U.S. Supreme Court

Florida v. Wells,495 U.S. 1(1990)Florida v. Wells

No. 88-1835

Argued Dec. 4, 1989

Decided April 18,1990

495 U.S.1

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OFFLORIDA

Syllabus

Following his arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol,respondent Wells gave the Florida Highway Patrol permission to openthe trunk of his impounded car. An inventory search of the carturned up two marijuana cigarette butts in an ashtray and a lockedsuitcase in the trunk. The suitcase was opened, and a considerableamount of marijuana was discovered. After the state trial courtdenied Wells' motion to suppress the marijuana on the ground thatit was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, he pleadednolo contendere to a charge of possession of a controlledsubstance, but retained his right to appeal the denial of themotion to suppress. The intermediate appellate court held,inter alia, that the trial court erred in denyingsuppression of the marijuana found in the suitcase. The StateSupreme Court affirmed, noting the absence of any Highway Patrolpolicy on the opening of closed containers found during inventorysearches, and holding thatColorado v. Bertine,479 U. S. 367,requires police to mandate either that all containers be openedduring such searches or that no containers be opened, leaving noroom for discretion on the part of individual officers.

Held: Absent any Highway Patrol policy with respect tothe opening of closed containers encountered during an inventorysearch, the instant search was insufficiently regulated to satisfythe Fourth Amendment. Requiring standardized criteria orestablished routine as to such openings prevents individual policeofficers from having so much latitude that inventory searches areturned into a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discoverincriminating evidence. However, denying, as did

Page 495 U. S. 2

the State Supreme Court, police officers all discretion is atodds withBertine. While an "all or nothing" policy ispermissible, one that allows a police officer sufficient latitudeto determine whether a particular container should be opened inlight of the nature of the search and characteristics of thecontainer itself does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Pp.495 U. S. 3-5.

539 So. 2d464, (Fla.1989), affirmed.

REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in whichWHITE, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J.,filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which MARSHALL, J.,joined,post, p.495 U. S. 5.BLACKMUN, J.,post, p.495 U. S. 10, andSTEVENS, J.,post, p.495 U. S. 12,filed opinions concurring in the judgment.

OPINION

Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

A Florida Highway Patrol trooper stopped respondent Wells forspeeding. After smelling alcohol on Wells' breath, the trooperarrested Wells for driving under the influence. Wells then agreedto accompany the trooper to the station to take a breathalyzertest. The trooper informed Wells that the car would be impounded,and obtained Wells' permission to open the trunk. At theimpoundment facility, an inventory search of the car turned up twomarijuana cigarette butts in an ashtray and a locked suitcase inthe trunk. Under the trooper's direction, employees of the facilityforced open the suitcase and discovered a garbage bag containing aconsiderable amount of marijuana.

Wells was charged with possession of a controlled substance. Hismotion to suppress the marijuana on the ground that it was seizedin violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United StatesConstitution was denied by the trial court.

Page 495 U. S. 3

He thereupon pleadednolo contendere to the charge, butreserved his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress.On appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeal for the FifthDistrict held,inter alia, that the trial court erred indenying suppression of the marijuana found in the suitcase. Over adissent, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed.539 So. 2d464, 469 (1989). We granted certiorari, 491 U.S. 903 (1989),and now affirm (although we disagree with part of the reasoning ofthe Supreme Court of Florida).

The Supreme Court of Florida relied on the opinions inColorado v. Bertine,479 U. S. 367(1987);id. at479 U. S. 376(BLACKMUN, J., concurring). Referring to language in theBertine concurrence and a footnote in the majorityopinion, the court held. that:

"[i]n the absence of a policy specifically requiring the openingof closed containers found during a legitimate inventory search,Bertine prohibits us from countenancing the procedurefollowed in this instance."

539 So. 2d at 469. According to the court, the record containedno evidence of any Highway Patrol policy on the opening of closedcontainers found during inventory searches.Ibid. Thecourt added, however, that:

"[t]he police underBertine must mandate either thatall containers will be opened during an inventory search, or thatno containers will be opened. There can be no room fordiscretion."

Ibid.

