U.S. Supreme Court

Vale v. Louisiana,399 U.S.30 (1970)Vale v. Louisiana

No. 727

Argued March 4-5,1970

Decided June 22, 1970

399 U.S.30

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OFLOUISIANA

Syllabus

Police officers, possessing warrants for appellant's arrest,were watching the house where he resided. They observed what theysuspected was an exchange of narcotics between a known addict andappellant outside the house, after appellant had gone into thehouse and brought something out to the addict. They arrestedappellant at the front steps and announced that they would searchthe house. A search of the then-unoccupied house disclosednarcotics in a bedroom. The Louisiana Supreme Court, affirmingappellant's conviction for possessing heroin, held that the searchdid not violate the Fourth Amendment, as it occurred "in theimmediate vicinity of the arrest" and was "substantiallycontemporaneous therewith." Consideration by this Court of thequestion of jurisdiction was postponed to the hearing of the caseon the merits.

Held: The warrantless search of appellant's houseviolated the Fourth Amendment as made applicable to the States bythe Fourteenth Amendment. Pp.399 U. S.33-35.

(a) Even ifChimel v. California,395 U.S. 752, holding that the warrantless search of a housecan be justified as incident to a lawful arrest only if confined tothe area within the arrestee's reach, were given retroactive effect(a question not decided here), there is no precedent of this Courtto sustain the validity of this search. P.399 U. S.33.

(b) If a search of a house is to be upheld as incident to anarrest, the arrest must take place inside the house. Pp.399 U. S.33-34.

(c) A warrantless search of a dwelling is constitutionally validonly in "a few specifically established and well delineatedexceptions," none of which the State has shown here, and the searchcannot be justified solely because narcotics, which are easilydestroyed, are involved. Pp.399 U. S.34-35.

Appeal dismissed and certiorari granted; 252 La. 1056,215So. 2d 811, reversed and remanded.

Page 399 U. S. 31

MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.

The appellant, Donald Vale, was convicted in a Louisiana courton a charge of possessing heroin and was sentenced as a multipleoffender to 15 years' imprisonment at hard labor. The LouisianaSupreme Court affirmed the conviction, rejecting the claim thatevidence introduced at the trial was the product of an unlawfulsearch and seizure. 252 La. 1056,215 So. 2d811. We granted Vale's motion to proceedin formapauperis, postponed consideration of the question ofjurisdiction to the hearing of the case on the merits, and limitedreview to the search and seizure question. 396 U.S. 813.*

The evidence adduced at the pretrial hearing on a motion tosuppress showed that, on April 24, 1967, officers possessing twowarrants for Vale's arrest and having information that he wasresiding at a specified address proceeded there in an unmarked carand set up a surveillance of the house. The evidence of what thentook

Page 399 U. S. 32

place was summarized by the Louisiana Supreme Court asfollows:

"After approximately 15 minutes, the officers observed a green1958 Chevrolet drive up and sound the horn and after backing into aparking place, again blew the horn. At this juncture, Donald Vale,who was well known to Officer Brady, having arrested him twice inthe previous month, was seen coming out of the house and walk up tothe passenger side of the Chevrolet where he had a close briefconversation with the driver; and after looking up and down thestreet returned inside of the house. Within a few minutes, hereappeared on the porch, and again cautiously looked up and downthe street before proceeding to the passenger side of theChevrolet, leaning through the window. From this, the officers wereconvinced a narcotics sale had taken place. They returned to theircar and immediately drove toward Donald Vale, and, as they reachedwithin approximately three car's lengths from the accused (DonaldVale), he looked up and, obviously recognizing the officers, turnedaround, walking quickly toward the house. At the same time, thedriver of the Chevrolet started to make his get away when the carwas blocked by the police vehicle. The three officers promptlyalighted from the car, whereupon Officers Soule and Laumann calledto Donald Vale to stop as he reached the front steps of the house,telling him he was under arrest. Officer Brady, at the same time,seeing the driver of the Chevrolet, Arizzio Saucier, whom theofficers knew to be a narcotic addict, place something hurriedly inhis mouth, immediately placed him under arrest and joined hisco-officers. Because of the transaction

Page 399 U. S. 33

they had just observed they, informed Donald Vale they weregoing to search the house, and thereupon advised him of hisconstitutional rights. After they all entered the front room,Officer Laumann made a cursory inspection of the house to ascertainif anyone else was present, and, within about three minutes, Mrs.Vale and James Vale, mother and brother of Donald Vale, returnedhome carrying groceries, and were informed of the arrest andimpending search."

