U.S. Supreme Court

Coolidge v. New Hampshire,403U.S. 443 (1971)Coolidge v. NewHampshire

No. 323

Argued January 12,1971

Decided June 21, 1971

403U.S. 443

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OFNEW HAMPSHIRE

Syllabus

Police went to petitioner's home on January 28, 1964, toquestion him about a murder. In the course of their inquiry, heshowed them three guns, and he agreed to take a lie detector teston February 2. The test was inconclusive on the murder, but, duringits course, petitioner admitted a theft. In petitioner's absence,two other policemen came to the house and questioned petitioner'swife to check petitioner's story and corroborate his admission ofthe theft. Unaware of the visit of the other officers who had beenshown the guns and knowing little about the murder weapon, thepolice asked about any guns there might be in the house, and wereshown four by petitioner's wife which she offered to let them take.After one policeman first declined the offer, they took the guns,along with various articles of petitioner's clothing his wife madeavailable to them. On February 19, petitioner was arrested in hishouse for the murder, and, on that date, a warrant to searchpetitioner's automobile was applied for by the police chief andissued by the Attorney General (who had assumed charge of theinvestigation and was later the chief prosecutor at the trial),acting as a justice of the peace. The car, which, at the time ofthe arrest, was parked in petitioner's driveway, was subsequentlytowed to the police station, where, on February 21 and on twooccasions the next year, it was searched. Vacuum sweepings from thecar as well as from the clothing were used as evidence at thetrial, along with one of the guns made available by petitioner'swife. Following the overruling of pretrial motions to suppress thatevidence, petitioner was convicted, and the State Supreme Courtaffirmed.

Held:

1. The warrant for the search and seizure of petitioner'sautomobile did not satisfy the requirements of the FourthAmendment, as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth,because it was not issued by a "neutral and detached magistrate."Johnson v. United States,333 U. S.10,333 U. S. 14.Pp. 449-453.

2. The basic constitutional rule is that

"searches conducted outside the judicial process, without priorapproval by judge or magistrate, areper se unreasonableunder the Fourth Amendment -- subject only to a few specificallyestablished and well

Page 403 U. S. 444

defined exceptions,"

and, on the facts of this case, a warrantless search and seizureof the car cannot be justified under those exceptions. Pp.403 U. S.453-482.

(a) The seizure of the car in the driveway cannot be justifiedas incidental to the arrest, which took place inside the house.Even assuming,arguendo, that the police could properlyhave made a warrantless search of the car in the driveway when theyarrested petitioner, they could not have done so at their leisureafter its removal. Pp.403 U. S.455-457.

(b) Under the circumstances present here -- where the police forsome time had known of the probable role of the car in the crime,petitioner had had ample opportunity to destroy incriminatingevidence, the house was guarded at the time of arrest andpetitioner had no access to the car -- there were no exigentcircumstances justifying the warrantless search even had it beenmade before the car was taken to the police station, and thespecial exceptions for automobile searches inCarroll v. UnitedStates,267 U. S. 132, andChambers v. Maroney,399 U. S. 42, areclearly inapplicable.Cf. Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg.Co.,391 U. S. 216. Pp.403 U. S.458-464.

(c) Under certain circumstances, the police may, without awarrant seize, evidence in "plain view," though not for that reasonalone, and only when the discovery of the evidence is inadvertent.That exception is inapplicable to the facts of the instant case,where the police had ample opportunity to obtain a valid warrant,knew in advance the car's description and location, intended toseize it when they entered on petitioner's property, and nocontraband or dangerous objects were involved. Pp.403 U. S.464-473.

3. No search and seizure were implicated in the February 2 visitwhen the police obtained the guns and clothing from petitioner'swife, and hence they needed no warrant. The police, who exerted noeffort to coerce or dominate her, were not obligated to refuse heroffer for them to take the guns, and, in making these and the otheritems available to the police, she was not acting as the instrumentor agent of the police. Pp.403 U. S.484-490.

109 N.H. 403, 260 A.2d 547, reversed and remanded.

STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in whichBURGER, C.J. (as to Part III), and HARLAN (as to Parts I, II-D, andIII), DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. HARLAN, J.,filed a concurring opinion,post, p.403 U. S. 490.BURGER, C.J., filed a concurring and dissenting opinion,post, p.403 U. S. 492.BLACK, J., filed a concurring

Page 403 U. S. 445

and dissenting opinion, in a portion of Part I and in Parts IIand III of which BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN, J., joined,post, p.403 U. S. 493.WHITE, J., filed a concurring and dissenting opinion, in whichBURGER, C.J., joined,post, p.403 U. S.510.

MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.*

We are called upon in this case to decide issues under theFourth and Fourteenth Amendments arising in the context of a statecriminal trial for the commission of a particularly brutal murder.As in every case, our single duty is to determine the issuespresented in accord with the Constitution and the law.

Pamela Mason, a 14-year-old girl, left her home in Manchester,New Hampshire, on the evening of January 13, 1964, during a heavysnowstorm, apparently in response to a man's telephone call for ababysitter. Eight days later, after a thaw, her body was found bythe side of a major north-south highway several miles away. She hadbeen murdered. The event created great alarm in the area, and thepolice immediately began a massive investigation.

On January 28, having learned from a neighbor that thepetitioner, Edward Coolidge, had been away from home on the eveningof the girl's disappearance, the police went to his house toquestion him. They asked

Page 403 U. S. 446

him, among other things, if he owned any guns, and he producedthree, two shotguns and a rifle. They also asked whether he wouldtake a lie detector test concerning his account of his activitieson the night of the disappearance. He agreed to do so on thefollowing Sunday, his day off. The police later described hisattitude on the occasion of this visit as fully "cooperative." Hiswife was in the house throughout the interview.

On the following Sunday, a policeman called Coolidge early inthe morning and asked him to come down to the police station forthe trip to Concord, New Hampshire, where the lie detector test wasto be administered. That evening, two plainclothes policemenarrived at the Coolidge house, where Mrs. Coolidge was waiting withher mother-in-law for her husband's return. These two policemenwere not the two who had visited the house earlier in the week, andthey apparently did not know that Coolidge had displayed three gunsfor inspection during the earlier visit. The plainclothesmen toldMrs. Coolidge that her husband was in "serious trouble," andprobably would not be home that night. They asked Coolidge's motherto leave, and proceeded to question Mrs. Coolidge. During thecourse of the interview, they obtained from her four guns belongingto Coolidge, and some clothes that Mrs. Coolidge thought herhusband might have been wearing on the evening of Pamela Mason'sdisappearance.

Coolidge was held in jail on an unrelated charge that night, buthe was released the next day. [Footnote 1] During the ensuing two and a half weeks, theState accumulated a quantity of evidence to support the theory thatit was he who had killed Pamela Mason. On February 19, the resultsof the investigation were presented at a meeting between the policeofficers working on the case and the

Page 403 U. S. 447

State Attorney General, who had personally taken charge of allpolice activities relating to the murder, and was later to serve aschief prosecutor at the trial. At this meeting, it was decided thatthere was enough evidence to justify the arrest of Coolidge on themurder charge and a search of his house and two cars. At theconclusion of the meeting, the Manchester police chief made formalapplication, under oath, for the arrest and search warrants. Thecomplaint supporting the warrant for a search of Coolidge's Pontiacautomobile, the only warrant that concerns us here, stated that theaffiant

"has probable cause to suspect and believe, and does suspect andbelieve, and herewith offers satisfactory evidence, that there arecertain objects and things used in the Commission of said offense,now kept, and concealed in or upon a certain vehicle, to-wit: 1951Pontiac two-door sedan. . . ."

The warrants were then signed and issued by the Attorney Generalhimself, acting as a justice of the peace. Under New Hampshire lawin force at that time, all justices of the peace were authorized toissue search warrants. N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 595:1 (repealed1969).

The police arrested Coolidge in his house on the day the warrantissued. Mrs. Coolidge asked whether she might remain in the housewith her small child, but was told that she must stay elsewhere,apparently in part because the police believed that she would beharassed by reporters if she were accessible to them. When sheasked whether she might take her car, she was told that both carshad been "impounded," and that the police would providetransportation for her. Some time later, the police called a towingcompany, and, about two and a half hours after Coolidge had beentaken into custody, the cars were towed to the police station. Itappears that, at the time of the arrest, the cars were parked inthe Coolidge driveway, and that, although dark had fallen,

Page 403 U. S. 448

they were plainly visible both from the street and from insidethe house where Coolidge was actually arrested. The 1951 Pontiacwas searched and vacuumed on February 21, two days after it wasseized, again a year later, in January, 1965, and a third time inApril, 1965.

At Coolidge's subsequent jury trial on the charge of murder,vacuum sweepings, including particles of gun powder, taken from thePontiac were introduced in evidence against him, as part of anattempt by the State to show by microscopic analysis that it washighly probable that Pamela Mason had been in Coolidge's car.[Footnote 2] Also introduced inevidence was one of the guns taken by the police on their Sundayevening visit to the Coolidge house -- a .22-caliber Mossbergrifle, which the prosecution claimed was the murder weapon.Conflicting ballistics testimony was offered on the questionwhether the bullets found in Pamela Mason's body had been firedfrom this rifle. Finally, the prosecution introduced vacuumsweepings of the clothes taken from the Coolidge house that sameSunday evening, and attempted to show through microscopic analysisthat there was a high probability that the clothes had been incontact with Pamela Mason's body. Pretrial motions to suppress allthis evidence were referred by the trial judge to the New HampshireSupreme Court, which ruled the evidence admissible. 106 N.H. 186,208 A.2d 322. The jury found Coolidge guilty, and he was sentencedto life imprisonment. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed thejudgment of conviction, 109 N.H. 403, 260 A.2d 547, and we grantedcertiorari to consider the constitutional questions raised by theadmission of this evidence against Coolidge at his trial. 399 U.S.926.

Page 403 U. S. 449

IThe petitioner's first claim is that the warrant authorizing theseizure and subsequent search of his 1951 Pontiac automobile wasinvalid because not issued by a "neutral and detached magistrate."Since we agree with the petitioner that the warrant was invalid forthis reason, we need not consider his further argument that theallegations under oath supporting the issuance of the warrant wereso conclusory as to violate relevant constitutional standards.Cf. Giordenello v. United States,357 U.S. 480;Aguilar v. Texas,378 U.S. 108. The classic statement of the policy underlyingthe warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment is that of Mr.Justice Jackson, writing for the Court inJohnson v. UnitedStates,333 U. S. 10,333 U. S.13-14:

"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not graspedby zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement thesupport of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw fromevidence. Its protection consists in requiring that thoseinferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate, insteadof being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitiveenterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidencesufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination toissue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a searchwithout a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity, andleave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of policeofficers. . . . When the right of privacy must reasonably yield tothe right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicialofficer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent."

Cf. United States v. Lefkowitz,285 U.S. 452,285 U. S. 464;Giordenello v. United States, supra, at357 U. S. 486.Wong Sunv.

Page 403 U. S. 450

United States,371 U. S. 471,371 U. S.481-482;Katz v. United States,389 U.S. 347,389 U. S.356-357.

In this case, the determination of probable cause was made bythe chief "government enforcement agent" of the State the AttorneyGeneral -- who was actively in charge of the investigation andlater was to be chief prosecutor at the trial. To be sure, thedetermination was formalized here by a writing bearing the title"Search Warrant," whereas, inJohnson, there was no pieceof paper involved, but the State has not attempted to uphold thewarrant on any such artificial basis. Rather, the State argues thatthe Attorney General, who was unquestionably authorized as ajustice of the peace to issue warrants under then-existing statelaw, did, in fact, act as a "neutral and detached magistrate."Further, the State claims that any magistrate, confronted with theshowing of probable cause made by the Manchester chief of police,would have issued the warrant in question. To the firstproposition, it is enough to answer that there could hardly be amore appropriate setting than this for aper se rule ofdisqualification, rather than a case-by-case evaluation of all thecircumstances. Without disrespect to the state law enforcementagent here involved, the whole point of the basic rule so wellexpressed by Mr. Justice Jackson is that prosecutors and policemensimply cannot be asked to maintain the requisite neutrality withregard to their own investigations -- the "competitive enterprise"that must rightly engage their single-minded attention. [Footnote 3]Cf. Mancusi v.DeForte,392 U. S. 364,392 U. S. 371.As for the proposition that the existence of probable cause rendersnoncompliance with the warrant procedure an irrelevance,

Page 403 U. S. 451

it is enough to citeAgnello v. United States,269 U. S. 20,269 U. S. 33,decided in 1925:

"Belief, however well founded, that an article sought isconcealed in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for asearch of that place without a warrant. And such searches are heldunlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probablecause."

See also Jones v. United States,357 U.S. 493,357 U. S.497-498;Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. UnitedStates,251 U. S. 385,251 U. S. 392.("[T]he rights . . . against unlawful search and seizure are to beprotected even if the same result might have been achieved in alawful way.")

But the New Hampshire Supreme Court, in upholding theconviction, relied upon the theory that, even if the warrantprocedure here in issue would clearly violate the standards imposedon the Federal Government by the Fourth Amendment, it is notforbidden the States under the Fourteenth. This position waspremised on a passage from the opinion of this Court inKer v.California,374 U. S. 23,374 U. S.31:

"Preliminary to our examination of the search and seizuresinvolved here, it might be helpful for us to indicate what was notdecided inMapp \[v. Ohio,367 U. S.643]. First, it must be recognized that the"

"principles governing the admissibility of evidence in federalcriminal trials have not been restricted . . . to those derivedsolely from the Constitution. In the exercise of its supervisoryauthority over the administration of criminal justice in thefederal courts . . . , this Court has . . . formulated rules ofevidence to be applied in federal criminal prosecutions."

"McNabb v. United States,318 U. S.332,318 U. S. 341. . . .Mapp, however, established no assumption by this Court ofsupervisory authority over state courts . . . , and, consequently,it implied no total

Page 403 U. S. 452

obliteration of state laws relating to arrests and searches infavor of federal law.Mapp sounded no death knell for ourfederalism; rather, it echoed the sentiment ofElkins v. UnitedStates, supra, at364 U. S. 221, that 'ahealthy federalism depends upon the avoidance of needless conflictbetween state and federal courts' by itself urging that"

"[f]ederal-state cooperation in the solution of crime underconstitutional standards will be promoted, if only by recognitionof their now mutual obligation to respect the same fundamentalcriteria in their approaches."

"367 U.S. at367 U. S. 658."

(Emphasis inKer.) It is urged that the New Hampshirestatutes which, at the time of the searches here involved,permitted a law enforcement officer himself to issue a warrant wasone of those

"workable rules governing arrests, searches and seizures to meet'the practical demands of effective criminal investigation and lawenforcement' in the States,"

id. at374 U. S. 34,authorized byKer.

That such a procedure was indeed workable from the point of viewof the police is evident from testimony at the trial in thiscase:

"The Court: You mean that another police officer issues these[search warrants]?"

"The Witness: Yes. Captain Courture and Captain Shea and CaptainLoveren are J.P.'s."

"The Court: Well, let me ask you, Chief, your answer is to theeffect that you never go out of the department for the Justice ofthe Peace?"

"The Witness: It hasn't been our -- policy to go out of thedepartment."

"Q. Right. Your policy and experience is to have a fellow policeofficer take the warrant in the capacity of Justice of thePeace?"

"A. That has been our practice. "

Page 403 U. S. 453

But it is too plain for extensive discussion that this nowabandoned New Hampshire method of issuing "search warrants"violated a fundamental premise of both the Fourth and FourteenthAmendments -- a premise fully developed and articulated long beforethis Court's decisions inKer v. California, supra, andMapp v. Ohio,367 U. S. 643. AsMr. Justice Frankfurter put it inWolf v. Colorado,338 U. S. 25,338 U. S.27-28:

"The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion bythe police -- which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment -- isbasic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in 'the conceptof ordered liberty,' and, as such, enforceable against the Statesthrough the Due Process Clause. The knock at the door, whether byday or by night, as a prelude to a search, without authority of lawbut solely on the authority of the police, did not need thecommentary of recent history to be condemned. . . ."

We find no escape from the conclusion that the seizure andsearch of the Pontiac automobile cannot constitutionally rest uponthe warrant issued by the state official who was the chiefinvestigator and prosecutor in this case. Since he was not theneutral and detached magistrate required by the Constitution, thesearch stands on no firmer ground than if there had been no warrantat all. If the seizure and search are to be justified, they must,therefore, be justified on some other theory.

