U.S. Supreme Court

New York v. Class,475U.S. 106 (1986)New York v. Class

No. 84-1181

Argued November 4,1985

Decided February 25,1986

475U.S. 106

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALSOF NEW YORK

Syllabus

When two New York City police officers observed respondentdriving above the speed limit in a car with a cracked windshield,both traffic violations under New York law, they stopped him. Hethen emerged from the car and approached one of the officers. Theother officer opened the car door to look for the VehicleIdentification Number (VIN), which is located on the left doorjambin pre-1969 automobiles. When the officer did not find the VIN onthe doorjamb, he reached into the car's interior to move somepapers obscuring the area of the dashboard where the VIN is locatedon later model automobiles. In doing so, the officer saw the handleof a gun protruding from underneath the driver's seat and seizedthe gun. Respondent was then arrested. After the state trial courtdenied a motion to suppress the gun as evidence, respondent wasconvicted of criminal possession of a weapon. The AppellateDivision of the New York Supreme Court upheld the conviction, butthe New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, in theabsence of any justification for the search of respondent's carbesides the traffic violations, the search was prohibited and thegun must accordingly be excluded from evidence.

Held:

1. The New York Court of Appeals' decision did not rest on anadequate and independent state ground, so as to deprive this Courtof jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals' opinion, which mentions theNew York Constitution only once and then in direct conjunction withthe Federal Constitution, and which makes use of both federal andNew York cases in its analysis, lacks the requisite "plainstatement" that it rests on state grounds. Moreover, in determiningthat the search in question was prohibited, the court looked to theFederal Constitution, and not to a state statute that authorizesofficers to demand that drivers reveal their VIN, merely holdingthat that statute provided no justification for a search. Pp.475 U. S.109-110.

2. The police officer's action in searching respondent's car didnot violate the Fourth Amendment. Pp.475 U. S.111-119.

(a) Because of the important role played by the VIN in thepervasive governmental regulation of automobiles and the efforts bythe Federal Government through regulations to assure that the VINis placed in plain view, respondent had no reasonable expectationof privacy in the

Page 475 U. S. 107

VIN. The placement of the papers obscuring the VIN wasinsufficient to create a privacy interest in the VIN. Pp.475 U. S.111-114.

(b) The officer's search was sufficiently unintrusive to beconstitutionally permissible in light of respondent's lack of areasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN, the fact that theofficers observed respondent commit two traffic violations, andconcerns for the officers' safety. Pp.475 U. S.114-119.

63 N.Y.2d 491, 472 N.E.2d 1009, reversed and remanded.

O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in whichBURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, andin Part II of which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined.POWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BURGER, C.J.,joined,post, p.475 U. S. 120.BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting inpart, in which MARSHALL and STEVENS, JJ., joined,post, p.475 U. S. 122.WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, J.,joined,post, p.475 U. S.131.

JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, we must decide whether, in order to observe aVehicle Identification Number (VIN) generally visible from outsidean automobile, a police officer may reach into the passengercompartment of a vehicle to move papers obscuring the VIN after itsdriver has been stopped for a traffic violation and has exited thecar. We hold that, in these circumstances, the police officer'saction does not violate the Fourth Amendment.

IOn the afternoon of May 11, 1981, New York City police officersLawrence Meyer and William McNamee observed respondent

Page 475 U. S. 108

Benigno Class driving above the speed limit in a car with acracked windshield. Both driving with a cracked windshield andspeeding are traffic violations under New York law.SeeN.Y.Veh. & Traf.Law §§ 375(22), 1180(d) (McKinney 1970).Respondent followed the officers' ensuing directive to pull over.Respondent then emerged from his car and approached Officer Meyer.Officer McNamee went directly to respondent's vehicle. Respondentprovided Officer Meyer with a registration certificate and proof ofinsurance, but stated that he had no driver's license.

Meanwhile, Officer McNamee opened the door of respondent's carto look for the VIN, which is located on the left doorjamb inautomobiles manufactured before 1969. When the officer did not findthe VIN on the doorjamb, he reached into the interior ofrespondent's car to move some papers obscuring the area of thedashboard where the VIN is located in later model automobiles. Indoing so, Officer McNamee saw the handle of a gun protruding aboutone inch from underneath the driver's seat. The officer seized thegun, and respondent was promptly arrested. Respondent was alsoissued summonses for his traffic violations.

It is undisputed that the police officers had no reason tosuspect that respondent's car was stolen, that it containedcontraband, or that respondent had committed an offense other thanthe traffic violations. Nor is it disputed that respondentcommitted the traffic violations with which he was charged, andthat, as of the day of the arrest, he had not been issued a validdriver's license.

After the state trial court denied a motion to suppress the gunas evidence, respondent was convicted of criminal possession of aweapon in the third degree.See N.Y. Penal Law § 265.02(4)(McKinney 1980). The Appellate Division of the New York SupremeCourt upheld the conviction without opinion. 97 App.Div.2d 741, 468N.Y.S.2d 892 (1983). The New York Court of Appeals reversed. Itreasoned that the police officer's "intrusion . . . was undertakento obtain

Page 475 U. S. 109

information and it exposed . . . hidden areas" of the car, and"therefore constituted a search." 63 N.Y.2d 491, 495, 472 N.E.2d1009, 1011 (1984). Although it recognized that a search for a VINgenerally involves a minimal intrusion because of its limitedpotential locations, and agreed that there is a compelling lawenforcement interest in positively identifying vehicles involved inaccidents or automobile thefts, the court thought it decisive thatthe facts of this case "reveal no reason for the officer to suspectother criminal activity [besides the traffic infractions] or to actto protect his own safety."Id. at 495-496, 472 N.E.2d at1012. The state statutory provision that authorizes officers todemand that drivers reveal their VIN "provided no justification forthe officer's entry of [respondent's] car."Id. at 497,472 N.E.2d at 1013. If the officer had taken advantage of thatstatute and asked to see the VIN, respondent could have moved thepapers away himself, and no intrusion would have occurred. In theabsence of any justification for the search besides the trafficinfractions, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that the gun mustbe excluded from evidence.

