U.S. Supreme Court

United States Dept. of Agriculture v.Moreno,413U.S. 528 (1973)United States Department ofAgriculture v. Moreno

No. 72-534

Argued April 23, 1973

Decided June 25, 1973

413U.S. 528

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATESDISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OFCOLUMBIA

Syllabus

Section 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, as amended in 1971,generally excludes from participation in the food stamp program anyhousehold containing an individual who is unrelated to any otherhousehold member. The Secretary of Agriculture issued regulationsthereunder rendering ineligible for participation in the programany "household" whose members are not "all related to each other."Congress stated that the purposes of the Act were

"to safeguard the health and wellbeing of the Nation'spopulation and raise levels of nutrition among low incomehouseholds . . . [and] that increased utilization of food inestablishing and maintaining adequate national levels of nutritionwill promote the distribution . . . of our agricultural abundanceand will strengthen cur agricultural economy. . . ."

The District Court held that the "unrelated person" provision of§ 3(e) creates an irrational classification in violation of theequal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the FifthAmendment.

Held: The legislative classification here involvedcannot be sustained, the classification being clearly irrelevant tothe stated purposes of the Act and not rationally furthering anyother legitimate governmental interest. In practical operation, theAct excludes not those who are "likely to abuse the program," but,rather, only those who so desperately need aid that they cannoteven afford to alter their living arrangements so as to retaintheir eligibility. Pp. 533-538.345 F.Supp. 310, affirmed.

BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in whichDOUGLAS, STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ.,joined. DOUGLAS J., filed a concurring opinion,post, p.413 U. S. 538.REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J.,joined,post, p.413 U. S.545.

Page 413 U. S. 529

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case requires us to consider the constitutionality of §3(e) of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e), as amendedin 1971, 84 Stat. 2048, which, with certain exceptions, excludesfrom participation in the food stamp program any householdcontaining an individual who is unrelated to any other member ofthe household. In practical effect, § 3(e) creates two classes ofpersons for food stamp purposes: one class is composed of thoseindividuals who live in households all of whose members are relatedto one another, and the other class consists of those individualswho live in households containing one or more members who areunrelated to the rest. The latter class of persons is deniedfederal food assistance. A three-judge District Court for theDistrict of Columbia held this classification invalid as violativeof the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.345 F.Supp. 310 (1972). We noted probable jurisdiction. 409 U.S. 1036(1972). We affirm.

IThe federal food stamp program was established in 1964 in aneffort to alleviate hunger and malnutrition among the more needysegments of our society. 7 U.S.C. § 2011. Eligibility forparticipation in the program is determined on a household, ratherthan an individual basis. 7 CFR § 271.3(a). An eligible householdpurchases sufficient food stamps to provide that household with anutritionally adequate diet. The household pays for the stamps at areduced rate based

Page 413 U. S. 530

upon its size and cumulative income. The food stamps are thenused to purchase food at retail stores, and the Government redeemsthe stamps at face value, thereby paying the difference between theactual cost of the food and the amount paid by the household forthe stamps.See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2013(a), 2016, 2025(a).

As initially enacted, § 3(e) defined a "household" as

"a group ofrelated or non-related individuals, who arenot residents of an institution or boarding house, but are livingas one economic unit sharing common cooking facilities and for whomfood is customarily purchased in common. [Footnote 1]"

In January, 1971, however, Congress redefined the term"household" so as to include only groups ofrelatedindividuals. [Footnote 2]Pursuant to this amendment, the Secretary of Agriculturepromulgated regulations rendering ineligible for participation inthe program any "household" whose members are not "all related toeach other." [Footnote 3]

