U.S. Supreme Court
Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc. v.United States,251U.S. 385 (1920)Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc. v.United StatesNo. 358Argued December 12,1919Decided January 26,1920251U.S. 385ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THEUNITED STATESFOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEWYORKSyllabusThe Fourth Amendment protects a corporation and its officersfrom compulsory production of the corporate books and papers foruse in a criminal proceeding against them when the information uponwhich the subpoenas were framed was derived by the Governmentthrough a previous unconstitutional search and seizure, planned andexecuted by its officials under color of a void writ, provided thedefense of the Amendment be seasonably interposed, and not firstraised as a collateral issue at the trial of the indictment. P.
251 U. S.391.The rights of a corporation against unlawful search and seizureare to be protected even if it be not protected by the FifthAmendment from compulsory production of incriminating documents. P.
251 U. S.362.Reversed.The case is stated in the opinion.
Page 251 U. S. 390MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.This is a writ of error brought to reverse a judgment of theDistrict Court fining the Silverthorne Lumber Company two hundredand fifty dollars for contempt of court and ordering Frederick W.Silverthorne to be imprisoned until he should purge himself of asimilar contempt. The contempt in question was a refusal to obeysubpoenas and an order of Court to produce books and documents ofthe company before the grand jury to be used in regard to allegedviolation of the statutes of the United States by the saidSilverthorne and his father. One ground of the refusal was that theorder of the Court infringed the rights of the parties under theFourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.The facts are simple. An indictment upon a single specificcharge having been brought against the two Silverthornes mentioned,they both were arrested at their homes early in the morning ofFebruary 25, and were detained in custody a number of hours. Whilethey were thus detained, representatives of the Department ofJustice and the United States marshal, without a shadow ofauthority, went to the office of their company and made a cleansweep of all the books, papers and documents found there. All theemployes were taken or directed to go to the office of the DistrictAttorney of the United States, to which also the books, &c.,were taken at once. An application, was made as soon as might be tothe District
Page 251 U. S. 391Court for a return of what thus had been taken unlawfully. Itwas opposed by the District Attorney so far as he had foundevidence against the plaintiffs in error, and it was stated thatthe evidence so obtained was before the grand jury. Color had beengiven by the District Attorney to the approach of those concernedin the act by an invalid subpoena for certain documents relating tothe charge in the indictment then on file. Thus, the case is notthat of knowledge acquired through the wrongful act of a stranger,but it must be assumed that the Government planned or at all eventsratified, the whole performance. Photographs and copies of materialpapers were made, and a new indictment was framed based upon theknowledge thus obtained. The District Court ordered a return of theoriginals, but impounded the photographs and copies. Subpoenas toproduce the originals then were served, and, on the refusal of theplaintiffs in error to produce them, the Court made an order thatthe subpoenas should be complied with, although it had found thatall the papers had been seized in violation of the parties'constitutional rights. The refusal to obey this order is thecontempt alleged. The Government now, while in form repudiating andcondemning the illegal seizure, seeks to maintain its right toavail itself of the knowledge obtained by that means whichotherwise it would not have had.The proposition could not be presented more nakedly. It is that,although, of course, its seizure was an outrage which theGovernment now regrets, it may study the papers before it returnsthem, copy them, and then may use the knowledge that it has gainedto call upon the owners in a more regular form to produce them;that the protection of the Constitution covers the physicalpossession, but not any advantages that the Government can gainover the object of its pursuit by doing the forbidden act.
Weeks v. United States,232 U. S. 383, tobe sure, had established that laying the papers directly before thegrand jury was
Page 251 U. S. 392unwarranted, but it is taken to mean only that two steps arerequired instead of one. In our opinion, such is not the law. Itreduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words.
232 U. S. 232U.S. 393. The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition ofevidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquiredshall not be used before the Court, but that it shall not be usedat all. Of course, this does not mean that the facts thus obtainedbecome sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained froman independent source they may be proved like any others, but theknowledge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be used by itin the way proposed. The numerous decisions, like
Adams v. NewYork,192 U. S. 585,holding that a collateral inquiry into the mode in which evidencehas been got will not be allowed when the question is raised forthe first time at the trial, are no authority in the presentproceeding, as is explained in
Weeks v. United States,232 U. S. 383,
232 U. S. 394,
232 U. S. 395.Whether some of those decisions have gone too far or have givenwrong reasons it is unnecessary to inquire; the principleapplicable to the present case seems to us plain. It is statedsatisfactorily in
Flagg v. United States, 233 Fed.Rep.481, 483. In
Linn v. United States, 251 Fed.Rep. 476, 480,it was thought that a different rule applied to a corporation, onthe ground that it was not privileged from producing its books andpapers. But the rights of a corporation against unlawful search andseizure are to be protected even if the same result might have beenachieved in a lawful way.
Judgment reversed.THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE PITNEY dissent.