OCTOBER TERM, 1995SyllabusWHREN ET AL.
v. UNITED STATESCERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THEDISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 95-5841. Argued April 17, 1996-Decided June 10, 1996
Plainclothes policemen patrolling a "high drug area" in anunmarked vehicle observed a truck driven by petitioner Brownwaiting at a stop sign at an intersection for an unusually longtime; the truck then turned suddenly, without signaling, and spedoff at an "unreasonable" speed. The officers stopped the vehicle,assertedly to warn the driver about traffic violations, and uponapproaching the truck observed plastic bags of crack cocaine inpetitioner Whren's hands. Petitioners were arrested. Prior to trialon federal drug charges, they moved for suppression of theevidence, arguing that the stop had not been justified by either areasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe petitioners wereengaged in illegal drug-dealing activity, and that the officers'traffic-violation ground for approaching the truck was pretextual.The motion to suppress was denied, petitioners were convicted, andthe Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: The temporary detention of a motorist upon probablecause to believe that he has violated the traffic laws does notviolate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonableseizures, even if a reasonable officer would not have stopped themotorist absent some additional law enforcement objective. Pp.809-819.(a) Detention of a motorist is reasonable where probable causeexists to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. See,
e.g.,Delaware v.
Prouse,440 U. S. 648, 659.Petitioners claim that, because the police may be tempted to usecommonly occurring traffic violations as means of investigatingviolations of other laws, the Fourth Amendment test for trafficstops should be whether a reasonable officer would have stopped thecar for the purpose of enforcing the traffic violation at issue.However, this Court's cases foreclose the argument that ulteriormotives can invalidate police conduct justified on the basis ofprobable cause. See,
e.g.,United States v.
Robinson,414U. S. 218, 221, n. 1,236. Subjective intentions play no role inordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis. Pp.809-813.(b) Although framed as an empirical question-whether theofficer's conduct deviated materially from standard policepractices-petitioners' proposed test is plainly designed to combatthe perceived danger of pretextual stops. It is thus inconsistentwith this Court's cases, which
807make clear that the Fourth Amendment's concern with"reasonableness" allows certain actions to be taken in certaincircumstances,
whatever the subjective intent. See,
e.g., Robinson, supra, at 236. Nor can the Fourth Amendment'sprotections be thought to vary from place to place and from time totime, which would be the consequence of assessing thereasonableness of police conduct in light of local law enforcementpractices. Pp. 813-816.(c) Also rejected is petitioners' argument that the balancing ofinterests inherent in Fourth Amendment inquiries does not supportenforcement of minor traffic laws by plainclothes police inunmarked vehicles, since that practice only minimally advances thegovernment's interest in traffic safety while subjecting motoriststo inconvenience, confusion, and anxiety. Where probable causeexists, this Court has found it necessary to engage in balancingonly in cases involving searches or seizures conducted in a mannerunusually harmful to the individual. See,
e. g., Tennesseev.
Garner,471U. S. 1. The making of a traffic stop out of uniform does notremotely qualify as such an extreme practice. pp. 816-819.
53 F.3d371, affirmed.SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Lisa Burget Wright argued the cause for petitioners.With her on the briefs were A.
J. Kramer, Neil H. Jaffee,and G. Allen Dale.
James A. Feldman argued the cause for the UnitedStates.On the brief were Solicitor General Days, Acting AssistantAttorney General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and PaulA. Engelmayer.
**Briefs of
amici curiae urging reversal were filed forthe American Civil Liberties Union by
Steven R. Shapiro and
Susan N. Herman; and for the National Association ofCriminal Defense Lawyers by
Natman Schaye and
Walter B.Nash III.Briefs of
amici curiae urging affirmance were filed forthe Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by
Kent S.