Page 413 U. S. 531

Appellees in this case consist of several groups of individualswho allege that, although they satisfy the income eligibilityrequirements for federal food assistance, they have neverthelessbeen excluded from the program solely because the persons in eachgroup are not "all related to each other." Appellee Jacinta Moreno,for example, is a 56-year-old diabetic who lives with ErminaSanchez and the latter's three children. They share common livingexpenses, and Mrs. Sanchez helps to care for appellee. Appellee'smonthly income, derived from public assistance, is $75; Mrs.Sanchez receives $133 per month from public assistance. Thehousehold pays $135 per month for rent, gas, and electricity, ofwhich appellee pays $50. Appellee spends $10 per month fortransportation to a hospital for regular visits, and $5 per monthfor laundry. That leaves her $10 per month for food and othernecessities. Despite her poverty, appellee has been denied federalfood assistance solely because she is unrelated to the othermembers of her household. Moreover, although Mrs. Sanchez and herthree children were permitted to purchase $108 worth of food stampsper month for $18, their participation in the program will be

Page 413 U. S. 532

terminated if appellee Moreno continues to live with them.

Appellee Sheilah Hejny is married and has three children.Although the Hejnys are indigent, they took in a 20-year-old girl,who is unrelated to them, because "we felt she had emotionalproblems." The Hejnys receive $144 worth of food stamps each monthfor $14. If they allow the 20-year-old girl to continue to livewith them, they will be denied food stamps by reason of § 3(e).

Appellee Victoria Keppler has a daughter with an acute hearingdeficiency. The daughter requires special instruction in a schoolfor the deaf. The school is located in an area in which appelleecould not ordinarily afford to live. Thus, in order to make themost of her limited resources, appellee agreed to share anapartment near the school with a woman who, like appellee, is onpublic assistance. Since appellee is not related to the woman,appellee's food stamps have been, and will continue to be, cut offif they continue to live together.

These and two other groups of appellees instituted a classaction against the Department of Agriculture, its Secretary, andtwo other departmental officials, seeking declaratory andinjunctive relief against the enforcement of the 1971 amendment of§ 3(e) and its implementing regulations. In essence, appelleescontend, [Footnote 4] and theDistrict Court held, that the "unrelated person" provision of §3(e) creates an irrational classification in violation

Page 413 U. S. 533

of the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause ofthe Fifth Amendment. [Footnote5] We agree.

IIUnder traditional equal protection analysis, a legislativeclassification must be sustained if the classification itself isrationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.SeeJefferson v. Hackney,406 U. S. 535,406 U. S. 546(1972);Richardson v. Belcher,404 U. S.78,404 U. S. 81(1971);Dandridge v. Williams.397 U.S. 471,397 U. S. 485(1970);McGowan v. Maryland,366 U.S. 420,366 U. S. 426(1961). The purposes of the Food Stamp Act were expressly set forthin the congressional "declaration of policy":

"It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress . . . tosafeguard the health and wellbeing of the Nation's population andraise levels of nutrition among low income households. The Congresshereby finds that the limited food purchasing power of low incomehouseholds contributes to hunger and malnutrition among members ofsuch households. The Congress further finds that increasedutilization of food in establishing and maintaining adequatenational levels of nutrition will promote the distribution in abeneficial manner of our agricultural abundances and willstrengthen our agricultural economy, as well as result in moreorderly marketing and distribution of food. To alleviate suchhunger and malnutrition, a food stamp program is herein authorizedwhich will permit low income households to

Page 413 U. S. 534

purchase a nutritionally adequate diet through normal channelsof trade."

7 U.S.C. § 2011. The challenged statutory classification(households of related persons versus households containing one ormore unrelated persons) is clearly irrelevant to the statedpurposes of the Act. As the District Court recognized,

"[t]he relationships among persons constituting one economicunit and sharing cooking facilities have nothing to do with theirabilities to stimulate the agricultural economy by purchasing farmsurpluses, or with their personal nutritional requirements."

