U.S. Supreme Court

Weeks v. United States,232U.S. 383 (1914)Weeks v. UnitedStates

No. 461

Argued December 2, 3,1913

Decided February24,1914

232U.S. 383

ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THEUNITED STATES

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OFMISSOURI

Syllabus

Under the Fourth Amendment, Federal courts and officers areunder such limitations and restraints in the exercise of theirpower and authority as to forever secure the people, their persons,houses, papers and effects against all unreasonable searches andseizures under the guise of law.

The protection of the Fourth Amendment reaches all alike,whether accused of crime or not; and the duty of giving it forceand effect is obligatory on all entrusted with the enforcement ofFederal laws.

The tendency of those executing Federal criminal laws to obtainconvictions by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessionsin violation of Federal rights is not to be sanctioned by thecourts which are charged with the support of constitutionalrights.

The Federal courts cannot, as against a seasonable applicationfor their return, in a criminal prosecution, retain for thepurposes of evidence against the accused his letters andcorrespondence seized in his house during his absence and withouthis authority by a United States marshal holding no warrant for hisarrest or for the search of his premises.

While the efforts of courts and their officials to bring theguilty to punishment are praiseworthy, they are not to be aided bysacrificing the great fundamental rights secured by theConstitution.

While an incidental seizure of incriminating papers, made in theexecution of a legal warrant, and their use as evidence, may bejustified, and a collateral issue will not be raised to ascertainthe source of competent evidence,Adams v. New York,192 U. S. 585,that rule does not justify the retention of letters seized inviolation of the protection given by the Fourth Amendment where anapplication in the cause for their return has been made by theaccused before trial.

The court has power to deal with papers and documents in thepossession of the District Attorney and other officers of the courtand to direct their return to the accused if wrongfully seized.

Where letters and papers of the accused were taken from hispremises by an official of the United States, acting under color ofoffice but

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without any search warrant and in violation of theconstitutional rights of accused under the Fourth Amendment, and aseasonable application for return of the letters and papers hasbeen refused and they are used in evidence over his objection,prejudicial error is committed, and the judgment should bereversed.

The Fourth Amendment is not directed to individual misconduct ofstate officers. Its limitations reach the Federal Government andits agencies.Boyd v. United States,116 U.S. 616.

The facts, which involve the validity under the Fourth Amendmentof a verdict and sentence and the extent to which the privatepapers of the accused taken without search warrant can be used asevidence against him, are stated in the opinion.

Page 232 U. S. 386

MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the court:

An indictment was returned against the plaintiff in error,defendant below, and herein so designated, in the district court ofthe United States for the western district of Missouri, containingnine counts. The seventh count, upon which a conviction was had,charged the use of the mails for the purpose of transportingcertain coupons or tickets representing chances or shares in alottery or gift enterprise, in violation of § 213 of the CriminalCode. Sentence of fine and imprisonment was imposed. This writ oferror is to review that judgment.

The defendant was arrested by a police officer, so far as therecord shows, without warrant, at the Union Station in Kansas City,Missouri, where he was employed by an express company. Other policeofficers had gone to the house of the defendant, and being told bya neighbor where the key was kept, found it and entered the house.They searched the defendant's room and took possession of variouspapers and articles found there, which were afterwards turned overto the United States marshal. Later in the same day, policeofficers returned with the marshal, who thought he might findadditional evidence and, being admitted by someone in the house,probably a boarder, in response to a rap, the marshal searched thedefendant's room and carried away certain letters and envelopsfound in the drawer of a chiffonier. Neither the marshal nor thepolice officer had a search warrant.

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The defendant filed in the cause before the time for trial thefollowing petition:

"Petition to Return Private Papers, Books, and OtherProperty."