Scheidegger and
Charles L. Hobson; and for the Stateof California et al. by
Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney Generalof California,
George Williamson, Chief Assistant AttorneyGeneral,
Ronald A. Bass, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Joan Killeen and
Catherine A. Rivlin, SupervisingDeputy Attorneys General, and
Christina V. Kuo, DeputyAttorney General; and by the Attorneys General for their respectiveStates as follows:
M. Jane Brady of Delaware,
808JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.In this case we decide whether the temporary detention of amotorist who the police have probable cause to believe hascommitted a civil traffic violation is inconsistent with the FourthAmendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures unless areasonable officer would have been motivated to stop the car by adesire to enforce the traffic laws.IOn the evening of June 10, 1993, plainclothes vice-squadofficers of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Departmentwere patrolling a "high drug area" of the city in an unmarked car.Their suspicions were aroused when they passed a dark Pathfindertruck with temporary license plates and youthful occupants waitingat a stop sign, the driver looking down into the lap of thepassenger at his right. The truck remained stopped at theintersection for what seemed an unusually long time-more than 20seconds. When the police car executed aU-turn in order to head backtoward the truck, the Pathfinder turned suddenly to its right,without signaling, and sped off at an "unreasonable" speed. Thepolicemen followed, and in a short while overtook the Pathfinderwhen it stopped behind other traffic at a red light. They pulled upalongside, and Officer Ephraim Soto stepped out and approached thedriver's door, identifying himself as a police officer anddirecting the driver, petitioner Brown, to put the vehicle in park.When Soto drew up to the driver'sThomas
J. Miller of Iowa, Carla
J. Stovall ofKansas,
J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Mike Moore ofMississippi, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Deborah T. Poritz ofNew Jersey, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of NorthCarolina, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, W A. Drew Edmondson ofOklahoma, Charles W Burson of Tennessee, and Jan Graham ofUtah.
Richard S.
Michaels and
Jeff Rubin filed abrief for the California District Attorney's Association as
amicus curiae.
809window, he immediately observed two large plastic bags of whatappeared to be crack cocaine in petitioner Whren's hands.Petitioners were arrested, and quantities of several types ofillegal drugs were retrieved from the vehicle.Petitioners were charged in a four-count indictment withviolating various federal drug laws, including 21 U. S. C. §§844(a) and 860(a). At a pretrial suppression hearing, theychallenged the legality of the stop and the resulting seizure ofthe drugs. They argued that the stop had not been justified byprobable cause to believe, or even reasonable suspicion, thatpetitioners were engaged in illegal drug-dealing activity; and thatOfficer Soto's asserted ground for approaching the vehicle-to givethe driver a warning concerning traffic violations-was pretextual.The District Court denied the suppression motion, concluding that"the facts of the stop were not controverted," and "[t]here wasnothing to really demonstrate that the actions of the officers werecontrary to a normal traffic stop." App. 5.Petitioners were convicted of the counts at issue here.The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding withrespect to the suppression issue that, "regardless of whether apolice officer subjectively believes that the occupants of anautomobile may be engaging in some other illegal behavior, atraffic stop is permissible as long as a reasonable officer in thesame circumstances
could have stopped the car for thesuspected traffic violation."
53 F.3d371, 374-375 (CADC 1995). We granted certiorari. 516 U. S. 1036(1996).IIThe Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to besecure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, againstunreasonable searches and seizures." Temporary detention ofindividuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even ifonly for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a"seizure" of "persons" within the
810meaning of this provision. See
Delaware v.
Prouse,440 U. S. 648, 653 (1979);
United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 556 (1976);
UnitedStates v.
Brignoni-Ponce,422 U. S. 873, 878(1975). An automobile stop is thus subject to the constitutionalimperative that it not be "unreasonable" under the circumstances.As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile isreasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that atraffic violation has occurred. See
Prouse, supra, at 659;
Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, 109 (1977)
(per curiam).Petitioners accept that Officer Soto had probable cause tobelieve that various provisions of the District of Columbia trafficcode had been violated. See 18 D. C. Mun. Regs. §§ 2213.4 (1995)("An operator shall ... give full time and attention to theoperation of the vehicle"); 2204.3 ("No person shall turn anyvehicle ... without giving an appropriate signal"); 2200.3 ("Noperson shall drive a vehicle ... at a speed greater than isreasonable and prudent under the conditions"). They argue, however,that "in the unique context of civil traffic regulations" probablecause is not enough. Since, they contend, the use of automobiles isso heavily and minutely regulated that total compliance withtraffic and safety rules is nearly impossible, a police officerwill almost invariably be able to catch any given motorist in atechnical violation. This creates the temptation to use trafficstops as a means of investigating other law violations, as to whichno probable cause or even articulable suspicion exists.Petitioners, who are both black, further contend that policeofficers might decide which motorists to stop based on decidedlyimpermissible factors, such as the race of the car's occupants. Toavoid this danger, they say, the Fourth Amendment test for trafficstops should be, not the normal one (applied by the Court ofAppeals) of whether probable cause existed to justify the stop; butrather, whether a police officer, acting reasonably, would havemade the stop for the reason given.
811APetitioners contend that the standard they propose is consistentwith our past cases' disapproval of police attempts to use validbases of action against citizens as pretexts for pursuing otherinvestigatory agendas. We are reminded that in
Florida v.