345 F. Supp. at 313.

Thus, if it is to be sustained, the challenged classificationmust rationally further some legitimate governmental interest otherthan those specifically stated in the congressional "declaration ofpolicy." Regrettably, there is little legislative history toilluminate the purposes of the 1971 amendment of § 3(e). [Footnote 6] The legislative historythat does exist, however, indicates that that amendment wasintended to prevent so-called "hippies" and "hippie communes" fromparticipating in the food stamp program.See H.R.Conf.Rep.No. 91-1793, p. 8; 116 Cong.Rec. 44439 (1970) (Sen. Holland). Thechallenged classification clearly cannot be sustained by referenceto this congressional purpose. For if the constitutional conceptionof "equal protection of the laws" means anything, it must, at thevery least, mean that a bare congressional desire to harm apolitically unpopular group cannot constitute alegitimategovernmental interest. As a result,

"[a] purpose to discriminate against hippies cannot, in and ofitself and without reference to [some independent] considerationsin the

Page 413 U. S. 535

public interest, justify the 1971 amendment."

345 F. Supp. at 314 n. 11.

Although apparently conceding this point, the Governmentmaintains that the challenged classification should nevertheless beupheld as rationally related to the clearly legitimate governmentalinterest in minimizing fraud in the administration of the foodstamp program. [Footnote 7] Inessence, the Government contends that, in adopting the 1971amendment, Congress might rationally have thought (1) thathouseholds with one or more unrelated members are more likely than"fully related" households to contain individuals who abuse theprogram by fraudulently failing to report sources of income or byvoluntarily remaining poor; and (2) that such households are"relatively unstable," thereby increasing the difficulty ofdetecting such abuses. But even if we were to accept as rationalthe Government's wholly unsubstantiated assumptions concerning thedifferences between "related" and "unrelated" households, we stillcould not agree with the Government's conclusion that the denial ofessential

Page 413 U. S. 536

federal food assistance to all otherwise eligible householdscontaining unrelated members constitutes a rational effort to dealwith these concerns.

At the outset, it is important to note that the Food Stamp Actitself contains provisions, wholly independent of § 3(e), aimedspecifically at the problems of fraud and of the voluntarily poor.For example, with certain exceptions, § 5(c) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §2014(c), renders ineligible for assistance any household containing"an able-bodied adult person between the ages of eighteen andsixty-five" who fails to register for, and accept, offeredemployment. Similarly, §§ 14(b) and (c), 7 U.S.C. §§ 2023(b) and(c), specifically impose strict criminal penalties upon anyindividual who obtains or uses food stamps fraudulently. [Footnote 8] The existence of theseprovisions

Page 413 U. S. 537

necessarily casts considerable doubt upon the proposition thatthe 1971 amendment could rationally have been intended to preventthose very same abuses.See Eisenstadt v. Baird,405 U. S. 438,405 U. S. 452(1972);cf. Dunn v. Blumstein,405 U.S. 330,405 U. S.353-354 (1972).

Moreover, in practical effect, the challenged classificationsimply does not operate so as rationally to further the preventionof fraud. As previously noted, § 3(e) defines an eligible"household" as

"a group of related individuals . . . [1] living as one economicunit [2] sharing common cooking facilities [and 3] for whom food iscustomarily purchased in common."

Thus, twounrelated persons living together and meetingall three of these conditions would constitute a single householdineligible for assistance. If financially feasible, however, thesesame two individuals can legally avoid the "unrelated person"exclusion simply by altering their living arrangements so as toeliminate any one of the three conditions. By so doing, theyeffectively create two separate "households," both of which areeligible for assistance.See Knowles v.Butz, 358 F.Supp. 228 (ND Cal.1973). Indeed, as the California Director ofSocial Welfare has explained:

"The 'related household' limitations will eliminate manyhouseholds from eligibility in the Food Stamp Program. It is myunderstanding that the Congressional intent of the new regulationsare specifically aimed at the 'hippies' and 'hippie communes.' Mostpeople in this category can and will alter their livingarrangements in order to remain eligible for food stamps. However,the AFDC mothers who try to raise their standard of living bysharing housing will be affected. They will not be able to

Page 413 U. S. 538

utilize the altered living patterns in order to continue o beeligible without giving up their advantage of shared housingcosts."

