U.S. Supreme Court

Trupiano v. United States,334U.S. 699 (1948)Trupiano v. UnitedStates

No. 427

Argued March 9,1948

Decided June 14, 1948

334U.S. 699

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OFAPPEALS

FOR THE THIRDCIRCUIT

Syllabus

Federal agents who had known for at least three weeks that abuilding on a farm was being used for illicit distilling made anight-time raid thereon without a warrant of arrest or a searchwarrant. They were led onto the farm and to the building by theowner, who was an informer. Through an open door, they saw one ofthe petitioners engaged in illicit distilling. An agent entered,arrested him, and seized the contraband apparatus and material. Theother petitioners were arrested later. Charged with violations offederal revenue laws, they moved to suppress the evidence as havingbeen obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the FederalConstitution.

Held:

1. The arrest was lawful as an arrest of a person who wascommitting a felony in the discernible presence of a lawenforcement officer at a place where the officer was lawfullypresent. Pp.334 U. S.700-705.

(a) The absence of a warrant of arrest, even though there wassufficient time to obtain one, does not invalidate an arrest underthese circumstances. P.334 U. S.705.

2. The seizure of the contraband property was in violation ofthe Fourth Amendment, and not justified as incident to the lawfularrest. Pp.334 U. S.705-710.

(a) In the circumstances of this case, there was no excuse forfailure to obtain a search warrant. Pp.334 U. S.705-706,334 U. S.708.

(b) The fact that the property actually seized was contraband,which doubtless would have been described in a warrant had oneissued, does not legalize the seizure. P.334 U. S.707.

(c) The proximity of the contraband property to the arrestedperson at the moment of his arrest was a fortuitous circumstanceinadequate to legalize the seizure. Pp.334 U. S.707-708.

(d) The presence or absence of an arrestee at the exact time andplace of a foreseeable and anticipated seizure does not determinethe validity of that seizure if it occurs without a warrant. P.334 U. S.708.

(e) The mere fact that there is a valid arrest does notipsofacto legalize a search or seizure without a warrant. P.334 U. S.708.

Page 334 U. S. 700

(f)Harris v. United States,331 U.S. 145, distinguished;Taylor v. United States,286 U. S. 1,followed. Pp.334 U. S.708-709.

3. Petitioners were entitled to have the unlawfully seizedproperty suppressed as evidence; but, since the property wascontraband, they were not entitled to have it returned to them. P.334 U. S.710.

163 F.2d 828, reversed.

Petitioners, charged with violations of federal revenue laws,moved to suppress certain evidence alleged to have been illegallyobtained. An order of the District Court denying the motion, 70 F.Supp. 764, was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 163 F.2d828. This Court granted certiorari. 332 U.S. 841.Reversed, p.334 U. S.710.

MR. JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case adds another chapter to the body of law growing out ofthe Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. ThatAmendment provides:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but uponprobable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularlydescribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things tobe seized."

In other words, the Fourth Amendment is a recognition of thefact that, in this nation, individual liberty depends in large partupon freedom from unreasonable intrusion by those in authority. Itis the duty of this Court to give effect to that freedom.

Page 334 U. S. 701

In January, 1946, the petitioners sought to lease part of theKell farm in Monmouth County, New Jersey, and to erect a buildingthereon. Kell suspected that they intended to build and operate anillegal still. He accordingly reported the matter to theappropriate federal authority, the Alcohol Tax Unit of the Bureauof Internal Revenue. The federal agents told Kell to accept theproposition, provided he did nothing to entice or encourage thepetitioners into going ahead with their plans and provided he keptthe agents informed of all developments. Nilsen, one of the agents,was assigned in February to work on the farm in the disguise of a"dumb farm hand" and to accept work at the still if petitionersshould offer it.

Toward the end of March, 1946, Kell agreed with petitioners tolet them rent part of his farm for $300 a month. Kell and Nilsenassisted petitioners in the erection of the building, a roughlyconstructed barn about 200 yards from the Kell farmhouse. Nilsonalso assisted in the erection of the still and the vats.