IIThe State proposes three distinct theories to bring the facts ofthis case within one or another of the exceptions to the warrantrequirement. In considering them, we must not lose sight of theFourth Amendment's fundamental guarantee. Mr. Justice Bradley'sadmonition in his opinion for the Court almost a century ago inBoyd

Page 403 U. S. 454

v. United States,116 U. S. 616,116 U. S. 635,is worth repeating here:

"It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest andleast repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutionalpractices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silentapproaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule thatconstitutional provisions for the security of person and propertyshould be liberally construed. A close and literal constructiondeprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradualdepreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than insubstance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for theconstitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthyencroachments thereon. [Footnote4]"

Thus, the most basic constitutional rule in this area isthat

"searches conducted outside the judicial process, without priorapproval by judge or magistrate, areper se

Page 403 U. S. 455

unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment -- subject only to a fewspecifically established and well delineated exceptions. [Footnote 5]"

The exceptions are "jealously and carefully drawn," [Footnote 6] and there must be "ashowing by those who seek exemption . . . that the exigencies ofthe situation made that course imperative." [Footnote 7] "[T]he burden is on those seeking theexemption to show the need for it." [Footnote 8] In times of unrest, whether caused by crime orracial conflict or fear of internal subversion, this basic law andthe values that it represents may appear unrealistic or"extravagant" to some. But the values were those of the authors ofour fundamental constitutional concepts. In times not altogetherunlike our own they won -- by legal and constitutional means inEngland, [Footnote 9] and byrevolution on this continent -- a right of personal securityagainst arbitrary intrusions by official power. If times havechanged, reducing everyman's scope to do as he pleases in an urbanand industrial world, the changes have made the values served bythe Fourth Amendment more, not less, important. [Footnote 10]

A

The State's first theory is that the seizure on February 19 andsubsequent search of Coolidge's Pontiac were "incident" to a validarrest. We assume that the arrest of Coolidge inside his house wasvalid, so that the first condition of a warrantless "searchincident" is met.Whiteley v. Warden,401 U.S. 560,401 U. S. 567n. 11. And since the events in issue took place in 1964, we assessthe State's argument

Page 403 U. S. 456

in terms of the law as it existed beforeChimel v.California,395 U. S. 752,which substantially restricted the "search incident" exception tothe warrant requirement, but did so only prospectively.Williams v. United States,401 U.S. 646. But even under preChimel law, theState's position is untenable.

The leading case in the area beforeChimel wasUnited States v. Rabinowitz,339 U. S.56, which was taken to stand

"for the proposition,inter alia, that a warrantlesssearch 'incident to a lawful arrest' may generally extend to thearea that is considered to be in the 'possession' or under the'control' of the person arrested."

Chimel, supra, at395 U. S. 760.In this case, Coolidge was arrested inside his house; his car wasoutside in the driveway. The care was not touched until Coolidgehad been removed from the scene. It was then seized and taken tothe station, but it was not actually searched until two dayslater.

First, it is doubtful whether the police could have carried outa contemporaneous search of the car underRabinowitzstandards. For this Court has repeatedly held that, even underRabinowitz,

"[a] search may be incident to an arrest "only if it issubstantially contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined totheimmediate vicinity of the arrest. . . .'""

Vale v. Louisiana,399 U. S. 30,399 U. S. 33,quoting fromShipley v. California,395 U.S. 818,395 U. S. 819,quoting fromStoner v. California,376 U.S. 483,376 U. S. 486.(Emphasis inShipley.)Cf. Agnello v. UnitedStates, 269 U.S. at269 U. S. 30-31;James v. Louisiana,382 U. S. 36. Thesecases make it clear beyond any question that a lawfulpre-Chimel arrest of a suspect outside his house couldnever, by itself, justify a warrantless search inside the house.There is nothing in search-incident doctrine (as opposed to thespecial rules for automobiles and evidence in "plain view," to beconsidered below) that suggests

Page 403 U. S. 457

a different result where the arrest is made inside the house andthe search outside and at some distance away. [Footnote 11]

Even assuming,arguendo, that the police might havesearched the Pontiac in the driveway when they arrested Coolidge inthe house,Preston v. United States,376 U.S. 364, makes plain that they could not legally seizethe car, remove it, and search it at their leisure without awarrant. In circumstances virtually identical to those here, MR.JUSTICE BLACK's opinion for a unanimous Court held that,

"[o]nce an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search[of his car] made at another place, without a warrant, is simplynot incident to the arrest."

Id. at376 U. S. 367.Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co.,391 U.S. 216.Cf. Chambers v. Maroney,399 U. S.42,399 U. S. 47.Search-incident doctrine, in short, has no applicability to thiscase. [Footnote 12]

Page 403 U. S. 458

B

The second theory put forward by the State to justify awarrantless seizure and search of the Pontiac car is that, underCarroll v. United States,267 U.S. 132, the police may make a warrantless search of anautomobile whenever they have probable cause to do so, and, underour decision last Term inChambers v. Maroney,399 U. S. 42,whenever the police may make a legal contemporaneous search underCarroll, they may also seize the car, take it to thepolice station, and search it there. But even granting that thepolice had probable cause to search the car, the application of theCarroll case to these facts would extend it far beyond itsoriginal rationale.

Carroll did indeed hold that "contraband goodsconcealed and illegally transported in an automobile or othervehicle may be searched for without a warrant," [Footnote 13] provided that

"the seizing officer shall have reasonable or probable cause forbelieving that the automobile which he stops and seizes hascontraband liquor therein which is being illegally transported.[Footnote 14]"

Such searches had been explicitly authorized by Congress, and,as we have pointed out elsewhere, [Footnote 15] in the conditions of the time,

"[a]n automobile . . . was an almost indispensableinstrumentality in large-scale violation of the NationalProhibition Act, and the car itself therefore was treated somewhatas an offender, and became contraband."

In two later cases, [Footnote16] each involving an occupied automobile stopped on the openhighway and searched for contraband

Page 403 U. S. 459

liquor, the Court followed and reaffirmedCarroll.[Footnote 17] And last Term,inChambers, supra, we did so again.

The underlying rationale ofCarroll and of all thecases that have followed it is that there is

"a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwellinghouse or other structure in respect of which a proper officialwarrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon or automobile,

Page 403 U. S. 460

for contraband goods, where it is not practicableto securea warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of thelocality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."

267 U.S. at267 U. S. 153.(Emphasis supplied.) As we said inChambers, supra, at399 U. S. 51,"exigent circumstances" justify the warrantless search of "anautomobilestopped on the highway," where there isprobable cause, because the car is "movable, the occupants arealerted, and the car's contents may never be found again if awarrant must be obtained." "[T]he opportunity to search isfleeting. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, the police had known for some time of the probablerole of the Pontiac car in the crime. Coolidge was aware that hewas a suspect in the Mason murder, but he had been extremelycooperative throughout the investigation, and there was noindication that he meant to flee. He had already had ampleopportunity to destroy any evidence he thought incriminating. Thereis no suggestion that, on the night in question, the car was beingused for any illegal purpose, and it was regularly parked in thedriveway of his house. The opportunity for search was thus hardly"fleeting." The objects that the police are assumed to have hadprobable cause to search for in the car were neither stolen norcontraband nor dangerous.

When the police arrived at the Coolidge house to arrest him, twoofficers were sent to guard the back door while the main partyapproached from the front. Coolidge was arrested inside the house,without resistance of any kind on his part, after he hadvoluntarily admitted the officers at both front and back doors.There was no way in which he could conceivably have gained accessto the automobile after the police arrived on his property. WhenCoolidge had been taken away, the police informed Mrs. Coolidge,the only other adult occupant of the

Page 403 U. S. 461

house, that she and her baby had to spend the night elsewhere,and that she could not use either of the Coolidge cars. Two policeofficers then drove her in police car to the house of a relative inanother town, and they stayed with her there until around midnight,long after the police had had the Pontiac towed to the stationhouse. The Coolidge premises were guarded throughout the night bytwo policemen. [Footnote18]

The word "automobile" is not a talisman in whose presence theFourth Amendment fade away and disappears.

Page 403 U. S. 462

And surely there is nothing in this case to invoke the meaningand purpose of the rule ofCarroll v. United States -- noalerted criminal be on flight, no fleeting opportunity on an openhighway after a hazardous chase, no contraband or stolen goods orweapons, no confederates waiting to move the evidence, not even theinconvenience of a special police detail to guard the immobilizedautomobile. In short, by no possible stretch of the legalimagination can this be made into a case where "it is notpracticable to secure a warrant,"Carroll, supra, at267 U. S. 153,and the "automobile exception," despite its label, is simplyirrelevant. [Footnote19]

Page 403 U. S. 463

SinceCarroll would not have justified a warrantlesssearch of the Pontiac at the time Coolidge was arrested, the latersearch at the station house was plainly illegal, at least so far asthe automobile exception is concerned.Chambers, supra, isof no help to the State, since that case held only that, where thepolice may stop and search an automobile underCarroll,they may also seize it and search it later at the police station.[Footnote 20] Rather, thiscase is controlled byDyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co.,supra. There, the police lacked probable cause to seize orsearch the defendant's automobile at the time of his

Page 403 U. S. 464

arrest, and this was enough, by itself, to condemn thesubsequent search at the station house. Here there was probablecause, but no exigent circumstances justified the police inproceeding without a warrant. As inDyke, the later searchat the station house was therefore illegal. [Footnote 21]

C

The State's third theory in support of the warrantless seizureand search of the Pontiac car is that the car itself was an"instrumentality of the crime," and, as such, might be seized bythe police on Coolidge's property because it was in plain view.Supposing the seizure to be thus lawful, the case ofCooper v.California,386 U. S. 58, issaid to support a subsequent warrantless search at the stationhouse, with or without probable cause. Of course, the distinctionbetween an "instrumentality of crime" and "mere evidence" was doneaway with byWarden v. Hayden,387 U.S. 294, and we may assume that the police had probablecause to seize the automobile. [Footnote 22] But, for the reasons that follow, we holdthat the "plain view" exception to the warrant requirement isinapplicable to this case. Since the seizure was therefore

Page 403 U. S. 465

illegal, it is unnecessary to consider the applicability OfCooper, supra, to the subsequent search. [Footnote 23]

It is well established that, under certain circumstances, thepolice may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant. But itis important to keep in mind that, in the vast majority of cases,any evidence seized by the police will be in plain view, at leastat the moment of seizure. The problem with the "plain view"doctrine has been to identify the circumstances in which plain viewhas legal significance, rather than being simply the normalconcomitant of any search, legal or illegal.

An example of the applicability of the "plain view" doctrine isthe situation in which the police have a warrant to search a givenarea for specified objects, and, in the course of the search, comeacross some other article of incriminating character.Cf.Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,282 U.S. 344,282 U. S. 358;United States v. Lefkowitz,285 U.S. 452,285 U. S. 465;Steele v. United States,267 U. S. 498;Stanley v. Georgia,394 U. S. 557,394 U. S. 571(STEWART, J., concurring in result). Where the initial intrusionthat brings the police within plain view of such an article issupported not by a warrant, but by one of the recognized exceptionsto the warrant requirement, the seizure is also legitimate. Thus,the police may inadvertently come across evidence while in "hotpursuit" of a fleeing suspect.Warden v. Hayden, supra; cf.Hester v. United States,265 U. S. 57. Andan object that comes into view during a search incident to arrestthat is appropriately limited in scope under existing law may beseized without a warrant. [Footnote 24]Chimel v. California, 395

Page 403 U. S. 466

U.S. at395 U. S.762-763. Finally, the "plain view" doctrine has beenapplied where a police officer is not searching for evidenceagainst the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across anincriminating object.Harris v. United States,390 U. S. 234;Frazier v. Cupp,394 U. S. 731;Ker v. California, 374 U.S. at374 U. S. 43.Cf. Lewis v. United States,385 U.S. 206.

What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the policeofficer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusionin the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece ofevidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves tosupplement the prior justification -- whether it be a warrant foranother object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, orsome other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with asearch directed against the accused -- and permits the warrantlessseizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification islegitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police thatthey have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may notbe used to extend a general exploratory search from one object toanother until something incriminating at last emerges.

Page 403 U. S. 467

Cf. Stanley v. Georgia, supra, at394 U. S.571-572 (STEWART, J., concurring in result).

The rationale for the "plain view" exception is evident if wekeep in mind the two distinct constitutional protections served bythe warrant requirement. First, the magistrate's scrutiny isintended to eliminate altogether searches not based on probablecause. The premise here is that any intrusion in the way of searchor seizure is an evil, so that no intrusion at all is justifiedwithout a careful prior determination of necessity.See, e.g.,McDonald v. United States,335 U. S. 451;Warden v. Hayden,387 U. S. 294;Katz v. United States,389 U. S. 347;Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at395 U. S.761-762. The second, distinct objective is that thosesearches deemed necessary should be as limited as possible. Here,the specific evil is the "general warrant" abhorred by thecolonists, and the problem is not that of intrusionperse, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a person'sbelongings.See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at116 U. S.624-630;Marron v. United States,275 U.S. 192,275 U. S.195-196;Stanford v. Texas,379 U.S. 476. The warrant accomplishes this second objectiveby requiring a "particular description" of the things to beseized.

The "plain view" doctrine is not in conflict with the firstobjective, because plain view does not occur until a search is inprogress. In each case, this initial intrusion is justified by awarrant or by an exception such as "hot pursuit" or search incidentto a lawful arrest, or by an extraneous valid reason for theofficer's presence. And, given the initial intrusion, the seizureof an object in plain view is consistent with the second objective,since it does not convert the search into a general or exploratoryone. As against the minor peril to Fourth Amendment protections,there is a major gain in effective law enforcement. Where, once anotherwise lawful search is in progress, the police inadvertentlycome upon

Page 403 U. S. 468

a piece of evidence, it would often be a needless inconvenience,and sometimes dangerous -- to the evidence or to the policethemselves -- to require them to ignore it until they have obtaineda warrant particularly describing it.

The limits on the doctrine are implicit in the statement of itsrationale. The first of these is that plain view, alone, is neverenough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence. This issimply a corollary of the familiar principle discussed above, thatno amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search orseizure absent "exigent circumstances." Incontrovertible testimonyof the senses that an incriminating object is on premises belongingto a criminal suspect may establish the fullest possible measure ofprobable cause. But even where the object is contraband, this Courthas repeatedly stated and enforced the basic rule that the policemay not enter and make a warrantless seizure.Taylor v. UnitedStates,286 U. S. 1;Johnson v. United States,333 U. S.10;McDonald v. United States,335 U.S. 451;Jones v. United States,357 U.S. 493,357 U. S.497-498;Chapman v. United States,365 U.S. 610;Trupiano v. United States,334 U.S. 699. [Footnote25]

Page 403 U. S. 469

The second limitation is that the discovery of evidence in plainview must be inadvertent. [Footnote 26] The rationale of the exception to thewarrant requirement, as just stated,

Page 403 U. S. 470

is that a plain view seizure will not turn an initially valid(and therefore limited) search into a "general" one, while theinconvenience of procuring a warrant to cover an inadvertentdiscovery is great. But where the discovery is anticipated, wherethe police know in advance the location of the evidence and intendto seize it, the situation is altogether different. The requirementof a warrant to seize imposes no inconvenience whatever, or atleast none which is constitutionally cognizable in a legal systemthat regards warrantless searches as "per se

Page 403 U. S. 471

unreasonable" in the absence of "exigent circumstances." If theinitial intrusion is bottomed upon a warrant that fails to mentiona particular object, though the police know its location and intendto seize it, then there is a violation of the expressconstitutional requirement of "Warrants . . . particularlydescribing . . . [the] things to be seized." The initial intrusionmay, of course, be legitimated not by a warrant, but by one of theexceptions to the warrant requirement, such as hot pursuit orsearch incident to lawful arrest. But to extend the scope of suchan intrusion to the seizure of objects -- not contraband nor stolennor dangerous in themselves -- which the police know in advancethey will find in plain view and intend to seize would fly in theface of the basic rule that no amount of probable cause can justifya warrantless seizure. [Footnote27]

Page 403 U. S. 472

In the light of what has been said, it is apparent that the"plain view" exception cannot justify the police seizure of thePontiac car in this case. The police had ample opportunity toobtain a valid warrant; they knew the automobile's exactdescription and location well in advance; they intended to seize itwhen they came upon Coolidge's property. And this is not a caseinvolving contraband or stolen goods or objects dangerous inthemselves. [Footnote28]

Page 403 U. S. 473

The seizure was therefore unconstitutional, and so was thesubsequent search at the station house. Since evidence obtained inthe course of the search was admitted at Coolidge's trial, thejudgment must be reversed, and the case remanded to the NewHampshire Supreme Court.Mapp v. Ohio,367 U.S. 643.

D

In his dissenting opinion today, MR. JUSTICE WHITE marshals thearguments that can be made against our interpretation of the"automobile" and "plain view" exceptions to the warrantrequirement. Beyond the

Page 403 U. S. 474

unstartling proposition that, when a line is drawn, there isoften not a great deal of difference between the situations closestto it on either side, there is a single theme that runs throughwhat he has to say about the two exceptions. Since that theme is arecurring one in controversies over the proper meaning and scope ofthe Fourth Amendment, it seems appropriate to treat his views inthis separate section, rather than piecemeal.