Thus, in practical operation, the 1971 amendment excludes fromparticipation in the food stamp program,not those personswho are "likely to abuse the program" but, rather,onlythose persons who are so desperately in need of aid that theycannot even afford to alter their living arrangements so as toretain their eligibility. Traditional equal protection analysisdoes not require that every classification be drawn with precise"mathematical nicety.'"Dandridge v. Williams, 397U.S. at397 U. S. 485.But the classification here in issue is not only "imprecise," it iswholly without any rational basis. The judgment of the DistrictCourt holding the "unrelated person" provision invalid under theDue Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is therefore

Affirmed.

[Footnote 1]

78 Stat. 703 (emphasis added). The act provided further that

"[t]he term 'household' shall also mean a single individualliving alone who has cooking facilities and who purchases andprepares food for home consumption."

Ibid.

[Footnote 2]

84 Stat. 2048. The 1971 amendment did not affect certain groupsof nonrelated individuals over 60 years of age. As amended, § 3(e)now provides:

"The term 'household' shall mean a group of related individuals(including legally adopted children and legally assigned fosterchildren) or non-related individuals over age 60 who are notresidents of an institution or boarding house, but are living asone economic unit sharing common cooking facilities and for whomfood is customarily purchased in common. The term 'household' shallalso mean (1) a single individual living alone who has cookingfacilities and who purchases and prepares food for homeconsumption, or (2) an elderly person who meets the requirements ofsection 2019(h) of this title."

7 U.S.C. § 2012(e).

[Footnote 3]

Title 7 CFR § 270.2(jj) provides:

"(jj) 'Household' means a group of persons, excluding roomers,boarders, and unrelated live-in attendants necessary for medical,housekeeping, or child care reasons, who are not residents of aninstitution or boarding house, and who are living as one economicunit sharing common cooking facilities and for whom food iscustomarily purchased in common:Provided, That: "

"(1) When all persons in the group are under 60 years of age,they are all related to each other; and"

"(2) When more than one of the persons in the group is under 60years of age, and one or more other persons in the group is 60years of age or older, each of the persons under 60 years of age isrelated to each other or to at least one of the persons who is 60years of age or older."

"It shall also mean (i) a single individual living alone whopurchases and prepares food for home consumption, or (ii) anelderly person as defined in this section, and his spouse."

[Footnote 4]

Appellees also argued that the regulations themselves wereinvalid because beyond the scope of the authority conferred uponthe secretary by the statute. The District Court rejected thatcontention, and appellees have not pressed that argument on appeal.Moreover, appellees did not challenge the constitutionality of thestatutes reliance on "households" rather than "individuals" as thebasic unit of the food stamp program. We therefore intimate no viewon that question.

[Footnote 5]

"[W]hile the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protectionclause, it does forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable asto be violative of due process.'"

Schneider v. Rusk,377 U. S. 163,377 U. S. 168(1964);see Frontiero v. Richardson,411 U.S. 677,411 U. S. 680n. 5 (1973);Shapiro v. Thompson,394 U.S. 618,394 U. S.641-642 (1969);Bolling v. Sharpe,347 U.S. 497 (1954).

[Footnote 6]

Indeed, the amendment first materialized, bare of committeeconsideration, during a conference committee's consideration ofdiffering House and Senate bills.

[Footnote 7]

The Government initially argued to the District Court that thechallenged classification might be justified as a means to foster"morality." In rejecting that contention, the District Court notedthat "interpreting the amendment as an attempt to regulate moralitywould raise serious constitutional questions."345 F.Supp. 310, 314. Indeed, citing this Court's decisions inGriswold v. Connecticut,381 U. S. 479(1965),Stanley v. Georgia,394 U.S. 557 (1969), andEisenstadt v. Baird,405 U. S. 438(1972), the District Court observed that it was doubtful, at best,whether Congress, "in the name of morality," could "infringe therights to privacy and freedom of associationin the home."345 F. Supp. at 314. (Emphasis in original.) Moreover, the courtalso pointed out that the classification established in § 3(e) wasnot rationally related

"to prevailing notions of morality, since it in termsdisqualifies all households of unrelated individuals, withoutreference to whether a particular group contains both sexes."