Operation of the still began about May 13, 1946. Nilsenthereafter worked as "mash man" at a salary of $100 a week, whichhe turned over to the Government. During this period, he was inconstant communication with his fellow agents. By prearrangement,he would meet one or more of the agents at various places within afew miles of the Kell farm; at these meetings, "the conversationwould be about the still building I had assisted in erecting orabout the illicit distillery that I was working at on the Kellfarm." On May 20, he met with one of his superior officers and gavehim samples of alcohol, several sugar bags, a yeast wrapper and anempty five-gallon can which had been taken from the stillpremises.

On May 26, Nilsen received a two-way portable radio set from hissuperiors. He used this set to transmit frequent bulletins on theactivities of the petitioners. On

Page 334 U. S. 702

the basis of radio intelligence supplied by Nilsen, a truckloadof alcohol was seized on May 31 about an hour after it had left thefarm.

At about 9 p.m. in the evening of June 3, 1946, Nilsen radioedhis superior that the still operators were awaiting the arrival ofa load of sugar, and that alcohol was to be taken from the farmwhen the sugar truck arrived. Nilsen apparently knew then that araid was scheduled for that night, for he told Kell during theevening that "tonight is the night." He radioed at 11 p.m. that thetruck had been delayed but that petitioners Roett and Antoniolewere at the still.

Three federal agents then drove to within three miles of thefarm, at which point they were met by Kell. The remainder of thedistance was traversed in Kell's automobile. They arrived at thefarm at about 11:45 p.m. The agents stated that the odor offermenting mash and the sound of a gasoline motor were noticeableas the car was driven onto the farm premises; the odor becamestronger and the noise louder as they alighted from the car andapproached the building containing the still. Van De Car, one ofthe agents, went around one end of the building. Looking through anopen door into a dimly lighted interior, he could see a stillcolumn, a boiler and gasoline pump in operation. He also sawAntoniole bending down near the pump. He entered the building andplaced Antoniole under arrest. Thereupon he "seized the illicitdistillery."

After this arrest and seizure, Van De Car looked about furtherand observed a large number of five-gallon cans which he laterfound to contain alcohol and some vats which contained fermentingmash. Another agent, Casey, testified that he could see several ofthese cans through the open door before he entered; he subsequentlycounted the cans and found that there were 262 of them. After heentered, he saw the remainder of the distillery

Page 334 U. S. 703

equipment, including four large mash vats. The third agent,Gettel, proceeded to a small truck standing in the yard and"searched it thoroughly for papers and things of an evidentiarynature." It does not appear whether he was successful in his searchor whether he took anything from the truck.

A few minutes later, Roett was arrested outside the building.Petitioners Trupiano and Riccardelli apparently were arrested laterthat night by other agents, the place and the circumstances notbeing revealed by the record before us. In addition, three otherpersons were arrested that night because of their connections withthe illegal operations; one of them, who was unknown to Nilsen, wasarrested when he arrived at the farm with a truck loaded withcoke.

The agents engaged in this raid without securing a searchwarrant or warrants of arrest. It is undenied that they had morethan adequate opportunity to obtain such warrants before the raidoccurred, various federal judges and commissioners being readilyavailable.

All of the persons arrested were charged with various violationsof the Internal Revenue Code arising out of their ownership andoperation of the distillery. Prior to the return of an indictmentagainst them, the four petitioners filed in the District Court forthe District of New Jersey a motion alleging that the federalagents had illegally seized "a still, alcohol, mash and otherequipment," and asking that "all such evidence" be excluded andsuppressed at any trial, and that "all of the aforesaid property"be returned. The District Court denied the motion after a hearing,holding that the seizure was reasonable, and hence constitutional.70 F. Supp. 764. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuitaffirmed per curiam the order of the District Court. 163 F.id 828.Thus, we have a case where contraband property was seized byfederal agents without a search warrant under