"Now comes defendant and states that he is a citizen andresident of Kansas City, Missouri, and that he resides, owns, andoccupies a home at 1834 Penn street in said city:"

"That, on the 21st day of December, 1911, while plaintiff wasabsent at his daily vocation, certain officers of the government,whose names are to plaintiff unknown, unlawfully and withoutwarrant or authority so to do, broke open the door to plaintiff'ssaid home and seized all of his books, letters, money, papers,notes, evidences of indebtedness, stock, certificates, insurancepolicies, deeds, abstracts, and other muniments of title, bonds,candies, clothes, and other property in said home, and this inviolation of §§ 11 and 23 to the Constitution of Missouri, and ofthe 4th and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the UnitedStates;"

"That the district attorney, marshal, and clerk of the UnitedStates court for the western district of Missouri took theabove-described property so seized into their possession, and havefailed and refused to return to defendant portion of same,to-wit:"

"One (1) leather grip, value about $7; one (1) tin box valued at$3; one (1) Pettis county, Missouri, bond, value $500; three (3)mining stock certificates which defendant is unable to moreparticularly describe, valued at $12,000; and certain stockcertificates in addition thereto, issued by the San Domingo Mining,Loan, & Investment Company; about $75 in currency; one (1)newspaper published about 1790, an heirloom; and certain otherproperty which plaintiff is now unable to describe."

"That said property is being unlawfully and improperly

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held by said district attorney, marshal, and clerk, in violationof defendant's rights under the Constitution of the United Statesand the state of Missouri."

"That said district attorney purposes to use said books,letters, papers, certificates of stock, etc., at the trial of theabove-entitled cause, and that, by reason thereof and of the factsabove set forth, defendant's rights under the amendments aforesaidto the Constitutions of Missouri and the United States have beenand will be violated unless the court order the return prayedfor;"

"Wherefore, defendant prays that said district attorney,marshal, and clerk be notified, and that the court direct and ordersaid district attorney, marshal, and clerk, to return said propertyto said defendant."

Upon consideration of the petition, the court entered in thecause an order directing the return of such property as was notpertinent to the charge against the defendant, but denied thepetition as to pertinent matter, reserving the right to pass uponthe pertinency at a later time. In obedience to the order, thedistrict attorney returned part of the property taken and retainedthe remainder, concluding a list of the latter with the statementthat

"all of which last above described property is to be used inevidence in the trial of the above-entitled cause, and pertains tothe alleged sale of lottery tickets of the company abovenamed."

After the jury had been sworn and before any evidence had beengiven, the defendant again urged his petition for the return of hisproperty, which was denied by the court. Upon the introduction ofsuch papers during the trial, the defendant objected on the groundthat the papers had been obtained without a search warrant, and bybreaking open his home, in violation of the 4th and FifthAmendments to the Constitution of the United States, whichobjection was overruled by the court. Among the papers retained andput in evidence were a number of

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lottery tickets and statements with reference to the lottery,taken at the first visit of the police to the defendant's room, anda number of letters written to the defendant in respect to thelottery, taken by the marshal upon his search of defendant'sroom.

The defendant assigns error, among other things, in the court'srefusal to grant his petition for the return of his property, andin permitting the papers to be used at the trial.

It is thus apparent that the question presented involves thedetermination of the duty of the court with reference to the motionmade by the defendant for the return of certain letters, as well asother papers, taken from his room by the United States marshal,who, without authority of process, if any such could have beenlegally issued, visited the room of the defendant for the declaredpurpose of obtaining additional testimony to support the chargeagainst the accused, and, having gained admission to the house,took from the drawer of a chiffonier there found certain letterswritten to the defendant, tending to show his guilt. These letterswere placed in the control of the district attorney, and weresubsequently produced by him and offered in evidence against theaccused at the trial. The defendant contends that suchappropriation of his private correspondence was in violation ofrights secured to him by the 4th and Fifth Amendments to theConstitution of the United States. We shall deal with the 4thAmendment, which provides:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but uponprobable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularlydescribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things tobe seized."

The history of this Amendment is given with particularity in theopinion of Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for

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the court inBoyd v. United States,116 U.S. 616. As was there shown, it took its origin in thedetermination of the framers of the Amendments to the FederalConstitution to provide for that instrument a Bill of Rights,securing to the American people, among other things, thosesafeguards which had grown up in England to protect the people fromunreasonable searches and seizures, such as were permitted underthe general warrants issued under authority of the government, bywhich there had been invasions of the home and privacy of thecitizens, and the seizure of their private papers in support ofcharges, real or imaginary, make against them. Such practices hadalso received sanction under warrants and seizures under theso-called writs of assistance, issued in the American colonies.See 2 Watson, Const. 1414et seq. Resistance tothese practices had established the principle which was enactedinto the fundamental law in the Fourth Amendment, that a man'shouse was his castle, and not to be invaded by any generalauthority to search and seize his goods and papers. Judge Cooley,in his Constitutional Limitations, pp. 425, 426, in treating ofthis feature of our Constitution said:

"The maxim that 'every man's house is his castle' is made a partof our constitutional law in the clauses prohibiting unreasonablesearches and seizures, and has always been looked upon as of highvalue to the citizen."