Id. at 315. The Government itself has now abandoned the"morality" argument.See Brief for Appellants 9.

[Footnote 8]

Title 7 U.S.C. §§ 2023(b) and (c) provide:

"(b) Whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, orpossesses coupons or authorization to purchase cards in any mannernot authorized by this [Act] or the regulations issued pursuant tothis [Act] shall, if such coupons or authorization to purchasecards are of the value of $100 or more, be guilty of a felony andshall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000 orimprisoned for not more than five years or both, or, if suchcoupons or authorization to purchase cards are of a value of lessthan $100, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, uponconviction thereof, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned fornot more than one year, or both."

"(c) Whoever presents, or causes to be presented, coupons forpayment or redemption of the value of $100 or more, knowing thesame to have been received, transferred, or used in any manner inviolation of the provisions of this [Act] or the regulations issuedpursuant to this [Act] shall be guilty of a felony and shall, uponconviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisonedfor not more than five years, or both, or, if such coupons are of avalue of less than $100, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor andshall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $5,000 orimprisoned for not more than one year, or both."

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring.

Appellee Jacinta Moreno is a 56-year-old diabetic who lives withErmina Sanchez and the latter's three children. The two sharecommon living expenses, Mrs. Sanchez helping to care for thisappellee. Appellee's monthly income is $75, derived from publicassistance, and Mrs. Sanchez' is $133, also derived from publicassistance. This household pays $95 a month for rent, of whichappellee pays $40, and $40 a month for gas and electricity, ofwhich appellee pays $10. Appellee spends $10 a month fortransportation to a hospital for regular visits and $5 a month forlaundry. That leaves her $10 a month for food and othernecessities. Mrs. Sanchez and the three children received $108worth of food stamps per month for $18. But under the "unrelated"person

Page 413 U. S. 539

provision of the Act, [Footnote2/1] she will be cut off if appellee Moreno continues to livewith her.

Appellee Sheilah Hejny is married and has three children, agestwo to five. She and her husband took in a 20-year-old girl who isunrelated to them. She shares in the housekeeping. The Hejnys pay$14 a month and receive $144 worth of food stamps. The Hejnyscomprise an indigent household. But if they allow the 20-year-oldgirl to live with them, they too will be cut off from food stampsby reason of the "unrelated" person provision.

Page 413 U. S. 540

Appellee Keppler has a daughter with an acute hearing deficiencywho requires instruction in a school for the deaf. The school is inan area where the mother cannot afford to live. So she and her twominor children moved into a nearby apartment with a woman who, likeappellee Keppler, is on public assistance but who is not related toher. As a result, appellee Keppler's food stamps have been cut offbecause of the "unrelated" person provision.

These appellees instituted a class action to enjoin theenforcement of the "unrelated" person provision of the Act.

The "unrelated" person provision of the Act creates two classesof persons for food stamp purposes: one class is composed of peoplewho are all related to each other and all in dire need, and theother class is composed of households that have one or more personsunrelated to the others but have the same degree of need as thosein the first class. The first type of household qualifies forrelief, the second cannot qualify, no matter the need. It is thatapplication of the Act which is said to violate the conception ofequal protection that is implicit in the Due Process Clause of theFifth Amendment.Bolling v. Sharpe,347 U.S. 497,347 U. S.499.

The test of equal protection is whether the legislative linethat is drawn bears "some rational relationship to a legitimate"governmental purpose. [Footnote2/2]Weber v.Aetna

Page 413 U. S. 541

Casualty & Surety Co.,406 U.S. 164,406 U. S. 172.The requirement of equal protection denies government

"the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded topersons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis ofcriteria wholly unrelated to the objective"

of the enactment.Reed v. Reed,404 U. S.71,404 U. S.75-76.