Page 334 U. S. 704

circumstances where such a warrant could easily have beenobtained. The Government, however, claims that the failure tosecure the warrant has no effect upon the validity of the seizure.Reference is made to the well established right of law enforcementofficers to arrest without a warrant for a felony committed intheir presence,Carroll v. United States,267 U.S. 132,267 U. S.156-157, a right said to be unaffected by the fact thatthere may have been adequate time to procure a warrant of arrest.Since one of the petitioners, Antoniole, was arrested while engagedin operating an illegal still in the presence of agents of theAlcohol Tax Unit, his arrest was valid under this view even thoughit occurred without the benefit of a warrant. And since this arrestwas valid, the argument is made that the seizure of the contrabandopen to view at the time of the arrest was also lawful. Reliance ishere placed on the long line of cases recognizing that an arrestingofficer may look around at the time of the arrest and seize thosefruits and evidences of crime or those contraband articles whichare in plain sight and in his immediate and discernible presence.Weeks v. United States,232 U. S. 383,232 U. S. 392;Carroll v. United States, supra,267 U. S. 158;Agnello v. United States,269 U. S.20,269 U. S. 30;United States v. Lee,274 U. S. 559,274 U. S. 563;Marron v. United States,275 U. S. 192,275 U. S.198-199;Go-Bart Importing Co. v. UnitedStates,282 U. S. 344,282 U. S. 358;United States v. Lefkowitz,285 U.S. 452,285 U. S. 465;Harris v. United States,331 U. S. 145,331 U. S.150-151.

We sustain the Government's contention that the arrest ofAntoniole was valid. The federal agents had more than adequatecause, based upon the information supplied by Nilsen, to suspectthat Antoniole was engaged in felonious activities on the farmpremises. Acting on that suspicion, the agents went to the farm andentered onto the premises with the consent of Kell, the owner.There, Antoniole was seen through an open doorway by one of theagents to be operating an illegal still, an act

Page 334 U. S. 705

felonious in nature. His arrest was therefore valid on thetheory that he was committing a felony in the discernible presenceof an agent of the Alcohol Tax Unit, a peace officer of the UnitedStates. The absence of a warrant of arrest, even though there wassufficient time to obtain one, does not destroy the validity of anarrest under these circumstances. Warrants of arrest are designedto meet the dangers of unlimited and unreasonable arrests ofpersons who are not at the moment committing any crime. Thosedangers, obviously, are not present where a felony plainly occursbefore the eyes of an officer of the law at a place where he islawfully present. Common sense then dictates that an arrest in thatsituation is valid despite the failure to obtain a warrant ofarrest.

But we cannot agree that the seizure of the contraband propertywas made in conformity with the requirements of the FourthAmendment. It is a cardinal rule that, in seizing goods andarticles, law enforcement agents must secure and use searchwarrants wherever reasonably practicable.Carroll v. UnitedStates, supra,267 U. S. 156;Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, supra,282 U. S. 358;Taylor v. United States,286 U. S. 1,286 U. S. 6;Johnson v. United States,333 U. S.10,333 U. S. 14-15.This rule rests upon the desirability of having magistrates, ratherthan police officers, determine when searches and seizures arepermissible and what limitations should be placed upon suchactivities.United States v. Lefkowitz, supra,285 U. S. 464.In their understandable zeal to ferret out crime, and in theexcitement of the capture of a suspected person, officers are lesslikely to possess the detachment and neutrality with which theconstitutional rights of the suspect must be viewed. To provide thenecessary security against unreasonable intrusions upon the privatelives of individuals, the framers of the Fourth Amendment requiredadherence to judicial processes wherever possible. And subsequenthistory has confirmed the wisdom of that requirement.

Page 334 U. S. 706

The facts of this case do not measure up to the foregoingstandard. The agents of the Alcohol Tax Unit knew every detail ofthe construction and operation of the illegal distillery longbefore the raid was made. One of them was assigned to work on thefarm along with the illicit operators, making it possible for himto secure and report the minutest facts. In cooperation with thefarm owner, who served as an informer, this agent was in a positionto supply information which could easily have formed the basis fora detailed and effective search warrant. Concededly, there was anabundance of time during which such a warrant could have beensecured, even on the night of the raid after the odor and noise ofthe distillery confirmed their expectations. And the property wasnot of a type that could have been dismantled and removed beforethe agents had time to secure a warrant; especially is this sosince one of them was on hand at all times to report and guardagainst such a move.See United States v. Kaplan, 89 F.2d869, 871.

What was said inJohnson v. United States, supra,333 U. S. 15, isequally applicable here:

"No reason is offered for not obtaining a search warrant exceptthe inconvenience to the officers and some slight delay necessaryto prepare papers and present the evidence to a magistrate. Theseare never very convincing reasons, and, in these circumstances,certainly are not enough to bypass the constitutional requirement.. . . If the officers in this case were excused from theconstitutional duty of presenting their evidence to a magistrate,it is difficult to think of a case in which it should berequired."