We granted certiorari, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985), and nowreverse.

IIRespondent asserts that this Court is without jurisdiction tohear this case because the decision of the New York Court ofAppeals rests on an adequate and independent state ground. Wedisagree.

The opinion of the New York Court of Appeals mentions the NewYork Constitution but once, and then only in direct conjunctionwith the United States Constitution. 63 N.Y.2d at 493, 472 N.E.2dat 1010.Cf. Michigan v. Long,463 U.S. 1032,463 U. S.1043 (1983). The opinion below makes use of both federaland New York cases in its analysis, generally citing both for thesame proposition.See, e.g., 63 N.Y.2d at 494, 495, 472N.E.2d at 1011. The opinion lacks the requisite "plain statement"that it rests on state grounds.

Page 475 U. S. 110

Michigan v. Long, supra, at463 U. S.1042,463 U. S.1044. Accordingly, our holding inMichigan v.Long is directly applicable here:

"[W]hen . . . a state court decision fairly appears to restprimarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law,and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state lawground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept asthe most reasonable explanation that the state court decided thecase the way it did because it believed that federal law requiredit to do so."

463 U.S. at463 U. S.1040-1041.See also California v. Carney,471 U. S. 386,471 U. S. 389,n. 1 (1985).

Respondent's claim that the opinion below rested on independentand adequate state statutory grounds is also without merit. The NewYork Court of Appeals did not hold that § 401 of New York's Vehicleand Traffic Law prohibited the search at issue here, but, inrejecting an assertion of petitioner, merely held that § 401"provided nojustification" for a search. 63 N.Y.2d at497, 472 N.E.2d at 1013 (emphasis added). In determining that thepolice officer's action was prohibited, the court below looked tothe Federal Constitution, not the State's statute. Moreover, NewYork adheres to the general rule that, when statutory constructioncan resolve a case, courts should not decide constitutional issues.See Ashwander v. TVA,297 U. S. 288,297 U. S.346-347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring);In rePeters v. New York City Housing Authority, 307 N.Y.519, 527, 121 N.E.2d 529, 531 (1954). Since the New York Courtof Appeals discussed both statutory and constitutional grounds, wemay infer that the court believed the statutory issue insufficientto resolve the case. The discussion of the statute therefore couldnot have constituted an independent and adequate state ground.

Page 475 U. S. 111

IIIA

The officer here, after observing respondent commit two trafficviolations and exit the car, attempted to determine the VIN ofrespondent's automobile. In reaching to remove papers obscuring theVIN, the officer intruded into the passenger compartment of thevehicle.

The VIN consists of more than a dozen digits, unique to eachvehicle and required on all cars and trucks.See 49 CFR §571.115 (1984). The VIN is roughly analogous to a serial number,but it can be deciphered to reveal not only the place of theautomobile in the manufacturer's production run but also the make,model, engine type, and place of manufacture of the vehicle.See § 565.4.

The VIN is a significant thread in the web of regulation of theautomobile.See generally 43 Fed.Reg. 2189 (1978). Theease with which the VIN allows identification of a particularvehicle assists the various levels of government in many ways. Forthe Federal Government, the VIN improves the efficacy of recallcampaigns, and assists researchers in determining the risks ofdriving various makes and models of automobiles. In combinationwith state insurance laws, the VIN reduces the number of thoseinjured in accidents who go uncompensated for lack of insurance. Inconjunction with the State's registration requirements and safetyinspections, the VIN helps to ensure that automobile operators aredriving safe vehicles. By making automobile theft more difficult,the VIN safeguards not only property but also life and limb.See 33 Fed.Reg. 10207 (1968) (noting that stolen vehiclesare disproportionately likely to be involved in automobileaccidents).

To facilitate the VIN's usefulness for these laudablegovernmental purposes, federal law requires that the VIN be placedin the plain view of someone outside the automobile:

Page 475 U. S. 112

"The VIN for passenger cars [manufactured after 1969] shall belocated inside the passenger compartment. It shall be readable,without moving any part of the vehicle, through the vehicle glazingunder daylight lighting conditions by an observer having 20/20vision (Snellen) whose eye point is locatedoutside thevehicle adjacent to the left windshield pillar. Each characterin the VIN subject to this paragraph shall have a minimum height of4 mm."

49 CFR § 571.115 (S4.6) (1984) (emphasis added).

InDelaware v. Prouse,440 U.S. 648,440 U. S. 658(1979), we recognized the "vital interest" in highway safety andthe various programs that contribute to that interest. In light ofthe important interests served by the VIN, the Federal and StateGovernments are amply justified in making it a part of the web ofpervasive regulation that surrounds the automobile, and inrequiring its placement in an area ordinarily in plain view fromoutside the passenger compartment.

B

A citizen does not surrender all the protections of the FourthAmendment by entering an automobile.See Delaware v. Prouse,supra, at440 U. S. 663;Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,413 U.S. 266,413 U. S. 269(1973). Nonetheless, the State's intrusion into a particular area,whether in an automobile or elsewhere, cannot result in a FourthAmendment violation unless the area is one in which there is a"constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy."Katz v. United States,389 U. S. 347,389 U. S. 360(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).See Oliver v. UnitedStates,466 U. S. 170,466 U. S.177-180 (1984);Maryland v. Macon,472 U.S. 463,472 U. S. 469(1985).