Wells,495 U. S.1, 4 (1990), we stated that "an inventory search[l] must not bea ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminatingevidence"; that in
Colorado v.
Bertine,479 U. S. 367, 372(1987), in approving an inventory search, we apparently thought itsignificant that there had been "no showing that the police, whowere following standardized procedures, acted in bad faith or forthe sole purpose of investigation"; and that in
New York v.
Burger,482 U.S. 691, 716-717, n. 27 (1987), we observed, in upholding theconstitutionality of a warrantless administrative inspection,2 thatthe search did not appear to be "a 'pretext' for obtaining evidenceof ... violation of ... penal laws." But only an undiscerningreader would regard these cases as endorsing the principle thatulterior motives can invalidate police conduct that is justifiableon the basis of probable cause to believe that a violation of lawhas occurred. In each case we were addressing the validity of asearch conducted in the
absence of probable cause. Ourquoted statements simply explain that the exemption from the needfor probable cause (and warrant), which is accorded to searchesmade for the purpose of inventory or administrative1 An inventory search is the search of property lawfully seizedand detained, in order to ensure that it is harmless, to securevaluable items (such as might be kept in a towed car), and toprotect against false claims of loss or damage. See
SouthDakota v.
Opperman,428 U. S. 364, 369(1976).2 An administrative inspection is the inspection of businesspremises conducted by authorities responsible for enforcing apervasive regulatory scheme-for example, unannounced inspection ofa mine for compliance with health and safety standards. See
Donovan v.
Dewey,452 U. S. 594, 599-605(1981).
812regulation, is not accorded to searches that are
not madefor those purposes. See
Bertine, supra, at 371-372;
Burger, supra, at 702-703.Petitioners also rely upon
Colorado v.
Bannister,449 U. S. 1 (1980)
(per curiam), a case which, like this one, involved atraffic stop as the prelude to a plain-view sighting and arrest oncharges wholly unrelated to the basis for the stop. Petitionerspoint to our statement that "[t]here was no evidence whatsoeverthat the officer's presence to issue a traffic citation was apretext to confirm any other previous suspicion about theoccupants" of the car.
Id., at 4, n. 4. That dictum
atmost demonstrates that the Court in
Bannister found noneed to inquire into the question now under discussion; not that itwas certain of the answer. And it may demonstrate even less thanthat: If by "pretext" the Court meant that the officer really hadnot seen the car speeding, the statement would mean only that therewas no reason to doubt probable cause for the traffic stop.It would, moreover, be anomalous, to say the least, to treat astatement in a footnote in the
per curiam Bannister opinionas indicating a reversal of our prior law. Petitioners' difficultyis not simply a lack of affirmative support for their position. Notonly have we never held, outside the context of inventory search oradministrative inspection (discussed above), that an officer'smotive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under theFourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted thecontrary. In
United States v.
Villamonte-Marquez,462 U. S. 579,584, n. 3 (1983), we held that an otherwise valid warrantlessboarding of a vessel by customs officials was not rendered invalid"because the customs officers were accompanied by a Louisiana statepoliceman, and were following an informant's tip that a vessel inthe ship channel was thought to be carrying marihuana." We flatlydismissed the idea that an ulterior motive might serve to strip theagents of their legal justification. In
United States v.
Robinson,414U. S. 218 (1973), we held that
813a traffic-violation arrest (of the sort here) would not berendered invalid by the fact that it was "a mere pretext for anarcotics search,"
id., at 221, n. 1; and that a lawfulpost-arrest search of the person would not be rendered invalid bythe fact that it was not motivated by the officer-safety concernthat justifies such searches, see
id., at 236. See also
Gustafson v.
Florida,414 U. S. 260, 266(1973). And in
Scott v.