And so, when the agents of the Alcohol Tax Unit decided todispense with a search warrant and to take matters into their ownhands, they did precisely what the Fourth Amendment was designed tooutlaw. Uninhibited by any limitations that might have beencontained in a warrant, they descended upon the distillery in amidnight

Page 334 U. S. 707

raid. Nothing circumscribed their activities on that raid excepttheir own good senses, which the authors of the Amendment deemedinsufficient to justify a search or seizure except in exceptionalcircumstances not here present. The limitless possibilitiesafforded by the absence of a warrant were epitomized by the oneagent who admitted searching "thoroughly" a small truck parked inthe farmyard for items of an evidentiary character. The fact thatthey actually seized only contraband property, which woulddoubtless have been described in a warrant had one been issued,does not detract from the illegality of the seizure.See Amosv. United States,255 U. S. 313;Byars v. United States,273 U. S. 28;Taylor v. United States, supra.

Moreover, the proximity of the contraband property to the personof Antoniole at the moment of his arrest was a fortuitouscircumstance which was inadequate to legalize the seizure. As wehave seen, the existence of this property and the desirability ofseizing it were known to the agents long before the seizure, andformed one of the main purposes of the raid. Likewise, the arrestof Antoniole and the other petitioners in connection with theillicit operations was a foreseeable event motivating the raid. Butthe precise location of the petitioners at the time of their arresthad no relation to the foreseeability or necessity of the seizure.The practicability of obtaining a search warrant did not turn uponwhether Antoniole and the others were within the distillerybuilding when arrested, or upon whether they were then engaged inoperating the illicit equipment. Antoniole just happened to beworking amid the contraband surroundings at 11:45 p.m. on the nightin question, while the other three petitioners chanced to besomeplace else. But Antoniole might well have been outside thebuilding at that particular time. If that had been the case and hehad been arrested in the farmyard, the entire argument advanced

Page 334 U. S. 708

by the Government in support of the seizure without warrantwould collapse. We do not believe that the applicability of theFourth Amendment to the facts of this case depends upon such afortuitous factor as the precise location of Antoniole at the timeof the raid.

In other words, the presence or absence of an arrestee at theexact time and place of a foreseeable and anticipated seizure doesnot determine the validity of that seizure if it occurs without awarrant. Rather, the test is the apparent need for summary seizure,a test which clearly is not satisfied by the facts before us.

A search or seizure without a warrant as an incident to a lawfularrest has always been considered to be a strictly limited right.It grows out of the inherent necessities of the situation at thetime of the arrest. But there must be something more in the way ofnecessity than merely a lawful arrest. The mere fact that there isa valid arrest does notipso facto legalize a search orseizure without a warrant.Carroll v. United States,supra,267 U. S. 158.Otherwise, the exception swallows the general principle, making asearch warrant completely unnecessary wherever there is a lawfularrest. And so there must be some other factor in the situationthat would make it unreasonable or impracticable to require thearresting officer to equip himself with a search warrant. In thecase before us, however, no reason whatever has been shown why thearresting officers could not have armed themselves during all theweeks of their surveillance of the locus with a duly obtainedsearch warrant -- no reason, that is, except indifference to thelegal process for search and seizure which the Constitutioncontemplated.

We do not take occasion here to reexamine the situation involvedinHarris v. United States, supra. The instant caserelates only to the seizure of contraband the existence and precisenature and location of which the law enforcement officers wereaware long before making the lawful arrest. That circumstance waswholly lacking in the

Page 334 U. S. 709

Harris case, which was concerned with the permissiblescope of a general search without a warrant as an incident to alawful arrest. Moreover, theHarris case dealt with theseizure of Government property which could not have been thesubject of a prior search warrant, it having been foundunexpectedly during the course of a search. In contrast, thecontraband seized in this case could easily have been specified ina prior search warrant. These factual differences may or may not beof significance so far as general principles are concerned. But thedifferences are enough to justify confining ourselves to theprecise facts of this case, leaving it to another day to test theHarris situation by the rule that search warrants are tobe obtained and used wherever reasonably practicable.

