the C$3.9 million and C$226,000 BlackBerry investments, which represent a minuscule fraction of Canada’s Indo-Pacific funding, have delivered outsized diplomatic returns. They have trained thousands, established a functioning regional hub, secured Canada co-chair positions in regional institutions, and sustained the country’s strategic presence in Southeast Asia.
Meanwhile, larger government initiatives struggle with credibility and implementation. TheCanada-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement negotiations, which Carney said would be finalized by early 2026 during his recent ASEAN Summit visit, face skepticism. Carney pitched Canada as a “reliable partner for rules-based trade” immediately after U.S. President Donald Trump canceled Canada-U.S. trade talks – awkward timing that reinforced ASEAN’s historical concerns about Canadian staying power.
This pattern explains why BlackBerry’s model interests strategic analysts. The private-sector approach leverages Canadian competitive advantage (cybersecurity expertise), combines government support (funding and diplomatic facilitation) with commercial incentives, and reduces vulnerability to budget cuts or political shifts. It offers an alternative to government-led initiatives that struggle to sustain a long-term presence amid competing priorities.
The Cybersecurity Advantage
The cybersecurity sector provides particularly strong alignment for this public-private model.BlackBerry CEO John Giamatteo emphasized this at the ASEAN Summit. “The MCMC and BlackBerry CCoE is a vital hub for developing cyber talent both nationally and across the region,” he said. The facility has announced specialized programming in 2026, including a five-day ASEAN Week (February 9-13) with foundational and advanced technical tracks, and a dedicated Women in Cyber Leadership Program (January 26-30), which will target 40 mid-level women cybersecurity professionals across ASEAN.
Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy identifies “investing in and connecting people” as a strategic priority. The BlackBerry partnership achieves this simultaneously across multiple dimensions: capacity-building (3,500 ASEAN professionals trained), workforce development (55 globally recognized certifications), gender equity (a target of 25 percent women participants), and economic engagement (a Canadian company expanding regional operations and hiring).
Yet BlackBerry’s success shouldn’t obscure this model’s substantial constraints. Cybersecurity represents a narrow slice of Canada’s Indo-Pacific interests. Trade negotiations, defense cooperation, climate finance, and diplomatic influence require fundamentally different approaches. Not every sector has a Canadian private-sector champion possessing both technical expertise and commercial incentive for sustained regional presence.
Moreover, BlackBerry’s success depends entirely on Malaysia’s strategic receptivity. Canada cannot replicate this model across all ten ASEAN member states – particularly in countries like Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar where governance challenges complicate public-private partnerships. Malaysia’s prioritization of cybersecurity workforce development and openness to foreign investment has created enabling conditions that are not present across ASEAN.
BlackBerry also benefits from a first-mover advantage. Having established its Cyberjaya presence in March 2024, before intensified China-U.S. competition for ASEAN cyber partnerships, the company now faces mounting competition from other governments’ capacity-building initiatives. As Beijing and Washington increase regional cyber investments, Canadian firms may confront stiffer competition for influence and contract renewals.
Finally, commercial success doesn’t automatically translate to diplomatic advantage. While BlackBerry’s presence helped Canada secure ARF co-chair positions, this doesn’t address issues like Canada’s reputation for strategically unreliability, its late entry into ASEAN integration relative to other dialogue partners, or competition from more institutionally committed powers like Australia, Japan, and South Korea.
A Template for Strategic Restraint
Despite limitations, BlackBerry’s ASEAN footprint suggests lessons for Indo-Pacific Strategy implementation. Targeted investments in areas of Canadian competitive advantage – cybersecurity, clean technology, financial services – can deliver returns disproportionate to budget size. Canada cannot match China’s infrastructure spending or the United States’ military presence, but it can leverage focused expertise.
Second, public-private partnerships work when government support (funding, diplomatic facilitation, convening power) combines with private sector execution and commercial sustainability. This model reduces vulnerability to political shifts while maintaining presence during budget constraints.
Third, capacity-building programs create networks and goodwill that pure transactional relationships cannot. Over 5,500 ASEAN professionals have been trained at BlackBerry’s Cyberjaya facility. They represent future government officials, private sector leaders, and civil society actors – and are now naturally predisposed toward Canadian partnership and familiar with Canadian technical standards.
Fourth, demonstrating commitment through a sustained presence matters more than episodic high-level visits.
As Canada confronts its “fair-weather friend” reputation in Southeast Asia, BlackBerry’s transformation from smartphone failure to regional cybersecurity anchor presents an unlikely lesson: sometimes the best diplomacy happens when the government steps aside and lets commercial success do the talking.
