U.S. Supreme Court

Pierce v. Society of Sisters,268U.S. 510 (1925)Pierce v. Society ofSisters

Nos. 583, 584

Argued March 16, 17,1925

Decided June 1, 1925

268U.S. 510

APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OFTHE UNITED STATES

FOR THE DISTRICT OFOREGON

Syllabus

1. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governmentsof this Union rest excludes any general power of the State tostandardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction frompublic teachers only. P.268 U. S.535.

2. The Oregon Compulsory Education Act (Oreg. Ls., § 5259)which, with certain exemptions, requires every parent, guardian orother person having control of a child between the ages of eightand sixteen years to send him to the public school in the districtwhere he resides, for the period during which the school is heldfor the current year, is an unreasonable interference with theliberty of the parents and guardians to direct the upbringing ofthe children, and in that respect violates the FourteenthAmendment. P.268 U. S.534.

3. In a proper sense, it is true that corporations cannot claimfor themselves the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,and, in general, no person in any business has such an interest inpossible customers as to enable him to restrain exercise of properpower by the State upon the ground that he will be deprived ofpatronage;

4. But where corporations owning and conducting schools arethreatened with destruction of their business and property throughthe improper and unconstitutional compulsion exercised by thisstatute upon parents and guardians, their interest is direct andimmediate, and entitles them to protection by injunction.Truaxv. Raich,239 U. S. 33. P.268 U. S.535.

5. The Act, being intended to have general application, cannotbe construed in its application to such corporations as an exerciseof power to amend their charters.Berea College v.Kentucky,211 U. S. 45. P.268 U. S.535.

6. Where the injury threatened by an unconstitutional statute ispresent and real before the statute is to be effective, andwill

Page 268 U. S. 511

become irreparable if relief be postponed to that time, a suitto restrain future enforcement of the statute is not premature. P.268 U. S. 536.

296 Fed. 928, affirmed.

APPEALS from decrees of the District Court granting preliminaryinjunctions restraining the Governor, and other officials, of theState of Oregon from threatening or attempting to enforce anamendment to the school law -- an initiative measure adopted by thepeople November 7, 1922, to become effective in 1926 -- requiringparents and others having control of young children to send them tothe primary schools of the State. The plaintiffs were two Oregoncorporations owning and conducting schools.

Page 268 U. S. 529

MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.

These appeals are from decrees, based upon undenied allegations,which granted preliminary orders restraining

Page 268 U. S. 530

appellants from threatening or attempting to enforce theCompulsory Education Act* adopted November7, 1922, under the initiative provision of her Constitution by thevoters of Oregon. Jud.Code, § 266. They present the same points oflaw; there are no controverted questions of fact. Rights said to beguaranteed by the federal Constitution were specially set up, andappropriate prayers asked for their protection.

The challenged Act, effective September 1, 1926, requires everyparent, guardian or other person having control or charge orcustody of a child between eight and sixteen years to send him "toa public school for the period of time a public school shall beheld during the current year" in the district where the childresides, and failure so to do is declared a misdemeanor. Thereare

Page 268 U. S. 531

exemptions not specially important here -- for children who arenot normal, or who have completed he eighth grade, or who reside atconsiderable distances from any public school, or whose parents orguardians hold special permits from the County Superintendent. Themanifest purpose is to compel general attendance at public schoolsby normal children, between eight and sixteen, who have notcompleted the eighth grade. And without doubt enforcement of thestatute would seriously impair, perhaps destroy, the profitablefeatures of appellees' business and greatly diminish the value oftheir property.

Appellee, the Society of Sisters, is an Oregon corporation,organized in 1880, with power to care for orphans, educate andinstruct the youth, establish and maintain academies or schools,and acquire necessary real and personal

Page 268 U. S. 532

property. It has long devoted its property and effort to thesecular and religious education and care of children, and hasacquired the valuable good will of many parents and guardians. Itconducts interdependent primary and high schools and juniorcolleges, and maintains orphanages for the custody and control ofchildren between eight and sixteen. In its primary schools, manychildren between those ages are taught the subjects usually pursuedin Oregon public schools during the first eight years. Systematicreligious instruction and moral training according to the tenets ofthe Roman Catholic Church are also regularly provided. All coursesof study, both temporal and religious, contemplate continuity oftraining under appellee's charge; the primary schools are essentialto the system and the most profitable. It owns valuable buildings,especially constructed and equipped for school purposes. Thebusiness is remunerative -- the annual income from primary schoolsexceeds thirty thousand dollars -- and the successful conduct ofthis requires long-time contracts with teachers and parents. TheCompulsory Education Act of 1922 has already caused the withdrawalfrom its schools of children who would otherwise continue, andtheir income has steadily declined. The appellants, publicofficers, have proclaimed their purpose strictly to enforce thestatute.