"Accordingly," says Lieber in his work on Civil Liberty andSelf-Government, 62, in speaking of the English law in thisrespect,

"no man's house can be forcibly opened, or he or his goods becarried away after it has thus been forced, except in cases offelony; and then the sheriff must be furnished with a warrant, andtake great care lest he commit a trespass. This principle isjealously insisted upon."

InEx parte Jackson,96 U. S. 727,96 U. S. 733,this court recognized the principle of protection as applicable toletters and sealed packages in the mail, and held that,consistently

Page 232 U. S. 391

with this guaranty of the right of the people to be secure intheir papers against unreasonable searches and seizures, suchmatter could only be opened and examined upon warrants issued onoath or affirmation, particularly describing the thing to beseized, "as is required when papers are subjected to search inone's own household."

In theBoyd case,supra, after citing LordCamden's judgment inEntick v. Carrington, 19 Howell'sState Trials 1029, Mr. Justice Bradley said (630):

"The principles laid down in this opinion affect the veryessence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach fartherthan the concrete form of the case then before the court, with itsadventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the partof the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's homeand the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors andthe rummaging of his drawers that constitutes the essence of theoffense, but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right ofpersonal security, personal liberty, and private property, wherethat right has never been forfeited by his conviction of somepublic offense -- it is the invasion of this sacred right whichunderlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden'sjudgment."

InBram v. United States,168 U.S. 532, this court, in speaking by the present ChiefJustice ofBoyd's Case, dealing with the Fourth and FifthAmendments, said (544):

"It was in that case demonstrated that both of these Amendmentscontemplated perpetuating, in their full efficacy, by means of aconstitutional provision, principles of humanity and civil libertywhich had been secured in the mother country only after years ofstruggle, so as to implant them in our institutions in the fullnessof their integrity, free from the possibilities of futurelegislative change."

The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts

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of the United States and Federal officials, in the exercise oftheir power and authority, under limitations and restraints as tothe exercise of such power and authority, and to forever secure thepeople, their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against allunreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law. Thisprotection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, andthe duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon allintrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of thelaws. The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of thecountry to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures andenforced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjectingaccused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rightssecured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in thejudgments of the courts, which are charged at all times with thesupport of the Constitution, and to which people of all conditionshave a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamentalrights.

What, then, is the present case? Before answering that inquiryspecifically, it may be well, by a process of exclusion, to statewhat it is not. It is not an assertion of the right on the part ofthe government always recognized under English and American law tosearch the person of the accused when legally arrested, to discoverand seize the fruits or evidences of crime. This right has beenuniformly maintained in many cases. 1 Bishop.Criminal Procedure §211; Wharton, Crim. Plead. & Practice 8th ed. § 60;Dillonv. O'Brien, 16 Cox C.C. 245. Nor is it the case of testimonyoffered at a trial where the court is asked to stop and considerthe illegal means by which proofs, otherwise competent, wereobtained -- of which we shall have occasion to treat later in thisopinion. Nor is it the case of burglar's tools or other proofs ofguilt found upon his arrest within the control of the accused.

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The case in the aspect in which we are dealing with it involvesthe right of the court in a criminal prosecution to retain for thepurposes of evidence the letters and correspondence of the accused,seized in his house in his absence and without his authority, by aUnited States marshal holding no warrant for his arrest and nonefor the search of his premises. The accused, without awaiting histrial, made timely application to the court for an order for thereturn of these letters, as well or other property. Thisapplication was denied, the letters retained and put in evidence,after a further application at the beginning of the trial, bothapplications asserting the rights of the accused under the Fourthand Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. If letters and privatedocuments can thus be seized and held and used in evidence againsta citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the FourthAmendment, declaring his right to be secure against such searchesand seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed areconcerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. Theefforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty topunishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by thesacrifice of those great principles established be years ofendeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment inthe fundamental law of the land. The United States marshal couldonly have invaded the house of the accused when armed with awarrant issued as required by the Constitution, upon sworninformation, and describing with reasonable particularity the thingfor which the search was to be made. Instead, he acted withoutsanction of law, doubtless prompted by the desire to bring furtherproof to the aid of the government, and, under color of his office,undertook to make a seizure of private papers in direct violationof the constitutional prohibition against such action. Under suchcircumstances, without sworn information and particulardescription, not even an order of court would