This case involves desperately poor people with acute problemswho, though unrelated, come together for mutual help andassistance. The choice of one's associates for social, political,race, or religious purposes is basic in our constitutional scheme.NAACP v. Alabama,357 U. S. 449,357 U. S. 460;De Jonge v. Oregon,299 U. S. 353,299 U. S. 363;NAACP v. Button,371 U. S. 415,371 U. S.429-431;Gibson v. Florida LegislativeCommittee,372 U. S. 539;NAACP v. Alabama,377 U. S. 288. Itextends to "the associational rights of the members" of a tradeunion.Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia Bar,377 U. S. 1,377 U. S. 8.

I suppose no one would doubt that an association of peopleworking in the poverty field would be entitled to the sameconstitutional protection as those working in the racial, banking,or agricultural field. I suppose poor people holding a meeting orconvention would be under the same constitutional umbrella asothers. The dimensions of the "unrelated" person problem under theFood Stamp Act are in that category. As the facts of this caseshow, the poor are congregating in households where they can bettermeet the adversities of poverty. This banding together is anexpression of the right of freedom of association that is very deepin our traditions.

Page 413 U. S. 542

Other like rights have been recognized that are only peripheralFirst Amendment rights -- the right to send one's child to areligious school, the right to study the German language in aprivate school, the protection of the entire spectrum of learning,teaching, and communicating ideas, the marital right of privacy.Griswold v. Connecticut,381 U. S. 479,381 U. S.482-483.

As the examples indicate, these peripheral constitutional rightsare exercised not necessarily in assemblies that congregate inhalls or auditoriums but in discrete individual actions such asparents placing a child in the school of their choice. Taking aperson into one's home because he is poor or needs help or bringshappiness to the household is of the same dignity.

Congress might choose to deal only with members of a family ofone or two or three generations, treating it all as a unit.Congress, however, has not done that here. Concededly an individualliving alone is not disqualified from the receipt of food stampaid, even though there are other members of the family with whom hemight theoretically live. Nor are common law couples disqualified:they, like individuals living alone, may qualify under the Act ifthey are poor -- whether they have abandoned their wives andchildren and however anti-family their attitudes may be. In otherwords, the "unrelated" person provision was not aimed at themaintenance of normal family ties. It penalizes persons or familieswho have brought under their roof an "unrelated" needy person. Itpenalizes the poorest of the poor for doubling up against theadversities of poverty.

But for the constitutional aspects of the problem, the"unrelated" person provision of the Act might well be sustained asa means to prevent fraud. Fraud is a concern of the Act. 7 U.S.C.§§ 2023(b) and (c). Able-bodied persons must register and acceptwork or lose their food. stamp rights. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(c). I

Page 413 U. S. 543

could not say that this "unrelated" person provision has no"rational" relation to control of fraud. We deal here, however,with the right of association, protected by the First Amendment.People who are desperately poor but unrelated come together andjoin hands with the aim better to combat the crises of poverty. Theneed of those living together better to meet those crises isdenied, while the need of households made up of relatives that isno more acute is serviced. Problems of the fisc, as we stated inShapiro v. Thompson,394 U. S. 618,394 U. S. 633,are legitimate concerns of government. But government "may notaccomplish such a purpose by invidious distinctions between classesof its citizens."Ibid.

The legislative history of the Act indicates that the"unrelated" person provision of the Act was to prevent "essentiallyunrelated individuals who voluntarily chose to cohabit and live offfood stamps" [Footnote 2/3] --so-called "hippies" or "hippy communes" -- from participating inthe food stamp program. As stated in the Conference Report,[Footnote 2/4] the definition ofhousehold was "designed to prohibit food stamp assistance tocommunalfamilies' of unrelated individuals."

