Approximately half a month ago, Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae hinted during a parliament questioning that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could amount to a “survival-threatening situation” and trigger a potential military response from Tokyo.

This is the first time a sitting Japanese prime minister has so explicitly cited a Taiwan Strait crisis as a justification for Japan to deploy military force. This triggered strong indignation among Chinese people as well as strong protests and retaliation from the Chinese government.

The rhetoric reached a fevered pitch: Chinese state media openly stated that Takaichi’s head must have been “kicked by a donkey.” The PLA Daily,the newspaper of the Chinese military, published an article warning that if Japan intervenes in the Taiwan Strait situation, the entire nation of Japan would become a target of attack.

Having worked as an international news journalist and commentator for 20 years, I have never seen Chinese officials resort to such angry comments against a foreign leader, nor have I seen the Chinese military issue such an explicit threat to a country before.

For comparison: while China is also angered by the United States sometimes, it has never issued threats of this nature. For example, five years ago, when Trump’s Secretary of State Mike Pompeo referred to COVID-19 as the “Chinese virus,”the Chinese government condemned Pompeo as the “common enemy of mankind” but never launched similar attacks against Trump, who also used disparaging references to China in lieu of the term COVID-19.

Moreover, the “common enemy of mankind” is essentially a political label, falling under the category of information warfare. This is completely different from the threats that Chinese state media are currently making against Takaichi herself and against Japan with military power.

Before the Taiwan remarks, Japan may have overlooked many subtle signals about China’s unease with Takaichi.

For example, after Takaichi was elected prime minister of Japan, only Chinese Premier Li Qiang sent a congratulatory message, but it was not made public to China society. For over a decade, both the Chinese president and premier have sent congratulatory messages upon the election of a Japanese PM. These two signs indicate that China’s dissatisfaction with Takaichi’s election was so severe that it was willing to change diplomatic norms.

Later, Takaichi and Xi met at the APEC summit in South Korea. Neither smiled during their handshake, but they agreed to move the relations in the same direction. This might have led Japan to believe that China’s impression of Takaichi had changed. However, the very next day,Takaichi met with Taiwanese representatives at APEC in South Korea and even posted a photo of it on social media. To China, this was viewed as a betrayal.

A week later, Takaichi mentioned that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces could deploy troops in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait during a Diet committee meeting. The Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement condemning and protesting this.

But for the next five days or so, China remained basically silent, observing how the Japanese government would handle this issue, which concerned China’s core interests. Takaichi neither retracted her remarks nor made any move to salvage China-Japan relations. 

On November 13, the Chinese deputy foreign minister summoned the Japanese ambassador in Beijing. By that point, China’s observation period for Takaichi had ended and Beijing was beginning a phase of comprehensive sanctions.

I believe that the next two months will be a critical juncture for China-Japan relations, as well as a key period for how Takaichi handles this matter.  

AlthoughTakaichi’s current public support is high, China’s sanctions on Japan’s tourism and cultural industries have only just begun, and it will take one to two months for the effects to fully materialize. If another public opinion survey is conducted after two months, Takaichi’s support rate may decline due to the fallout from China-Japan relations.  

Another reason is that China is currently observing the effects of its existing punishments. If Takaichi does not retract her statements or apologize within two months, China will undoubtedly impose additional sanctions. For instance, measures targeting major Japanese corporations or restrictions on rare earth exports may be introduced.  

However, China is likely to maintain a delicate balance between sanctioning Japan and controlling domestic anti-Japanese sentiment. Ifanother attack on Japanese citizens occurs, resulting in casualties, it could undermine China’s efforts to pressure Japan.

The third reason is that Takaichi’s coalition is in the minority in parliament. If she fails to secure allies and opposition parties support for her policies in the next two months, it could lead to a general election for the House of Representatives, which would open a window of opportunity for a turnaround in China-Japan relations.  

If Takaichi falters in a snap election, and loses her leadership post as a result, the tensions between China and Japan would certainly ease.  

However, at this stage, if Takaichi dissolves the House of Representatives and calls a new election, the outcome remains highly uncertain. It is even possible that the Liberal Democratic Party and its coalition could secure a majority, which would, in fact, benefit her government.

Putting aside the question of a snap election – how can China-Japan relations improve, and how should the crisis be resolved?  

China’s stance has been very firm and resolute, insisting that there are only two possibilities for resolving the China-Japan disputes. The first is for Takaichi to retract her statements regarding Taiwan. The second is for Takaichi to step down.  

Of course, both the Japanese government and Takaichi herself currently reject these options. However, in my view, the situation is not without room for maneuver.  

First, on November 24, the spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairsdemanded that Japan demonstrate sincerity and provide a clarified stance and explanation of its policy toward Taiwan.  

The tone here showed some moderation. If the Japanese side were to submit an official document to China, reaffirming its stance on Taiwan in the name of the Japanese government and Takaichi, China might be willing to accept it.

Alternatively, China and Japan could negotiate and reach a new joint statement-like document to reconfirm Japan’s position on the Taiwan issue. In such a statement, Japan would commit to a policy of non-interference, endorsed by Takaichi. 

There is a similar precedent between China and the United States. In 1982, the two countries reached the “August 17th Communiqué,” which defined the U.S. position on Taiwan and remains in effect to this day. 

Also on November 24, the Chinese and U.S. leaders discussed the Taiwan issue during their phone call. According to Chinese state media reports, U.S. President Donald Trump understood China’s position on the Taiwan issue. Trump himself did not deny China’s account in a social media post on the call, although his post made no specific mention of Taiwan.

A few hours later,Trump and Takaichi had a phone call. 

Throughout the China-Japan tensions, Trump has neither publicly supported Takaichi’s words on Taiwan nor publicly discussed the situation across the Taiwan Strait, indicating that he recognizes the sensitivity of this issue. It’s same this time.

Trump’s attitude served to distance him from Takaichi’s remarks on Taiwan. This provides China with a relatively advantageous international leverage point.

While China is unlikely to allow Trump to openly mediate the China-Japan dispute in his typically condescending manner, as he might have done in the Gaza War or the Ukraine War, Beijing would be pleased to see Trump exert pressure on Takaichi privately. However, it will take some time to wait for results that are beneficial to China.

If Takaichi continues to firmly refuse to retract her statements and apologize, I believe that the chill and peril in China-Japan relations will persist throughout her entire tenure.  

Judging from China’s reactions over the past period, it appears that China has largely abandoned normal engagement with her. And it’s said Takaichi will visit the Yasukuni Shrine in next few weeks – she has often done so in her previous capacity as an MP. If so, it would be adding fuel to the fire. China would be unlikely to invite her to any international event it hosts next year, such as APEC.  

Moreover, the term of Japanese prime minister is generally one to two years, with the longest being around three years. Abe Shinzo was the marked exception, but political trends more recently had reverted to this revolving door.  

The fact that China has criticized Takaichi so strongly may well indicate that it expects she will be a short-lived prime minister. In that case, China is fully prepared to bear the risk of deteriorated China-Japan relations for one to two years. There have been many similar situations in the past, and the Chinese government should be confident in weathering this.  

For Takaichi, however, these one to two years of governance will be exceedingly difficult, as she will face strong countermeasures from China in the form of pressure and sanctions.