The Court has recognized that the physical characteristics of anautomobile and its use result in a lessened expectation of privacytherein:

"One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehiclebecause its function is transportation and it seldom

Page 475 U. S. 113

serves as one's residence or as the repository of personaleffects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. Ittravels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and itscontents are in plain view."

Cardwell v. Lewis,417 U. S. 583,417 U. S. 590(1974) (plurality opinion). Moreover, automobiles are justifiablythe subject of pervasive regulation by the State. Every operator ofa motor vehicle must expect that the State, in enforcing itsregulations, will intrude to some extent upon that operator'sprivacy.

"Automobiles, unlike homes, are subject to pervasive andcontinuing governmental regulation and controls, including periodicinspection and licensing requirements. As an everyday occurrence,police stop and examine vehicles when license plates or inspectionstickers have expired, or if other violations, such as exhaustfumes or excessive noise, are noted, or if headlights or othersafety equipment are not in proper working order."

South Dakota v. Opperman,428 U.S. 364,428 U. S. 368(1976).See also Cady v. Dombrowski,413 U.S. 433,413 U. S.441-442 (1973);California v. Carney, 471 U.S.at471 U. S.392.

The factors that generally diminish the reasonable expectationof privacy in automobiles are applicablea fortiori to theVIN. As we have discussed above, the VIN plays an important part inthe pervasive regulation by the government of the automobile. Amotorist must surely expect that such regulation will on occasionrequire the State to determine the VIN of his or her vehicle, andthe individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN isthereby diminished. This is especially true in the case of a driverwho has committed a traffic violation.See Delaware v. Prouse,supra, at440 U. S. 659("The foremost method of enforcing traffic and vehicle safetyregulations . . . is acting upon observed violations.Vehiclestops for traffic violations occur countless times each day; and onthese occasions, licenses and registration papers are subject toinspection and drivers without them will be ascertained")(emphasis added).

Page 475 U. S. 114

In addition, it is unreasonable to have an expectation ofprivacy in an object required by law to be located in a placeordinarily in plain view from the exterior of the automobile. TheVIN's mandated visibility makes it more similar to the exterior ofthe car than to the trunk or glove compartment. The exterior of acar, of course, is thrust into the public eye, and thus to examineit does not constitute a "search."See Cardwell v. Lewis,supra, at417 U. S.588-589. In sum, because of the important role played bythe VIN in the pervasive governmental regulation of the automobileand the efforts by the Federal Government to ensure that the VIN isplaced in plain view, we hold that there was no reasonableexpectation of privacy in the VIN.

We think it makes no difference that the papers in respondent'scar obscured the VIN from the plain view of the officer. We haverecently emphasized that efforts to restrict access to an area donot generate a reasonable expectation of privacy where none wouldotherwise exist.See Oliver v. United States, supra, at466 U. S.182-184 (placement of "No Trespassing" signs on secludedproperty does not create "legitimate privacy interest" in marihuanafields). Here, where the object at issue is an identificationnumber behind the transparent windshield of an automobile drivenupon the public roads, we believe that the placement of theobscuring papers was insufficient to create a privacy interest inthe VIN. The mere viewing of the formerly obscured VIN was not,therefore, a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

C

The evidence that respondent sought to have suppressed was notthe VIN, however, but a gun, the handle of which the officer sawfrom the interior of the car while reaching for the papers thatcovered the VIN. While the interior of an automobile is not subjectto the same expectations of privacy that exist with respect toone's home, a car's interior as a whole is nonetheless subject toFourth Amendment protection

Page 475 U. S. 115

from unreasonable intrusions by the police. We agree with theNew York Court of Appeals that the intrusion into that spaceconstituted a "search." 63 N.Y.2d at 495, 472 N.E.2d at 1011.Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at440 U. S. 653("[S]topping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute aseizure' . . . even though the purpose of the stop is limitedand the resulting detention quite brief"). We must decide,therefore, whether this search was constitutionallypermissible.

If respondent had remained in the car, the police would havebeen justified in asking him to move the papers obscuring the VIN.New York law authorizes a demand by officers to see the VIN,see 63 N.Y.2d at 496-497, 472 N.E.2d at 1012-1013, andeven if the state law were not explicit on this point, we have nodifficulty in concluding that a demand to inspect the VIN, like ademand to see license and registration papers, is within the scopeof police authority pursuant to a traffic violation stop.SeeProuse, supra, at440 U. S. 659.If respondent had stayed in his vehicle and acceded to such arequest from the officer, the officer would not have needed tointrude into the passenger compartment. Respondent chose, however,to exit the vehicle without removing the papers that covered theVIN; the officer chose to conduct his search without askingrespondent to return to the car. We must therefore decide whetherthe officer acted within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment inconducting the search. We hold that he did.

Keeping the driver of a vehicle in the car during a routinetraffic stop is probably the typical police practice.SeeD. Schultz & D. Hunt, Traffic Investigation and Enforcement 17(1983). Nonetheless, out of a concern for the safety of the police,the Court has held that officers may, consistent with the FourthAmendment, exercise their discretion to require a driver whocommits a traffic violation to exit the vehicle even though theylack any particularized reason for believing the driver possesses aweapon.Pennsylvania v.Mimms, 434

Page 475 U. S. 116

U.S. 106,434 U. S.108-111 (1977) (per curiam). While we impute torespondent no propensity for violence, and while we are consciousof the fact that respondent here voluntarily left the vehicle, thefacts of this case may be used to illustrate one of the principaljustifications for the discretion given police officers byPennsylvania v. Mimms: while in the driver's seat,respondent had a loaded pistol at hand.Mimms allows anofficer to guard against that possibility by requiring the driverto exit the car briefly. Clearly,Mimms also allowed theofficers here to detain respondent briefly outside the car that hevoluntarily exited while they completed their investigation.