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In Cyberjaya, Malaysia, a Canadian technology company that once dominated global smartphones has achieved something governments often struggle to attain: sustained regional engagement. BlackBerry Limited, the Waterloo-based software firm thatcollapsed from 50 percent U.S. market share to near-extinction by 2016, is currently enjoying an unexpected second act anchoring Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy through cybersecurity capacity-building across Southeast Asia.
This reverses the traditional diplomatic process whereby governments open doors for business. Instead, a private company’s commercial operation has created diplomatic opportunities that Ottawa couldn’t have achieved alone. It raises the question of whether Canada’s $2.3 billionIndo-Pacific Strategy can match the agility of private sector engagement.
BlackBerry was once a household name. At its 2011 peak,85 million subscribers worldwide relied on BlackBerry devices, and the company’s stock traded at $230 per share. Yet its fall was swift and total. U.S. market share fell from 43 percent in early 2013 to just 5.9 percent within months. By the final quarter of 2016, BlackBerrysold fewer than 208,000 devices – effectively zero percent market share – and abandoned hardware manufacturing.
Under CEO John Chen, who took over in November 2013, BlackBerry pivoted to software. The company acquiredCylance, an AI-driven cybersecurity firm, for $1.4 billion in 2018, built on its 2010 acquisition of QNX Software Systems (now embedded in 255 million vehicles globally), and purchased Secusmart for voice and data encryption in 2014. Today, BlackBerry secures “96 percent of the threat landscape” and manages over 500 million endpoints through its Cylance-powered security solutions, QNX automotive systems, andBlackBerry UEM endpoint management platform.
This transformation – from failed hardware maker to enterprise security leader – positioned BlackBerry for an improbable role: becoming Canada’s most effective diplomatic tool in Southeast Asia.
BlackBerry’s ASEAN footprint began modestly. In March 2024, the company launched theMCMC and BlackBerry Cybersecurity Center of Excellence in Cyberjaya, Malaysia. The facility, developed through partnership with Malaysia’s communications regulator, has since trained over 5,500 professionals, delivering more than 36,000 training hours across 55-plus courses developed with SANS, ISC2, CompTIA, and EC-Council.
In August 2025, BlackBerry expanded its Asia Pacific Secure Communications headquarters to three Malaysian locations: the original Cyberjaya training center, a central Kuala Lumpur sales and marketing hub in Q Sentral, and a 24/7 Regional Support Centre in Mont Kiara staffed by over 50 technical experts. The expansion coincided withCanada’s November 2024 investment of C$3.9 million in multi-year cybersecurity training funding announced during APEC.
Prime Minister Mark Carney elevated the partnership during his October 28 visit to the 47th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, announcing an additional C$226,000 allocation to train 100 government officials and civil society leaders over two years. The program targets approximately 3,500 participants across ASEAN, with 25 percent reserved for women.
A Diplomatic Opportunity
BlackBerry’s Malaysian presence has generated unexpected diplomatic returns. Canada nowco-chairs the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)’s cyber policy meetings alongside the Philippines – a position achieved largely BlackBerry’s establishment of regional technical credibility. According toCanada’s2023-2024 Indo-Pacific Strategy Implementation Update, this co-chair role includes leadership of the ARF Open-Ended Study Group on Confidence-Building Measures related to information and communications technologies, plus jointly hosting an ARF Workshop with Thailand and Japan on governance and security practices.
This public-private model contrasts with Canada’s broader ASEAN challenges. Despite elevating bilateral relations to a Strategic Partnership in September 2023 and ranking as ASEAN’sfourth-largest trading partner, Canada remains “nearly the last of ASEAN’s dialogue partners” to achieve meaningful institutional integration. ASEAN officials privately characterize Canada as a “fair-weather friend” whose engagement ebbs and flows with domestic political cycles.
BlackBerry’s sustained presence, and its company’s 18-month expansion from a single training center to three-location regional headquarters, demonstrates what sporadic government diplomacy cannot: long-term commitment backed by commercial incentives.
BlackBerry’s success forces policymakers to confront awkward realities about Canada’s Indo-Pacific engagement. Of Canada’s C$2.3 billion Indo-Pacific Strategy allocation (2022-2027), only C$92.6 million funds “Security Partnerships and Capacity-Building.” An additional C$87.8 million strengthens domestic national security agencies’ regional capacity. By contrast, the C$3.9 million and C$226,000 BlackBerry investments, which represent a minuscule fraction of Canada’s Indo-Pacific funding, have delivered outsized diplomatic returns. They have trained thousands, established a functioning regional hub, secured Canada co-chair positions in regional institutions, and sustained the country’s strategic presence in Southeast Asia.