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have justified such procedure; much less was it within theauthority of the United States marshal to thus invade the house andprivacy of the accused. InAdams v. New York,192 U.S. 585, this court said that the Fourth Amendment wasintended to secure the citizen in person and property againstunlawful invasion of the sanctity of his home by officers of thelaw, acting under legislative or judicial sanction. This protectionis equally extended to the action of the government and officers ofthe law acting under it. (Boyd Case, supra) To sanctionsuch proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifestneglect, if not an open defiance, of the prohibitions of theConstitution, intended for the protection of the people againstsuch unauthorized action.

The court before which the application was made in this caserecognized the illegal character of the seizure, and ordered thereturn of property not in its judgment competent to be offered atthe trial, but refused the application of the accused to turn overthe letters, which were afterwards put in evidence on behalf of thegovernment. While there is no opinion in the case, the court inthis proceeding doubtless relied upon what is now contended by thegovernment to be the correct rule of law under such circumstances-- that the letters having come into the control of the court, itwould not inquire into the manner in which they were obtained, but,if competent, would keep them and permit their use in evidence.Such proposition, the government asserts, is conclusivelyestablished by certain decisions of this court, the first of whichisAdams v. New York, supra. In that case, the plaintiffin error had been convicted in the Supreme Court of the State ofNew York for having in his possession certain gamblingparaphernalia used in the game known as policy, in violation of thePenal Code of New York. At the trial, certain papers, which hadbeen seized by police officers executing a search warrant for thediscovery and

Page 232 U. S. 395

seizure of policy slips, and which had been found in addition tothe policy slips, were offered in evidence over his objection. Theconviction was affirmed by the court of appeals of New York (176N.Y. 351), and the case was brought here for alleged violation ofthe Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the UnitedStates. Pretermitting the question whether these Amendments appliedto the action of the states, this court proceeded to examine thealleged violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and put itsdecision upon the ground that the papers found in the execution ofthe search warrant, which warrant had a legal purpose in theattempt to find gambling paraphernalia, was competent evidenceagainst the accused, and their offer in testimony did not violatehis constitutional privilege against unlawful search or seizure,for is was held that such incriminatory documents thus discoveredwere not the subject of an unreasonable search and seizure, and, ineffect, that the same were incidentally seized in the lawfulexecution of a warrant, and not in the wrongful invasion of thehome of a citizen and the unwarranted seizure of his papers andproperty. It was further held, approving in that respect thedoctrine laid down in 1 Greenleaf, § 254a, that it was no validobjection to the use of the papers that they had been thus seized,and that the courts in the course of a trial would not make anissue to determine that question, and many state cases were citedsupporting that doctrine.

The same point had been ruled inPeople v. Adams, 176N.Y. 351, from which decision the case was brought to this court,where it was held that if the papers seized in addition to thepolicy slips were competent evidence in the case, as the court heldthey were, they were admissible in evidence at the trial, the courtsaying (p. 358):

"The underlying principle obviously is that the court, whenengaged in trying a criminal cause, will not take notice of

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the manner in which witnesses have possessed themselves ofpapers or other articles of personal property which are materialand properly offered in evidence."

This doctrine thus laid down by the New York Court of Appealsand approved by this Court, that a court will not, in trying acriminal cause, permit a collateral issue to be raised as to thesource of competent testimony, has the sanction of so many statecases that it would be impracticable to cite or refer to them indetail. Many of them are collected in the note toState v.Turner, 136 Am. St. Rep. 129, 135et seq. Afterciting numerous cases, the editor says:

"The underlying principle of all these decisions obviously isthat the court, when engaged in the trial of a criminal action,will not take notice of the manner in which a witness has possessedhimself of papers or other chattels, subjects of evidence which arematerial and properly offered in evidence.People v. Adams,supra. Such an investigation is not involved necessarily inthe litigation in chief, and to pursue it would be to halt in theorderly progress of a cause, and consider incidentally a questionwhich has happened to cross the path of such litigation, and whichis wholly independent thereof."