The question remains, however, as to whether the officers couldnot only effect the seizure of respondent necessary to detain himbriefly outside the vehicle, but also effect a search for the VINthat may have been necessary only because of that detention. Thepistol beneath the seat did not, of course, disappear whenrespondent closed the car door behind him. To have returnedrespondent immediately to the automobile would have placed theofficers in the same situation that the holding inMimmsallows officers to avoid -- permitting an individual being detainedto have possible access to a dangerous weapon and the benefit ofthe partial concealment provided by the car's exterior.SeePennsylvania v. Mimms, supra, at434 U. S. 110.In light of the danger to the officers' safety that would have beenpresented by returning respondent immediately to his car, we thinkthe search to obtain the VIN was not prohibited by the FourthAmendment.

The Fourth Amendment, by its terms, prohibits "unreasonable"searches and seizures. We have noted:

"[T]here is"

"no ready test for determining reasonableness other than bybalancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion whichthe search [or seizure] entails."

"Camara v. Municipal Court,387 U. S.523,387 U. S. 534-535,387 U. S. 536-637 (1967).And in justifying the particular intrusion, the police officer mustbe able to point to specific and articulable facts which, takentogether with

Page 475 U. S. 117

rational inferences from those facts, justifiably warrant thatintrusion."

Terry v. Ohio,392 U. S. 1,392 U. S. 21(1968) (footnote omitted) (brackets as inTerry). Thistest generally means that searches must be conducted pursuant to awarrant backed by probable cause.See United States v.Ventresca,380 U. S. 102,380 U. S.105-109 (1965);United States v. Karo,468 U. S. 705,468 U. S.714-715 (1984). When a search or seizure has as itsimmediate object a search for a weapon, however, we have struck thebalance to allow the weighty interest in the safety of policeofficers to justify warrantless searches based only on a reasonablesuspicion of criminal activity.See Terry v. Ohio, supra; Adamsv. Williams,407 U. S. 143(1972). Such searches are permissible despite their substantialintrusiveness.See Terry v. Ohio, supra, at392 U. S. 24-25(search was "a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherishedpersonal security, and . . . must surely [have] b[een] an annoying,frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience").

When the officer's safety is less directly served by thedetention, something more than objectively justifiable suspicion isnecessary to justify the intrusion if the balance is to tip infavor of the legality of the governmental intrusion. InPennsylvania v. Mimms, supra, at434 U. S. 107,the officers had personally observed the seized individual in thecommission of a traffic offense before requesting that he exit hisvehicle. InMichigan v. Summers,452 U.S. 692,452 U. S. 693(1981), the officers had obtained a warrant to search the housethat the person seized was leaving when they came upon him. Whilethe facts inPennsylvania v. Mimms andMichigan v.Summers differ in some respects from the facts of this case,the similarities are strong enough that the balancing ofgovernmental interests against governmental intrusion undertaken inthose cases is also appropriate here. All three of the factorsinvolved inMimms andSummers are present in thiscase: the safety of the officers was served by the governmentalintrusion; the intrusion was minimal; and the search stemmed

Page 475 U. S. 118

from some probable cause focusing suspicion on the individualaffected by the search. Indeed, here the officers' probable causestemmed from directly observing respondent commit a violation ofthe law.

When we undertake the necessary balancing of

"the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual'sFourth Amendment interests against the importance of thegovernmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion,"

United States v. Place,462 U.S. 696,462 U. S. 703(1983), the conclusion that the search here was permissiblefollows. As we recognized inDelaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.at440 U. S. 658,the governmental interest in highway safety served by obtaining theVIN is of the first order, and the particular method of obtainingthe VIN here was justified by a concern for the officers' safety.The "critical" issue of the intrusiveness of the government'saction,United States v. Place, supra, at462 U. S. 722(BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment), also here weighs in favorof allowing the search. The search was focused in its objective andno more intrusive than necessary to fulfill that objective. Thesearch was far less intrusive than a formal arrest, which wouldhave been permissible for a traffic offense under New York law,see N.Y.Veh. & Traf.Law § 155 (McKinney Supp.1986);N.Y.Crim.Proc.Law § 140.10(1) (McKinney 1981), and little moreintrusive than a demand that respondent -- under the eyes of theofficers -- move the papers himself. The VIN, which was the clearinitial objective of the officer, is by law present in one of twolocations -- either inside the doorjamb or atop the dashboard, andthus ordinarily in plain view of someone outside the automobile.Neither of those locations is subject to a reasonable expectationof privacy. The officer here checked both those locations, and onlythose two locations. The officer did not root about the interior ofrespondent's automobile before proceeding to examine the VIN. Hedid not reach into any compartments or open any containers. He didnot even intrude into the interior at all until after he hadchecked the doorjamb for

Page 475 U. S. 119

the VIN. When he did intrude, the officer simply reacheddirectly for the unprotected space where the VIN was located tomove the offending papers. We hold that this search wassufficiently unintrusive to be constitutionally permissible inlight of the lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the VINand the fact that the officers observed respondent commit twotraffic violations. Any other conclusion would expose policeofficers to potentially grave risks without significantly reducingthe intrusiveness of the ultimate conduct -- viewing the VIN --which, as we have said, the officers were entitled to do as part ofan undoubtedly justified traffic stop.

We note that our holding today does not authorize policeofficers to enter a vehicle to obtain a dashboard-mounted VIN whenthe VIN is visible from outside the automobile. If the VIN is inthe plain view of someone outside the vehicle, there is nojustification for governmental intrusion into the passengercompartment to see it.*

The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is reversed, andthe case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent withthis opinion.

It is so ordered.