Meanwhile, larger government initiatives struggle with credibility and implementation. TheCanada-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement negotiations, which Carney said would be finalized by early 2026 during his recent ASEAN Summit visit, face skepticism. Carney pitched Canada as a “reliable partner for rules-based trade” immediately after U.S. President Donald Trump canceled Canada-U.S. trade talks – awkward timing that reinforced ASEAN’s historical concerns about Canadian staying power.
This pattern explains why BlackBerry’s model interests strategic analysts. The private-sector approach leverages Canadian competitive advantage (cybersecurity expertise), combines government support (funding and diplomatic facilitation) with commercial incentives, and reduces vulnerability to budget cuts or political shifts. It offers an alternative to government-led initiatives that struggle to sustain a long-term presence amid competing priorities.
The Cybersecurity Advantage
The cybersecurity sector provides particularly strong alignment for this public-private model.BlackBerry CEO John Giamatteo emphasized this at the ASEAN Summit. “The MCMC and BlackBerry CCoE is a vital hub for developing cyber talent both nationally and across the region,” he said. The facility has announced specialized programming in 2026, including a five-day ASEAN Week (February 9-13) with foundational and advanced technical tracks, and a dedicated Women in Cyber Leadership Program (January 26-30), which will target 40 mid-level women cybersecurity professionals across ASEAN.
Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy identifies “investing in and connecting people” as a strategic priority. The BlackBerry partnership achieves this simultaneously across multiple dimensions: capacity-building (3,500 ASEAN professionals trained), workforce development (55 globally recognized certifications), gender equity (a target of 25 percent women participants), and economic engagement (a Canadian company expanding regional operations and hiring).
Yet BlackBerry’s success shouldn’t obscure this model’s substantial constraints. Cybersecurity represents a narrow slice of Canada’s Indo-Pacific interests. Trade negotiations, defense cooperation, climate finance, and diplomatic influence require fundamentally different approaches. Not every sector has a Canadian private-sector champion possessing both technical expertise and commercial incentive for sustained regional presence.
Moreover, BlackBerry’s success depends entirely on Malaysia’s strategic receptivity. Canada cannot replicate this model across all ten ASEAN member states – particularly in countries like Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar where governance challenges complicate public-private partnerships. Malaysia’s prioritization of cybersecurity workforce development and openness to foreign investment has created enabling conditions that are not present across ASEAN.
BlackBerry also benefits from a first-mover advantage. Having established its Cyberjaya presence in March 2024, before intensified China-U.S. competition for ASEAN cyber partnerships, the company now faces mounting competition from other governments’ capacity-building initiatives. As Beijing and Washington increase regional cyber investments, Canadian firms may confront stiffer competition for influence and contract renewals.
Finally, commercial success doesn’t automatically translate to diplomatic advantage. While BlackBerry’s presence helped Canada secure ARF co-chair positions, this doesn’t address issues like Canada’s reputation for strategically unreliability, its late entry into ASEAN integration relative to other dialogue partners, or competition from more institutionally committed powers like Australia, Japan, and South Korea.
A Template for Strategic Restraint
Despite limitations, BlackBerry’s ASEAN footprint suggests lessons for Indo-Pacific Strategy implementation. Targeted investments in areas of Canadian competitive advantage – cybersecurity, clean technology, financial services – can deliver returns disproportionate to budget size. Canada cannot match China’s infrastructure spending or the United States’ military presence, but it can leverage focused expertise.
Second, public-private partnerships work when government support (funding, diplomatic facilitation, convening power) combines with private sector execution and commercial sustainability. This model reduces vulnerability to political shifts while maintaining presence during budget constraints.
Third, capacity-building programs create networks and goodwill that pure transactional relationships cannot. Over 5,500 ASEAN professionals have been trained at BlackBerry’s Cyberjaya facility. They represent future government officials, private sector leaders, and civil society actors – and are now naturally predisposed toward Canadian partnership and familiar with Canadian technical standards.
Fourth, demonstrating commitment through a sustained presence matters more than episodic high-level visits.
As Canada confronts its “fair-weather friend” reputation in Southeast Asia, BlackBerry’s transformation from smartphone failure to regional cybersecurity anchor presents an unlikely lesson: sometimes the best diplomacy happens when the government steps aside and lets commercial success do the talking.