252 La. at. 1067-1068, 215 So. 2d at 815. (Footnote omitted.)The search of a rear bedroom revealed a quantity of narcotics.

The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the search of the housedid not violate the Fourth Amendment, because it occurred "in theimmediate vicinity of the arrest" of Donald Vale and was"substantially contemporaneous therewith. . . ." 252 La. at 1070,215 So. 2d at 816. We cannot agree. Last Term, inChimel v.California,395 U. S. 752, weheld that, when the search of a dwelling is sought to be justifiedas incident to a lawful arrest, it must constitutionally beconfined to the area within the arrestee's reach at the time of hisarrest -- "the area from within which he might gain possession of aweapon or destructible evidence." 395 U.S. at395 U. S. 763.But even ifChimel is not accorded retroactive effect -- aquestion on which we do not now express an opinion -- no precedentof this Court can sustain the constitutional validity of the searchin the case before us.

A search may be incident to an arrest "only if it issubstantially contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined tothe immediate vicinity of the arrest.'"Shipley v.California,395 U. S. 818,395 U. S. 819;Stoner v. California,376 U. S. 483,376 U. S. 486.If a search of a house is to be upheld

Page 399 U. S. 34

as incident to an arrest, that arrest must take place inside thehouse,cf. Agnello v. United States,269 U. S.20,269 U. S. 32,not somewhere outside -- whether two blocks away,James v.Louisiana,382 U. S. 36,twenty feet away,Shipley v. California, supra, or on thesidewalk near the front steps.

"Belief, however well founded, that an article sought isconcealed in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for asearch of that place without a warrant."

Agnello v. United States, supra, at269 U. S. 33.That basic rule "has never been questioned in this Court."Stoner v. California, supra, at376 U. S. 487n. 5.

The Louisiana Supreme Court thought the search independentlysupportable because it involved narcotics, which are easilyremoved, hidden, or destroyed. It would be unreasonable, theLouisiana court concluded,

"to require the officers under the facts of the case to firstsecure a search warrant before searching the premises, as time isof the essence inasmuch as the officers never know whether there isanyone on the premises to be searched who could very easily destroythe evidence."

252 La. at 1070, 215 So. 2d at 816. Such a rationale could notapply to the present case, since by their own account the arrestingofficers satisfied themselves that no one else was in the housewhen they first entered the premises. But entirely apart from thatpoint, our past decisions make clear that only in "a fewspecifically established and well delineated" situations,Katzv. United States,389 U. S. 347,389 U. S. 357,may a warrantless search of a dwelling withstand constitutionalscrutiny, even though the authorities have probable cause toconduct it. The burden rests on the State to show the existence ofsuch an exceptional situation.Chimel v. California,supra, at395 U. S. 762;United States v. Jeffers,342 U. S.48,342 U. S. 51;McDonald v. United States,335 U.S. 451,335 U. S. 456.And the record before us discloses none.

Page 399 U. S. 35

There is no suggestion that anyone consented to the search.Cf. Zap v. United States,328 U.S. 624,328 U. S. 628.The officers were not responding to an emergency.United Statesv. Jeffers, supra, at342 U. S. 52;McDonald v. United States, supra,at335 U. S. 454.They were not in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon.Warden v.Hayden,387 U. S. 294,387 U. S.298-299;Chapman v. United States,365 U.S. 610,365 U. S. 615;Johnson v. United States,333 U. S.10,333 U. S. 15.The goods ultimately seized were not in the process of destruction.Schmerber v. California,384 U. S. 757,384 U. S.770-771;United States v. Jeffers, supra; McDonaldv. United States, supra, at335 U. S. 455.Nor were they about to be removed from the jurisdiction.Chapman v. United States, supra; Johnson v. United States,supra; United States v. Jeffers, supra.

The officers were able to procure two warrants for Vale'sarrest. They also had information that he was residing at theaddress where they found him. There is thus no reason, so far asanything before us appears, to suppose that it was impracticablefor them to obtain a search warrant as well.Cf. McDonald v.United States, supra, at335 U. S.454-455;Trupiano v. United States,334 U. S. 699,334 U. S.705-706;Johnson v. United States, supra; Taylor v.United States,286 U. S. 1,286 U. S. 6;Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,282 U.S. 344,282 U. S. 358;Carroll v. United States,267 U.S. 132,267 U. S. 156;cf. Ker v. California,374 U. S. 23,374 U. S. 42(opinion of Clark, J.). We decline to hold that an arrest on thestreet can provide its own "exigent circumstance" so as to justifya warrantless search of the arrestee's house.