Page 475 U. S. 120

* Petitioner invites us to hold that respondent's status as anunlicensed driver deprived him of any reasonable expectations ofprivacy in the vehicle, because the officers would have been withintheir discretion to have prohibited respondent from driving the caraway, to have impounded the car, and to have later conducted aninventory search thereof.Cf. South Dakota v. Opperman,428 U. S. 364(1976) (police may conduct inventory search of car impounded formultiple parking violations);Nix v. Williams,467 U. S. 431(1984) (discussing the "inevitable discovery" exception to theexclusionary rule). Petitioner also argues that there can be noFourth Amendment violation here, because the police could havearrested respondent,see N.Y.Veh. & Traf.Law § 156(McKinney Supp.1986); N.Y.Crim.Proc.Law § 140.10(1) (McKinney1981), and could then have searched the passenger compartment atthe time of arrest,cf. New York v. Belton,453 U.S. 454 (1981), or arrested respondent and searched thecar after impounding it pursuant to the arrest,see Cady v.Dombrowski,413 U. S. 433(1973). We do not, however, reach those questions here.

JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins,concurring.

I join the Court's opinion, but write to emphasize that, becauseof the unique and important governmental interests served byinspection of the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN), an officermaking a lawful stop of a vehicle has the right and duty to inspectthe VIN. Where the VIN is not visible from outside the vehicle orvoluntarily disclosed by the driver, the officer may enter thevehicle to the extent necessary to read the VIN.

As the Court explains, the VIN essentially is a serial numberthat, by identifying certain features of the vehicle to which it isaffixed, provides an effective and reliable means for positiveidentification of the vehicle. The VIN occupies a central positionin the elaborate federal and state regulation of automobiles, whichfrequently depends on such positive identification. Federalregulations now direct manufacturers to place the VIN in a locationwhere it is in the plain view of an observer standing outside thevehicle. 49 CFR § 571.115 (S4.6) (1984).

The Court has answered correctly the question presented in thiscase by applying conventional Fourth Amendment analysis. I believe,however, that an officer's efforts to observe the VIN need not besubjected to the same scrutiny that courts properly apply whenpolice have intruded into a vehicle to arrest or to search forevidence of crime. When an officer lawfully has stopped a motorvehicle for a traffic infraction, the officer is entitled toinspect license and registration documents.See Delaware v.Prouse,440 U. S. 648(1979);Pennsylvania v. Mimms,434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam). Unquestionably, the officeralso may look through the windshield, observe the VIN, and recordit without implicating any Fourth Amendment concerns. Respondentdoes not contend, nor could it reasonably be contended, that suchaction violates the Federal Constitution. The question raised onthe facts of this case, therefore, is whether the

Page 475 U. S. 121

Fourth Amendment was offended by the incremental intrusionresulting from the officer's efforts to observe this VIN oncerespondent's vehicle lawfully was stopped.Cf. Pennsylvania v.Mimms, supra, at434 U. S.109.

The problem for the officer was that the VIN, located on thedashboard just behind the windshield, was obscured by papers. Thesequence of events that transpired is well stated in the Court'sopinion. Suffice it to say here that, when respondent left hisvehicle to talk to one of the officers, the other officer sought todetermine the VIN of the automobile. This officer did what his dutyrequired. Because he could not see the VIN from outside the car,and because the driver had exited the vehicle, the officer enteredthe car to the extent necessary to move the papers covering theVIN. It was only then that he observed a handgun protruding frombeneath the front seat. The Court of Appeals of New York held thatthis intrusion was an unlawful search. While agreeing that a searchoccurred, this Court today sustains the officer's action onreasoning familiar in cases applying Fourth Amendment principles toautomobiles.

In my view, the Fourth Amendment question may be stated simplyas whether the officer's efforts to inspect the VIN werereasonable. There is no finding in this case that the officer'sentry into respondent's vehicle -- opening the door and reachinghis hand to the dashboard -- was not reasonably necessary toachieve his lawful purpose. If respondent had remained in his seat,as the Court observes, the officer properly should have requestedhim to remove the papers obstructing the VIN. In the absence ofcompliance with such a request, an arrest would have been lawful.Cf. People v. Ellis, 62 N.Y.2d 393, 465 N.E.2d 826 (1984)(on lawful traffic stop, officers properly arrested driver forfailure to produce license or other identification).

In view of the important public purposes served by the VINsystem and the minimal expectation of privacy in the VIN, I wouldhold that, where a police officer lawfully stops a

Page 475 U. S. 122

motor vehicle, he may inspect the VIN, and remove anyobstruction preventing such inspection, where the driver of thevehicle either is unwilling or unable to cooperate.*

* I do not suggest, of course, that the Fourth Amendment isinapplicable in this context. An officer may not use VIN inspectionas a pretext for searching a vehicle for contraband or weapons. Normay the officer undertake an entry more extensive than reasonablynecessary to remove any obstruction and read the VIN.

JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL and JUSTICE STEVENSjoin, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I agree that the decision of the New York Court of Appeals doesnot rest on an adequate and independent state ground,seeMichigan v. Long,463 U. S. 1032,1043 (1983), and therefore join475 U. S. Ialso agree that the police conducted asearch ofrespondent's vehicle to inspect the Vehicle Identification Number(VIN).Ante at475 U. S.114-115. However, I disagree that thissearchwas constitutionally permissible, and to that extent respectfullydissent.

IThe facts bear repetition. Officers Meyer and McNamee pulledrespondent over after observing him commit minor trafficviolations. Respondent emerged from his car, closed the door, andjoined Officer Meyer at the rear of the vehicle. Respondent gaveOfficer Meyer his car registration certificate and proof ofinsurance, but did not have a driver's license. Meanwhile, withoutfirst examining the documents, and unaware that respondent had nodriver's license, Officer McNamee opened the door of the car tolook for the VIN on the doorjamb and, not finding it there, reachedinside to remove papers obstructing his view of the VIN on thedashboard. While doing so, McNamee saw a gun handle protruding fromunderneath the driver's seat. Respondent was arrested, andeventually convicted, for criminal possession

Page 475 U. S. 123

of a weapon. He was issued summonses for his trafficviolations.