United States,436 U. S. 128, 138(1978), in rejecting the contention that wiretap evidence wassubject to exclusion because the agents conducting the tap hadfailed to make any effort to comply with the statutory requirementthat unauthorized acquisitions be minimized, we said that"[sJubjective intent alone ... does not make otherwise lawfulconduct illegal or unconstitutional." We described
Robinsonas having established that "the fact that the officer does not havethe state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons whichprovide the legal justification for the officer's action does notinvalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewedobjectively, justify that action." 436 U. S., at 136, 138.We think these cases foreclose any argument that theconstitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on theactual motivations of the individual officers involved. We ofcourse agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibitsselective enforcement of the law based on considerations such asrace. But the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionallydiscriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause,not the Fourth Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role inordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.BRecognizing that we have been unwilling to entertain FourthAmendment challenges based on the actual motivations of individualofficers, petitioners disavow any intention to make the individualofficer's subjective good faith the touchstone of "reasonableness."They insist that the stand-
814ard they have put forward-whether the officer's conduct deviatedmaterially from usual police practices, so that a reasonableofficer in the same circumstances would not have made the stop forthe reasons given-is an "objective" one.But although framed in empirical terms, this approach is plainlyand indisputably driven by subjective considerations. Its wholepurpose is to prevent the police from doing under the guise ofenforcing the traffic code what they would like to do for differentreasons. Petitioners' proposed standard may not use the word"pretext," but it is designed to combat nothing other than theperceived "danger" of the pretextual stop, albeit only indirectlyand over the run of cases. Instead of asking whether the individualofficer had the proper state of mind, the petitioners would have usask, in effect, whether (based on general police practices) it isplausible to believe that the officer had the proper state ofmind.Why one would frame a test designed to combat pretext in suchfashion that the court cannot take into account
actual andadmitted pretext is a curiosity that can only be explained bythe fact that our cases have foreclosed the more sensible option.If those cases were based only upon the evidentiary difficulty ofestablishing subjective intent, petitioners' attempt to root outsubjective vices through objective means might make sense. But theywere not based only upon that, or indeed even principally uponthat. Their principal basis-which applies equally to attempts toreach subjective intent through ostensibly objective means-issimply that the Fourth Amendment's concern with "reasonableness"allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances,
whatever the subjective intent. See,
e. g., Robinson,supra, at 236 ("Since it is the fact of custodial arrest whichgives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [theofficer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] orthat he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed")(footnotes omitted);
Gustafson, supra, at 266 (same). Buteven if our concern had been only an evidentiary one,
815petitioners' proposal would by no means assuage it. Indeed, itseems to us somewhat easier to figure out the intent of anindividual officer than to plumb the collective consciousness oflaw enforcement in order to determine whether a "reasonableofficer" would have been moved to act upon the traffic violation.While police manuals and standard procedures may sometimes provideobjective assistance, ordinarily one would be reduced tospeculating about the hypothetical reaction of a hypotheticalconstable-an exercise that might be called virtualsubjectivity.Moreover, police enforcement practices, even if they could bepracticably assessed by a judge, vary from place to place and fromtime to time. We cannot accept that the search and seizureprotections of the Fourth Amendment are so variable, cf.
Gustafson, supra, at 265;
United States v.
Caceres,440U. S. 741, 755-756 (1979), and can be made to turn upon suchtrivialities. The difficulty is illustrated by petitioners'arguments in this case. Their claim that a reasonable officer wouldnot have made this stop is based largely on District of Columbiapolice regulations which permit plainclothes officers in unmarkedvehicles to enforce traffic laws "only in the case of a violationthat is so grave as to pose an
immediate threat to thesafety of others." Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D.C., General Order 303.1, pt. 1, Objectives and Policies (A)(2)(4)(Apr. 30, 1992), reprinted as Addendum to Brief for Petitioners.This basis of invalidation would not apply in jurisdictions thathad a different practice. And it would not have applied even in theDistrict of Columbia, if Officer Soto had been wearing a uniform orpatrolling in a marked police cruiser.Petitioners argue that our cases support insistence upon policeadherence to standard practices as an objective means of rootingout pretext. They cite no holding to that effect, and dicta in onlytwo cases. In
Abel v.
United States, 362 U. S. 217(1960), the petitioner had been arrested by the Immigration andNaturalization Service (INS), on the basis of
816an administrative warrant that, he claimed, had been issued onpretextual grounds in order to enable the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI) to search his room after his arrest. Weregarded this as an allegation of "serious misconduct," butrejected Abel's claims on the ground that "[a] finding of bad faithis ... not open to us on thee] record" in light of the findingsbelow, including the finding that "'the proceedings taken by the[INS] differed in no respect from what would have been done in thecase of an individual concerning whom [there was no pending FBIinvestigation],'"
id., at 226-227. But it is a long leapfrom the proposition that following regular procedures is someevidence of lack of pretext to the proposition that failure tofollow regular procedures
proves (or is an operationalsubstitute for) pretext.
Abel, moreover, did not involve theassertion that pretext could invalidate a search or seizure forwhich there was probable cause-and even what it said about pretextin other contexts is plainly inconsistent with the views we laterstated in
Robinson, Gustafson, Scott, and
Villamonte-Marquez. In the other case claimed to containsupportive dicta,
United States v.
Robinson,414 U. S. 218 (1973), inapproving a search incident to an arrest for driving without alicense, we noted that the arrest was "not a departure fromestablished police department practice."