What we have here is a set of facts governed by a principleindistinguishable from that recognized and applied inTaylor v.United States, supra. The Court there held that the seizure ofillicit whiskey was unreasonable, however well grounded thesuspicions of the federal agents, where there was an abundantopportunity to obtain a search warrant and to proceed in anorderly, judicial way. True, theTaylor case did notinvolve a seizure in connection with an arrest. And the officersthere made an unlawful entry onto the premises. But those factorshad no relation to the practicability of obtaining a search warrantbefore making the seizure. It was the time element and theforeseeability of the need for a search and seizure that made thewarrant essential. TheTaylor case accordingly makes plainthe illegality of the seizure in the instant proceeding.

The Fourth Amendment was designed to protect both the innocentand the guilty from unreasonable intrusions upon their right ofprivacy while leaving adequate room for the necessary processes oflaw enforcement. The people of the United States insisted onwriting the Fourth Amendment into the Constitution because sadexperience had taught them that the right to search and

Page 334 U. S. 710

seize should not be left to the mere discretion of the police,but should, as a matter of principle, be subjected to therequirement of previous judicial sanction wherever possible. Theeffective operation of government, however, could hardly beembarrassed by the requirement that arresting officers who havethree weeks or more within which to secure the authorization ofjudicial authority for making search and seizure should secure suchauthority and not be left to their own discretion as to what is tobe searched and what is to be seized. Such a requirement partakesof the very essence of the orderly and effective administration ofthe law.

It is a mistake to assume that a search warrant in thesecircumstances would contribute nothing to the preservation of therights protected by the Fourth Amendment. A search warrant mustdescribe with particularity the place to be searched and the thingsto be seized. Without such a warrant, however, officers are free todetermine for themselves the extent of their search and the preciseobjects to be seized. This is no small difference. It is adifference upon which depends much of the potency of the right ofprivacy. And it is a difference that must be preserved even wherecontraband articles are seized in connection with a validarrest.

It follows that it was error to refuse petitioners' motion toexclude and suppress the property which was improperly seized. Butsince this property was contraband, they have no right to have itreturned to them.

Reversed.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE VINSON, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR.JUSTICE REED and MR. JUSTICE BURTON concur, dissenting.

Federal officers, following a lawful arrest, seized contrabandmaterials which were being employed in open view in violation anddefiance of the laws of the land.

Page 334 U. S. 711

Today, the Court for the first time has branded such a seizureillegal. Nothing in the explicit language of the Fourth Amendmentdictates that result. Nor is that holding supported by any decisionof this Court.

The material facts are not in dispute. In January, 1946, certainof the petitioners approached one Kell offering to rent a portionof the latter's farm on which a building was to be erected. Hissuspicions aroused, Kell reported the matter to agents of theAlcohol Tax Unit of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. He was advisedthat the offer could be accepted provided that nothing was done toentice petitioners into completion of their plans. An agent,Nilsen, was assigned to the farm to act the part of a farm hand inthe employ of Kell.

Ultimately, an agreement was entered into whereby Kell rented aportion of his farm to petitioners at $300 a month. Petitioners,with the assistance of Kell and Nilsen, constructed a barn-likestructure some two hundred yards from the farmhouse. A still andvats were installed. After the still began operation, Nilsen actedas a "mash man" receiving a salary of $100 a week from petitioners.All sums received by Nilsen were turned over t the FederalGovernment.

Throughout this period, Nilsen reporter regularly to hissuperiors. As a result of this information, federal agents, on May31, 1946, seized a truckload of alcohol about an hour after it hadleft the Kell farm.

The night of June 3, 1946, was chosen by the agents to conducttheir raid. Kell cooperated fully with the officers and drove threeof the agents to the farm in his own car. As the car entered thefarm premises, the odor of fermenting mash and the sound of agasoline motor became apparent. When the agents alighted from thecar, it was obvious that the sound and the odor were emanating fromthe building in which the still was located. One of the agentsapproached the structure and, through an

Page 334 U. S. 712

open door, observed a still and a boiler. He also saw thepetitioner Antoniole bending over a gasoline pump. The agententered the building and placed Antoniole under arrest on thetheory that a crime was being committed in his presence.Subsequently, the agent seized the still, mash vats containingfermenting mash, other distillery equipment, and 262 five-galloncans containing illicit alcohol. Neither the arrest nor the seizurewas effected under the authority of a warrant. Later, six otherpersons were arrested, including three of the petitioners in thiscase. [Footnote 1]

There can be no doubt that the activities of petitioners were inflagrant violation of the laws of the United. [Footnote 2] It is clear also that the materialsseized consisted of instrumentalities used by petitioners in theircriminal enterprise and contraband goods, possession of which is acrime. The materials and objects falling into the control of thefederal agents, therefore, were of the type properly subject tolawful seizure. [Footnote3]

Further, it is obvious that entry of the federal agents onto thefarm premises was in no sense trespassory or otherwise illegal.Amos v. United States,255 U. S. 313(1921);Byars v. United States,273 U. S.28 (1927).