Much the most important part of the conflict that has been sonotable in this Court's attempts over a hundred years to develop acoherent body of Fourth Amendment law has been caused bydisagreement over the importance of requiring law enforcementofficers to secure warrants. Some have argued that a determinationby a magistrate of probable cause as a precondition of any searchor seizure is so essential that the Fourth Amendment is violatedwhenever the police might reasonably have obtained a warrant butfailed to do so. Others have argued with equal force that a test ofreasonableness, applied after the fact of search or seizure whenthe police attempt to introduce the fruits in evidence, affordsample safeguard for the rights in question, so that "[t]he relevanttest is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant,but whether the search was reasonable." [Footnote 29]

Both sides to the controversy appear to recognize a distinctionbetween searches and seizures that take place on a man's property-- his home or office -- and those carried out elsewhere. It isaccepted, at least as a matter of principle, that a search orseizure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant isper se unreasonable, unless the police can show that itfalls within one of a carefully defined set of exceptions based onthe

Page 403 U. S. 475

presence of "exigent circumstances." [Footnote 30] As to other kinds of intrusions, however,there has been disagreement about the basic rules to be applied, asour cases concerning automobile searches, electronic surveillance,street searches and administrative searches make clear. [Footnote 31]

With respect to searches and seizures carried out on a suspect'spremises, the conflict has been over the question of what qualifiesas an "exigent circumstance." It might appear that the difficultinquiry would be when it is that the police can enter upon aperson's property to seize his "person . . . papers, and effects,"without prior judicial approval. The question of the scope ofsearch and seizure once the police are on the premises would appearto be subsidiary to the basic issue of when intrusion ispermissible. But the law has not developed in this fashion.

The most common situation in which Fourth Amendment issues havearisen has been that in which the police enter the suspect'spremises, arrest him, and then carry out a warrantless search andseizure of evidence. Where there is a warrant for the suspect'sarrest, the evidence seized may later be challenged, either on theground that the warrant was improperly issued because there was notprobable cause, [Footnote32] or on the ground that the police search and seizure wentbeyond that which they could carry out as an incident to theexecution of the arrest warrant. [Footnote 33] Where the police act without an

Page 403 U. S. 476

arrest warrant, the suspect may argue that an arrest warrant wasnecessary, that there was no probable cause to arrest, [Footnote 34] or that, even if thearrest was valid, the search and seizure went beyond permissiblelimits. [Footnote 35]Perhaps because each of these lines of attack offers a plethora oflitigable issues, the more fundamental question of when the policemay arrest a man in his house without a warrant has been littleconsidered in the federal courts. This Court has chosen on a numberof occasions to assume the validity of an arrest and decide thecase before it on the issue of the scope of permissible warrantlesssearch.E.g., Chimel v. California, supra. The more commoninquiry has therefore been:

"Assuming a valid police entry for purposes of arrest, whatsearches and seizures may the police carry out without priorauthorization by a magistrate?"

Two very broad, and sharply contrasting answers to this questionhave been assayed by this Court in the past. The answer ofTrupiano v. United States, supra, was that no searches andseizures could be legitimated by the mere fact of valid entry forpurposes of arrest so long as there was no showing of specialdifficulties in obtaining a warrant for search and seizure. Thecontrasting answer inHarris v. United States,331 U. S. 145, andUnited States v. Rabinowitz, supra, was that a valid entryfor purposes of arrest served to legitimate warrantless searchesand seizures throughout the premises where the arrest occurred,however spacious those premises might be.

The approach taken inHarris andRabinowitzwas open to the criticism that it made it so easy for the police toarrange to search a man's premises without a warrant

Page 403 U. S. 477

that the Constitution's protection of a man's "effects" became adead letter. The approach taken inTrupiano, on the otherhand, was open to the criticism that it was absurd to permit thepolice to make an entry in the dead of night for purposes ofseizing the "person" by main force, and then refuse them permissionto seize objects lying around in plain sight. It is arguable that,if the very substantial intrusion implied in the entry and arrestare "reasonable" in Fourth Amendment terms, then the less intrusivesearch incident to arrest must also be reasonable.

This argument against theTrupiano approach is oflittle force so long as it is assumed that the police must, in theabsence of one of a number of defined exceptions based on "exigentcircumstances," obtain an arrest warrant before entering a man'shouse to seize his person. If the Fourth Amendment requires awarrant to enter and seize the person, then it makes sense as wellto require a warrant to seize other items that may be on thepremises. The situation is different, however, if the police areunder no circumstances required to obtain an arrest warrant beforeentering to arrest a person they have probable cause to believe hascommitted a felony. If no warrant is ever required to legitimatethe extremely serious intrusion of a midnight entry to seize theperson, then it can be argued plausibly that a warrant should neverbe required to legitimate a very sweeping search incident to suchan entry and arrest. If the arrest without a warrant isperse reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, then it is difficultto perceive why a search incident in the style ofHarrisandRabinowitz is notper se reasonable aswell.

It is clear, then, that the notion that the warrantless entry ofa man's house in order to arrest him on probable cause isperse legitimate is in fundamental conflict with the basicprinciple of Fourth Amendment law that

Page 403 U. S. 478

searches and seizures inside a man's house without warrant areper se unreasonable in the absence of some one of a numberof well defined "exigent circumstances." This conflict came to thefore inChimel v. California, supra. The Court thereapplied the basic rule that the "search incident to arrest" is anexception to the warrant requirement, and that its scope musttherefore be strictly defined in terms of the justifying "exigentcircumstances." The exigency in question arises from the dangers ofharm to the arresting officer and of destruction of evidence withinthe reach of the arrestee. Neither exigency can conceivably justifythe far-ranging searches authorized underHarris andRabinowitz. The answer of the dissenting opinion of MR.JUSTICE WHITE inChimel, supported by no decision of thisCourt, was that a warrantless entry for the purpose of arrest onprobable cause is legitimate and reasonable no matter what thecircumstances. 395 U.S. at395 U. S. 776-780. From this it was said to follow thatthe full-scale search incident to arrest was also reasonable, sinceit was a lesser intrusion. 395 U.S. at395 U. S.772-775.

The same conflict arises in this case. Since the police knew ofthe presence of the automobile, and planned all along to seize it,there was no "exigent circumstance" to justify their failure toobtain a warrant. The application of the basic rule of FourthAmendment law therefore requires that the fruits of the warrantlessseizure be suppressed. MR. JUSTICE WHITE's dissenting opinion,however, argues once again that, so long as the police couldreasonably make a warrantless nighttime entry onto Coolidge'sproperty in order to arrest him, with no showing at all of anemergency, then it is absurd to prevent them from seizing hisautomobile as evidence of the crime.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE takes a basically similar approach to thequestion whether the search of the automobile in

Page 403 U. S. 479

this case can be justified underCarroll v. United States,supra, andChambers v. Maroney, supra.Carroll, on its face, appears to be a classic example ofthe doctrine that warrantless searches areper seunreasonable in the absence of exigent circumstances. Every word inthe opinion indicates the Court's adherence to the underlying ruleand its care in delineating a limited exception. Read thus, thecase quite evidently does not extend to the situation at bar. Yet,if we take the viewpoint of a judge called on only to decide in theabstract, after the fact, whether the police have behaved"reasonably" under all the circumstances -- in short, if we simplyignore the warrant requirement --Carroll comes to standfor something more. The stopping of a vehicle on the open highwayand a subsequent search amount to a major interference in the livesof the occupants.Carroll held such an interference to bereasonable without a warrant, given probable cause. It may bethought to followa fortiori that the seizure and searchhere -- where there was no stopping and the vehicle was unoccupied-- were also reasonable, since the intrusion was less substantial,although there were no exigent circumstances whatever. Usingreasoning of this sort, it is but a short step to the position thatit is never necessary for the police to obtain a warrant beforesearching and seizing an automobile, provided that they haveprobable cause. And MR. JUSTICE WHITE appears to adopt exactly thisview when he proposes that the Court should "treat searches ofautomobiles as we do the arrest of a person."

If we were to accept MR. JUSTICE WHITE's view that warrantlessentry for purposes of arrest and warrantless seizure and search ofautomobiles areper se reasonable so long as the policehave probable cause, it would be difficult to see the basis fordistinguishing searches of houses and seizures of effects. If it isreasonable for the police to make a warrantless nighttime entry forthe purpose

Page 403 U. S. 480

of arresting a person in his bed, then surely it must bereasonable as well to make a warrantless entry to search for andseize vital evidence of a serious crime. If the police may, withouta warrant, seize and search an unoccupied vehicle parked on theowner's private property, not being used for any illegal purpose,then it is hard to see why they need a warrant to seize and searcha suitcase, a trunk, a shopping bag, or any other portablecontainer in a house, garage, or backyard.

The fundamental objection, then, to the line of argument adoptedby MR. JUSTICE WHITE in his dissent in this case and inChimelv. California, supra, is that it proves too much. If we wereto agree with MR. JUSTICE WHITE that the police may, whenever theyhave probable cause, make a warrantless entry for the purpose ofmaking an arrest, and that seizures and searches of automobiles arelikewiseper se reasonable, given probable cause, then bythe same logic any search or seizure could be carried out without awarrant, and we would simply have read the Fourth Amendment out ofthe Constitution. Indeed, if MR. JUSTICE WHITE is correct that ithas generally been assumed that the Fourth Amendment is notviolated by the warrantless entry of a man's house for purposes ofarrest, it might be wise to reexamine the assumption. Such areexamination

"would confront us with a grave constitutional question, namely,whether the forceful nighttime entry into a dwelling to arrest aperson reasonably believed within, upon probable cause that he hadcommitted a felony, under circumstances where no reason appears whyan arrest warrant could not have been sought, is consistent withthe Fourth Amendment."

Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. at357 U. S.499-500.

None of the cases cited by MR. JUSTICE WHITE disposes of this"grave constitutional question." The case ofWarden v. Hayden,supra, where the Court elaborated

Page 403 U. S. 481

a "hot pursuit" justification for the police entry into thedefendant's house without a warrant for his arrest, certainlystands by negative implication for the proposition that an arrestwarrant is required in the absence of exigent circumstances.See also Davis v. Mississippi,394 U.S. 721,394 U. S. 728;Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at371 U. S.481-482. The Court of Appeals for the District ofColumbia Circuit, sitting en banc, has unanimously reached the sameconclusion. [Footnote 36]But we find it unnecessary to decide the question in this case. Therule that

"searches conducted outside the judicial process, without priorapproval by judge or magistrate, areper se unreasonableunder the Fourth Amendment -- subject only to a few specificallyestablished and well delineated exceptions, [Footnote 37]"

is not so frail that its continuing vitality depends on the fateof a supposed doctrine of warrantless arrest. The warrantrequirement has been a valued part of our constitutional law fordecades, and it has determined the result in scores and scores ofcases in courts all over this country. It is not an inconvenienceto be somehow "weighed" against the claims of police efficiency. Itis, or should be, an important working part of our machinery ofgovernment, operating as a matter of course to check the"well-intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous executive officers"[Footnote 38] who are a partof any system of law enforcement. If it is to be a true guide toconstitutional police action, rather than just a pious phrase, then"[t]he exceptions cannot be enthroned into the rule."UnitedStates v. Rabinowitz, supra, at339 U. S. 80(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The confinement of the exceptions totheir appropriate scope was the function ofChimel v.California, supra, where we dealt with the

Page 403 U. S. 482

assumption that a search "incident" to a lawful arrest mayencompass all of the premises where the arrest occurs, howeverspacious. The "plain view" exception is intimately linked with thesearch-incident exception, as the cases discussed in403 U.S. To permit warrantless plain view seizures withoutlimit would be to undo much of what was decided inChimel,as the similar arguments put forward in dissent in the two casesindicate clearly enough.

Finally, a word aboutTrupiano v. United States, supra.Our discussion of "plain view" in403 U. S.above, corresponds with that given inTrupiano. Here, asinTrupiano, the determining factors are advance policeknowledge of the existence and location of the evidence, policeintention to seize it, and the ample opportunity for obtaining awarrant.See 334 U.S. at334 U. S.707-708 and n. 27,supra. However, we do not"reinstate"Trupiano, since we cannot adopt all itsimplications. To begin with, inChimel v. California,supra, we held that a search of the person of an arrestee andof the area under his immediate control could be carried outwithout a warrant. We did not indicate there, and do not suggesthere, that the police must obtain a warrant if they anticipate thatthey will find specific evidence during the course of such asearch.Seen 24,supra. And as to the automobile exception, we do notquestion the decisions of the Court inCooper v.California,386 U. S. 58, andChambers v. Maroney, supra, although both are arguablyinconsistent withTrupiano.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE s dissent characterizes the coexistence ofChimel, Cooper, Chambers, and this case as "punitive,""extravagant," "inconsistent," "without apparent reason,""unexplained," and "inexplicable."Post at403 U. S. 517,403 U. S. 519,403 U. S. 521.It is urged upon us that we have here a

"ready opportunity, one way or another,

Page 403 U. S. 483

to bring clarity and certainty to a body of law that lowercourts and law enforcement officials often find confusing."

Post at403 U. S. 521.Presumably one of the ways in which MR. JUSTICE WHITE believes wemight achieve clarity and certainty would be the adoption of hisproposal that we treat entry for purposes of arrest and seizure ofan automobile alike asper se reasonable on probablecause. Such an approach might dispose of this case clearly andcertainly enough, but, as we have tried to show above, it wouldcast into limbo the whole notion of a Fourth Amendment warrantrequirement. And it is difficult to take seriously MR. JUSTICEWHITE's alternative suggestion that clarity and certainty, as wellas coherence and credibility, might also be achieved by modifyingChimel and overrulingChambers andCooper. Surely, quite apart from his strong disagreementon the merits, he would take vehement exception to any suchcavalier treatment of this Court's decisions.

Of course, it would be nonsense to pretend that our decisiontoday reduces Fourth Amendment law to complete order and harmony.The decisions of the Court over the years point in differingdirections and differ in emphasis. No trick of logic will make themall perfectly consistent. But it is no less nonsense to suggest, asdoes MR. JUSTICE WHITE,post at403 U. S. 521,403 U. S. 520,that we cease today "to strive for clarity and consistency ofanalysis," or that we have "abandoned any attempt" to find reasoneddistinctions in this area. The time is long past when men believedthat development of the law must always proceed by the smoothincorporation of new situations into a single coherent analyticalframework. We need accept neither the "clarity and certainty" of aFourth Amendment without a warrant requirement nor the facileconsistency obtained by wholesale overruling of recently decidedcases. A remark by

Page 403 U. S. 484

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concerning the Fifth Amendment is applicableas well to the Fourth:

"There are those, I suppose, who would put the 'liberalconstruction' approach of cases likeMiranda \[v.Arizona,384 U. S. 436,] andBoyd v.United States,116 U. S. 616 (1886),side-by-side with the balancing approach ofSchmerber \[v.California,384 U. S. 757,] and perceivenothing more subtle than a set of constructional antinomies to beutilized as convenient bootstraps to one result or another. But Iperceive in these cases the essential tension that springs from theuncertain mandate which this provision of the Constitution gives tothis Court."

California v. Byers,402 U. S. 424,402 U. S.449-450 (concurring in judgment). We are convinced thatthe result reached in this case is correct, and that the principleit reflects -- that the police must obtain a warrant when theyintend to seize an object outside the scope of a valid searchincident to arrest -- can be easily understood and applied bycourts and law enforcement officers alike. It is a principle thatshould work to protect the citizen without overburdening thepolice, and a principle that preserves and protects the guaranteesof the Fourth Amendment.

IIIBecause of the prospect of a new trial, the efficientadministration of justice counsels consideration of the secondsubstantial question under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendmentspresented by this case. The petitioner contends that, when thepolice obtained a rifle and articles of his clothing from his homeon the night of Sunday, February 2, 1964, while he was beinginterrogated at the police station, they engaged in a search andseizure violative of the Constitution. In order to

Page 403 U. S. 485

understand this contention, it is necessary to review in somedetail the circumstances of the February 2 episode.

A

The lie detector test administered to Coolidge in Concord on theafternoon of the 2d was inconclusive as to his activities on thenight of Pamela Mason's disappearance, but, during the course ofthe test, Coolidge confessed to stealing $375 from his employer.After the group returned from Concord to Manchester, theinterrogation about Coolidge's movements on the night of thedisappearance continued, and Coolidge apparently made a number ofstatements which the police immediately checked out as best theycould. The decision to send two officers to the Coolidge house tospeak with Mrs. Coolidge was apparently motivated in part by adesire to check his story against whatever she might say, and inpart by the need for some corroboration of his admission to thetheft from his employer. The trial judge found as a fact, and therecord supports him, that, at the time of the visit, the policeknew very little about the weapon that had killed Pamela Mason. Thebullet that had been retrieved was of small caliber, but the policewere unsure whether the weapon was a rifle or a pistol. During theextensive investigation following the discovery of the body, thepolice had made it a practice to ask all those questioned whetherthey owned any guns, and to ask the owners for permission to runtests on those that met the very general description of the murderweapon. The trial judge found as a fact that, when the policevisited Mrs. Coolidge on the night of the 2d, they were unaware ofthe previous visit during which Coolidge had shown other officersthree guns, and that they were not motivated by a desire to findthe murder weapon.

Page 403 U. S. 486

The two plainclothesmen asked Mrs. Coolidge whether her husbandhad been at home on the night of the murder victim's disappearance,and she replied that he had not. They then asked her if her husbandowned any guns. According to her testimony at the pretrialsuppression hearing, she replied, "Yes, I will get them in thebedroom." One of the officers replied, "We will come with you." Thethree went into the bedroom, where Mrs. Coolidge took all four gunsout of the closet. Her account continued:

"A. I believe I asked if they wanted the guns. One gentlemansaid, 'No;' then the other gentleman turned around and said, 'Wemight as well take them.' I said, 'If you would like them, you maytake them.'"

"Q. Did you go further and say, 'We have nothing to hide.?'"

"A. I can't recall if I said that then or before. I don'trecall."

