U.S. Supreme Court

Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles,262U.S. 700 (1923)Rindge Company v. County of LosAngeles

No. 237

Argued April 26, 1923

Decided June 11, 1923

262U.S. 700

ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OFAPPEAL, SECOND APPELLATE

DISTRICT, DIVISION ONE, OF THESTATE OF CALIFORNIA

Syllabus

1. Whether a use for which private property is taken is publicor private is a judicial question the determination of which isinfluenced by local conditions, and this Court, while enforcing theFourteenth Amendment, should keep in view the diversity of suchconditions, and regard with great respect the judgment of statecourts upon what should be deemed public uses. P.262 U. S.705.

2. It is not essential that the entire community, or even aconsiderable portion, should directly enjoy an improvement in orderto constitute a public use. P.262 U. S.706.

3. A taking of land for a highway extension is a taking for apublic use, even though the extension he wholly within the tract ofa single landowner and terminate at his boundaries and connect withno public road save at its beginning, if it be susceptible ofpresent use not only by those gaining access from the highway, butby persons living on or adjacent to the tract with access byprivate ways, and of future use by those living beyond itsterminus, through future road construction. P.262 U. S.706.

4. A highway may be legally laid out extending to a state orcounty line even though there be at the time no connecting highwayin

Page 262 U. S. 701

the adjoining state or county in reasonable anticipation offuture connections and future public use. P.262 U. S.707.

5. Public use of a road is not limited to its use as a merebusiness necessity or ordinary convenience, but includes its use asa scenic highway for the public enjoyment, recreation, and health.P.262 U. S.707.

6. The necessity for appropriating private property for a publicuse is a legislative question which may be determined by amunicipality to which the legislature has delegated the power, andthe Fourteenth Amendment does not entitle the owner to a hearingbefore the determination is made. P.262 U. S.708.

53 Cal. App. 166 affirmed.

Error to judgments of the District Court of Appeal of Californiawhich affirmed judgments condemning private lands as countyhighways.

MR. JUSTICE SANFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.

This record includes two cases which were tried together in thestate courts and have been heard together here.

The writs of error are brought to review judgments of theDistrict Court of Appeal affirming judgments of the Superior Courtof Los Angeles County, California, condemning lands of theplaintiffs in error for use by the county as public highways, whichthey insist have deprived them of their property without dueprocess of law and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.[Footnote 1]

Page 262 U. S. 702

The two fundamental questions involved are whether the uses forwhich these lands have been taken are public uses authorized by lawand whether the taking was necessary to such uses.

Section 1238 of the California Code of Civil Procedure includes"highways" among the "public uses" for which the right of eminentdomain may be exercised. Section 1241, as amended in 1913, providesthat, before property can be taken, it must appear that the use towhich it is to be applied is one authorized by law and that thetaking is necessary to such use, provided,inter alia,that when the legislative body of a county has, by resolutionadopted by vote of two-thirds of its members, found and determinedthat the public interest and necessity require the construction bythe county of any proposed public improvement located within itslimits and that designated property is necessary therefor, suchresolution shall be "conclusive evidence" of the public necessityfor such improvement, that such property is necessary therefor, andthat such improvement is located in the manner most compatible withthe greatest public good and the least private injury. Stats. 1913,p. 549.

The plaintiffs in error are the owners of a large tract of landlying on the shore of the Pacific Ocean, known as the Malibu Ranch,extending in an easterly and westerly direction about twenty-twomiles and varying in width from one-half mile to one and one-halfmiles. It lies at the base of a high and rugged mountain rangewhich parallels the shore at a distance of from three to fourmiles, its northern line extending along the slope and foothills ofthis mountain range, and is traversed by many ridges andintervening canyons leading from the mountains toward the shore. Itlies about ten miles west of Santa Monica, one of the principalcities of Los Angeles County, situated on the coast to thesouthwest of the City of Los Angeles, and is mainly in Los AngelesCounty, but extends