The Louisiana courts committed constitutional error in admittinginto evidence the fruits of the illegal search.Shipley v.California, supra, at395 U. S. 819;James v. Louisiana, supra, at382 U. S. 37;Ker v. California, supra, at374 U. S. 30-34;Mapp v. Ohio,367 U. S. 643.Accordingly, the judgment is

Page 399 U. S. 36

reversed, and the case is remanded to the Louisiana SupremeCourt for further proceedings not inconsistent with thisopinion.

It is so ordered.

MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN took no part in the consideration ordecision of this case.

* In his Notice of Appeal, Vale asserted that the LouisianaSupreme Court in affirming the conviction had relied upon a statestatute, Article 225 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure(1967), which provides in pertinent part:

"A peace officer making an arrest shall take from the personarrested all weapons and incriminating articles which he may haveabout his person."

Although the state court referred to this statute in the courseof its opinion, we do not understand its decision to be grounded onthe statute. We therefore dismiss the appeal and treat the papersas a petition for certiorari, which is hereby granted. 28 U.S.C. §2103.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins,dissenting.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibitsonly "unreasonable searches."* A warrant has never been thought tobe an absolute requirement for a constitutionally proper search.Searches, whether with or without a warrant, are to be judged bywhether they are reasonable, and, as I said, speaking for the CourtinPreston v. United States,376 U.S. 364,376 U. S.366-367 (1964), common sense dictates thatreasonableness varies with the circumstances of the search.See, e.g., Henry v. United States,361 U. S.98 (1959);Brinegar v. United States,338 U. S. 160(1949). The Louisiana Supreme Court held not only that the policeaction here was reasonable, but also that failure to conduct animmediate search would have been unreasonable. 252 La. 1056, 1070,215So. 2d 811, 816. With that view I am in complete agreement forthe following reasons.

The police, having warrants for Vale's arrest, were watching hismother's house from a short distance away. Not long after theybegan their vigil, a car arrived,

Page 399 U. S. 37

sounded its horn, and backed into a parking space near thehouse. The driver did not get out, but instead honked the car hornagain. Vale, who had been arrested twice the month before andagainst whom an indictment for a narcotics offense was thenpending, came out of his mother's house and talked to the driver ofthe car. At the conclusion of the conversation, Vale looked bothways, up and down the street, and then went back inside the house.When he reappeared, he stopped before going to the car and stood,as one of the officers testified, "[l]ooking back and forth like tosee who might be coming or who was in the neighborhood." He thenwalked to the car and leaned in.

From this behavior, the officers were convinced that a narcoticstransaction was taking place at that very moment. They drove downthe street toward Vale and the parked car. When they came within afew car lengths of the two men Vale saw them and began to walkquickly back toward the house. At the same time, the driver of thecar attempted to pull away. The police brought both parties to thetransaction to a stop. They then saw that the driver of the car wasone Saucier, a known narcotics addict. He hurriedly placedsomething in his mouth, and apparently swallowed it. The policeplaced both Vale and Saucier under arrest.

At this point, the police had probable cause to believe thatVale was engaged in a narcotics transfer, and that a supply ofnarcotics would be found in the house, to which Vale had returnedafter his first conversation, from which he had emerged furtivelybearing what the police could readily deduce was a supply ofnarcotics, and toward which he hurried after seeing the police. Butthe police did not know then who else might be in the house. Vale'sarrest took place near the house, and anyone observing from insidewould surely have been alerted to destroy the stocks of contrabandwhich

Page 399 U. S. 38

the police believed Vale had left there. The police had alreadyseen Saucier, the narcotics addict, apparently swallow what Valehad given him. Believing that some evidence had already beendestroyed and that other evidence might well be, the police werefaced with the choice of risking the immediate destruction ofevidence or entering the house and conducting a search. I cannotsay that their decision to search was unreasonable. Delay in orderto obtain a warrant would have given an accomplice just the time heneeded.

That the arresting officers did, in fact, believe that othersmight be in the house is attested to by their actions upon enteringthe door left open by Vale. The police at once checked the smallhouse to determine if anyone else was present. Just as theydiscovered the house was empty, however, Vale's mother and brotherarrived. Now what had been a suspicion became a certainty: Vale'srelatives were in possession, and knew of his arrest. To haveabandoned the search at this point and left the house with Valewould not have been the action of reasonable police officers. AsMR. JUSTICE WHITE said, dissenting inChimel v.California,395 U. S. 752,395 U. S. 775(1969):

"For the police to search the house while the evidence they hadprobable cause to search out and seize was still there cannot beconsidered unreasonable."