"Q. But, at some time, you indicated to them that, as far as youwere concerned, you had nothing to hide, and they might take whatthey wanted?"

"A. That was it."

"* * * *"

"Q. Did you feel at that time that you had something tohide?"

"A. No."

The two policemen also asked Mrs. Coolidge what her husband hadbeen wearing on the night of the disappearance. She then producedfour pairs of trousers, and indicated that her husband had probablyworn either of two of them on that evening. She also brought out ahunting jacket. The police gave her a receipt for the guns and theclothing, and, after a search of the Coolidge cars not here inissue, took the various articles to the police station.

Page 403 U. S. 487

B

The first branch of the petitioner's argument is that, when Mrs.Coolidge brought out the guns and clothing and then handed themover to the police, she was acting as an "instrument" of theofficials, complying with a "demand" made by them. Consequently, itis argued, Coolidge was the victim of a search and seizure withinthe constitutional meaning of those terms. Since we cannot acceptthis interpretation of the facts, we need not consider thepetitioner's further argument that Mrs. Coolidge could not or didnot "waive" her husband's constitutional protection againstunreasonable searches and seizures.

Had Mrs. Coolidge, wholly on her own initiative, sought out herhusband's guns and clothing and then taken them to the policestation to be used as evidence against him, there can be no doubtunder existing law that the articles would later have beenadmissible in evidence.Cf. Burdeau v. McDowell,256 U. S. 465. Thequestion presented here is whether the conduct of the policeofficers at the Coolidge house was such as to make her actionstheir actions for purposes of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendmentsand their attendant exclusionary rules. The test, as thepetitioner's argument suggests, is whether Mrs. Coolidge, in lightof all the circumstances of the case, must be regarded as havingacted as an "instrument" or agent of the state when she producedher husband's belongings.Cf. United States v. Goldberg,330 F.2d 30 (CA3),cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964);People v. Tarantino, 45 Cal. 2d590, 290 P.2d 505 (1955);see Byars v. United States,273 U. S. 28;Gambino v. United States,275 U.S. 310.

In a situation like the one before us, there no doubt alwaysexist forces pushing the spouse to cooperate with

Page 403 U. S. 488

the police. Among these are the simple, but often powerful,convention of openness and honesty, the fear that secretivebehavior will intensify suspicion, and uncertainty as to whatcourse is most likely to be helpful to the absent spouse. But thereis nothing constitutionally suspect in the existence, without more,of these incentives to full disclosure or active cooperation withthe police. The exclusionary rules were fashioned "to prevent, notto repair," and their target is official misconduct. They are "tocompel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the onlyeffectively available way -- by removing the incentive to disregardit."Elkins v. United States,364 U.S. 206,364 U. S. 217.But it is no part of the policy underlying the Fourth andFourteenth Amendments to discourage citizens from aiding to theutmost of their ability in the apprehension of criminals. If, then,the exclusionary rule is properly applicable to the evidence takenfrom the Coolidge house on the night of February 2, it must be uponthe basis that some type of unconstitutional police conductoccurred.

Yet it cannot be said that the police should have obtained awarrant for the guns and clothing before they set out to visit Mrs.Coolidge, since they had no intention of rummaging around amongCoolidge's effects or of dispossessing him of any of his property.Nor can it be said that they should have obtained Coolidge'spermission for a seizure they did not intend to make. There wasnothing to compel them to announce to the suspect that theyintended to question his wife about his movements on the night ofthe disappearance or about the theft from his employer. Once Mrs.Coolidge had admitted them, the policemen were surely actingnormally and properly when they asked her, as they had asked thosequestioned earlier in the investigation, including Coolidgehimself, about any guns there might be in the house. Thequestion

Page 403 U. S. 489

concerning the clothes Coolidge had been wearing on the night ofthe disappearance was logical, and in no way coercive. Indeed, onemight doubt the competence of the officers involved had they notasked exactly the questions they did ask. And surely, when Mrs.Coolidge, of her own accord, produced the guns and clothes forinspection, rather than simply describing them, it was notincumbent on the police to stop her or avert their eyes.

The crux of the petitioner's argument must be that, when Mrs.Coolidge asked the policemen whether they wanted the guns, theyshould have replied that they could not take them, or have firsttelephoned Coolidge at the police station and asked his permissionto take them, or have asked her whether she had been authorized byher husband to release them. Instead, after one policeman haddeclined the offer, the other turned and said, "We might as welltake them," to which Mrs. Coolidge replied, "If you would likethem, you may take them."

In assessing the claim that this course of conduct amounted to asearch and seizure, it is well to keep in mind that Mrs. Coolidgedescribed her own motive as that of clearing her husband, and thatshe believed that she had nothing to hide. She had seen her husbandhimself produce his guns for two other policemen earlier in theweek, and there is nothing to indicate that she realized that hehad offered only three of them for inspection on that occasion. Thetwo officers who questioned her behaved, as her own testimonyshows, with perfect courtesy. There is not the slightestimplication of an attempt on their part to coerce or dominate her,or, for that matter, to direct her actions by the more subtletechniques of suggestion that are available to officials incircumstances like these. To hold that the conduct of the policehere was a search and seizure would be to hold, in effect, that acriminal suspect has constitutional protection against

Page 403 U. S. 490

the adverse consequences of a spontaneous, good faith effort byhis wife to clear him of suspicion. [Footnote 39]

The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to theSupreme Court of New Hampshire for further proceedings notinconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

* Parts II-A, II-B, and II-C of this opinion are joined only byMR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, and MR. JUSTICEMARSHALL.

[Footnote 1]

During the lie detector test, Coolidge had confessed to a theftof money from his employer.See403 U.S.infra.

[Footnote 2]

For a very strong argument that this evidence should have beenexcluded because altogether lacking in probative value,see Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual inthe Legal Process, 84 Harv.L.Rev. 1329, 1342 n. 40 (1971).

[Footnote 3]

After hearing the Attorney General's testimony on the issuanceof the warrants, the trial judge said:

"I found that an impartial Magistrate would have done the sameas you did. I don't think, in all sincerity, that I would expectthat you could wear two pairs of shoes."

[Footnote 4]

See also Gouled v. United States,255 U.S. 298,255 U. S.303-304 (1921):

"It would not be possible to add to the emphasis with which theframers of our Constitution and this court . . . have declared theimportance to political liberty and to the welfare of our countryof the due observance of the rights guaranteed under theConstitution by these two Amendments [the Fourth and Fifth]. Theeffect of the decisions cited is: that such rights are declared tobe indispensable to the 'full enjoyment of personal security,personal liberty and private property;' that they are to beregarded as of the very essence of constitutional liberty; and thatthe guaranty of them is as important and as imperative as are theguaranties of the other fundamental rights of the individualcitizen, -- the right, to trial by jury, to the writ of habeascorpus and to due process of law. It has been repeatedly decidedthat these Amendments should receive a liberal construction, so asto prevent stealthy encroachment upon or 'gradual depreciation' ofthe rights secured by them, by imperceptible practice of courts orby well intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous executiveofficers."

See also Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,282 U. S. 344,282 U. S.357.

[Footnote 5]

Katz v. United States,389 U.S. 347,389 U. S.357.

[Footnote 6]

Jones v. United States,357 U.S. 493,357 U. S.499.

[Footnote 7]

McDonald v. United States,335 U.S. 451,335 U. S.456.

[Footnote 8]

United States v. Jeffers,342 U. S.48,342 U. S.51.

[Footnote 9]

See Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 95Eng.Rep. 807 (1765), andWilkes v. Wood, 19 How.St.Tr.1153, 98 Eng.Rep. 489 (1763).

[Footnote 10]

See Elkins v. United States,364 U.S. 206.

[Footnote 11]

The suggestion in Part III-A of the concurring and dissentingopinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK that this represents the formulationof "aper se rule reaching far beyond"Chimel v.California,395 U. S. 752,post at403 U. S. 503,is mistaken. The question discussed here is whether, underpre-Chimel law, the police could, contemporaneously withthe arrest of Coolidge inside his house, make a search of his carfor evidence --i.e., the particles later introduced athis trial. There can be no question that, afterChimel,such a search could not be justified as "incident" to the arrest,sinceChimel held that a search so justified can extendonly to the

"arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control'-- construing that phrase to mean the area from within which hemight gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence."

395 U.S. at395 U. S. 763.The quite distinct question whether the police were entitled toseize the automobile as evidence in plain view is discussed in403 U. S.Cf.n 24,infra.

[Footnote 12]

Cooper v. California,386 U. S. 58, isnot in point, since there, the State did not rely on the theory ofa search incident to arrest, but sought to justify the search onother grounds.Id. at386 U. S. 60.MR. JUSTICE BLACK's opinion for the Court inCooperreaffirmedPreston v. United States,376 U.S. 364.

[Footnote 13]

267 U.S. at267 U. S.153.

[Footnote 14]

Id. at267 U. S.156.

[Footnote 15]

United States v. Di Re,332 U.S. 581,332 U. S.586.

[Footnote 16]

Husty v. United States,282 U.S. 694;Brinegar v. United States,338 U.S. 160.

[Footnote 17]

A third case that has sometimes been cited as an application ofCarroll v. United States,267 U.S. 132, isScher v. United States,305 U.S. 251. There, the police were following an automobilethat they had probable cause to believe contained a large quantityof contraband liquor. The facts were as follows:

The driver

"turned into a garage a few feet back of his residence andwithin the curtilage. One of the pursuing officers left their carand followed. As petitioner was getting out of his car, thisofficer approached, announced his official character, and stated hewas informed that the car was hauling bootleg liquor. Petitionerreplied, 'just a little for a party.' Asked whether the liquor wastax-paid, he replied that it was Canadian whiskey; also, he said itwas in the trunk at the rear of the car. T he officer opened thetrunk and found. . . ."

305 U.S. at305 U. S.253.

The Court held:

"Considering the doctrine ofCarroll v. United States,267 U. S.132 . . . and the application of this to the facts theredisclosed, it seems plain enough that, just before he entered thegarage, the following officers properly could have stoppedpetitioner's car, made search, and put him under arrest. So muchwas not seriously controverted at the argument."

"Passage of the car into the open garage closely followed by theobserving officer did not destroy this right. No search was made ofthe garage. Examination of the automobile accompanied an arrest,without objection and upon admission of probable guilt. Theofficers did nothing either unreasonable or oppressive.Agnellov. United States,269 U. S. 20,269 U. S.30;Wisniewski v. United States, 47 F.2d 825,826 [CA6 1931]."

305 U.S. at305 U. S.254-255. BothAgnello, at the page cited, andWisniewski dealt with the admissibility of evidence seizedduring asearch incident to a lawful arrest.

[Footnote 18]

It is frequently said that occupied automobiles stopped on theopen highway may be searched without a warrant because they are"mobile," or "movable." No other basis appears for MR. JUSTICEWHITE's suggestion in his dissenting opinion that we should "treatsearches of automobiles as we do the arrest of a person."Post at403 U. S. 527.In this case, it is, of course, true that, even though Coolidge wasin jail, his wife was miles away in the company of twoplainclothesmen, and the Coolidge property was under the guard oftwo other officers, the automobile was in a literal sense "mobile."A person who had the keys and could slip by the guard could driveit away. We attach no constitutional significance to this sort ofmobility.

First, a good number of the containers that the police mightdiscover on a person's property and want to search are equallymovable,e.g., trunks, suitcases, boxes, briefcases, andbags. How are such objects to be distinguished from an unoccupiedautomobile -- not then being used for any illegal purpose sittingon the owner's property? It is true that the automobile has wheelsand its own locomotive power. But, given the virtually universalavailability of automobiles in our society, there is littledifference between driving the container itself away and driving itaway in a vehicle brought to the scene for that purpose. Of course,if there is a criminal suspect close enough to the automobile sothat he might get a weapon from it or destroy evidence within it,the police may make a search of appropriately limited scope.Chimel v. California,395 U. S. 752.See403 U. S.supra. But ifCarroll v. United States,267 U. S. 132,permits a warrantless search of an unoccupied vehicle, on privateproperty and beyond the scope of a valid search incident to anarrest, then it would permit as well a warrantless search of asuitcase or a box. We have found no case that suggests such anextension ofCarroll.See nn.1617supra.

[Footnote 19]

Cf. United States v. Payne, 429 F.2d 169 (CA9 1970). Inthat case, two couples were camping in an individually allottedcampsite in Yosemite National Park. During the evening, an off-dutypoliceman, camping with his family in an adjoining site, observedthe two couples smoking a substance he believed to be marihuana,and also observed them making what he thought "furtive" movementsto remove objects he thought to be drugs from the glove compartmentof a car parked nearby. He summoned a park ranger, and the twoentered the campsite. They found that one of the couples waspreparing to bed down for the night, while the couple to whom thecar belonged were visiting in another campsite. The officerssearched the unoccupied parked automobile, found 12 Seconalcapsules, and arrested the couple who had stayed behind. TheGovernment attempted to uphold the search underCarroll,supra, andBrinegar, supra. The Court of Appealsanswered:

"While it is true that the Supreme Court has enunciated slightlydifferent rules concerning a search of an automobile without awarrant, the rationale is apparently based upon the fact that a'vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdictionin which the warrant must be sought.'Chimel v.California,395 U. S. 752,395 U. S.764. . . . In the instant case, the search of theVolkswagen cannot be justified upon this reasoning. There is noindication in the record that the appellant or any of his partywere preparing to leave, and, quite to the contrary, it is clearthat appellant was bedding down for the evening, and that there wasample time to secure the necessary warrant for the search of thecar had [the Park Ranger] believed there was probable cause to seekone."

429 F.2d at 171-172.

[Footnote 20]

Part403 U. S.JUSTICE BLACK argues with vehemence that this case must somehow becontrolled byChambers v. Maroney,399 U. S.42, yet the precise applicability ofChambersis never made clear. On its face,Chambers purports todeal only with situations in which the police may legitimately makea warrantless search underCarroll v. United States,267 U. S. 132.Since theCarroll rule does not apply in the circumstancesof this case, the police could not have searched the car without awarrant when they arrested Coolidge. Thus, MR. JUSTICE BLACK'sargument must be thatChambers somehow operatedsubsilentio to extend the basic doctrine ofCarroll. Itis true that the actual search of the automobile inChambers was made at the police station many hours afterthe car had been stopped on the highway, when the car was no longermovable, any "exigent circumstances" had passed, and, for all therecord shows, there was a magistrate easily available. Nonetheless,the analogy to this case is misleading. The rationale ofChambers is that, given a justified initial intrusion,there is little difference between a search on the open highway anda later search at the station. Here, we deal with the priorquestion of whether the initial intrusion is justified. For thispurpose, it seems abundantly clear that there is a significantconstitutional difference between stopping, seizing, and searchinga car on the open highway and entering private property to seizeand search an unoccupied, parked vehicle not then being used forany illegal purpose. That the police may have been legally on theproperty in order to arrest Coolidge is, of course, immaterial,since, as shown in403 U. S.supra, that purpose could not authorize search of the careven underUnited States v. Rabinowitz,339 U. S.56.

[Footnote 21]

Cooper v. California,386 U. S. 58, is nomore in point here than in the context of a search incident to alawful arrest.Seen 12,supra. InCooper, the seizure ofthe petitioner's car was mandated by California statute, and itslegality was not questioned. The case stands for the propositionthat, given an unquestionably legal seizure, there are specialcircumstances that may validate a subsequent warrantless search.Cf. Chambers, supra. The case certainly should not be readas holding that the police can do without a warrant at the policestation what they are forbidden to do without a warrant at theplace of seizure.

[Footnote 22]

Coolidge had admitted that, on the night of Pamela Mason'sdisappearance, he had stopped his Pontiac on the side of thehighway opposite the place where the body was found. He claimed thecar was stuck in the snow. Two witnesses, who had stopped and askedhim if he needed help, testified that his car was not stuck.

[Footnote 23]

See nn.12 and |12 and S. 443fn21|>21,supra.

[Footnote 24]

The "plain view" exception to the warrant requirement is not inconflict with the law of search incident to a valid arrestexpressed inChimel v. California,395 U.S. 752. The Court there held that

"[t]here is ample justification . . . for a search of thearrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control' --construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he mightgain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence."

Id. at395 U. S. 763.The "plain view" doctrine would normally justify as well theseizure of other evidence that came to light during such anappropriately limited search. The Court inChimel went onto hold that

"[t]here is no comparable justification, however, for routinelysearching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs -- or,for that matter, for searching through all the desk drawers orother closed or concealed areas in that room itself. Such searches,in the absence of well recognized exceptions, may be made onlyunder the authority of a search warrant."

Ibid. Where, however, the arresting officerinadvertently comes within plain view of a piece of evidence, notconcealed, although outside of the area under the immediate controlof the arrestee, the officer may seize it, so long as the plainview was obtained in the course of an appropriately limited searchof the arrestee.