Page 262 U. S. 703

about a mile and a half into Ventura County, the adjoiningcounty on the west. It is traversed lengthwise by a private road ofthe ranch owners which was formerly used by farmers and settlersliving north of the ranch on the slope of the mountains and west ofthe ranch in Ventura County, but which has been for several yearsclosed by the ranch owners to the public. [Footnote 2]

In 1916 and 1917, the Board of Supervisors, the legislative bodyof Los Angeles County, without notice to the ranch owners, adopted,by the required vote, two resolutions declaring that the publicinterest and necessity required the construction of the twohighways now in controversy "for public highway purposes" and thatit was necessary for such "public uses" that the lands includedtherein be acquired by the county, and directing that condemnationproceedings be instituted for such purposes. One of these proposedhighways, which is known in the record as the "main road,"commences at the eastern boundary of the ranch, where it connectswith and forms a continuation of a much traveled public countyhighway running along the shore of the ocean from Santa Monica, andextends lengthwise through the ranch in a westerly direction to theVentura County line, where it terminates within the boundaries ofthe ranch. The other is a branch from this main road, extending tothe northern boundary of the ranch, where it terminates. There areno connecting public roads either at the western termination of themain road or the northern termination of the branch road.

These condemnation proceedings were thereupon instituted in theSuperior Court of the County. They were

Page 262 U. S. 704

vigorously resisted by the ranch owners, who denied the county'sright of condemnation. Certain special defenses which theyinterposed, alleging that the main road would furnish no way ofnecessity or convenience for public use or travel, were strickenout by the court. Upon a preliminary trial as to the right ofcondemnation, the trial judge, after the resolutions of the Boardhad been introduced in evidence by the county, ruled that, whilethey were not conclusive evidence of the matters specified in theproviso to § 1241 of the Code, they wereprima facieevidence thereof. And the ranch owners then, without objection orlimitation, introduced a large mass of evidence in support of allof their defenses, including the matters which had been alleged inthe special defenses that had been stricken out, and a large massof rebuttal evidence was then introduced by the county, thetestimony on both sides relating to all the matters which had beenor now are in issue in the cases.

The trial judge reviewed the evidence and, manifestly withoutreference to any presumption arising under his ruling as to theprima facie evidence furnished by the resolutions, decidedall the questions submitted in favor of the county, and madespecific findings that the public interest and necessity requiredthe acquisition of these public highways; that the use to whichthey were to be applied was authorized by law; that they wouldafford accommodation to the traveling public, and that they werelocated as required. Thereafter, the amount of landowners'compensation and damages having been determined by a jury, as towhich no question is made, judgments condemning these lands forpublic highways were entered.

On appeals taken by the ranch owners, the District Court ofAppeal held that the taking of the property for these highways wasfor a public use; that the proviso to § 1241 of the Code was notobnoxious to any provision of

Page 262 U. S. 705

the state or federal constitutions, and under it the resolutionswere conclusive evidence of the matters specified; that, in anyevent, the ranch owners had not been prejudiced by the rulings ofthe trial court as to the effect of this proviso, as they had beenpermitted to introduce full and complete evidence on thesesubjects, and that they had not been prejudiced by the striking outof their special defenses not only because the resolutions wereconclusive evidence that the taking was necessary, but also becauseevery material issue tendered by these special defenses wasotherwise raised by the pleadings, and they had been permitted tooffer evidence touching every matter contained therein, and itthereupon sustained the findings of the trial court and affirmedthe judgments of condemnation.Los Angeles county v. RindgeCo., 53 Cal. App. 166.

The ranch owners urge here, in substance, that the use for whichtheir property was taken was not a public use authorized by law,and their special defenses raising this question as to the mainroad were erroneously stricken out; that their property was takenwithout any public necessity, and, the proviso to § 1241 of theCode purporting to make the resolutions conclusive evidence thereofbeing in violation of the state constitution and of the FourteenthAmendment and constituting neither conclusive norprimafacie evidence, the burden of disproving this public necessitywas erroneously cast upon them, and that, in consequence, thejudgments of condemnation deprived them of their property inviolation of the due process and equal protection clauses of theFourteenth Amendment.