After setting out the above facts, the Society's bill allegesthat the enactment conflicts with the right of parents to chooseschools where their children will receive appropriate mental andreligious training, the right of the child to influence theparents' choice of a school, the right of schools and teacherstherein to engage in a useful business or profession, and isaccordingly repugnant to the Constitution and void. And, further,that, unless enforcement of the measure is enjoined thecorporation's business and property will suffer irreparableinjury.

Appellee, Hill Military Academy, is a private corporationorganized in 1908 under the laws of Oregon, engaged

Page 268 U. S. 533

in owning, operating and conducting for profit an elementary,college preparatory and military training school for boys betweenthe ages of five and twenty-one years. The average attendance isone hundred, and the annual fees received for each student amountto some eight hundred dollars. The elementary department is dividedinto eight grades, as in the public schools; the collegepreparatory department has four grades, similar to those of thepublic high schools; the courses of study conform to therequirements of the State Board of Education. Military instructionand training are also given, under the supervision of an Armyofficer. It owns considerable real and personal property, someuseful only for school purposes. The business and incident goodwill are very valuable. In order to conduct its affairs, long timecontracts must be made for supplies, equipment, teachers andpupils. Appellants, law officers of the State and County, havepublicly announced that the Act of November 7, 1922, is valid, andhave declared their intention to enforce it. By reason of thestatute and threat of enforcement, appellee's business is beingdestroyed and its property depreciated; parents and guardians arerefusing to make contracts for the future instruction of theirsons, and some are being withdrawn.

The Academy's bill states the foregoing facts and then allegesthat the challenged Act contravenes the corporation's rightsguaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and that, unless appellantsare restrained from proclaiming its validity and threatening toenforce it, irreparable injury will result. The prayer is for anappropriate injunction.

No answer was interposed in either cause, and, after propernotices, they were heard by three judges (Jud.Code § 266) onmotions for preliminary injunctions upon the specifically allegedfacts. The court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteedappellees against the

Page 268 U. S. 534

deprivation of their property without due process of lawconsequent upon the unlawful interference by appellants with thefree choice of patrons, present and prospective. It declared theright to conduct schools was property, and that parents andguardians, as a part of their liberty, might direct the educationof children by selecting reputable teachers and places. Also, thatthese schools were not unfit or harmful to the public, and thatenforcement of the challenged statute would unlawfully deprive themof patronage, and thereby destroy their owners' business andproperty. Finally, that the threats to enforce the Act wouldcontinue to cause irreparable injury, and the suits were notpremature.

No question is raised concerning the power of the Statereasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise andexamine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that allchildren of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall beof good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certainstudies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, andthat nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the publicwelfare.

The inevitable practical result of enforcing the Act underconsideration would be destruction of appellees' primary schools,and perhaps all other private primary schools for normal childrenwithin the State of Oregon. These parties are engaged in a kind ofundertaking not inherently harmful, but long regarded as useful andmeritorious. Certainly there is nothing in the present records toindicate that they have failed to discharge their obligations topatrons, students or the State. And there are no peculiarcircumstances or present emergencies which demand extraordinarymeasures relative to primary education.

Under the doctrine ofMeyer v. Nebraska,262 U.S. 390, we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardiansto direct the upbringing and education of children

Page 268 U. S. 535

under their control: as often heretofore pointed out, rightsguaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislationwhich has no reasonable relation to some purpose within thecompetency of the State. The fundamental theory of liberty uponwhich all governments in this Union repose excludes any generalpower of the State to standardize its children by forcing them toaccept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not themere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct hisdestiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognizeand prepare him for additional obligations.