[Footnote 25]

Trupiano v. United States, supra, applied the principlein circumstances somewhat similar to those here. Federal lawenforcement officers had infiltrated an agent into a group engagedin manufacturing illegal liquor. The agent had given them thefullest possible description of the layout and equipment of theillegal distillery. Although they had ample opportunity to do so,the investigators failed to procure search or arrest warrants.Instead, they staged a warrantless nighttime raid on the premises.After entering the property, one of the officers looked through thedoorway of a shed, and saw one of the criminals standing beside anillegal distillery. The officer entered, made a legal arrest, andseized the still. This Court held it inadmissible at trial,rejecting the Government's argument based on

"the long line of cases recognizing that an arresting officermay look around at the time of the arrest and seize those fruitsand evidences of crime or those contraband articles which are inplain sight and in his immediate and discernible presence."

334 U.S. at334 U. S. 704.The Court reasoned that there was no excuse whatever for thefailure of the agents to obtain a warrant before entering theproperty, and that the mere fact that a suspect was arrested in theproximity of the still provided no "exigent circumstance" tovalidate a warrantless seizure. The scope of the intrusionpermitted to make the valid arrest did not include a warrantlesssearch for and seizure of a still whose exact location and illegaluse were known well in advance. The fact that, at the time of thearrest, the still was in plain view and nearby was thereforeirrelevant. The agents were in exactly the same position as thepolicemen inTaylor v. United States,286 U. S.1, who had unmistakable evidence of sight and smell thatcontraband liquor was stored in a garage, but nonetheless violatedthe Fourth Amendment when they entered and seized it without awarrant.

Trupiano, to be sure, did not long remain undisturbed.The extremely restrictive view taken there of the allowable extentof a search and seizure incident to lawful arrest was rejected inUnited States v. Rabinowitz,339 U. S.56.See Chimel v. California,395 U.S. 752. The case demonstrates, however, the operation ofthe general principle that "plain view" alone can never justify awarrantless seizure.Cf.n 24,supra.

[Footnote 26]

None of the cases cited in403 U. S.JUSTICE BLACK casts any doubt upon this conclusion. InSteelev. United States,267 U. S. 498,agents observed cases marked "Whiskey" being taken into a buildingfrom a truck. On this basis, they obtained a warrant to search thepremises for contraband liquor. In the course of the search, theycame upon a great deal of whiskey and gin -- not that they had seenunloaded -- and various bottling equipment, and seized all theyfound.

InWarden v. Hayden,387 U. S. 294, thepolice entered and searched a house in hot pursuit of a fleeingarmed robber. The Court pointed out that

"[s]peed here was essential, and only a thorough search of thehouse for persons and weapons could have insured that Hayden wasthe only man present and that the police had control of all weaponswhich could be used against them or to effect an escape."

387 U.S. at387 U. S. 299.The Court then established with painstaking care that the variousarticles of clothing seized were discovered during a searchdirected at the robber and his weapons.Id. at387 U. S.299-300.

InUnited States v. Lee,274 U.S. 559, a Coast Guard patrol approached a boat on thehigh seas at night. A searchlight was turned on the boat, andrevealed cases of contraband. The liquor subsequently seized wasnever introduced in evidence, but the seizing officers were allowedto testify to what they had seen. As the Court put it: "A latertrespass by the officers, if any, did not render inadmissible inevidence knowledge legally obtained." 274 U.S. at274 U. S.563.

InMarron v. United States,275 U.S. 192, officers raided a speakeasy with a warrant tosearch for and seize contraband liquor. They arrested the bartenderand seized a number of bills and other papers in plain view on thebar. While searching a closet for liquor, they came across a ledgerkept in the operation of the illegal business, which they alsoseized. There is no showing whatever that these seizures outsidethe warrant were planned in advance. TheMarron Courtupheld them as "incident" to the arrest. The "plain view" aspect ofthe case was later emphasized in order to avoid the implicationthat arresting officers are entitled to make an exploratory searchof the premises where the arrest occurs.See Go-Bart ImportingCo. v. United States, 282 U.S. at282 U. S. 358;United States v. Lefkowitz,285 U.S. 452,285 U. S. 465;United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at339 U. S. 78(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Thus,Marron, likeSteele, supra, Warden, supra, andLee, supra, canhardly be cited for the proposition that the police may justify aplanned warrantless seizure by maneuvering themselves within "plainview" of the object they want.

Finally,Ker v. California,374 U. S.23, is fully discussed inn 28,infra.

[Footnote 27]

MR. JUSTICE BLACK laments that the Court today "abolishesseizure incident to arrest" (but seen 24,supra), while MR. JUSTICE WHITEno less forcefully asserts that the Court's "new rule" will"accomplish nothing." In assessing these claims, it is well to keepin mind that we deal here with aplanned warrantlessseizure. This Court has never permitted the legitimation of aplanned warrantless seizure on plain view grounds,seen 26,supra, and todo so here would be flatly inconsistent with the existing body ofFourth Amendment law. A long line of cases, of which those cited inthe text atn 25,supra, are only a sample, make it clear beyond doubt thatthe mere fact that the police have legitimately obtained a plainview of a piece of incriminating evidence is not enough to justifya warrantless seizure. Although MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICEWHITE appear to hold contrasting views of the import of today'sdecision, they are in agreement that this warrant requirementshould be ignored whenever the seizing officers are able to arrangeto make an arrest within sight of the object they are after. "Theexceptions cannot be enthroned into the rule."United States v.Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at339 U. S. 80(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). We recognized the dangers ofallowing the extent of Fourth Amendment protections to turn on thelocation of the arrestee inChimel v. California, 395 U.S.at395 U. S. 767,noting that, under the law of search incident to arrest asenunciated prior toChimel,

"law enforcement officials [had] the opportunity to engage insearches not justified by probable cause, by the simple expedientof arranging to arrest suspects at home rather than elsewhere."

Cf. Trupiano v. United States, supra,n 25, where the Court held:

"As we have seen, the existence of [the illegal still] and thedesirability of seizing itwere known to the agents long beforethe seizure, and formed one of the main purposes of the raid.Likewise, the arrest of Antoniole [the person found in the shedwith the still] . . . was a foreseeable event motivating the raid.But the precise location of the petitioners at the time of theirarrest had no relation to the foreseeability or necessity of theseizure. The practicability of obtaining a search warrant did notturn upon whether Antoniole and the others were within thedistillery building when arrested, or upon whether they were thenengaged in operating the illicit equipment. . . . Antoniole mightwell have been outside the building at that particular time. Ifthat had been the case and he had been arrested in the farmyard,the entire argument advanced by the Government in support of theseizure without warrant would collapse. We do not believe that theapplicability of the Fourth Amendment to the facts of this casedepends upon such a fortuitous factor as the precise location ofAntoniole at the time of the raid."

334 U.S. at334 U. S.707-708. (Emphasis supplied.)

[Footnote 28]

Ker v. California,374 U. S. 23, isnot to the contrary. In that case, the police had probable cause toenter Ker's apartment and arrest him, and they made an entry forthat purpose. They did not have a search warrant, but the Courtheld that "time . . . was of the essence," so that a warrant wasunnecessary. As the police entered the living room, Ker's wifeemerged from the adjacent kitchen. One of the officers moved to thedoor of the kitchen, looked in, and observed a brick of marihuanain plain view on a table. The officer brought Ker and his wife intothe kitchen, questioned them, and, when they failed to explain themarihuana, arrested them and seized the contraband. The police thensearched the whole apartment and found various other incriminatingevidence. The Court held that the general exploratory search of thewhole apartment "was well within the limits upheld inHarris v. UnitedStates [331 U.S. 145]" for a search incident to alawful arrest. The Court also rejected Ker's claim that the seizureof the brick of marihuana in the kitchen was illegal because thepolice had "searched" for it (by going to the door of the kitchenand looking in) before making any arrest. The Court reasoned that,when Mrs. Ker emerged from the kitchen, it was reasonable for theofficer to go to the door and look in, and that, when he saw thebrick of marihuana, he was not engaged in any "search" at all. Oncehe had arrested the Kers, the actual seizure of the brick waslawful because "incident" to the arrest. 374 U.S. at374 U. S.42-43.

Ker is distinguishable from the present case on atleast the following grounds: inKer, the Court found that"the officers entered the apartment for the purpose of arrestingGeorge Ker," rather than for purposes of seizure or search, 374U.S. at374 U. S. 42-43;exigent circumstances justified the failure to obtain a searchwarrant; the discovery of the brick of marihuana was fortuitous;the marihuana was contraband easily destroyed; and it was in theimmediate proximity of the Kers at the moment of their arrest sothat the seizure was unquestionably lawful under thesearch-incident law of the time, and might be lawful under the morerestrictive standard ofChimel v. California,395 U.S. 752. Not one of these elements was present in thecase before us.

[Footnote 29]

United States v. Rabinowitz, supra, at339 U. S.66.

[Footnote 30]

See the cases cited in nn.5-8supra, and in the text atn 25,supra.

[Footnote 31]

See Carroll v. United States, supra, and casesdiscussed in403 U. S.Katz v. United States, supra, (electronic surveillance);Terry v. Ohio,392 U. S. 1;Sibron v. New York,392 U. S. 40(street searches);Camara v. Municipal Court,387 U.S. 523;See v. Seattle,387 U.S. 541 (administrative searches).

[Footnote 32]

E.g., Giordenello v. United States,357 U.S. 480.

[Footnote 33]

E.g., Marron v. United States, supra; United States v.Rabinowitz, supra.

[Footnote 34]

E.g., Wong Sun v. United States,371 U.S. 471.

[Footnote 35]

E.g., Trupiano v. United States, supra; Warden v. Hayden,supra; Ker v. California, supra.

[Footnote 36]

Dorman v. United States, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 313, 435 F.2d385 (1970).

[Footnote 37]

Katz v. United States, supra, at389 U. S.357.

[Footnote 38]

Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. at255 U. S.304.

[Footnote 39]

Cf. Recent Cases, 79 Harv.L.Rev. 1513, 1519 (1966);Note, Seizures by Private Parties: Exclusion in Criminal Cases, 19Stan.L.Rev. 608 (1967).

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring.

From the several opinions that have been filed in this case, itis apparent that the law of search and seizure is due for anoverhauling. State and federal law enforcement officers andprosecutorial authorities must find quite intolerable the presentstate of uncertainty, which extends even to such an everydayquestion as the circumstances under which police may enter a man'sproperty to arrest him and seize a vehicle believed to have beenused during the commission of a crime.

I would begin this process of reevaluation by overrulingMapp v. Ohio,367 U. S. 643(1961), andKer v. California,374 U. S.23 (1963). The former of these cases made the federal"exclusionary rule" applicable to the States. The latter forced theStates to follow all the ins and outs of this Court's FourthAmendment decisions, handed down in federal cases.

In combination,Mapp andKer have beenprimarily responsible for bringing about serious distortions andincongruities in this field of constitutional law. Basically, thesehave had two aspects, as I believe an examination of our morerecent opinions and certiorari docket will show. First, the Stateshave been put in a federal mold with respect to this aspect ofcriminal law enforcement, thus depriving the country of theopportunity to observe

Page 403 U. S. 491

the effects of different procedures in similar settings.See, e.g., Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Searchand Seizure, 37 U.Chi.L.Rev. 665 (1970), suggesting that theassumed "deterrent value" of the exclusionary rule has never beenadequately demonstrated or disproved, and pointing out that,because ofMapp, all comparative statistics are 10 yearsold, and no new ones can be obtained. Second, in order to leavesome room for the States to cope with their own diverse problems,there has been generated a tendency to relax federal requirementsunder the Fourth Amendment, which now govern state procedures aswell. For an illustration of that tendency in anotherconstitutional field, again resulting from the infelicitous"incorporation" doctrine,see Williams v. Florida,399 U. S. 78(1970). Until we face up to the basic constitutional mistakes ofMapp andKer, no solid progress in setting thingsstraight in search and seizure law will, in my opinion, occur.

But forMapp andKer, I would have littledifficulty in voting to sustain this conviction, for I do not thinkthat anything the State did in this case could be said to offendthose values which are "at the core of the Fourth Amendment."Wolf v. Colorado,338 U. S. 25,338 U. S. 27(1949);cf. Irvine v. California,347 U.S. 128 (1954);Rochin v. California,342 U. S. 165(1952).

Because ofMapp andKer, however, this casemust be judged in terms of federal standards, and, on that basis, Iconcur, although not without difficulty, in Parts I, II-D, and IIIof the Court's opinion and in the judgment of the Court.* It mustbe recognized that the case is a close one. The reason I am tippedin favor of MR. JUSTICE

Page 403 U. S. 492

STEWART's position is that a contrary result in this case would,I fear, go far toward relegating the warrant requirement of theFourth Amendment to a position of little consequence in federalsearch and seizure law, a course which seems to me opposite to theone we took inChimel v. California,395 U.S. 752 (1969), two Terms ago.

Recent scholarship has suggested that, in emphasizing thewarrant requirement over the reasonableness of the search, theCourt has "stood the fourth amendment on its head" from ahistorical standpoint. T. Taylor, Two Studies in ConstitutionalInterpretation 23-24 (1969). This issue is perhaps most clearlypresented in the case of a warrantless entry into a man's home toarrest him on probable cause. The validity of such entry was leftopen inJones v. United States,357 U.S. 493,357 U. S.499-500 (1958), and, although my Brothers WHITE andSTEWART both feel that their contrary assumptions on this point areat the root of their disagreement in this case,ante at403 U. S.477-479;post at403 U. S.510-512, 521, the Court again leaves the issue open.Ante at403 U. S. 481.In my opinion, it does well to do so. This matter should not bedecided in a state case not squarely presenting the issue, andwhere it was not fully briefed and argued. I intimate no view onthis subject, but, until it is ripe for decision, I hope, in afederal case, I am unwilling to lend my support to setting back thetrend of our recent decisions.

* Because of my views as to the retroactivity ofChimel v.California,395 U. S. 752(1969), I do not believe the seizure of the Pontiac can be upheldas incident to Coolidge's arrest.See my separate opinioninMackey v. United States,401 U.S. 667,401 U. S. 675(1971).

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting in part and concurring inpart.

I join the dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE WHITE and in PartsII and III of MR. JUSTICE BLACK's concurring and dissentingopinion. I also agree with most of what is said in Part I of MR.JUSTICE BLACK's opinion, but I am not prepared to accept theproposition that the Fifth Amendment requires the exclusion ofevidence

Page 403 U. S. 493

seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. I join in Part IIIof MR. JUSTICE STEWART's opinion.

This case illustrates graphically the monstrous price we pay forthe exclusionary rule in which we seem to have imprisonedourselves.See my dissent inBivens v. Six UnknownNamed Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, ante, p.403 U. S.411.

On the merits of the case, I find not the slightest basis in therecord to reverse this conviction. Here again, the Court reachesout, strains, and distorts rules that were showing some signs ofstabilizing, and directs a new trial which will be held more thanseven years after the criminal acts charged.

Mr. Justice Stone, of the Minnesota Supreme Court, called thekind of judicial functioning in which the Court indulges today"bifurcating elements too infinitesimal to be split."

MR. JUSTICE BLACK, concurring and dissenting.

After a jury trial in a New Hampshire state court, petitionerwas convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Holdingthat certain evidence introduced by the State was seized during an"unreasonable" search, and that the evidence was inadmissible underthe judicially created exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment,the majority reverses that conviction. Believing that the searchand seizure here was reasonable and that the Fourth Amendment,properly construed, contains no such exclusionary rule, Idissent.

The relevant facts are these. Pamela Mason, a 14-year-old schoolgirl, lived with her mother and younger brother in Manchester, NewHampshire. She occasionally worked after school as a babysitter,and sought such work by posting a notice on a bulletin board in alocal laundromat. On January 13, 1064, she arrived home from schoolabout 4:15 p.m. Pamela's mother told her

Page 403 U. S. 494

that a man had called seeking a babysitter for that evening andsaid that he would call again later. About 4:30 p.m., afterPamela's mother had left for her job as a waitress at a nearbyrestaurant, Pamela received a phone call. Her younger brother, whoanswered the call but did not overhear the conversation, laterreported that the caller was a man. After the call, Pamela prepareddinner for her brother and herself, then left the house about 6p.m. Her family never again saw her alive. Eight days later, onJanuary 21, 1964, Pamela's frozen body was discovered in asnowdrift beside an interstate highway a few miles from her home.Her throat had been slashed and she had been shot in the head.Medical evidence showed that she died some time between 8 and 10p.m. on January 13, the night she left home.

A manhunt ensued. Two witnesses informed the police that, about9:30 p.m. on the night of the murder, they had stopped to offerassistance to a man in a 1951 Pontiac automobile which was parkedbeside the interstate highway near the point where the littlegirl's dead body was later found. Petitioner came under suspicionseven days after the body was discovered when one of his neighborsreported to the police that petitioner had been absent from hishome between 5 and 11 p.m. on January 13, the night of the murder.Petitioner owned a 1951 Pontiac automobile that matched thedescription of the car which the two witnesses reported seeingparked where the girl's body had been found. The police firsttalked with petitioner at his home on the evening of January 28,fifteen days after the girl was killed, and arranged for him tocome to the police station the following Sunday, February 2, 1964.He went to the station that Sunday and answered questionsconcerning his activities on the night of the murder, telling thepolice that he had been shopping in a neighboring town at the

Page 403 U. S. 495

time the murder was committed. During questioning, petitionerconfessed to having committed an unrelated larceny from hisemployer, and was held overnight at the police station inconnection with that offense. On the next day, he was permitted togo home.