1.Authorized Public Use. The nature of a use, whetherpublic or private, is ultimately a judicial question. However, thedetermination of this question is influenced by local conditions,and this Court, while enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, shouldkeep in

Page 262 U. S. 706

view the diversity of such conditions and regard with greatrespect the judgments of state courts upon what should be deemedpublic uses in any state.Fallbrook Irrigation District v.Bradley,164 U. S. 112,164 U. S.158-160;Hairston v. Danville Railway,208 U. S. 598,208 U. S.606-607. That a taking of property for a highway is ataking for public use has been universally recognized from timeimmemorial. The California Code specifically declares "highways" tobe "public uses" for which the right of eminent domain may beexercised. Here, the Board of Supervisors, familiar with localconditions, has declared these highways to be for public uses, andthe local and appellate state courts have likewise held them to befor public uses authorized by law.

The ranch owners concede that a genuine highway, in fact adaptedas a way of convenience or necessity for public use and travel, isa public use. Their real contention is that these particular roads,while called highways, are "highways" in name merely -- that is,that they are shams under the name of public improvements, whichcannot, in fact furnish ways of convenience or necessity to thetraveling public. This argument is based upon the fact that theyextend through the ranch alone, the main road terminating withinits boundaries, and connect with no other public roads at theirwestern and northern ends. These roads will, however, be open tothe general public to such extent as it can and may use it. Thepeople to the eastward in Santa Monica, Los Angeles, and othercities will have access to them and to the people living on theranch through the connecting road from Santa Monica. The peopleliving on the ranch will have egress over them. The people livingnorth of the terminus of the crossroad, who now have no adequateoutlet, will have access to it through private roads and ways, andmay then travel over these two roads to Los Angeles and othercities for marketing produce and other purposes, and the

Page 262 U. S. 707

people in these cities will have reciprocal access to them forpurposes of trade and otherwise. It is not essential that theentire community, nor even any considerable portion, shoulddirectly enjoy or participate in an improvement in order toconstitute a public use.Fallbrook Irrigation District v.Bradley, supra, p.164 U. S. 161.In like manner, if Ventura County should hereafter extend the mainroad to the western end of the ranch, the people living beyond it,who now have no practical outlet, would be furnished a similarmeans of egress, with reciprocal ingress to them by the peopleliving in the cities to the east. A highway can be legally laid outterminating at a state line even though there be no connectinghighway in the adjoining state and no definite official action hasbeen taken to establish such connection highway; otherwise, greatembarrassment and difficulty would be experienced in establishinghighways across state lines.Rice v. Rindge, 53 N.H. 530,531. So as to county highways. Public road systems, it is manifest,must frequently be constructed in installments, especially whereadjoining counties are involved. In determining whether the takingof property is necessary for public use, not only the presentdemands of the public, but those which may be fairly anticipated inthe future may be considered.Central Pacific Railway v.Feldman, 152 Cal. 303, 309.

But, aside from these considerations, these roads, especiallythe main road, through its connection with the public road comingalong the shore from Santa Monica, will afford a highway forpersons desiring to travel along the shore to the county line, witha view of the ocean on the one side and of the mountain range onthe other, constituting, as stated by the trial judge, a scenichighway of great beauty. Public uses are not limited, in the modernview, to matters of mere business necessity and ordinaryconvenience, but may extend to matters of public health,recreation, and enjoyment. Thus, the condemnation

Page 262 U. S. 708

of lands for public parks is now universally recognized as ataking for public use.Shoemaker v. United States,147 U. S. 282,147 U. S. 297.A road need not be for a purpose of business to create a publicexigency; air, exercise, and recreation are important to thegeneral health and welfare; pleasure travel may be accommodated aswell as business travel, and highways may be condemned to places ofpleasing natural scenery.Higginson v. Nahant, 11 Allen(Mass.) 530, 536. The Riverside Drive in New York is as essentiallya highway for public use as Broadway; the Speedway in this city asPennsylvania Avenue. And manifestly, in these days of generalpublic travel in motor cars for health and recreation, such ahighway as this, extending for more than twenty miles along theshores of the Pacific at the base of a range of mountains, must beregarded as a public use.