Id., at 221, n. 1.That was followed, however, by the statement that "[w]e leave foranother day questions which would arise on facts different fromthese."
Ibid. This is not even a dictum that purports toprovide an answer, but merely one that leaves the questionopen.IIIIn what would appear to be an elaboration on the "reasonableofficer" test, petitioners argue that the balancing inherent in anyFourth Amendment inquiry requires us to weigh the governmental andindividual interests implicated in a traffic stop such as we havehere. That balancing, petitioners claim, does not supportinvestigation of minor traffic in-
817fractions by plainclothes police in unmarked vehicles; suchinvestigation only minimally advances the government's interest intraffic safety, and may indeed retard it by producing motoristconfusion and alarm-a view said to be supported by the MetropolitanPolice Department's own regulations generally prohibiting thispractice. And as for the Fourth Amendment interests of theindividuals concerned, petitioners point out that our casesacknowledge that even ordinary traffic stops entail "a possiblyunsettling show of authority"; that they at best "interfere withfreedom of movement, are inconvenient, and consume time" and atworst "may create substantial anxiety,"
Prouse, 440 U. S.,at 657. That anxiety is likely to be even more pronounced when thestop is conducted by plainclothes officers in unmarked cars.It is of course true that in principle every Fourth Amendmentcase, since it turns upon a "reasonableness" determination,involves a balancing of all relevant factors. With rare exceptionsnot applicable here, however, the result of that balancing is notin doubt where the search or seizure is based upon probable cause.That is why petitioners must rely upon cases like
Prouse toprovide examples of actual "balancing" analysis. There, the policeaction in question was a random traffic stop for the purpose ofchecking a motorist's license and vehicle registration, a practicethat-like the practices at issue in the inventory search andadministrative inspection cases upon which petitioners rely inmaking their "pretext" claim-involves police intrusion
withoutthe probable cause that is its traditional justification. Ouropinion in
Prouse expressly distinguished the case from astop based on precisely what is at issue here: "probable cause tobelieve that a driver is violating anyone of the multitude ofapplicable traffic and equipment regulations."
Id., at 661.It noted approvingly that "[t]he foremost method of enforcingtraffic and vehicle safety regulations ... is acting upon observedviolations,"
id., at 659, which afford the "'quantum ofindividualized suspicion'" necessary to ensure that police
818discretion is sufficiently constrained,
id., at 654-655(quoting
United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S.,at 560). What is true of
Prouse is also true of other casesthat engaged in detailed "balancing" to decide theconstitutionality of automobile stops, such as
Martinez-Fuerte, which upheld checkpoint stops, see 428 U.S., at 556-562, and
Brignoni-Ponce, which disallowedso-called "roving patrol" stops, see 422 U. S., at 882-884: Thedetailed "balancing" analysis was necessary because they involvedseizures without probable cause.Where probable cause has existed, the only cases in which wehave found it necessary actually to perform the "balancing"analysis involved searches or seizures conducted in anextraordinary manner, unusually harmful to an individual's privacyor even physical interests-such as, for example, seizure by meansof deadly force, see
Tennessee v.
Garner,471 U. S. 1 (1985),unannounced entry into a home, see
Wilson v.
Arkansas,514U. S. 927 (1995), entry into a home without a warrant, see
Welsh v.
Wisconsin,466 U. S. 740 (1984), orphysical penetration of the body, see
Winston v.
Lee,470 U. S. 753(1985). The making of a traffic stop out of uniform does notremotely qualify as such an extreme practice, and so is governed bythe usual rule that probable cause to believe the law has beenbroken "outbalances" private interest in avoiding policecontact.Petitioners urge as an extraordinary factor in this case thatthe "multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations" isso large and so difficult to obey perfectly that virtually everyoneis guilty of violation, permitting the police to single out almostwhomever they wish for a stop. But we are aware of no principlethat would allow us to decide at what point a code of law becomesso expansive and so commonly violated that infraction itself can nolonger be the ordinary measure of the lawfulness of enforcement.And even if we could identify such exorbitant codes, we do not knowby what standard (or what right) we would decide, as
819petitioners would have us do, which particular provisions aresufficiently important to merit enforcement.For the run-of-the-mine case, which this surely is, we thinkthere is no realistic alternative to the traditional common-lawrule that probable cause justifies a search and seizure.***Here the District Court found that the officers had probablecause to believe that petitioners had violated the traffic code.That rendered the stop reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, theevidence thereby discovered admissible, and the upholding of theconvictions by the Court of Appeals for the District of ColumbiaCircuit correct. The judgmentisAffirmed.