Page 334 U. S. 713

Kell, the owner of the farm, gave his active consent to theentry. Indeed, he voluntarily drove three of the agents to thepremises in his own car.

Nor can there be doubt that the arrest of the petitionerAntoniole while engaged in the commission of a felony in thepresence of the agent was a valid arrest. The majority of the Courtexplicitly concedes such to be the fact. Under the English commonlaw, a police officer had power without a warrant to arrest personscommitting a misdemeanor in the officer's presence and persons whomthe officer had reasonable cause to believe had committed a felony.This rule, which had its origin in the ancient formative period ofthe common law, was firmly established at the time of the adoptionof the Fourth Amendment. [Footnote4] Since that time, it has received general application bystate and federal courts. [Footnote5] Indeed, this Court has heretofore given specific recognitionto the rule.Carroll v. United States,267 U.S. 132,267 U. S.156-157 (1925). [Footnote 6]

Thus, even though agents charged with enforcement of the laws ofthe United States made a lawful entry onto the farm, and despitethe fact that a valid arrest was made of a party who was in the actof committing a felony, the Court now holds that the arrestingofficer, in the absence of a search warrant, was powerless to makea valid seizure of contraband materials located in plain sight inthe structure in which the arrest took place. And this despite thelong line of decisions in this Court recognizing as consistent withthe restrictions of the Fourth Amendment the power of lawenforcement officers

Page 334 U. S. 714

to make reasonable searches and seizures as incidents to lawfularrests.

InAgnello v. United States,269 U. S.20,269 U. S. 30(1925), this Court stated:

"The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to searchpersons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search theplace where the arrest is made in order to find and seize thingsconnected with the crime . . . as well as weapons and other thingsto effect an escape from custody, is not to be doubted. . . . Suchsearches and seizures naturally and usually appertain to and attendsuch arrests. [Footnote 7]"

And see Weeks v. United States,232 U.S. 383,232 U. S. 392(1914);Carroll v. United States, supra, at267 U. S. 158;United States v. Lee,274 U. S. 559,274 U. S. 563(1927);Marron v. United States,275 U.S. 192,275 U. S.198-199 (1927);Go-Bart Importing Co. v. UnitedStates,282 U. S. 344,282 U. S. 358(1931);United States v. Lefkowitz,285 U.S. 452,285 U. S. 465(1932);Harris v. United States,331 U.S. 145,331 U. S.150-151,331 U. S. 168,331 U. S. 186(1947).

The validity of the search and seizure as incident to a lawfularrest has been based upon a recognition by this Court that, wherelaw enforcement agents have lawfully gained entrance into premisesand have executed a valid arrest of the occupant, the vital rightsof privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment are not denied byseizure of contraband materials and instrumentalities of crime inopen view or such as may be brought to light by a reasonablesearch. Here, there can be no objection to the scope or intensityof the search.Cf. Marron v. United States, supra; Go-BartImporting Co. v. United States, supra; United States v. Lefkowitz,supra; Harris v. United States, supra. The seizure was notpreceded by an exploratory search. The objects seized were in plainsight. To insist upon the use of a search warrant in situationswhere the issuance of such a warrant can contribute nothing to thepreservation of the rights which

Page 334 U. S. 715

the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect, serves only toopen an avenue of escape for those guilty of crime and to menacethe effective operation of government which is an essentialprecondition to the existence of all civil liberties.

In reaching its result, the Court relies onTaylor v. UnitedStates,286 U. S. 1 (1932).There, federal agents broke into a garage and seized a quantity ofillicit liquor. At the time of entry, "No one was within the place,and there was no reason to think otherwise."Id. at286 U. S. 5. Theagents acted without the authority of a search warrant, nor, unlikethe present case, was lawful entry into the building made for thepurpose of effecting a valid arrest. Under these circumstances, theCourt ruled that the seizure was unlawful. But to apply thatholding in a situation like the present, where law enforcementofficers have entered a building to arrest a party openly engagedin the commission of a felony, is to disregard the very basis uponwhich theTaylor case was decided.