McNamee conducted the search even though

"[i]t is undisputed that the police officers had no reason tosuspect that respondent's car was stolen, that it containedcontraband, or that respondent had committed an offense other thanthe traffic violations."

Ante at475 U. S.108.

IIThe Fourth Amendment guarantees the "right of the people to besecure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, againstunreasonable searches and seizures."

"This fundamental right is preserved by a requirement thatsearches be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by anindependent judicial officer."

California v. Carney,471 U. S. 386,471 U. S. 390(1985). While we have found no Fourth Amendment violation incertain warrantless police searches of cars,see, e.g., Carrollv. United States,267 U. S. 132(1925), this narrow exception "applies only to searches of vehiclesthat are supported by probable cause."United States v.Ross,456 U. S. 798,456 U. S. 809(1982).

Officer McNamee'ssearch of respondent's car wasclearly without probable cause, and was therefore patentlyunconstitutional. The Court's contrary holding rests not on anyreasoning or logic grounded in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, butrather on a strained and irrelevant analysis. To substitute for theabsence of probable cause, the Court struggles to balance "thegovernmental interest in highway safety served by obtaining theVIN" and a "concern for the officers' safety" against the "natureand quality" of the intrusion that took place.Ante at475 U. S. 118.Once again, the Court "takes a long step . . . towardbalancing' into oblivion the protections the Fourth Amendmentaffords."Michigan v. Long, supra, at463 U. S.1065 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). The police had nojustification whatever, let alone probable cause, tosearch for the

Page 475 U. S. 124

VIN, and therefore no amount of "balancing" can make thesearch of respondent's car constitutional.

A

The Court says much about the "important role played by the VINin the pervasive governmental regulation of the automobile," andholds that respondent had no "reasonable expectation of privacy inthe VIN."Ante at475 U. S. 114. This aspect of the Court's analysis isparticularly baffling. Of course, the VIN plays a significant partin federal and state schemes for regulating automobiles, andfederal regulations require vehicle manufacturers to install VINsthat may be read from outside the passenger compartment.See 49 CFR § 571.115 (S4.6) (1984). However, even assumingthat respondent had no reasonable expectation of privacy in theVIN, why is this relevant to the question we decide? OfficerMcNamee did not look for the VIN from outside of respondent'svehicle, butsearched the car without respondent's consentin order to locate the VIN. By focusing on the object of the search-- the VIN -- the Court misses the issue we must decide: whether aninteriorsearch of the car to discover that object wasconstitutional. Regardless of whether he had a reasonableexpectation of privacy in the VIN, respondent clearly retained areasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the area searchedby the police -- the car's interior. As the court below noted,

"[t]he fact that certain information must be kept, or that itmay be of a public nature, does not automatically sanction policeintrusion into private space in order to obtain it."

63 N.Y.2d 491, 495, 472 N.E.2d 1009, 1011 (1984);cf.id. at 496-497, 472 N.E.2d at 1012-1013 (noting that state lawonly requires drivers to furnish police with vehicleidentification).

B

Because vehicles are mobile and subject to pervasive governmentregulation, an individual's justifiable expectation of privacy in avehicle is less than in his home.California v.

Page 475 U. S.125

Carney, supra. This is why the Court has held thatwarrantless searches of cars may sometimes not violate the FourthAmendment, but only if the searches are supported by probablecause.See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, supra; UnitedStates v. Ross, supra. For

"[a]n individual operating or traveling in an automobile doesnot lose all reasonable expectation of privacy simply because theautomobile and its use are subject to government regulation."

Delaware v. Prouse,440 U. S. 648,440 U. S. 662(1979);see also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,413 U. S. 266,413 U. S. 269(1973) ("[T]heCarroll doctrine does not declare a fieldday for the police in searching automobiles"). Because the FourthAmendment constrains the State's authority tosearchautomobiles under the guise of "regulation," the fact that theGovernment uses the VIN as part of its scheme for regulatingautomobiles is insufficient to justify asearch of thepassenger compartment to retrieve such information. Rather, as isordinarily the case with any car search, a VIN search must besupported by probable cause.See Almeida-Sanchez v. UnitedStates, supra, at413 U. S. 269("Automobile or no automobile, there must be probable cause for thesearch"). "[T]o eliminate any requirement that an officer be ableto explain the reasons for his actions . . . leaves policediscretion utterly without limits."Pennsylvania v. Mimms,434 U. S. 106,434 U. S. 122(1977) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). In this case, the police clearlylacked probable cause to search for the VIN.

The Court suggests that respondent's traffic infractionsprovided the requisite probable cause, this on the ground thatthere was "probable cause focusing suspicion on the individualaffected by the search."Ante at475 U. S. 118.This analysis makes a mockery of the Fourth Amendment. There can beno question that respondent's traffic offenses gave the policeprobable cause to stop the car and to demand some form of vehicleidentification.Delaware v. Prouse, supra, at440 U. S. 663.Too, this sort of routine traffic stop generally gives police anopportunity to inspect the VIN through the carwindshield.