While this latter statement of the Supreme Court of Floridaderived support from a sentence in theBertine concurrencetaken in isolation, we think it is at odds with the thrust of boththe concurrence and the opinion of the Court in that case. We saidinBertine:

"[n]othing in[South Dakota v.] Opperman[,428 U. S.364 (1976)] or[Illinois v.] Lafayette[,462 U. S.640 (1983)] prohibits the exercise of police discretionso long as that

Page 495 U. S. 4

discretion is exercised according to standard criteria and onthe basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminalactivity."

479 U.S. at479 U. S. 375.Our view that standardized criteria,ibid., or establishedroutine,Illinois v. Lafayette,462 U.S. 640,462 U. S. 648(1983), must regulate the opening of containers found duringinventory searches is based on the principle that an inventorysearch must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order todiscover incriminating evidence. The policy or practice governinginventory searches should be designed to produce an inventory. Theindividual police officer must not be allowed so much latitude thatinventory searches are turned into "a purposeful and general meansof discovering evidence of crime,"Bertine, supra, 479U.S. at479 U. S. 376(BLACKMUN, J., concurring).

But in forbidding uncanalized discretion to police officersconducting inventory searches, there is no reason to insist thatthey be conducted in a totally mechanical "all or nothing"fashion.

"[I]nventory procedures serve to protect an owner's propertywhile it is in the custody of the police, to insure against claimsof lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the policefrom danger."

Id. at479 U. S. 372;see also South Dakota v. Opperman,428 U.S. 364,428 U. S. 369(1976). A police officer may be allowed sufficient latitude todetermine whether a particular container should or should not beopened in light of the nature of the search and characteristics ofthe container itself. Thus, while policies of opening allcontainers or of opening no containers are unquestionablypermissible, it would be equally permissible, for example, to allowthe opening of closed containers whose contents officers determinethey are unable to ascertain from examining the containers'exteriors. The allowance of the exercise of judgment based onconcerns related to the purposes of an inventory search does notviolate the Fourth Amendment.

In the present case, the Supreme Court of Florida found that theFlorida Highway Patrol had no policy whatever with respect to theopening of closed containers encountered during

Page 495 U. S. 5

an inventory search. We hold that, absent such a policy, theinstant search was not sufficiently regulated to satisfy the FourthAmendment, and that the marijuana which was found in the suitcasetherefore was properly suppressed by the Supreme Court of Florida.Its judgment is therefore Affirmed.

Justice BRENNAN, with whom Justice MARSHALL joins, concurring inthe judgment.

I agree with the Court that the judgment of the Florida SupremeCourt should be affirmed because the Florida Highway Patrol had nopolicy at all with respect to opening closed containers. As themajority recognizes,see ante at495 U. S. 4, thesearch was therefore unconstitutional under any reading of ourcases.See Colorado v. Bertine,479 U.S. 367,479 U. S. 374(1986) (opening closed container found in a vehicle during aninventory search constitutional only because policy mandatedopening of such containers). Our cases have required that inventorysearches be "sufficiently regulated,"ante, this page, soas to avoid the possibility that police will abuse their power toconduct such a search.See South Dakota v. Opperman,428 U. S. 364,428 U. S. 384(1976) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[N]o significant discretion isplaced in the hands of the individual officer: he usually has nochoice as to the subject of the search or its scope").

The facts of this case demonstrate a prime danger ofinsufficiently regulated inventory searches: police may use theexcuse of an "inventory search" as a pretext for broad searches ofvehicles and their contents. In this case, there was no evidencethat the inventory search was done in accordance withanystandardized inventory procedure. Although the State characterizedthe search as an inventory search in the trial court, it did notpoint to any standard policy governing inventory searches ofvehicles (much less to any policy governing the opening of closedcontainers) until the case reached the Florida Supreme Court. Atthat time, which was after our