For these reasons, we conclude that these highways will, asfound by the trial judge, afford accommodation to the travelingpublic, and that the taking of land for them is a taking for apublic use authorized by the laws of California.

The ranch owners were not prejudiced by the action of the trialcourt in striking out their special defenses in this behalf, since,under the general issues, they were entitled, as held by theDistrict Court of Appeal, and were in fact permitted, to introduceall their evidence bearing upon this question.

2.Public necessity for the taking. We necessarilyaccept as a matter of state law the holding of the District Courtof Appeal that the proviso to § 1241 of the Code made theresolutions of the Board of Supervisors conclusive evidence as tothe necessity of taking these particular highways and the othermatters therein specified. So construed it, was held by that courtnot to be objectionable to any provision of the state or federalconstitutions. By this we are controlled so far as theprovisions

Page 262 U. S. 709

of the state constitutions are concerned.FallbrookIrrigation District v. Bradley, supra, p.164 U. S. 155;Georgia Railway v. Town of Decatur, ante,262 U. S. 432.And, so construed, this statute is not in conflict with theFourteenth Amendment either because it fails to provide for ahearing by the landowners before such resolution is adopted orotherwise. The necessity for appropriating private property forpublic use is not a judicial question. This power resides in thelegislature, and may either be exercised by the legislature ordelegated by it to public officers.

"Where the intended use is public, the necessity and expediencyof the taking may be determined by such agency and in such mode asthe state may designate. They are legislative questions no matterwho may be charged with their decision, and a hearing thereon isnot essential to due process in the sense of the FourteenthAmendment."

Bragg v. Weaver,251 U. S. 57,251 U. S.58.

"That the necessity and expediency of taking property for publicuse is a legislative, and not a judicial, question is not open todiscussion. . . . Neither is it any longer open to question in thisCourt that the legislature may confer upon a municipality theauthority to determine such necessity for itself. . . . Thequestion is purely political, does not require a hearing, and isnot the subject of judicial inquiry."

Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence, ante,262 U. S. 668. Andclearly the fact that the resolutions are made conclusive evidenceby the statute only when adopted by a two-thirds vote and asapplied to an improvement lying within the county does notconstitute an unjust or unreasonable classification.

And, since the resolutions were conclusive evidence as to thenecessity for the taking of these public highways, the ranch ownerswere not prejudiced by the ruling of the trial judge which treatedthem asprima facie evidence merely, and allowed them fullopportunity to introduce their evidence upon the subject. Alitigant can

Page 262 U. S. 710

be heard to question the validity of a statute only when andinsofar as it is applied to his disadvantage.Dahnke-Walker Co.v. Bondurant,257 U. S. 282,257 U. S.289.

We therefore conclude that the property of the ranch owners hasbeen taken for highways constituting a public use authorized bylaw, and upon a public necessity for the taking duly established,and that they have not been deprived of their property in violationof the Fourteenth Amendment. The judgments of the district court ofAppeal are accordingly

Affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND took no part in the consideration ordecision of this case.

[Footnote 1]

After these judgments of affirmance, petitions to have the casesheard and determined by the Supreme Court of California were deniedby that court.

[Footnote 2]

There has been much litigation between the ranch owners and thecounty and federal authorities as to the public use of roads andways across this ranch, in which, prior to these proceedings, theranch owners have been successful. In this litigation areUnited States v. Rindge, 208 F. 611, andPeople v.Rindge, 174 Cal. 743.