Page 475 U. S. 126

But Fourth Amendment protections evaporate if this supplies therequisite probable cause tosearch for a VIN not visiblefrom the exterior of the car. Plainly the search of the interiorfor the VIN was unnecessary, since respondent had supplied his carregistration certificate, and there is no suggestion that it wasinadequate. [Footnote 1]

C

The Court supplies not an iota of reasoning to support theholding that respondent's traffic infractions gave the policeprobable cause to search for the VIN. The Court is content simplyto conclude that "the governmental interest in highway safetyserved by obtaining the VIN is of the first order."Anteat475 U. S. 118.Although I agree that the government has a strong interest inpromoting highway safety,see Delaware v. Prouse, supra,at440 U. S. 658,I fail to see just how the VIN search conducted here advanced thatinterest. Despite the Court's lengthy exposition on the variety ofsafety-related purposes served by the VIN, [Footnote 2] respondent's car was not searched tofurther any of the identified interests. If the officers intendedto identify what they considered to be an "unsafe" vehicle, thatcould have been done without searching respondent's car. Thus, themere fact that the State utilizes the VIN in conjunction withregulations designed to promote

Page 475 U. S. 127

highway safety does not give the police a reason to search forsuch information every time a motorist violates a traffic law.[Footnote 3] Absent some reasonto search for the VIN, the government's admittedly strong interestin promoting highway safety cannot validate the intrusion resultingfrom thesearch of respondent's vehicle.

IIIThe Court, relying onPennsylvania v. Mimms, supra, andMichigan v. Summers,452 U. S. 692(1981), next attempts to support its holding on the groundthat,

"[i]n light of the danger to the officers' safety [that wouldbe] presented by returning respondent immediately to his car [touncover the VIN,] the search to obtain the VIN was not prohibitedby the Fourth Amendment."

Ante at475 U.S.116. Neither cited decision supports this argument.

InSummers, police detained the occupant of a homebeing searched pursuant to a valid warrant. The Court held thatthis seizure was constitutional because it served several importantlaw enforcement interests, including officer safety, and becausethe search warrant provided a reasonable basis for the police todetermine that the occupant was engaged in criminal activity, andshould therefore be detained. 452 U.S. at452 U. S.702-704. By contrast, here there was no reason for theofficers to search the car to inspect the VIN. The officers knewonly that respondent had committed minor traffic violations, andwhile this may have given them anopportunity to inspectthe VIN, it did not provide a reason tosearch theinterior of the car for it.

InMimms, police stopped an automobile for a trafficinfraction, and ordered the driver to step outside the vehicle. Asthe driver emerged, the officers noticed a large bulge

Page 475 U. S. 128

under his jacket, and after frisking him, discovered a loadedrevolver. The Court held that, because such actions protectedofficer safety, the police could legitimately order a driver out ofhis car when they made a lawful traffic stop. Unlike the situationinMimms, the intrusion in this case -- the search ofrespondent's vehicle -- did not directly serve officer safety.Nevertheless, the Court finds that

"[t]o have returned respondent immediately to the automobile [toclear the papers on the dashboard obscuring the VIN] would haveplaced the officers in the same situation that the holding inMimms allows officers to avoid."

Ante at475 U.S.116. Again, the Court forgets that the police, withnoreason to search the interior, hadno reason toreturn respondent to his car. Thus, the State's interest inprotecting officer safety cannot validate the search.

Of course, if the officers had reasonable grounds to suspectthat the traffic stop presented a threat to their safety, theywould have been authorized to search respondent's vehicle forweapons.See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at463 U. S.1051. However, neither officer ever suggested that thesituation posed any danger, and the court below specifically foundthat the facts "reveal no reason for the officer[s] . . . to act toprotect [their] own safety." 63 N.Y.2d at 496, 472 N.E.2d at 1012.In the absence of even the slightest suspicion of danger, thesearch of respondent's car cannot be justified on grounds ofofficer safety.

IVFinally, the Court finds that "[t]hecritical' issue of theintrusiveness of the Government's action . . . also here weighs infavor of allowing the search."Ante at475 U. S. 118.The Court's effort to minimize the extent of the intrusion,seeante at475 U. S.118-119, won't wash. Officer McNamee clearlysearched respondent's car by opening the door and reachinginto the passenger compartment to remove papers from the dashboard.Even if he did not engage in a full-scale excavation, this searchexposed areas of the passenger compartment not visible

Page 475 U. S. 129

from outside the vehicle.

"The narrow intrusions involved in [Terry v. Ohio,392 U. S.1 (1968), and its progeny] were judged by a balancingtest, rather than by the general principle that Fourth Amendmentseizures must be supported by the 'long-prevailing standards' ofprobable cause . . . only because these intrusions fell far shortof the kind of intrusion associated with an arrest."

Dunaway v. New York,442 U. S. 200,442 U. S. 212(1979). That the search conducted here was substantially moreintrusive than an ordinary traffic stop starkly exposes theimpropriety of the Court's strained effort to sanction McNamee'spatently illegal search by the balancing approach. InUnitedStates v. Place,462 U. S. 696,462 U. S. 721(1983), JUSTICE BLACKMUN too noted his concern over the "emergingtendency on the part of the Court to convert theTerrydecision into a general statement that the Fourth Amendmentrequires only that any seizure be reasonable."Cf. 462U.S. at462 U. S. 718(BRENNAN,J., concurring in result);Kolender v. Lawson,461 U. S. 352,461 U. S. 363(1983) (BRENNAN, J., concurring);Florida v. Royer,460 U. S. 491,460 U. S. 509(1983) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in result). [Footnote 4]

In any event, even if there had been only a limited search herethat justified the Court in balancing the extent of the intrusionagainst the importance of the governmental interests allegedlyserved, this alone cannot legalize the search of respondent's car.In situations where the Court has approved of very limitedintrusions on less than probable cause, the Court has alwaysrequired that

"the police officer . . . be

Page 475 U. S. 130

able to point to specific and articulable facts which, takentogether with rational inferences from those facts, reasonablywarrant that intrusion."