Page 495 U. S. 6

decision inBertine, supra, the Florida Highway Patrolentered the case asamicus curiae, and argued that Chapter16 of the "Florida Highway Patrol Forms and Procedural Manual"contained the standard policy that guided the conduct of the searchin this case. The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the manualdid not provide any policy for the opening of closed containers.App. 256. But it now appears that the Florida Supreme Court mayhave been under the misapprehension that the manual was in effectat the time of the search in this case.See Tr. of OralArg. 30-31. The State conceded at oral argument before this Courtthat the manual wasnot in effect at the time of thesearch in this case, but argued nonetheless that the officer hadperformed the search according to "standard operating procedures"that were later incorporated into the Highway Patrol Manual.See id. at 17 ("The rules and regulations which . . . cameinto effect shortly thereafter, merely codified what the FloridaHighway Patrol was doing to all procedures [sic] duringthat period of time"). But the State did not offer any evidence atthe suppression hearing to support a finding that Trooper Adamsperformed the inventory according to "standard operatingprocedures." Trooper Adams testified that he asked his immediatesuperior whether he should impound and inventory the car, but thathis superior left it to Adams' discretion, stating that he foundnothing suspicious about the car. Trooper Adams testified that he"took it upon [himself] to go ahead and have the car towed." App.88. He also testified that he thought that opening the suitcase waspart of a proper inventory, but that he did not ask anyone else'sopinion until after the search was completed.Id. at82-83. He testified "Well, I had to take my chances."Id.at 83.

In addition, there was no evidence that an inventory wasactually done in this case: the State introduced neither aninventory sheet nor any testimony that the officer actuallyinventoried the items found in respondent's car. Tr. of Oral Arg.5, and 25-26. Rather, the testimony at the suppression

Page 495 U. S. 7

hearing suggests that the officer used the need to "inventory"as an excuse to search for drugs. The testimony establishes that,after arresting respondent for driving under the influence ofalcohol and accompanying him to the station house, Trooper Adamsreturned to the impound lot to conduct the inventory search at 1:30a.m. Grover Bryan, who assisted the state trooper with theinventory, testified at the hearing that Trooper Adams told himthat "he wanted to inventory the car good, he wanted to go throughit real good because he felt that there was drugs in it." App. 141.According to Bryan, Adams' desire to inventory the car stemmed fromthe fact that there was a large amount of cash lying on the floorof the car when respondent was arrested. Bryan testified that Adamsinsisted that contraband would be found in the car because "[t]hereain't nobody runs around with that kind of money in the floorboardunless they're dealing drugs or something like that."Id.at 142;see ibid. ("[H]e felt that the money that they hadfound was from a drug deal"). When they finally found the lockedsuitcase in the trunk, Bryan testified that Adams "want[ed] in thesuitcase" because he "had a strong suspicion there was drugs inthat car and it was probably in that suitcase."Id. at145. The men then spent ten minutes prying open the lock on thesuitcase with two knives.App. 82 and 147. Bryan testified that oncethey opened the suitcase and found a bag of marijuana inside,"[Adams] was quite excited. He saidthere it is.'"Id.at 147.See also Tr. of Oral Arg. 24 ("Well, to be quitefrank, the officer, as he got further and further along in hissearch, got hungrier and hungrier").

The majority finds it unnecessary to recount these facts becauseit affirms the Florida Supreme Court on the narrow ground, clearlyestablished byOpperman andBertine, that policemay not be given total discretion to decide whether to open closedcontainers found during an inventory search. With this much Iagree. Like JUSTICE BLACKMUN,post at495 U. S. 11-12,however, I cannot join the majority opinion because it

Page 495 U. S. 8

goes on to suggest that a State may adopt an inventory policythat vests individual police officers withsome discretionto decide whether to open such containers.See ante at495 U. S. 4 ("Apolice officer may be allowed sufficient latitude to determinewhether a particular container should or should not be opened inlight of the nature of the search and characteristics of thecontainer itself"). This suggestion is pure dictum, given thedisposition of the case. But as JUSTICE BLACKMUN notes,post at495 U. S. 11,there is a danger that this dictum will be relied on by lowercourts in reviewing the constitutionality of particular inventorysearches, or even by local policymakers drafting procedures forpolice to follow when performing inventories of impounded vehicles.Thus, I write separately to emphasize that the majority'ssuggestion is inconsistent with the reasoning underlying ourinventory search cases, and relies on a mischaracterization of theholding inBertine.