While petitioner was being questioned at the police station onFebruary 2, two policemen went to petitioner's home to talk withhis wife. They asked what firearms the petitioner owned, and hiswife produced two shotguns and two rifles which she voluntarilyoffered to the police. Upon examination, the University of RhodeIsland Criminal Investigation Laboratory concluded that one of thefirearms, a Mossberg .22-caliber rifle, had fired the bullet foundin the murdered girl's brain.

Petitioner admitted that he was a frequent visitor to thelaundromat where Pamela posted her babysitting notice and that hehad been there on the night of the murder. The following day, aknife belonging to petitioner, which could have inflicted themurdered girl's knife wounds, was found near that laundromat. Thepolice also learned that petitioner had unsuccessfully contactedfour different persons before the girl's body had been discoveredin an attempt to fabricate an alibi for the night of January13.

On February 19, 1964, all this evidence was presented to thestate attorney general, who was authorized under New Hampshire lawto issue arrest and search warrants. The attorney generalconsidered the evidence and issued a warrant for petitioner'sarrest and four search warrants, including a warrant for theseizure and search of petitioner's Pontiac automobile.

On the day the warrants issued, the police went to thepetitioner's residence and placed him under arrest. They tookcharge of his 1951 Pontiac, which was parked in plain view in thedriveway in front of the house, and, two hours later, towed the carto the police station.

Page 403 U. S. 496

During the search of the automobile at the station, the policeobtained vacuum sweepings of dirt and other fine particles whichmatched like sweepings taken from the clothes of the murdered girl.Based on the similarity between the sweepings taken frompetitioner's automobile and those taken from the girl's clothes,experts who testified at trial concluded that Pamela had been inthe petitioner's car. The rifle given to the police by petitioner'swife was also received in evidence.

Petitioner challenges his conviction on the ground that therifle obtained from his wife and the vacuum sweepings taken fromhis car were seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment and wereimproperly admitted at trial. With respect to the rifle voluntarilygiven to the police by petitioner's wife, the majority holds thatit was properly received in evidence. I agree. But the Courtreverses petitioner's conviction on the ground that the sweepingstaken from his car were seized during an illegal search, and, forthis reason, the admission of the sweepings into evidence violatedthe Fourth Amendment. I dissent.

IThe Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches andseizures. The Amendment says nothing about consequences. Itcertainly nowhere provides for the exclusion of evidence as theremedy for violation. The Amendment states:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but uponprobable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularlydescribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things tobe seized."

No examination of that text can find an exclusionary rule by amere process of construction. Apparently the first suggestion thatthe Fourth Amendment somehow embodied a rule of evidence came

Page 403 U. S. 497

in Justice Bradley's majority opinion inBoyd v. UnitedStates,116 U. S. 616(1886). The holding in that case was that, ordinarily, a person maynot be compelled to produce his private books and papers for useagainst him as proof of crime. That decision was a soundapplication of accepted principles of common law and the command ofthe Fifth Amendment that no person shall be compelled to be awitness against himself. But Justice Bradley apparently preferredto formulate a new exclusionary rule from the Fourth Amendment,rather than rely on the already existing exclusionary rulecontained in the language of the Fifth Amendment. His opinionindicated that compulsory production of such evidence at trialviolated the Fourth Amendment. Mr. Justice Miller, with whom ChiefJustice Waite joined, concurred solely on the basis of the FifthAmendment, and explicitly refused to go along with JusticeBradley's novel reading of the Fourth Amendment. It was not until1914, some 28 years afterBoyd and when no member of theBoyd Court remained, that the Court, inWeeks v.United States,232 U. S. 383,stated that the Fourth Amendment itself barred the admission ofevidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. TheWeeks opinion made no express confession of a break withthe past. But if it was merely a proper reading of the FourthAmendment, it seems strange that it took this Court nearly 125years to discover the true meaning of those words. The truth isthat the source of the exclusionary rule simply cannot be found inthe Fourth Amendment. That Amendment did not when adopted, and doesnot now, contain any constitutional rule barring the admission ofillegally seized evidence.

In striking contrast to the Fourth Amendment, the FifthAmendment states in express, unambiguous terms that no person"shall be compelled in any criminal case

Page 403 U. S. 498

to be a witness against himself." The Fifth Amendment, in and ofitself, directly and explicitly commands its own exclusionary rule-- a defendant cannot be compelled to give evidence againsthimself. Absent congressional action taken pursuant to the FourthAmendment, if evidence is to be excluded, it must be under theFifth Amendment, not the Fourth. That was the point so ably made inthe concurring opinion of Justice Miller, joined by Chief JusticeWaite, inBoyd v. United States, supra, and that was thethrust of my concurring opinion inMapp v. Ohio,367 U. S. 643,367 U. S. 661(1961).

The evidence seized by breaking into Mrs. Mapp's house and thesearch of all her possessions was excluded from evidence not by theFourth Amendment, which contains no exclusionary rule, but by theFifth Amendment, which does. The introduction of such evidencecompels a man to be a witness against himself, and evidence socompelled must be excluded under the Fifth Amendment not becausethe Court says so, but because the Fifth Amendment commands it.

The Fourth Amendment provides a constitutional means by whichthe Government can act to obtain evidence to be used in criminalprosecutions. The people are obliged to yield to a proper exerciseof authority under that Amendment. [Footnote 2/1] Evidence properly seized under the FourthAmendment, of course, is admissible at trial. But nothing in theFourth Amendment provides that evidence seized in violation of thatAmendment must be excluded.

The majority holds that evidence it views as improperly seizedin violation of its ever-changing concept of the Fourth Amendmentis inadmissible. The majority

Page 403 U. S. 499

treats the exclusionary rule as a judge-made rule of evidencedesigned and utilized to enforce the majority's own notions ofproper police conduct. The Court today announces its new rules ofpolice procedure in the name of the Fourth Amendment, then holdsthat evidence seized in violation of the new "guidelines" isautomatically inadmissible at trial. The majority does not purportto rely on the Fifth Amendment to exclude the evidence in thiscase. Indeed, it could not. The majority prefers instead to rely on"changing times" and the Court's role, as it sees it, as theadministrator in charge of regulating the contacts of officialswith citizens. The majority states that, in the absence of a bettermeans of regulation, it applies a court-created rule ofevidence.

I readily concede that there is much recent precedent for themajority's present announcement of yet another new set of policeoperating procedures. By invoking this rulemaking power found notin the words, but somewhere in the "spirit," of the FourthAmendment, the Court has expanded that Amendment beyondrecognition. And each new step is justified as merely a logicalextension of the step before.

It is difficult for me to believe the Framers of the Bill ofRights intended that the police be required to prove a defendant'sguilt in a "little trial" before the issuance of a search warrant.But see Aguilar v. Texas,378 U.S. 108 (1964);Spinelli v. United States,393 U. S. 410(1969). No such proceeding was required before or after theadoption of the Fourth Amendment, until this Court decidedAguilar andSpinelli. Likewise, eavesdropperswere deemed to be competent witnesses in both English and Americancourts up until this Court, in its Fourth Amendment "rulemaking"capacity, undertook to lay down rules for electronic surveillance.Berger v. New York,388 U. S. 41,388 U. S. 70(1967) (BLACK, J., dissenting);Katz v. United States,389 U. S. 347,389 U. S. 364(1967) (BLACK, J., dissenting).

Page 403 U. S. 500

The reasonableness of a search incident to an arrest, extendingto areas under the control of the defendant and areas whereevidence may be found, was an established tenet of English commonlaw, and American constitutional law after adoption of the FourthAmendment -- that is, untilChimel v. California,395 U. S. 752(1969). The broad, abstract, and ambiguous concept of "privacy" isnow unjustifiably urged as a comprehensive substitute for theFourth Amendment's guarantee against "unreasonable searches andseizures."Griswold v. Connecticut,381 U.S. 479 (1965).

Our Government is founded upon a written Constitution. Thedraftsmen expressed themselves in careful and measured termscorresponding with the immense importance of the powers delegatedto them. The Framers of the Constitution, and the people whoadopted it, must be understood to have used words in their naturalmeaning, and to have intended what they said. The Constitutionitself contains the standards by which the seizure of evidencechallenged in the present case and the admissibility of thatevidence at trial is to be measured in the absence of congressionallegislation. It is my conclusion that both the seizure of the rifleoffered by petitioner's wife and the seizure of the automobile atthe time of petitioner's arrest were consistent with the FourthAmendment, and that the evidence so obtained under thecircumstances shown in the record in this case could not beexcluded under the Fifth Amendment.

IIThe majority holds that the warrant authorizing the seizure andsearch of petitioner's automobile was constitutionally defectiveand void. With respect to search warrants, the Fourth Amendmentprovides that

"no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported byOath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place

Page 403 U. S. 501

to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

The majority concedes that the police did show probable causefor the issuance of the warrant. The majority does not contest thatthe warrant particularly described the place to be searched, andthe thing to be seized.

But compliance with state law and the requirements of the FourthAmendment apparently is not enough. The majority holds that thestate attorney general's connection with the investigationautomatically rendered the search warrant invalid. In the firstplace, there is no language in the Fourth Amendment which providesany basis for the disqualification of the state attorney general toact as a magistrate. He is a state official of high office. TheFourth Amendment does not indicate that his position of authorityover state law enforcement renders him ineligible to issue warrantsupon a showing of probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.The majority's argument proceeds on the "little trial" theory thatthe magistrate is to sit as a judge and weigh the evidence andpractically determine guilt or innocence before issuing a warrant.There is nothing in the Fourth Amendment to support such amagnified view of the magistrate's authority. The state attorneygeneral was not barred by the Fourth Amendment or any otherconstitutional provision from issuing the warrant.

In the second place, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held ineffect that the state attorney general's participation in theinvestigation of the case at the time he issued the search warrantwas "harmless error" if it was error at all. I agree. It isdifficult to imagine a clearer showing of probable cause. There wasno possibility of prejudice, because there was no room fordiscretion. Indeed, it could be said that a refusal to issue awarrant on the showing of probable cause made in this case wouldhave been an abuse of discretion. In light

Page 403 U. S. 502

of the showing made by the police, there is no reasonablepossibility that the state attorney general's own knowledge of theinvestigation contributed to the issuance of the warrant. I see noerror in the state attorney general's action. But even if there waserror, it was harmless beyond reasonable doubt.See Harringtonv. California,395 U. S. 250(1969);Chapman v. California,386 U. S.18 (1967).

Therefore, it is my conclusion that the warrant authorizing theseizure and search of petitioner's automobile was constitutionalunder the Fourth Amendment, and that the evidence obtained duringthat search cannot be excluded under the Fifth Amendment. Moreover,I am of the view that, even if the search warrant had not issued,the search in this case nonetheless would have been constitutionalunder all three of the principles considered and rejected by themajority.

IIIIt is important to point out that the automobile itself wasevidence, and was seized as such. Prior to the seizure, the policehad been informed by two witnesses that, on the night of themurder, they had seen an automobile parked near the point where thelittle girl's dead body was later discovered. Their description ofthe parked automobile matched petitioner's car. At the time of theseizure, the identification of petitioner's automobile by thewitnesses as the car they had seen on the night of the murder wasyet to be made. The police had good reason to believe that theidentification would be an important element of the case againstthe petitioner. Preservation of the automobile itself as evidencewas a reasonable motivation for its seizure. Considered in light ofthe information in the hands of the New Hampshire police at thetime of the seizure, I conclude that the seizure and search wereconstitutional, even had there been no search warrant, for thefollowing among other reasons.

Page 403 U. S. 503

A

First, the seizure of petitioner's automobile was valid asincident to a lawful arrest. The majority concedes that there wasprobable cause for petitioner's arrest. Upon arriving atpetitioner's residence to make that arrest, the police sawpetitioner's automobile, which they knew fitted the description ofthe car observed by two witnesses at the place where the murderedgirl's body had been found. The police arrested the petitioner andseized the automobile. The majority holds that, because the policehad to go into petitioner's residence in order to place petitionerunder arrest, the contemporaneous seizure of the automobile outsidethe house was not incident to that arrest. I cannot accept thiselevation of form over reason.

After stating thatChimel v. California,395 U.S. 752 (1969), is inapplicable to this case, themajority goes on to formulate and apply aper se rulereaching far beyondChimel. To do so, the majority employsa classicnon sequitur. Because this Court has held thatpolice arresting a defendant on the street in front of his housecannot go into that house and make a general search, it follows,says the majority, that the police having entered a house to makean arrest cannot step outside the house to seize clearly visibleevidence. Even though the police, upon entering a doorway to make avalid arrest, would be authorized, under the pre-Chimellaw the majority purports to apply, to make a five-hour search of afour-room apartment,see Harris v. United States,331 U. S. 145(1947), the majority holds that the police could not step outsidethe doorway to seize evidence they passed on their way in. Themajority reasons that, as the doorway locks the policeman out, onceentered, it must lock him in.

The test of reasonableness cannot be governed by such arbitraryrules. Each case must be judged on its

Page 403 U. S. 504

own particular facts. Here, there was no general exploration,only a direct seizure of important evidence in plain view from bothinside as well as outside the house. On the facts of this case, itis my opinion that the seizure of petitioner's automobile wasincident to his arrest, and was reasonable under the terms of theFourth Amendment.

B

Moreover, under our decision last Term inChambers v.Maroney,399 U. S. 42(1970), the police were entitled not only to seize petitioner'scar, but also to search the car after it had been taken to thepolice station. The police had probable cause to believe that thecar had been used in the commission of the murder and that itcontained evidence of the crime. UnderCarroll v. UnitedStates,267 U. S. 132(1925), andChambers v. Maroney, supra, such belief wassufficient justification for the seizure and the search ofpetitioner's automobile.

The majority reasons that theChambers andCarroll rationale, based on the mobility of automobiles,is inapplicable here because the petitioner's car could have beenplaced under guard, and thereby rendered immobile. But this Courtexplicitly rejected such reasoning inChambers:

"For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between, onthe one hand, seizing and holding a car before presenting theprobable cause issue to a magistrate and, on the other hand,carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. . . . Theprobable cause factor still obtained at the station house, and sodid the mobility of the car. . . ."

399 U.S. at399 U. S. 52.This Court held there that the delayed search at the station house,as well as an immediate search at the time of seizure, wasreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

As a second argument for holding that theChambersdecision does not apply to this case, the majority reasons that theevidence could not have been altered or the car

Page 403 U. S. 505

moved, because petitioner was in custody and his wife wasaccompanied by police, at least until the police towed the car tothe station. But the majority's reasoning depends on twoassumptions: first, that the police should, or even could, continueto keep petitioner's wife effectively under house arrest, andsecond, that no one else had any motivation to alter or remove thecar. I cannot accept the first assumption, nor do I believe thatthe police acted unreasonably in refusing to accept the second.[Footnote 2/2]

C

I believe the seizure of petitioner's automobile was valid underthe well established right of the police to seize evidence in plainview at the time and place of arrest. The majority concedes thatthe police were rightfully at petitioner's residence to make avalid arrest at

Page 403 U. S. 506

the time of the seizure. To use the majority's words, the"initial intrusion" which brought the police within plain view ofthe automobile was legitimate. The majority also concedes that theautomobile was "plainly visible both from the street and frominside the house where Coolidge was actually arrested,"ante at403 U. S. 448,and that the automobile itself was evidence which the police hadprobable cause to seize.Ante at403 U. S. 464.Indeed, the majority appears to concede that the seizure ofpetitioner's automobile was valid under the doctrine upholdingseizures of evidence in plain view at the scene of arrest, at leastas it stood before today.Ante at403 U. S.465-466, n. 24.

However, even after conceding that petitioner's automobileitself was evidence of the crime, that the police had probablecause to seize it as such, and that the automobile was in plainview at the time and place of arrest, the majority holds theseizure to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment because thediscovery of the automobile was not "inadvertent." The majorityconfidently states:

"What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the policeofficer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusionin the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece ofevidence incriminating the accused."

But the prior holdings of this Court not only fail to supportthe majority's statement, they flatly contradict it. One need lookno further than the cases cited in the majority opinion to discoverthe invalidity of that assertion.