The right of association, the right to invite the stranger intoone's home is too basic in our constitutional regime to deal withroughshod. If there are abuses inherent in that pattern of livingagainst which the food stamp program should be protected, the Actmust be "narrowly drawn,"Cantwell v. Connecticut,310 U. S. 296,310 U. S. 307,to meet the precise end. The method adopted and applied to thesecases makes § 3(e) of the Act unconstitutional by reason of theinvidious discrimination between the two classes of needypersons.

Page 413 U. S. 544

Dandridge v. Williams,397 U.S. 471, is not opposed. It sustained a Maryland grant ofwelfare, against the claim of violation of equal protection, whichplaced an upper limit on the monthly amount any single family couldreceive. The claimants had large families, so that their standardof need exceeded the actual grants. Their claim was that the grantsof aid, considered in light of the size of their families, createdan invidious discrimination against them and in favor of smallneedy families. The claim was rejected on the basis that stateeconomic or social legislation had long been judged by a lessstrict standard than comes into play when constitutionallyprotected rights are involved.Id. at397 U. S.484-48. Laws touching social and economic matters canpass muster under the Equal Protection Clause though they areimperfect, the test being whether the classification has some"reasonable basis."Ibid.Dandridge held that"the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts no power toimpose upon the States their views of what constitutes wiseeconomic or social policy."Id. at397 U. S. 486.But for the First Amendment aspect of the case,Dandridgewould control here.

Dandridge, however, did not reach classificationstouching on associational rights that lie in the penumbra of theFirst Amendment. Since the "unrelated" person provision is notdirected to the maintenance of the family as a unit but treatsimpoverished households composed of relatives more favorably thanimpoverished households having a single unrelated person, it drawsa line that can be sustained only on a showing of a "compelling"governmental interest.

The "unrelated" person provision of the present Act has animpact on the rights of people to associate for lawful purposeswith whom they choose. When state action "may have the effect ofcurtailing the freedom to

Page 413 U. S. 545

associate" it "is subject to the closest scrutiny."NAACP v.Alabama, 357 U.S. at357 U. S.460-461. The "right of the people peaceably to assemble"guaranteed by the First Amendment covers a wide spectrum of humaninterests -- including, as stated inid. at357 U. S. 460,"political, economic, religious, or cultural matters." Bandingtogether to combat the common foe of hunger is in that category.The case therefore falls within the zone represented byShapirov. Thompson, supra, which held that a waiting period onwelfare imposed by a State on the "in-migration of indigents"penalizing the constitutional right to travel could not besustained absent a "compelling governmental interest."Id.at394 U. S. 631,394 U. S.634.

[Footnote 2/1]

Section 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act provides in relevantpart:

"The term 'household' shall mean a group of related individuals(including legally adopted children and legally assigned fosterchildren) or non-related individuals over age 60 who are notresidents of an institution or boarding house, but are living asone economic unit sharing common cooking facilities and for whomfood is customarily purchased in common."

7 U.S.C. § 2012(e).

The Regulations provide:

"'Household' means a group of persons, excluding roomers,boarders, and unrelated live-in attendants necessary for medical,housekeeping, or child care reasons, who are not residents of aninstitution or boarding house, and who are living as one economicunit sharing common cooking facilities and for whom food iscustomarily purchased in common:Provided, That: "

"(1) When all persons in the group are under 60 years of age,they are all related to each other; and"

"(2) When more than one of the persons in the group is under 60years of age, and one or more other persons in the group is 60years of age or older, each of the persons under 60 years of age isrelated to each other or to at least one of the persons who is 60years of age or older."

7 CFR § 270.2(jj).

"Eligibility for and participation in the program shall be on ahousehold basis. All persons, excluding roomers, boarders, andunrelated live-in attendants necessary for medical, housekeeping,or child care reasons, residing in common living quarters shall beconsolidated into a group prior to determining if such a group is ahousehold as determined in § 270.2(jj) of this subchapter."