Our cases clearly hold that an inventory search is reasonableunder the Fourth Amendment only if it is done in accordance withstandard procedures thatlimit the discretion of thepolice.See Opperman, 428 U.S. at428 U. S. 384(Powell, J., concurring). InBertine, the Court held thatthe police may open closed containers found within an impoundedvehicle only if the inventory policy mandates the opening of allsuch containers.See 479 U.S. at479 U. S. 374,n. 6 ("We emphasize that, in this case, the trial court found thatthe Police Department's procedures mandated the opening of closedcontainers and the listing of their contents"). Contrary to themajority's assertion today,ante at495 U. S. 3,Bertine did not establish that police may exercisediscretion with respect to the opening of closed containers duringan inventory search. The statement inBertine that"[n]othing inOpperman . . . prohibits the exercise ofpolice discretion so long as that discretion is exercised accordingto standard criteria," 479 U.S. at479 U. S. 375,was made in response to an argument that the inventory search wasunconstitutional because the police had some discretion todetermine whether toimpound the car. The Court'sconclusion

Page 495 U. S. 9

that the opening of defendant's backpack was constitutional wasclearly premised on the city's inventory policy that left nodiscretion to individual police officers as to the opening ofcontainers found inside a car once it was impounded.Seeid. at479 U. S. 374,n. 6. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S concurrence inBertine could notbe clearer:

"it is permissible for police officers to open closed containersin an inventory searchonly if they are following standardpolice procedures that mandate the opening of such containers inevery impounded vehicle."

Id. at479 U. S. 377(emphasis added). [Footnote1]

Opening a closed container constitutes a great intrusion intothe privacy of its owner, even when the container is found in anautomobile.See Arkansas v. Sanders,442 U.S. 753,442 U. S.762-764 (1979);United States v. Chadwick,433 U. S. 1,433 U. S. 13(1977). For this reason, I continue to believe that, in the absenceof consent or exigency, police may not open a closed containerfound during an inventory search of an automobile.SeeBertine, 479 U.S. at479 U. S. 387(MARSHALL, J., joined by BRENNAN, J., dissenting). [Footnote 2] In any event, inBertine, the

Page 495 U. S. 10

Court recognized that opening a container constitutes such agreat intrusion that the discretion of the police to do so must becircumscribed sharply to guard against abuse. If the Court wishesto revisit that holding, it must wait for another case. Attemptingto cast doubt on the vitality of the holding inBertine inthis otherwise easy case is not justified.

[Footnote 1]

Indeed, the majority's suggestion that police may be vested withdiscretion to open a container "in light of the nature of thesearch and characteristics of the container itself,"anteat495 U. S. 4,flatly contradicts the reasoning inBertine. In that case,the Court rejected the argument that police are required to

"weigh the strength of the individual's privacy interest in thecontainer against the possibility that the container might serve asa repository for dangerous or valuable items."

Bertine, 479 U.S. at479 U. S. 374.The Court found such a rule unworkable for

"'it would be unreasonable to expect police officers in theeveryday course of business to make fine and subtle distinctions indeciding which container or items may be searched and which must besealed as unit.'"

Id. at479 U. S. 375,quotingIllinois v. Lafayette,462 U.S. 640,462 U. S. 648(1983);see also 479 U.S. at479 U. S. 375("We reaffirm these principles here: [a] single familiar standardis essential to guide police officers, who have only limited timeand expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individualinterests involved in the specific circumstances they confront")(internal quotations omitted).

[Footnote 2]

The Court has recognized that an inventory search potentiallycan serve three governmental interests: protection of the owner'svaluables, protection of the police from false claims of theft ordamage, and protection of the police from danger.South Dakotav. Opperman,428 U. S. 364,428 U. S. 369(1976);id. at428 U. S. 378(Powell, J., concurring). The Court has concluded that routineinventory searches are constitutional because these governmentinterests outweigh an individual's diminished expectation ofprivacy in a car.Id. at428 U. S.378-379 (Powell, J., concurring). I do not agree thatthese interests justify the opening of a closed container in whichan individual retains a significant expectation of privacy.SeeBertine, supra, 479 U.S. at479 U. S.382-387 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Indeed, I do not seehow the treatment of the luggage in this case -- prying open thelock with two knives -- served any of these governmentalinterests.