Terry v. Ohio,392 U. S. 1,392 U. S. 21(1968);see Michigan v. Long, supra, at463 U. S.1049 (police must have reasonable belief that suspect isdangerous and may gain immediate control of weapons to search areasof passenger compartment where weapons may be placed or hidden);Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at440 U. S. 663(police must have reasonable suspicion that motorist is unlicensed,that car is unregistered, or that either the vehicle or an occupantis otherwise subject to seizure, to stop automobile and detaindriver);United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,422 U.S. 873,422 U. S.881-882 (1975) (police must have reasonable suspicionthat vehicle contains illegal aliens in order to stop the car andquestion occupants about citizenship). In this case, respondent'straffic infractions did not give the police a reason to search forthe VIN, and the police offered no other justification that wouldreasonably warrant such an intrusion.

In sum, the Court's decision today is still another of its stepson the road to evisceration of the protections of the FourthAmendment. The Court's willingness to sanction a car search thatthe police had no probable cause to conduct highlights this trend.However, I find the Court's holding particularly disturbing becausenone of the factors the Court relies upon -- the lack of reasonableexpectation of privacy in the VIN, the officers' observingrespondent commit minor traffic violations, the government'sinterest both in promoting highway safety and in shielding officersfrom danger, and the allegedly limited nature of the search thattook place -- gave the policeany reason to search for theVIN. The Court once again disregards the admonition of JusticeJackson:

"[Fourth Amendment rights] are not mere second-class rights, butbelong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivationsof rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushingthe spirit of the

Page 475 U. S. 131

individual, and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolledsearch and seizure is one of the first and most effective weaponsin the arsenal of every arbitrary government."

Brinegar v. United States,338 U.S. 160,338 U. S. 180(1949) (dissenting opinion). [Footnote 5]

[Footnote 1]

Indeed, the facts of this case belie any suggestion that the VINsearch was needed positively to identify respondent's vehicle.Officer McNamee did not wait to see respondent's vehicleregistration certificate before he started to search respondent'scar, and did not record the VIN he found in order to compare itwith other identifying documents.

[Footnote 2]

The Court notes that "[t]he ease with which the VIN allowsidentification of a particular vehicle assists the various levelsof government in many ways."Ante at475 U. S. 111.As examples, the Court explains that "the VIN improves the efficacyof recall campaigns," "assists researchers in determining the risksof driving various makes and models of automobiles," helps to"reduc[e] the number of those injured in accidents who gouncompensated for lack of insurance," ensures "that automobileoperators are driving safe vehicles," and "[b]y making automobiletheft more difficult . . . , safeguards not only property but alsolife and limb."Ibid.

[Footnote 3]

By analogy, had respondent emerged from his car without hisvehicle registration certificate or driver's license, I do not readthe Court's opinion to hold that the police could have searched thepassenger compartment in order to locate these documents, eventhough they also play important roles in the State's regulation ofautomobiles.

[Footnote 4]

"There are important reasons why balancing inquiries should notbe conducted except in the most limited circumstances."UnitedStates v. Place, 462 U.S. at462 U. S. 718(BRENNAN, J., concurring in result).

"[T]he protections intended by the Framers could all too easilydisappear in the consideration and balancing of the multifariouscircumstances presented by different cases."

Dunaway v. New York,442 U. S. 200,442 U. S. 213(1979). As a general rule,

"the Framers of the [Fourth] Amendment balanced the interestsinvolved and decided that a seizure is reasonable only if supportedby a judicial warrant based on probable cause."

United States v. Place, supra, at462 U. S. 722(BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment).

[Footnote 5]

JUSTICE POWELL, in a concurring opinion joined by THE CHIEFJUSTICE, would find that,

"[w]here the VIN is not visible from outside the vehicle orvoluntarily disclosed by the driver, the officer may enter thevehicle to the extent necessary to read the VIN."

Ante at475 U. S. 120.Even were I to agree with this standard, in this case, OfficerMcNamee searched respondent's car without ever asking himvoluntarily to disclose the VIN's location.

JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, dissenting.

The police officer involved in this case entered the interior ofrespondent's automobile, an area protected by the Fourth Amendmentagainst unreasonable searches and seizures. A car may be searchedwithout a warrant if there is probable cause to do so, but no onesuggests that this precondition for a search existed here. Theentry was solely to remove an obstruction that prevented the VINfrom being seen from outside the car. The issue is whether thegovernmental interest in obtaining the VIN by entering a protectedarea is sufficient to outweigh the owner's privacy interest in theinterior of the car. I am unprepared, at least for the reasons theCourt gives, to conclude that it is.

Had Class remained in his car and refused an officer's order (1)to turn over his registration certificate and (2) to remove thearticle obscuring the VIN, there would have been no morejustification for entering the interior of the car and doing whatwas necessary to read the VIN than there would have been to enterand search for the registration certificate in the glovecompartment. It may be that, under our cases, Class could have beensanctioned for his refusal in such a case, but we have never heldthat his refusal would permit a search of the glove compartment.Even if it did, it would be different if there was no refusal atall, but just an entry to

Page 475 U. S. 132

find a registration certificate. If that is the case, this oneis no different in kind: there was no refusal, and nothing but anonconsensual entry to search without probable cause and withoutemergent circumstances.

It makes no difference that the law requires the VIN to bevisible from outside the car. Otherwise, a requirement that the VINbe carried in a prominent location in the trunk of the car wouldjustify searches of that area whenever there was a stop for atraffic violation. I thus do not join the Court's opinion, which ineffect holds that a search of a car for the VIN is permissiblewhenever there is a legal stop, whether or not the driver is evenasked to consent.

Nevertheless, Class was unlicensed, and the police were notconstitutionally required merely to give him a citation and let hisunlicensed driving continue. Arguably, one of the officers legallycould have driven the car away himself and, in the process, noticedthe gun; the car could have been towed and inspected at thestation; or Class could have been arrested for driving without alicense, and the entire car searched. But the Court eschews thesepossible alternative rationales and rests its judgment on groundsthat I do not accept.