In my view, whether a search incident to a lawful arrest isreasonable should still be determined by the facts andcircumstances of each case.Ker v. California,374 U. S. 23,374 U. S. 34-36(1963);United States v. Rabinowitz,339 U. S.56,339 U. S. 63-64(1950). For the reasons given above, I am convinced that the searchhere was reasonable even though Vale had not yet crossed thethreshold of the house toward which he was headed.

Page 399 U. S. 39

Moreover, the circumstances here were sufficiently exceptionalto justify a search, even if the search was not strictly"incidental" to an arrest. The Court recognizes that searches toprevent the destruction or removal of evidence have long been heldreasonable by this Court.Preston v. United States, supra;McDonald v. United States,335 U. S. 451,335 U. S. 455(1948);Carroll v. United States,267 U.S. 132 (1925). Whether the "exceptional circumstances"justifying such a search exist or not is a question that may be, asit is here, quite distinct from whether or not the search wasincident to a valid arrest.See United States v. Jeffers,342 U. S. 48,342 U. S. 51(1951);Johnson v. United States,333 U. S.10 (1948). It is thus unnecessary to determine whetherthe search was valid as incident to the arrest under eitherChimel v. California, supra, or under thepre-Chimel standard as interpreted inShipley v.California,395 U. S. 818(1969). It is only necessary to find that, given Vale's arrest in aspot readily visible to anyone in the house and the probableexistence of narcotics inside, it was reasonable for the police toconduct an immediate search of the premises.

The Court, however, finds the search here unreasonable. First,the Court suggests that the contraband was not "in the process ofdestruction." None of the cases cited by the Court supports theproposition that "exceptional circumstances" exist only when theprocess of destruction has already begun. On the contrary, weimplied that those circumstances did exist when "evidence orcontraband wasthreatened with removal or destruction."Johnson v. United States, supra, at333 U. S. 15(emphasis added).See also Chapman v. United States,365 U. S. 610,365 U. S. 615(1961);Hernandez v. United States, 363 F.2d 624 (C.A. 9thCir.1965),cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1008 (1966).

Page 399 U. S. 40

Second, the Court seems to argue that the search wasunreasonable because the police officers had time to obtain awarrant. I agree that the opportunity to obtain a warrant is one ofthe factors to be weighed in determining reasonableness.Trupiano v. United States,334 U.S. 699 (1948);United States v. Rabinowitz,supra, at339 U. S. 66(BLACK, J., dissenting). But the record conclusively shows thatthere was no such opportunity here. As I noted above, once theofficers had observed Vale's conduct in front of the house, theyhad probable cause to believe that a felony had been committed andthat immediate action was necessary. At no time after the events infront of Mrs. Vale's house would it have been prudent for theofficers to leave the house in order to secure a warrant.

The Court asserts, however, that, because the police obtainedtwo warrants for Vale's arrest, there is "no reason . . . tosuppose that it was impracticable for them to obtain a searchwarrant as well." The difficulty is that the two arrest warrants onwhich the Court seems to rely so heavily were not issued because ofany present misconduct of Vale's; they were issued because the bondhad been increased for an earlier narcotics charge then pendingagainst Vale. When the police came to arrest Vale, they knew onlythat his bond had been increased. There is nothing in the record toindicate that, absent the increased bond, there would have beenprobable cause for an arrest, much less a search. Probable causefor the search arose for the first time when the police observedthe activity of Vale and Saucier in and around the house.

I do not suggest that all arrests necessarily provide the basisfor a search of the arrestee's house. In this case, there is farmore than a mere street arrest. The police also observed Vale's useof the house as a base of operations for his commercial business,his attempt to

Page 399 U. S. 41

return hurriedly to the house on seeing the officers, and theapparent destruction of evidence by the man with whom Vale wasdealing. Furthermore, the police arrival and Vale's arrest wereplainly visible to anyone within the house, and the police hadevery reason to believe that someone in the house was likely todestroy the contraband if the search were postponed.

This case raises mot graphically the question how does apoliceman protect evidence necessary to the State if he must leavethe premises to get a warrant, allowing the evidence he seeks to bedestroyed. The Court's answer to that question makes unnecessarilydifficult the conviction of those who prey upon society.

* The Fourth Amendment says:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but uponprobable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularlydescribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things tobe seized."