In one of these cases,Ker v. California,374 U. S.23 (1963), the police observed the defendant'sparticipation in an illegal marihuana transaction, then went to hisapartment to arrest him. After entering the apartment, the policesaw and seized a block of marihuana as they placed the defendantunder arrest. This Court upheld that seizure on the ground that thepolice were justifiably

Page 403 U. S. 507

in the defendant's apartment to make a valid arrest, there wasno search because the evidence was in plain view, and the seizureof such evidence was authorized when incident to a lawful arrest.The discovery of the marihuana there could hardly be described as"inadvertent." [Footnote 2/3]

InMarron v. United States,275 U.S. 192 (1927), also cited by the majority, the Courtupheld the seizure of business records as being incident to a validarrest for operating an illegal retail whiskey enterprise. Therecords were discovered in plain view. I cannot say that theseizure of business records from a place of business during thecourse of an arrest for operating an illegal business was"inadvertent." [Footnote 2/4]

The majority confuses the historically justified right of thepolice to seize visible evidence of the crime in open view at thescene of arrest with the "plain view" exception

Page 403 U. S. 508

to the requirement of particular description in search warrants.The majority apparently reasons that, unless the seizure madepursuant to authority conferred by a warrant is limited to theparticularly described object of seizure, the warrant will become ageneral writ of assistance. Evidently, as a check on therequirement of particular description in search warrants, themajority announces a new rule that items not named in a warrantcannot be seized unless their discovery was unanticipated or"inadvertent." [Footnote 2/5] Themajority's concern is with the

Page 403 U. S. 509

scope of the intrusion authorized by a warrant. But the right toseize items properly subject to seizure because in open view at thetime of arrest is quite independent of any power tax search forsuch items pursuant to a warrant. The entry in the present case didnot depend for its authority on a search warrant, but wasconcededly authorized by probable cause to effect a valid arrest.The intrusion did not exceed that authority. The intrusion waslimited in scope to the circumstances which justified the entry inthe first place the arrest of petitioner. There was no generalsearch; indeed, there was no search at all. The automobile itselfwas evidence properly subject to seizure, and was in open view atthe time and place of arrest. [Footnote2/6]

Only rarely can it be said that evidence seized incident to anarrest is truly unexpected or inadvertent. Indeed, if the policeofficer had no expectation of discovering weapons, contraband, orother evidence, he would make no search. It appears to me that therule adopted by the Court today, for all practical purposes,abolishes seizure incident to arrest. The majority rejects the testof reasonableness provided in the Fourth Amendment and substitutesaper se -- rule if the police could have obtained awarrant and did not, the seizure, no matter how reasonable, isvoid. But the Fourth Amendment does not require that every searchbe made pursuant to a warrant. It prohibits only "unreasonablesearches and seizures." The relevant test is not the reasonablenessof the opportunity to procure a warrant, but the reasonableness ofthe seizure under all the circumstances. The

Page 403 U. S. 510

test of reasonableness cannot be fixed byper se rules;each case must be decided on its own facts.

For all the reasons stated above, I believe the seizure andsearch of petitioner's car was reasonable and, therefore,authorized by the Fourth Amendment. The evidence so obtainedviolated neither the Fifth Amendment, which does contain anexclusionary rule, nor the Fourth Amendment, which does not. Thejury of petitioner's peers, as conscious as we of the awesomegravity of their decision, heard that evidence and found thepetitioner guilty of murder. I cannot in good conscience upset thatverdict.

MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins MR. JUSTICE BLACK in Parts II and IIIof this opinion and in that portion of Part I thereof which is tothe effect that the Fourth Amendment supports no exclusionaryrule.

[Footnote 2/1]

There are, of course, certain searches which constitutionallycannot be authorized even with a search warrant or subpoena.See, e.g., Boyd v. United States,116 U.S. 616 (1886);Rochin v. California,342 U. S. 165,342 U. S. 174(1952) (BLACK, J., concurring);Schmerber v. California,384 U. S. 757,384 U. S. 773(1966) (BLACK, J., dissenting).

[Footnote 2/2]

The majority attempts to rely onPreston v. UnitedStates,376 U. S. 364(1964), to support its holding that the police could not searchpetitioner's automobile at the station house. But this case is notPreston, nor is it controlled byPreston. Thepolice arrested Preston for vagrancy. No claim was made that thepolice had any authority to hold his car in connection with thatcharge. The fact that the police had custody of Preston's car wastotally unrelated to the vagrancy charge for which they arrestedhim; so was their subsequent search of the car. Here, the officersarrested petitioner for murder. They seized petitioner's car asevidence of the crime for which he was arrested. Their subsequentsearch of the car was directly related to the reason petitioner wasarrested and the reason his car had been seized, and, therefore,was valid under this Court's decision inCooper v.California,386 U. S. 58(1967).

My Brother WHITE points out that the police in the present casenot only searched the car immediately upon taking it to the stationhouse, but also searched it 11 months and 14 months after seizure.We held inCooper, where the search occurred one weekafter seizure, that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by theexamination or search of a car validly held by officers for use asevidence in a pending trial. In my view, the police are entitled tosearch a car, whether detained for a week or for a year, where thatcar is being properly held as relevant evidence of the crimecharged.

[Footnote 2/3]

The facts inKer undermine the majority's attempt todistinguish it from the instant case. The arresting officer therelearned from other policemen that Ker had been observed meetingwith a known marihuana supplier. The arresting officer had receivedinformation at various times over an eight-month period that Kerwas selling marihuana from his apartment and that he was securingthis marihuana from the known supplier. The arresting officer had a"mug" photograph of Ker at the time of the arrest, and testifiedthat, for at least two months, he had received information as toKer's marihuana activities from a named informant who hadpreviously given information leading to three other arrests andwhose information was believed to be reliable. The arrestingofficer did not know whether Ker would be present at his apartmenton the night of arrest. The officer had neither an arrest nor asearch warrant. He entered Ker's apartment, placed Ker underarrest, and seized the block of marihuana in plain view in theadjoining room. This Court held that the seizure was reasonable,and therefore valid under the Fourth Amendment.

[Footnote 2/4]

The majority correctly notes,ante at403 U. S. 464,that this Court, inWarden v. Hayden,387 U.S. 294 (1967), flatly rejected the distinction forpurposes of the Fourth Amendment between "mere evidence" andcontraband, a distinction which the majority appears to me toreinstate at another point in its opinion,ante at403 U. S. 471and403 U. S.472.

[Footnote 2/5]

The cases cited by the majority simply do not support themajority's new rule. For instance, when the police inSteele v.United States,267 U. S. 498(1925), entered a warehouse under the authority of a search warrantissued on a showing of probable cause that the Prohibition Act wasbeing violated and naming "cases of whiskey" as the objects ofsearch, it can scarcely be said that their discovery and seizure ofbarrels of whiskey and bottles and bottling equipment in plain viewwere "inadvertent."

The majority states that the seizure inWarden v. Hayden,supra, was justified because the police "inadvertently" cameacross the evidence while in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect. Inthat case, the police answered the call of two witnesses who statedthat an armed robber had just held up a business. The witnessesdescribed the robber and the clothes he was wearing. They hadfollowed the robber to a particular house. The police searched thehouse and seized (1) a shotgun and a pistol found in a toilet onthe second floor; (2) ammunition for the pistol and a cap like theone worn by the robber, both found beneath the mattress in thedefendant's bedroom; and (3) a jacket and trousers of the type thefleeing man was said to have worn, found in a washing machine inthe basement. It is quite difficult for me to accept the majority'scharacterization of these discoveries as "inadvertent."

See also United States v. Lee,274 U.S. 559 (1927), another case cited by the majority, whereCoast Guard officers, with probable cause to believe that a boatwas being used to violate the Prohibition Act, shined a searchlightacross the deck and discovered illicit whiskey. The admission oftestimony regarding that discovery was upheld by this Court againsta Fourth Amendment challenge, although the discovery could hardlybe termed "inadvertent."

[Footnote 2/6]

Moreover, what a person knowingly exposes to the public is not asubject of Fourth Amendment protection.See Lewis v. UnitedStates,385 U. S. 206,385 U. S. 210(1966);United States v. Lee,274 U.S. 559,274 U. S. 563(1927);Hester v. United States,265 U. S.57 (1924).

MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, concurringand dissenting.

I would affirm the judgment. In my view, Coolidge's Pontiac waslawfully seized as evidence of the crime in plain sight, andthereafter was lawfully searched underCooper v.California,386 U. S. 58(1967). I am therefore in substantial disagreement with Parts II-Cand II-D of the Court's opinion. Neither do I agree with Part II-B,and I can concur only in the result as to Part III.

IThe Fourth Amendment commands that the public shall be secure intheir "persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonablesearches and seizures. . . ." As to persons, the overwhelmingweight of authority is that a police officer may make an arrestwithout a warrant when he has probable cause to believe thesuspect

Page 403 U. S. 511

has committed a felony. [Footnote3/1] The general rule also is that upon the lawful arrest of aperson, he and the area under his immediate control may besearched, and contraband or

Page 403 U. S. 512

evidence seized without a warrant. The right

"to search the person of the accused when legally arrested todiscover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime . . . has beenuniformly maintained in many cases."

Weeks v. United States,232 U.S. 383,232 U. S. 392(1914).Accord, Chimel v. California,395 U.S. 752 (1969).

With respect to houses and other private places, the generalrule is otherwise: a search is invalid unless made on probablecause and under the authority of a warrant specifying the area tobe searched and the objects to be seized. There are variousexceptions to the rule, however, permitting warrantless entries andlimited searches, the most recurring being the arrest without awarrant.

The case before us concerns the protection offered by the FourthAmendment to "effects" other than personal

Page 403 U. S. 513

papers or documents. It is clear that effects may not be seizedwithout probable cause, but the law as to when a warrant isrequired to validate their seizure is confused and confusing. Partof the difficulty derives from the fact that effects enjoyderivative protection when located in a house or other area withinreach of the Fourth Amendment. Under existing doctrine, effectsseized in warrantless, illegal searches of houses are fruits of aconstitutional violation, and may not be received in evidence. Butis a warrant required to seize contraband or criminal evidence whenit is found by officers at a place where they are legally entitledto be at the time? Before a person is deprived of his possession orright to possession of his effects, must a magistrate confirm thatwhat the officer has legally seen (and would be permitted totestify about, if relevant and material) is actually contraband orcriminal evidence?

The issue arises in different contexts. First, the effects maybe found on public property. Suppose police are informed thatimportant evidence has been secreted in a public park. A search ismade and the evidence found. Although the evidence was hidden,rather than abandoned, I had not thought a search warrant wasrequired for officers to make a seizure,see United States v.Lee,274 U. S. 559(1927) (boat seized on public waters); [Footnote 3/2]Hester v. United States,265 U. S. 57 (1924)(liquor seized in open field); any more than a warrant is needed toseize an automobile which is itself evidence of crime and which isfound on a public street or in a parking lot.See Cooper v.California, supra.

Second, the items may be found on the premises of a third partywho gives consent for an official search

Page 403 U. S. 514

but who has no authority to consent to seizure of anotherperson's effects.Frazier v. Cupp,394 U.S. 731 (1969), would seem to settle the validity of theseizure without a warrant as long as the search itself involves noFourth Amendment violation.

Third, the police may arrest a suspect in his home and in thecourse of a properly limited search discover evidence of crime. Theline of cases fromWeeks v. United States, supra, toHarris v. United States,331 U. S. 145(1947), had recognized the rule that, upon arrest, searches of theperson and of adjacent areas were reasonable, andHarrishad approved an incidental search of broad scope. In the next Term,however,Trupiano v. United States,334 U.S. 699 (1948), departed from theHarrisapproach. InTrupiano, officers, with probable cause toarrest, entered property and arrested the defendant while he wasoperating an illegal still. The still was seized. Time andcircumstance would have permitted the officers to secure botharrest and search warrants, but they had obtained neither. TheCourt did not disturb seizure of the person without warrant, butinvalidated seizure of the still, since the officers could have hada warrant, but did not.United States v. Rabinowitz,339 U. S. 56(1950), however, returned to the rule that the validity of searchesincident to arrest does not depend on the practicability ofsecuring a warrant. And, whileChimel v. California,supra, narrowed the permissible scope of incident searches tothe person and the immediate area within reach of the defendant, itdid not purport to reestablish theTrupiano rule thatsearches accompanying arrests are invalid if there is opportunityto get a warrant.

Finally, officers may be on a suspect's premises executing asearch warrant and, in the course of the authorized search,discover evidence of crime not covered by the warrant.Marronv. United States,275 U. S. 192

Page 403 U. S. 515

(1927), flatly held that legal presence under a warrant did notitself justify the seizure of such evidence. However, seizure ofthe same evidence was permitted, because it was found in plainsight in the course of making an arrest and an accompanying search.It is at least odd to me to permit plain-sight seizures arising inconnection with warrantless arrests, as the long line of casesending withChimel has done, or arising in the course of ahot-pursuit search for a felon,Warden v. Hayden,387 U. S. 294(1967);Hester v. United States, supra; and yet forbid thewarrantless seizure of evidence in plain sight when officers entera house under a search warrant that is perfectly valid but does notcover the items actually seized. I have my doubts that this aspectofMarron can survive later cases in this Court,particularlyZap v. United States,328 U.S. 624 (1946),vacated on other grounds, 330U.S. 800 (1947), where federal investigators seized a cancelledcheck evidencing a crime that had been observed during the courseof an otherwise lawful search.See also Stanley v.Georgia,394 U. S. 557,394 U. S. 569(1969) (STEWART, J., concurring in result).Cf. Chimel v.California, supra; Warden v. Hayden, supra; Frazier v. Cupp,supra. Apparently the majority agrees, for it lumpsplain-sight seizures in such circumstances along with othersituations where seizures are made after a legal entry.

In all of these situations, it is apparent that seizure ofevidence without a warrant is not itself an invasion either ofpersonal privacy or of property rights beyond that alreadyauthorized by law. Only the possessory interest of a defendant inhis effects is implicated. And in these various circumstances, atleast where the discovery of evidence is "inadvertent," the Courtwould permit the seizure because, it is said, "the minor peril toFourth Amendment protections" is overridden by the "major gain ineffective law enforcement" inherent in

Page 403 U. S. 516

avoiding the "needless inconvenience" of procuring a warrant.Ante at403 U. S. 467,403 U. S. 468.I take this to mean that both the possessory interest of thedefendant and the importance of having a magistrate confirm thatwhat the officer saw with his own eyes is, in fact, contraband orevidence of crime are not substantial constitutionalconsiderations. Officers in these circumstances need neither guardnor ignore the evidence while a warrant is sought. Immediateseizure is justified and reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

The Court would interpose in some or all of these situations,however, a condition that the discovery of the disputed evidence be"inadvertent." If it is "anticipated," that is, if "the police knowin advance the location of the evidence and intend to seize it,"the seizure is invalid.Id. at403 U. S.470.

I have great difficulty with this approach. Let us supposeofficers secure a warrant to search a house for a rifle. Whilestaying well within the range of a rifle search, they discover twophotographs of the murder victim, both in plain sight in thebedroom. Assume also that the discovery of the one photograph wasinadvertent, but finding the other was anticipated. The Court wouldpermit the seizure of only one of the photographs. But, in terms ofthe "minor" peril to Fourth Amendment values, there is surely nodifference between these two photographs: the interference withpossession is the same in each case, and the officers' appraisal ofthe photograph they expected to see is no less reliable than theirjudgment about the other. And, in both situations, the actualinconvenience and danger to evidence remain identical if theofficers must depart and secure a warrant. The Court, however,states that the State will suffer no constitutionally cognizableinconvenience from invalidating anticipated seizures, since it hadprobable cause to search

Page 403 U. S. 517

for the items seized and could have included them in awarrant.

This seems a punitive and extravagant application of theexclusionary rule. If the police have probable cause to search fora photograph as well as a rifle, and they proceed to seek awarrant, they could have no possible motive for deliberatelyincluding the rifle but omitting the photograph. Quite the contraryis true. Only oversight or careless mistake would explain theomission in the warrant application if the police were convincedthey had probable cause to search for the photograph. Of course,they may misjudge the facts and not realize they have probablecause for the picture, or the magistrate may find against them andnot issue a warrant for it. In either event the officers mayvalidly seize the photograph for which they had no probable causeto search, but the other photograph is excluded from evidence whenthe Court subsequently determines that the officers, after all, hadprobable cause to search for it.

More important, the inadvertence rule is unnecessary to furtherany Fourth Amendment ends, and will accomplish nothing. Police witha warrant for a rifle may search only places where rifles might be,and must terminate the search once the rifle is found; theinadvertence rule will in no way reduce the number of places intowhich they may lawfully look. So, too the areas of permissiblesearch incident to arrest are strictly circumscribed byChimel. Excluding evidence seen from within those areascan hardly be effective to operate to prevent wider, unauthorizedsearches. If the police stray outside the scope of an authorizedChimel search, they are already in violation of the FourthAmendment, and evidence so seized will be excluded; adding a secondreason for excluding evidence hardly seems worth the candle.Perhaps the Court is concerned that officers, having the

Page 403 U. S. 518

right to intrude upon private property to make arrests, will usethat right as a pretext to obtain entry to search for objects inplain sight,cf. Chimel v. California, supra, at395 U. S. 767,but, if so, such a concern is unfounded. The reason is that, underChimel, the police can enter only into those portions ofthe property into which entry is necessary to effect the arrest.Given the restrictions ofChimel, the police face asubstantial risk that, in effecting an arrest and a search incidentthereto, they will never enter into those portions of the propertyfrom which they can plainly see the objects for which they aresearching, and that, if they do not, those objects will bedestroyed before they can return and conduct a search of the entirepremises pursuant to a warrant. If the police, in fact, possessprobable cause to believe that weapons, contraband, or evidence ofcrime is in plain view on the premises, it will be far safer toobtain a search warrant than to take a chance that, in making anarrest, they will come into plain view of the object they areseeking. It is only when they lack probable cause for a search --when, that is, discovery of objects in plain view from a lawfulvantage point is inadvertent -- that entry to make an arrest might,as a practical matter, assist the police in discovering an objectfor which they could not have obtained a warrant. But the majority,in that circumstance, would uphold their authority to seize whatthey see. I thus doubt that the Court's new rule will have anymeasurable effect on police conduct. It will merely attach undueconsequences to what will most often be an unintended mistake or amisapprehension of some of this Court's probable cause decisions, afailing which, I am afraid, we all have.