7 CFR § 271.3(a).

[Footnote 2/2]

The purpose of the present Act was stated by Congress:

"[T]o safeguard the health and wellbeing of theNation's population andraise levels of nutritionamong low income households. The Congress hereby finds that thelimited food purchasing power of low income households contributestohunger and malnutrition among members of suchhouseholds. The Congress further finds that increased utilizationof food in establishing and maintainingadequate nationallevels of nutrition will promote the distribution in abeneficial manner of our agricultural abundances and willstrengthen our agricultural economy, as well as result in moreorderly marketing and distribution of food. To alleviate suchhunger and malnutrition, a food stamp program is herein authorizedwhich will permitlow income households to purchase anutritionally adequate diet through normal channels oftrade."

7 U.S.C. § 2011. (Italics added.)

[Footnote 2/3]

See 116 Cong.Rec. 42003.

[Footnote 2/4]

H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 91-1793, p. 8.

MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE concurs,dissenting.

For much the same reasons as those stated in my dissentingopinion inUnited States Department of Agriculture v. Murry,ante p.413 U. S. 522,I am unable to agree with the Court's disposition of this case.Here, appellees challenged a provision in the Federal Food StampAct, 7 U.S.C. § 2011et seq., which limited food stamps torelated people living in one "household." The result of thisprovision is that unrelated persons who live under the same roofand pool their resources may not obtain food stamps even thoughotherwise eligible.

The Court's opinion would make a very persuasive congressionalcommittee report arguing against the adoption of the limitation inquestion. Undoubtedly, Congress attacked the problem with a ratherblunt instrument, and, just as undoubtedly, persuasive argumentsmay be made that what we conceive to be its purpose will not besignificantly advanced by the enactment of the limitation. Butquestions such as this are for Congress, rather than for thisCourt; our role is limited to the

Page 413 U. S. 546

determination of whether there is any rational basis on whichCongress could decide that public funds made available under thefood stamp program should not go to a household containing anindividual who is unrelated to any other member of thehousehold.

I do not believe that asserted congressional concern with thefraudulent use of food stamps is, when interpreted in the lightmost favorable to sustaining the limitation, quite as irrational asthe Court seems to believe. A basic unit which Congress has chosenfor determination of availability for food stamps is the"household," a determination which is not criticized by the Court.By the limitation here challenged, it has singled out householdswhich contain unrelated persons and made such householdsineligible. I do not think it is unreasonable for Congress toconclude that the basic unit which it was willing to support withfederal funding through food stamps is some variation on the familyas we know it -- a household consisting of related individuals.This unit provides a guarantee which is not provided by householdscontaining unrelated individuals that the household exists for somepurpose other than to collect federal food stamps.

Admittedly, as the Court points out, the limitation will makeineligible many households which have not been formed for thepurpose of collecting federal food stamps, and will, at the sametime, not wholly deny food stamps to those households which mayhave been formed in large part to take advantage of the program.But, as the Court concedes, "[t]raditional equal protectionanalysis does not require that every classification be drawn withprecisemathematical nicety,'"ante at413 U. S. 538.And earlier this Term, the constitutionality of a similarly"imprecise" rule promulgated pursuant to the Truth in Lending Actwas challenged

Page 413 U. S. 547

on grounds such as those urged by appellees here. InMourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc.,411 U. S. 356(1973), the imposition of the rule on all members of a definedclass was sustained because it served to discourage evasion by asubstantial portion of that class of disclosure mechanisms chosenby Congress for consumer protection.

The limitation which Congress enacted could, in the judgment ofreasonable men, conceivably deny food stamps to members ofhouseholds which have been formed solely for the purpose of takingadvantage of the food stamp program. Since the food stamp programis not intended to be a subsidy for every individual who desireslow-cost food, this was a permissible congressional decision quiteconsistent with the underlying policy of the Act. The fact that thelimitation will have unfortunate and perhaps unintendedconsequences beyond this does not make it unconstitutional.