It is therefore evident that theAdams Case affords noauthority for the action of the court in this case, when applied toin due season for the return of papers seized in violation of theConstitutional Amendment. The decision in that case rests uponincidental seizure made in the execution of a legal warrant, and inthe application of the doctrine that a collateral issue will not beraised to ascertain the source from which testimony, competent in acriminal case, comes.

The government also relies uponHale v. Henkel,201 U. S. 43, inwhich the previous cases ofBoyd v. United States, Adams v. NewYork, supra;154 U. S. S.397� Commerce Commission v. Brimson,154 U.S. 447, and Interstate Commerce Commission v.Baird,194 U. S. 25, arereviewed, and wherein it was held that a subpoena duces tecum@requiring a corporation to produce all its contracts andcorrespondence with no less than six other companies, as well asall letters received by the corporation from thirteen othercompanies, located in different parts of the United States, was anunreasonable search and seizure within the Fourth Amendment, and itwas there stated that (201 U.S. p.201 U. S.76)

"an order for the production of books and papers may constitutean unreasonable search and seizure within the Fourth Amendment.While a search ordinarily implies a quest by an officer of the law,and a seizure contemplates a forcible dispossession of the owner,still, as was held in theBoyd Case, the substance of theoffense is the compulsory production of private papers, whetherunder a search warrant or a subpoenaduces tecum, againstwhich the person, be he individual or corporation, is entitled toprotection."

If such a seizure under the authority of a warrant supposed tobe legal constitutes a violation of the constitutional protection,a fortiori does the attempt of an officer of the UnitedStates, the United States marshal, acting under color of hisoffice, without even the sanction of a warrant, constitute aninvasion of the rights within the protection afforded by the FourthAmendment.

Another case relied upon isAmerican Tobacco Co. v.Werckmeister,207 U. S. 284, inwhich it was held that the seizure by the United States marshal ina copyright case of certain pictures under a writ of replevin didnot constitute an unreasonable search and seizure. The other casefrom this court relied upon isHolt v. United States,218 U. S. 245, inwhich it was held that testimony tending to show that a certainblouse which was in evidence as incriminating him, had been putupon the prisoner, and fitted him, did not violate hisconstitutional right. We

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are at a loss to see the application of these cases to the onein hand.

The right of the court to deal with papers and documents in thepossession of the district attorney and other officers of thecourt, and subject to its authority, was recognized inWise v.Henkel,220 U. S. 556.That papers wrongfully seized should be turned over to the accusedhas been frequently recognized in the early, as well as later,decisions of the courts. 1 Bishop on Criminal Procedure § 210;Rex v. Barnett, 3 C. & P. 600;Rex v. Kinsey,7 C. & P. 447;United States v. Mills, 185 Fed. 318;United States v. McHie, 194 Fed. 894, 898.

We therefore reach the conclusion that the letters in questionwere taken from the house of the accused by an official of theUnited States, acting under color of his office, in directviolation of the constitutional rights of the defendant; that,having made a seasonable application for their return, which washeard and passed upon by the court, there was involved in the orderrefusing the application a denial of the constitutional rights ofthe accused, and that the court should have restored these lettersto the accused. In holding them and permitting their use upon thetrial, we think prejudicial error was committed. As to the papersand property seized by the policemen, it does not appear that theyacted under any claim of Federal authority such as would make theamendment applicable to such unauthorized seizures. The recordshows that what they did by way of arrest and search and seizurewas done before the finding of the indictment in the Federal court-- under what supposed right or authority does not appear. Whatremedies the defendant may have against them we need not inquire,as the Fourth Amendment is not directed to individual misconduct ofsuch officials. Its limitations reach the Federal government andits agencies.Boyd case, 116 U.S.,supra, and seeTwining v. New Jersey,211 U. S. 78

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It results that the judgment of the court below must bereversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings inaccordance with this opinion.

Reversed.