Appellees are corporations, and therefore, it is said, theycannot claim for themselves the liberty which the FourteenthAmendment guarantees. Accepted in the proper sense, this is true.Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs,203 U.S. 243,203 U. S. 255;Western Turf Association v. Greenberg,204 U.S. 359,204 U. S. 363.But they have business and property for which they claimprotection. These are threatened with destruction through theunwarranted compulsion which appellants are exercising over presentand prospective patrons of their schools. And this court has gonevery far to protect against loss threatened by such action.Truax v. Raich,239 U. S. 33;Truax v. Corrigan,257 U. S. 312;Terrace v. Thompson,263 U. S. 197.

The courts of the State have not construed the Act, and we mustdetermine its meaning for ourselves. Evidently it was expected tohave general application, and cannot be construed as though merelyintended to amend the charters of certain private corporations, asinBerea College v. Kentucky,211 U. S.45. No argument in favor of such view has beenadvanced.

Generally it is entirely true, as urged by counsel, that noperson in any business has such an interest in possible customersas to enable him to restrain exercise of proper power of the Stateupon the ground that he will be deprived

Page 268 U. S. 536

of patronage. But the injunctions here sought are not againstthe exercise of any proper power. Plaintiffs asked protectionagainst arbitrary, unreasonable and unlawful interference withtheir patrons and the consequent destruction of their business andproperty. Their interest is clear and immediate, within the ruleapproved inTruax v. Raich, Truax v. Corrigan andTerrace v. Thompson, supra, and many other cases whereinjunctions have issued to protect business enterprises againstinterference with the freedom of patrons or customers.HitchmanCoal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell,245 U.S. 229;Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,254 U. S. 443;American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central TradesCouncil,257 U. S. 184;Nebraska District v. McKelvie,262 U.S. 404;Truax v. Corrigan, supra, and casesthere cited.

The suits were not premature. The injury to appellees waspresent and very real, not a mere possibility in the remote future.If no relief had been possible prior to the effective date of theAct, the injury would have become irreparable. Prevention ofimpending injury by unlawful action is a well recognized functionof courts of equity. The decrees below are

Affirmed.

*

"Be it Enacted by the People of the State ofOregon:"

"Section 1. That Section 5259, Oregon Laws, be and the same ishereby amended so as to read as follows:"

"Sec. 5259.Children Between the Ages of Eight and SixteenYears -- Any parent, guardian or other person in the State ofOregon, having control or charge or custody of a child under theage of sixteen years and of the age of eight years or over at thecommencement of a term of public school of the district in whichsaid child resides, who shall fail or neglect or refuse to sendsuch child to a public school for the period of time a publicschool shall be held during the current year in said district,shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and each day's failure to sendsuch child to a public school shall constitute a separate offense;provided, that, in the following cases, children shall not berequired to attend public schools:"

"(a)Children Physically Unable -- Any child who isabnormal, subnormal or physically unable to attend school."

"(b)Children Who Have Completed the Eighth Grade --Any child who has completed the eighth grade, in accordance withthe provisions of the state course of study."

"(c)Distance from school -- Children between the agesof eight and ten years, inclusive, whose place of residence is morethan one and one-half miles, and children over ten years of agewhose place of residence is more than three miles, by the nearesttraveled road, from public school; provided, however, that, iftransportation to and from school is furnished by the schooldistrict, this exemption shall not apply."

"(d)Private Instruction -- Any child who is beingtaught for a like period of time by the parent or private teachersuch subjects as are usually taught in the first eight years in thepublic school; but before such child can be taught by a parent or aprivate teacher, such parent or private teacher must receivewritten permission from the county superintendent, and suchpermission shall not extend longer than the end of the currentschool year. Such child must report to the county schoolsuperintendent or some person designated by him at least once everythree months and take an examination in the work covered. If, aftersuch examination, the county superintendent shall determine thatsuch child is not being properly taught, then the countysuperintendent shall order the parent, guardian or other person, tosend such child to the public school the remainder of the schoolyear."

"If any parent, guardian or other person having control orcharge or custody of any child between the ages of eight andsixteen years shall fail to comply with any provision of thissection, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, onconviction thereof, be subject to a fine of not less than $5, normore than $100, or to imprisonment in the county jail not less thantwo nor more than thirty days, or by both such fine andimprisonment in the discretion of the court."

"This Act shall take effect and be and remain in force from andafter the first day of September, 1926."