By invalidating otherwise valid, plain-sight seizures whereofficers have probable cause and presumably, although the Courtdoes not say so, opportunity to secure a warrant, the Court seemsto turn in the direction of

Page 403 U. S. 519

theTrupiano rule, rejected inRabinowitz andnot revived inChimel. But it seems unsure of its ownrule.

It is careful to note that Coolidge's car is not contraband,stolen, or, in itself, dangerous. Apparently, contraband, stolen,or dangerous materials may be seized when discovered in the courseof an otherwise authorized search even if the discovery is fullyanticipated and a warrant could have been obtained. The distinctionthe Court draws between contraband and mere evidence of crime isreminiscent of the confusing and unworkable approach that I thoughtWarden v. Hayden, supra, had firmly put aside.

Neither does the Court in so many words limitChimel;on the contrary, it indicates that warrantlessChimel-typesearches will not be disturbed, even if the police "anticipate thatthey will find specific evidence during the course of such asearch."Ante at403 U. S. 482.The Court also concedes that, when an arresting officer

"comes within plain view of a piece of evidence, not concealed,although outside of the area under the immediate control of thearrestee, the officer may seize it, so long as the plain view wasobtained in the course of an appropriately limited search of thearrestee."

Id. at403 U. S. 466n. 24. Yet today's decision is a limitation onChimel,for, in the latter example, the Court would permit seizure only ifthe plain view was inadvertently obtained. If the police, that is,fully anticipate that, when they arrest a suspect as he is enteringthe front door of his home, they will find a credit card in hispocket and a picture in plain sight on the wall opposite the door,both of which will implicate him in a crime, they may, undertoday's decision, seize the credit card but not the picture. Thisis a distinction that I find to be without basis, and that theCourt makes no attempt to explain. I can therefore conclude onlythatChimel and today's holding are squarely inconsistent,and that the Court, unable to perceive

Page 403 U. S. 520

any reasoned distinction, has abandoned any attempt to findone.

The Court also fails to mention searches carried out withthird-party consent. Assume for the moment that authorities arereliably informed that a suspect, subject to arrest but not yetapprehended, has concealed specified evidence of his crime in thehouse of a friend. The friend freely consents to a search of hishouse, and accompanies the officers in the process. The evidence isfound precisely where the officers were told they would find it,and the officers proceed to seize it, aware, however, that thefriend lacks authority from the suspect to confer possession onthem. The suspect's interest in not having his possession forciblyinterfered with in the absence of a warrant from a magistrate isidentical to the interest of Coolidge, and one would accordinglyexpect the Court to deal with the question.Frazier v. Cupp,supra, indicates that a seizure in these circumstances wouldbe lawful, and the Court today neither overrules nor distinguishesFrazier; in fact, Part III of the Court's opinion, whichdiscusses the officers' receipt of Coolidge's clothing and weaponsfrom Mrs. Coolidge, implicitly approvesFrazier.

Neither does the Court indicate whether it would apply theinadvertence requirement to searches made in public places,although one might infer from its approval ofUnited States v.Lee, supra, which held admissible a chemical analysis ofbootleg liquor observed by revenue officers in plain sight, that itwould not.

Aware of these inconsistencies, the Court admits that "it wouldbe nonsense to pretend that our decision today reduces FourthAmendment law to complete order and harmony."Ante at403 U. S. 483.But it concludes that logical consistency cannot be attained inconstitutional law, and ultimately comes to rest upon its belief"that the result reached in this case is correct. . . ."Id. at403 U. S. 484.It

Page 403 U. S. 521

may be that constitutional law cannot be fully coherent, andthat constitutional principles ought not always be spun out totheir logical limits, but this does not mean that we should ceaseto strive for clarity and consistency of analysis. Here, the Courthas a ready opportunity, one way or another, to bring clarity andcertainty to a body of law that lower courts and law enforcementofficials often find confusing. Instead, without apparent reason,it only increases their confusion by clinging to distinctions thatare both unexplained and inexplicable.

IIIn the case before us, the officers had probable cause both toarrest Coolidge and to seize his car. In order to effect hisarrest, they went to his home -- perhaps the most obvious place inwhich to look for him. They also may have hoped to find his car athome and, in fact, when they arrived on the property to make thearrest, they did find the 1951 Pontiac there. Thus, even assumingthat the Fourth Amendment protects against warrantless seizuresoutside the house,but see Hester v. United States, supra,at265 U. S. 59, thefact remains that the officers had legally entered Coolidge'sproperty to effect an arrest, and that they seized the car onlyafter they observed it in plain view before them. The Court,however, would invalidate this seizure on the premise that officersshould not be permitted to seize effects in plain sight when theyhave anticipated they will see them.

Even accepting this premise of the Court, seizure of the car wasnot invalid. The majority makes an assumption that, when the policewent to Coolidge's house to arrest him, they anticipated that theywould also find the 1951 Pontiac there. In my own reading of therecord, however, I have found no evidence to support thisassumption. For all the record shows, the police, although they mayhave hoped to find the Pontiac at

Page 403 U. S. 522

Coolidge's home, did not know its exact location when they wentto make the arrest, and their observation of it in Coolidge'sdriveway was truly inadvertent. Of course, they did have probablecause to seize the car, and, if they had had a valid warrant aswell, they would have been justified in looking for it inCoolidge's driveway -- a likely place for it to be. But if the factof probable cause bars this seizure, it would also bar seizures notonly of cars found at a house, but also of cars parked in a parkinglot, hidden in some secluded spot, or delivered to the police by athird party at the police station. This would simply be a rule thatthe existence of probable cause bars all warrantless seizures.

It is evident on the facts of this case that Coolidge's Pontiacwas subject to seizure if proper procedures were employed. It isalso apparent that the Pontiac was in plain view of the officerswho had legally entered Coolidge's property to effect his arrest. Iam satisfied that it was properly seized whether or not theofficers expected that it would be found where it was. And, sincethe Pontiac was legally seized as evidence of the crime for whichCoolidge was arrested,Cooper v. California, supra,authorizes its warrantless search while in lawful custody of thepolice.

"It would be unreasonable to hold that the police, having toretain the car in their custody for such a length of time, had noright, even for their own protection, to search it. It is no answerto say that the police could have obtained a search warrant, for'[t]he relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure asearch warrant, but whether the search was reasonable.'. . . Underthe circumstances of this case, we cannot hold unreasonable underthe Fourth Amendment the examination or search of a car validlyheld by officers for use as evidence. . . ."

Cooper v. California, supra, at386 U. S.61-62.

Page 403 U. S. 523

IIIGiven the foregoing views, it is perhaps unnecessary to dealwith the other grounds offered to sustain the search of Coolidge'scar. Nonetheless, it may be helpful to explain my reasons forrelying on the plain-sight rule, rather than onChambers v.Maroney,399 U. S. 42(1970), to validate this search.

Chambers upheld the seizure and subsequent search ofautomobiles at the station house, rather than requiring the policeto search cars immediately at the places where they are found. ButChambers did not authorize indefinite detention ofautomobiles so seized; it contemplated some expedition incompleting the searches, so that automobiles could be released andreturned to their owners. In the present case, however, Coolidge'sPontiac was not released quickly, but was retained in policecustody for more than a year, and was searched not only immediatelyafter seizure, but also on two other occasions: one of them 11months and the other 14 months after seizure. Since fruits of thelater searches as well as the earlier one were apparentlyintroduced in evidence, I cannot look toChambers, andwould invalidate the later searches but for the fact that thepolice had a right to seize and detain the car not because it was acar, but because it was itself evidence of crime. It is onlybecause of the long detention of the car that I findChambers inapplicable, however, and I disagree stronglywith the majority's reasoning for refusing to apply it.

As recounted earlier, arrest and search of the person onprobable cause but without a warrant is the prevailingconstitutional and legislative rule, without regard to whether, onthe particular facts, there was opportunity to secure a warrant.Apparently, exigent circumstances are so often present in arrestsituations that it has been

Page 403 U. S. 524

deemed improvident to litigate the issue in every case.

In similar fashion, "practically since the beginning of theGovernment," Congress and the Court have recognized

"a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwellinghouse or other structure in respect of which a proper officialwarrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is notpracticable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quicklymoved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant mustbe sought."

Carroll v. United States,267 U.S. 132,267 U. S. 153(1925). As in the case of an arrest and accompanying search of aperson, searches of vehicles on probable cause but without awarrant have been deemed reasonable within the meaning of theFourth Amendment without requiring proof of exigent circumstancesbeyond the fact that a movable vehicle is involved. The rule hasbeen consistently recognized,see Cooper v. California, supra;Brinegar v. United States,338 U. S. 160(1949);Harris v. United States, supra, at390 U. S. 168(dissenting opinion);Davis v. United States,328 U.S. 582,328 U. S. 609(1946) (dissenting opinion);Scher v. United States,305 U. S. 251(1938);Husty v. United States,282 U.S. 694 (1931);United States v. Lee, supra; andwas reaffirmed less than a year ago inChambers v. Maroney,supra, where a vehicle was stopped on the highway but wassearched at the police station, there being probable cause but nowarrant.

The majority now approves warrantless searches of vehicles inmotion when seized. On the other hand, warrantless, probable causesearches of parked but movable vehicles in some situations would bevalid only upon proof of exigent circumstances justifying thesearch. Although I am not sure, it would seem that, when policediscover a parked car that they have probable cause to search, theymay not immediately search but must seek

Page 403 U. S. 525

a warrant. But if, before the warrant arrives, the car is put inmotion by its owner or others, it may be stopped and searched onthe spot or elsewhere. In the case before us, Coolidge's car,parked at his house, could not be searched without a valid warrant,although, if Coolidge had been arrested as he drove away from hishome, immediate seizure and subsequent search of the car would havebeen reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

I find nothing in the language or the underlying rationale ofthe line of cases fromCarroll toChamberslimiting vehicle searches as the Court now limits them insituations such as the one before us. Although each of those casesmay, as the Court argues, have involved vehicles or vessels inmotion prior to their being stopped and searched, each of themapproved the search of a vehicle that was no longer moving and,with the occupants in custody, no more likely to move than theunattended but movable vehicle parked on the street or in thedriveway of a person's house. In both situations, the probabilityof movement at the instance of family or friends is equally real,and hence the result should be the same whether the car is at restor in motion when it is discovered.

InHusty v. United States, supra, the police hadlearned from a reliable informant that Husty had two loads ofliquor in automobiles of particular make and description parked atdescribed locations. The officers found one of the cars parked andunattended at the indicated spot. Later, as officers watched, Hustyand others entered and started to drive away. The car was stoppedafter having moved no more than a foot or two; immediate search ofthe car produced contraband. Husty was then arrested. The Court, ina unanimous opinion, sustained denial of a motion to suppress thefruits of the search, saying that

"[t]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the search, withoutwarrant, of an automobile, for liquor illegally

Page 403 U. S. 526

transported or possessed, if the search is upon probable cause.. . ."

Id. at282 U. S. 700.Further,

"[t]he search was not unreasonable because, as petitionersargue, sufficient time elapsed between the receipt by the officerof the information and the search of the car to have enabled him toprocure a search warrant. He could not know when Husty would cometo the car or how soon it would be removed. In such circumstances,we do not think the officers should be required to speculate uponthe chances of successfully carrying out the search, after thedelay and withdrawal from the scene of one or more officers whichwould have been necessary to procure a warrant. The search was,therefore, on probable cause, and not unreasonable. . . ."

Id. at282 U. S.701.

The Court apparently citesHusty with approval asinvolving a car in motion on the highway. But it was obviouslyirrelevant to the Court that the officers could have obtained awarrant before Husty attempted to drive the car away. Equallyimmaterial was the fact that the car had moved one or two feet atthe time it was stopped. The search would have been approved evenif it had occurred before Husty's arrival, or after his arrival butbefore he had put the car in motion. The Court's attempt todistinguishHusty on the basis of the car's negligiblemovement prior to its being stopped is without force.

The Court states flatly, however, that this case is not ruled bytheCarroll-Chambers line of cases but byDyke v.Taylor Implement Mfg. Co.,391 U. S. 216(1968). There, the car was properly stopped and the occupantsarrested for reckless driving, but the subsequent search at thestation house could not be justified as incident to the arrest.See Preston v. United States,376 U.S. 364 (1964). Nor could the car itself be seized andlater searched, as it was, absent probable cause to believe itcontained evidence of crime. InDyke, it was pointedout

Page 403 U. S. 527

that probable cause did not exist at the time of the search, andwe expressly rested our holding on this fact, noting that, "[s]incethe search was not shown to have been based upon sufficient cause,"it was not necessary to reach other grounds urged for invalidatingit. 391 U.S. at391 U. S. 222.Given probable cause, however, we would have upheld the search inDyke.

For Fourth Amendment purposes, the difference between a movingand movable vehicle is tenuous, at best. It is a metaphysicaldistinction without roots in the common sense standard ofreasonableness governing search and seizure cases. Distinguishingthe case before us from theCarroll-Chambers line of casesfurther enmeshes Fourth Amendment law in litigation breedingrefinements having little relation to reality. I suggest that, inthe interest of coherence and credibility, we either overrule ourprior cases and treat automobiles precisely as we do houses orapply those cases to readily movable as well as moving vehicles,and thus treat searches of automobiles as we do the arrest of aperson. By either course, we might bring some modicum of certaintyto Fourth Amendment law and give the law enforcement officers someslight guidance in how they are to conduct themselves.

I accordingly dissent from Parts II-B, II-C, and II-D of theCourt's opinion. I concur, however, in the result reached in PartIII of the opinion. I would therefore affirm the judgment of theNew Hampshire Supreme Court.

[Footnote 3/1]

This was the common law rule. 1 J. Stephen, A History ofCriminal Law of England 193 (1883); 2 M. Hale, Historia PlacitorumCoronae 72-104 (new ed. 1800). It is also the constitutional rule.InCarroll v. United States,267 U.S. 132 (1925), the Court said that

"[t]he usual rule is that a police officer may arrest withoutwarrant one believed by the officer upon reasonable cause to havebeen guilty of a felony. . . ."

Id. at267 U. S. 156.There, in September, 1921, officers had probable cause to believethe two defendants were unlawfully transporting bootleg liquor, butthey had neither effected an immediate arrest nor sought a warrant.Several months later, they observed the two men driving on a publichighway, stopped, and searched the car and arrested the men, andthis Court sustained both the search and the arrest. So also inTrupiano v. United States,334 U.S. 699 (1948), officers were amply forewarned ofcriminal activities, and had time to seek a warrant, but did not doso. Instead, some time later, they entered on property whereTrupiano had a still and found exactly what they expected to find-- one of the defendants engaged in the distillation of bootlegliquor. His arrest without a warrant was sustained, the Courtsaying that "[t]he absence of a warrant of arrest, even thoughthere was sufficient time to obtain one, [did] not destroy thevalidity of an arrest" in the circumstances of the case.Id. at334 U. S.705.

The judgment of Congress also is that federal law enforcementofficers may reasonably make warrantless arrests upon probablecause. It has authorized such arrests by United States Marshals,agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and of the SecretService, and narcotics law enforcement officers.See Actof June 15, 1935, § 2, 49 Stat. 378, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3053;Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 1008, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3052;Act of Sept. 29, 1965, 79 Stat. 890, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3056(1964 ed., Supp. V); Act of July 18, 1956, Tit. I, § 104(a), 70Stat. 570, as amended, 26 U.S.C. § 7607(2). And, in 1951, Congressexpressly deleted from the authority to make warrantless arrests apreexisting statutory restriction barring them in the absence of alikelihood that the person would escape before a warrant could beobtained.See Act of Jan. 10, 1951, § 1, 64 Stat. 1239;S.Rep. No. 2464, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1950); H.R.Rep. No. 3228,81st Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1950);Chimel v. California,395 U. S. 752,395 U. S.776-780 (1969) (dissenting opinion).

The majority now suggests that warrantless, probable causearrests may not be made in the home absent exigent circumstances.Jones v. United States,357 U. S. 493(1958), invalidated a forcible nighttime entry to effect a searchwithout a warrant and suggested also that the particularcircumstances of the entry would have posed a serious FourthAmendment issue if the purpose of the entry had been to make anarrest. But, as a constitutional matter, the Court has never heldor intimated that all probable cause arrests without a warrant inthe home must be justified by exigent circumstances other than thenecessity for arresting a felon, or that, if the elapsed timebetween the accrual of probable cause and the making of the arrestproves sufficient to have obtained a warrant, the arrest isinvalid. On the contrary, many cases in this Court have proceededon the assumption that ordinarily warrantless arrests on probablecause may be effected even in the home.See Sabbath v. UnitedStates,391 U. S. 585(1968);Miller v. United States,357 U.S. 301,357 U. S.305-308 (1958);United States v. Rabinowitz,339 U. S. 56,339 U. S. 60(1950) (dictum);Trupiano v. United States, supra; Johnson v.United States,333 U. S. 10,333 U. S. 15(1948) (dictum). Of course, this is not to say that the time andmethod of entry could never pose serious constitutional questionsunder the Fourth Amendment.

[Footnote 3/2]

Lee permitted the revenue officers who seized the boatto take and chemically analyze bootleg liquor found aboard it andthen to testify as to the results of their analysis.