Justice BLACKMUN, concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the Court that the judgment of the Supreme Court ofFlorida is to be affirmed. If our cases establish anything, it isthat an individual police officer cannot be given completediscretion in choosing whether to search or to leave undisturbedcontainers and other items encountered during an inventory search.See Colorado v. Bertine,479 U. S. 367,479 U. S. 374,n. 6 (1987);South Dakota v. Opperman,428 U.S. 364 (1976). Here, given the complete discretionFlorida Highway Patrol troopers enjoyed to open or not to openclosed containers, the evidence in question properly wassuppressed. I do not join the majority opinion, however, because,instead of ending the case at that point, it continues withlanguage, unnecessary on the facts of this case, concerning theextent to which a policeman, under the Fourth Amendment,may be given discretion in conducting an inventorysearch.

The majority disagrees with the Florida Supreme Court'sstatement that a police department must have a policy which"mandate[s] either that all containers will be opened during

Page 495 U. S. 11

an inventory search, or that no containers will be opened."Ante at495 U. S. 3. Themajority concludes that the Fourth Amendment does not impose suchan "all or nothing" requirement. With this much I agree. A State,for example, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, probably couldadopt a policy which requires the opening of all containers thatare not locked, or a policy which requires the opening of allcontainers over or under a certain size, even though these policiesdo not call for the opening of all or no containers. In otherwords, a State has the discretion to choose a scheme that liessomewhere between the extremes identified by the Florida SupremeCourt.

It is an entirely different matter, however, to say, as thismajority does, that an individual policeman may be affordeddiscretion in conducting an inventory search. The exercise ofdiscretion by an individual officer, especially when it cannot bemeasured against objective, standard criteria, creates thepotential for abuse of Fourth Amendment rights our earlierinventory search cases were designed to guard against. Thus, whenthe majority states that a

"police officer may be allowed sufficientlatitude todetermine whether a particular container should or should not beopened in light of the nature of the search,"

and that it is permissible for a State

"toallow the opening of closed containers whosecontents officers determine they are unable to ascertain fromexamining the containers' exteriors,"

ante at495 U. S. 4(emphasis added), the majority is doing more than refuting theFlorida Supreme Court's all-or-nothing approach; it is opiningabout a very different and important constitutional question notaddressed by the state courts here and not raised by thecircumstances of the case. Although the majority's statements onthe issue perhaps are to be regarded as no more than dicta, theynonetheless are problematic, inasmuch as they may be taken out ofcontext or misinterpreted by policymakers and trial courts.Because, as noted above, the complete discretion afforded Floridapolicemen in this case renders the search at issue

Page 495 U. S. 12

undeniably unconstitutional, I see no reason for the Court tosay anything about preciselyhow much, if any, discretionan individual policeman constitutionally may exercise.

Justice STEVENS, concurring in the judgment.

While I agree with JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S opinion, I thinkadditional criticism of the Court's activism is appropriate. Onemust wonder why this case merited a grant of certiorari. Thejudgment of the Florida Supreme Court was obviously correct. Itsopinion contained a minor flaw, as countless opinions do. Unless weare to become self-appointed editors of state court opinions in thecriminal law area, that is surely an insufficient reason forexercising our certiorari jurisdiction.

The flaw, of course, might impose a stricter standard for theconduct of inventory searches in Florida than the FederalConstitution actually requires, but there is no suggestion that theextra layer of protection provided to Florida citizens by theFlorida Supreme Court will hamper law enforcement in that State.Apparently the mere possibility of a minor burden on lawenforcement interests is enough to generate corrective action bythis Court.

But then, as JUSTICE BLACKMUN properly observes, the Court doesnot content itself with commenting on the flaw in the FloridaSupreme Court's opinion. Instead, it plunges ahead with a flawedopinion of its own. While purportedly reaffirming the requirementof "standard criteria" to control police discretion in conductinginventory searches,see Colorado v. Bertine,479 U.S. 367,479 U. S. 375(1987), the Court invites the State to allow their officersdiscretion to open -- or not to open -- "closed containers whosecontents officers determine they are unable to ascertain fromreviewing the containers' exteriors."Ante at495 U. S. 4. Thus,luggage, briefcases, handbags, brown paper bags, violin cases --indeed, virtually all containers except goldfish bowls -- could beopened at the whim of the officer, whether locked or unlocked. Whatis left for the "standard criteria"?

Page 495 U. S. 13

It is a proper part of the judicial function to make law as anecessary by-product of the process of deciding actual cases andcontroversies. But to reach out so blatantly and unnecessarily tomake new law in a case of this kind is unabashed judicialactivism.