We are told, however, that, although the petitioner Antoniolewas arrested while undeniably engaged in the commission of afelony, his presence in the building in which the contrabandmaterials were located was a "fortuitous circumstance which wasinadequate to legalize the seizure." We should suppose that anyarrest of a party engaged in the commission of a felony is based inpart upon an element of chance. Criminals do not normally choose toengage in felonious enterprises before an audience of policeofficials. We may well anticipate the perplexity of officersengaged in the practical business of law enforcement whenconfronted with a rule which makes the validity of a seizure ofcontraband materials as an incident to a lawful arrest dependentupon subsequent judicial judgment as to the "fortuitous"circumstances relating to the presence of the party arrested on thepremises in which the illegal goods are located.

Page 334 U. S. 716

Nor are we free to assume that the agents in this case wouldhave proceeded illegally to seize the materials in the barn in theabsence of the justification of a valid arrest. A lawful seizure isnot to be invalidated by speculations as to what the conduct of theagents might have been had a different factual situation beenpresented.

The case ofJohnson v. United States,333 U. S.10 (1948), does not support the result which the Courthas reached. For there, the majority of the Court held that thearrest in question was an invalid one. Obviously, a search andseizure may not be held valid on the sole ground that it was anincident to an invalid arrest. Such is not the situation here.

InCarroll v. United States, supra, at267 U. S. 149,this Court observed:

"The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of whatwas deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted,and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as theinterests and rights of individual citizens."

We believe that the result reached today is not consistent withjudicial authority as it existed before the adoption of the FourthAmendment, nor as it has developed since that time. Nor do we feelthat the decision commends itself as adapted to conserve vitalpublic and individual interests. Heretofore, it has been thoughtthat where officers charged with the responsibility of enforcementof the law have lawfully entered premises and executed a validarrest, a reasonable accommodation of the interests of society andthe individual permits such officials to seize instrumentalities ofthe crime and contraband materials in open view of the arrestingofficer. The Court would now condition this right of seizure aftera valid arrest upon anex post facto judicial judgment ofwhether the arresting officers might have obtained a searchwarrant. At best, the operation of the rule which the Court todayenunciates for the first time may be expected to confound confusionin a field already replete with complexities.

[Footnote 1]

Subsequently, petitioners moved the District Court to order thereturn of the property seized and to suppress its use as evidence.70 F. Supp. 764 (1947). The motion was denied. The order wasaffirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals in a per curiam statement.163 F.2d 828 (1947).

[Footnote 2]

See §§ 2803, 2810, 2812, 2814, 2831, 2833 of theInternal Revenue Code.

[Footnote 3]

Boyd v. United States,116 U.S. 616,116 U. S.623-624 (1886);Weeks v. United States,232 U. S. 383,232 U. S.392-393 (1914);Gouled v. United States,255 U. S. 298,255 U. S. 309(1921);Carroll v. United States,267 U.S. 132,267 U. S.149-150 (1925);Agnello v. United States,269 U. S. 20,269 U. S. 30(1925);;Marron v. United States,275 U.S. 192,275 U. S. 199(1927);United States v. Lefkowitz,285 U.S. 452,285 U. S.465-466 (1932);Harris v. United States,331 U. S. 145,331 U. S. 154(1947)

[Footnote 4]

Samuel v. Payne, 1 Doug.K.B. 359 (1780);Wakely v.Hart, 6 Bin. 316 (1814).And see 2 Hale, Pleas of theCrown 85-97; 4 Blackstone, Commentaries 292-293; Wilgus, ArrestWithout a Warrant, 22 Mich.L.Rev. 541, 673.

[Footnote 5]

United States v. Daison, 288 F. 199 (1923);Rohanv. Sawin, 5 Cush. 281 (1850);Wade v. Chaffee, 8 R.I.224 (1865).

[Footnote 6]

Cf. Kurtz v. Moffitt,115 U. S. 487,115 U. S.498-499 (1885).

[Footnote 7]

And see id. at269 U. S. 32-33.